Mail Theft Mitigation and Response: Las Vegas, NV

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-101-R26 | September 30, 2026

Table of Contents

Cover
Transmittal Letter 1
Results 2
- Background 2
- Findings Summary 3
- Finding # 1: Arrow and MAL Key Accountability 4
  - Recommendation #1 9
  - Recommendation #2 9
  - Postal Service Response 9
  - OIG Evaluation 9
- Finding #2: Collection Box Reviews 10
  - Recommendation #3 13
  - Recommendation #4 13
  - Recommendation #5 13
  - Postal Service Response 13
  - OIG Evaluation 13

Appendices 14
- Appendix A: Additional Information 15
  - Scope and Methodology 15
  - Prior Audit Coverage 16
- Appendix B: Management's Comments 17

Contact Information 21

Transmittal Letter

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

September 30, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR: ELVIN MERCADO
CHIEF RETAIL AND DELIVERY OFFICER AND
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

DON KRAVOS
DISTRICT MANAGER, NV-UT DISTRICT

FROM: Jan E. Hamm
Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Field Operations

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Mail Theft Mitigation and Response: Las Vegas, NV
(Report Number 26-101-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit, Mail Theft Mitigation and Response: Las Vegas, NV.

All recommendations require U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General's (OIG) concurrence before closure. Consequently, the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. All recommendations should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact John Littlejohn, Director, Mail Safety and Security or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Corporate Audit and Response Management

Results

Background

This report presents the results of our audit of Mail Theft Mitigation and Response at the Meadow Mesa and Westridge Post Offices in the Las Vegas, NV, area (Project Number 26-101). These sites are in the Nevada-Utah (NV-UT) District of the Retail and Delivery Operations, WestPac Area. Our objective was to assess the U.S. Postal Service's actions taken to mitigate and respond to mail theft at selected facilities in Las Vegas, NV. See Appendix A for additional information about this audit.

The U.S. Postal Service's mission is to provide the nation with trusted, safe, and secure communications and mail services. In fiscal year (FY) 2025, Las Vegas, NV, facilities processed almost 1.8 billion mailpieces. Unfortunately, these operations continue to be disrupted due to mail theft. Mail theft occurs in various ways such as individuals using stolen universal keys — called arrow keys — to access collection boxes, outdoor parcel lockers, cluster box units (CBU), and apartment panels. Additionally, mail theft occurs when individuals fish[1] or break into collection boxes with force, and through residential mailbox break-ins, package theft, and carrier robberies.

Concerns about how the Postal Service prevents and responds to mail theft frequently appear in the media and have been a topic of congressional hearings and inquiries sent to the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG). News articles have also highlighted carrier robberies and theft from blue collection boxes and CBUs nationally, which have included customers' credit cards, checks, and social security benefits.

Mail Theft Prevention Efforts

In May 2023, the Postal Service and U.S. Postal Inspection Service announced a joint initiative called Project Safe Delivery to combat the rise in mail theft and carrier robberies. Included in this initiative were new prevention efforts designed to reduce mail theft such as high security collection boxes (HSCB),[2] electronic arrow locks (eLock),[3] and modified arrow lock (MAL)[4] keys specifically in areas determined to have high incidents of mail theft. In January 2024, the Postal Service announced the "Go Forward Plan," which included the deployment of high security electronic locks (HSEL)[5] in select cities.

Nationally, as of January 2026, the Postal Service had installed about 24,000 HSCBs and 47,362 eLocks, as we reported in our May 2026 mail theft response follow-up report.[6] As of May 2026, in Las Vegas, NV, the Postal Service had installed 127 HSCBs and 262 eLocks but had not installed any HSELs.

Mail Theft Complaints in Las Vegas, NV

The Postal Inspection Service, which is the federal law enforcement arm of the Postal Service, uses an internal database[7] to retain and review complaints related to mail theft, financial crimes, and other issues. It receives these complaints through a variety of sources such as phone calls, letter correspondence, the Postal Service's website,[8] and referrals made by federal, state, and local law enforcement agencies. Additionally, the Postal Service is required to timely report lost, missing, or stolen keys to the Postal Inspection Service. The Postal Inspection Service is then required to enter those keys within seven days of the reported loss into its internal database, the Case Management System (CMS). The Postal Inspection Service then compiles postal-related complaints alleging criminal conduct and lost/stolen arrow key data to identify target

1 Mail fishing is a scheme where criminals use a handmade tool to pull envelopes out of collection boxes.
2 The HSCB, compared to a standard blue collection box, has enhanced security features such as a narrow mail slot without the lever/door, finger rakes to deter mail fishing, and reinforced steel.
3 The eLocks add an extra layer of security by requiring dual authentication — [redacted] They are designed to deter counterfeiting of keys and are used in areas that sustain or are subject to high incidents of mail attacks or losses.
4 The MAL has a higher security cylinder for use in areas that sustain or are subject to high incidents of mail attacks or losses.
5 The HSEL is an improved version of the eLock designed to be useable for different types of mailboxes.
6 *Follow up to U.S. Postal Service's and U.S. Postal Inspection Service's Response to Mail Theft* (Report Number 25-137-R26, dated May 19, 2026).
7 Financial Crimes Database (FCD) is the system that houses complaints submitted to the Postal Inspection Service.
8 Customer 360, or C360, is the system that houses complaints submitted on the Postal Service's website.

areas at risk of mail theft. It shares this information with the Postal Service's Business and Consumer Technology and Delivery Operations groups to determine potential deployment locations for mail theft prevention initiatives.

