Internal Controls Over Voyager Card Transactions – Petaluma – Casa Grande Station
Background
The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) uses data analytics, including predictive risk models and tripwires, to identify financial anomalies. Tripwires are analytic tools that look at specific behaviors and patterns that are strong indicators of improper activity. The Voyager credit card tripwire identified purchases made outside of the OIG-defined normal workhours (7 a.m. - 5 p.m.) at the Petaluma-Casa Grande, CA, Station. These types of purchases are considered suspicious and could indicate ineffective internal controls.
Every Postal Service-owned vehicle is assigned a Voyager card and every driver receives a personal identification number (PIN). The card is used to pay for fuel, oil, and routine vehicle maintenance. Site managers are responsible for verifying Voyager card transactions and all supporting documentation.
The objectives of this audit were to review the validity of transactions outside of normal workhours and assess the internal controls over the Voyager card at the Petaluma-Casa Grande Station.
What the OIG Found
The Voyager card tripwire identified 47 of 205 (23 percent) purchases outside of normal work hours. However, we reviewed supporting documentation and found:
- Eighteen transactions occurred outside of normal workhours; however, the purchases were valid fuel purchases.
- Thirteen transactions did not occur outside of normal workhours and were valid fuel purchases.
- Sixteen transactions were missing receipts. Therefore we could not determine the validity of these transactions. We referred the information to the OIG’s Office of Investigations for further review.
In addition, we determined internal controls over Voyager card transactions needed improvement. Specifically, the designees responsible for oversight of the program did not:
- Require receipts or other documentation to explain missing receipts for 61 of 205 (30 percent) transactions, valued at $1,573. These included purchases made after normal workhours.
- Actively monitor driver PINs. For example, he did not immediately deactivate four PINs assigned to drivers no longer working at the site, and two drivers had more than one PIN assigned to them.
Also, 198 transactions valued at $5,200 were made using a former site manager’s PIN. We reviewed receipts for 127 transactions within our scope of review and determined all transactions were for fuel. However, there were 71 transactions with missing receipts or outside our scope of review. These transactions were referred to the OIG’s Office of Investigations for further review.
When internal controls are not in place and functioning, Voyager card holders may misuse the card to make unauthorized or improper purchases. Further, the practice of sharing PINs inhibits accountability of purchases by driver making it more difficult for site managers or their designees to identify unauthorized use.
As a result of this audit, management appointed and trained a site manager to oversee the Voyager card program. Also, management deactivated all PINs assigned to employees no longer working at the site.
What the OIG Recommended
We recommended management establish controls to ensure the newly appointed site manager follows Voyager card standard operating procedures for missing receipts.