From October 1, 2025, to March 31, 2026, customers submitted 1,077 mail theft-related complaints to the Postal Service in Las Vegas, NV, as shown in Figure 1.[9]

Figure 1. Customer Complaints From October 1, 2025, Through March 31, 2026



Source: Financial Crime Database (FCD) and OIG analysis.

During this timeframe, the Postal Inspection Service jacketed[10] six mail theft cases (including an identity mail theft case) in Las Vegas, NV. The Postal Inspection Service's efforts to prioritize mail theft investigations and customer complaints are key to addressing mail theft. Postal inspectors accept and review customer complaints about alleged mail theft, conduct investigations, and submit cases for prosecution.

Findings Summary

We found deficiencies in tracking, safeguarding, managing, and reporting of arrow and MAL keys at the two facilities we visited in the Las Vegas, NV, area. In addition, management did not conduct annual safety inspections that would help to ensure that blue collection box and collection box unit mail is secure.

9 Las Vegas, NV is ranked 8th out of 12,458 total locations nationwide with at least one mail theft-related complaint.
10 Cases are jacketed to document specific tasks in investigations conducted by the Inspection Service.

Finding # 1: Arrow and MAL Key Accountability

What We Found

The Meadow Mesa and Westridge Post Offices did not properly track and safeguard their daily arrow and MAL key[11] inventories. Specifically, key inventories at each facility were not accurately reported in Retail and Delivery Analytics and Reports (RADAR).[12]

Key Inventory Tracking

According to the June 2026 RADAR monthly arrow key certifications,[13] the Meadow Mesa and Westridge Post Offices had a combined total of 480 keys that facility management recorded as verified[14] and 499 recorded as not verified.[15] On June 23 and 24, 2026, we performed a physical inventory of the keys present at the Meadow Mesa and Westridge Post Offices and compared the results to the June 2026 RADAR monthly arrow key certification. We found deficiencies at both facilities.

For the 209 keys at the Meadow Mesa Post Office recorded as verified in RADAR, we found that 60 (29 percent) were missing, leaving mail receptacles across seven ZIP Codes in Las Vegas, NV, at risk for mail theft. At the Westridge Post Office, we identified that 35 of 271 (13 percent) keys were missing, leaving mail receptacles across six additional ZIP Codes in Las Vegas, NV, at risk for mail theft, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Keys Recorded as Verified in RADAR

Facility Name	Key Status	Keys Found	Keys Not Found	Totals
Meadow Mesa Post Office	In-Use	124	28	152
	In-Vault	24	32	56
	Damaged	1		1
	Subtotal	149	60	209
Westridge Post Office	In-Use	212	34	246
	In-Vault	24	1	125
	Subtotal	236	35	271
	Total	**385**	**95**	**480**

Source: OIG analysis based on observations and reviews of June 2026 Monthly RADAR certifications.

For the 329 keys at the Meadow Mesa Post Office recorded as not verified in RADAR, we found 29 (9 percent) keys on-site. At the Westridge Post Office, we found 13 of the 170 (8 percent) keys on-site that were recorded as not verified. However, 300 of the 329 keys (91 percent) at the Meadow Mesa Post Office and 157 of the 170 keys (92 percent) at the Westridge Post Office were not found on-site despite remaining on the inventory, as shown in Table 2.

11 The word "key" will refer to Arrow and MAL keys throughout the report.
12 The Postal Service's RADAR system provides a national platform of current inventory of arrow and MAL keys at all facilities.
13 In FY 2023, the Postal Service began requiring facilities to complete monthly and semi-annual arrow key certifications, which are conducted by the installation head (or designee) to validate and maintain all key accountability and proper reporting.
14 Verified means the keys were physically confirmed against the current inventory. Facility management selects "Yes" in the verified column when completing the monthly and semi-annual RADAR arrow key certifications.
15 Not verified is when facility management selects "No" in the verified column when completing the monthly and semi-annual RADAR arrow key certifications.

Table 2. Keys Recorded as Not Verified in RADAR

Facility Name	Inventory Key Status	Keys Found	Keys Not Found	Totals
Meadow Mesa Post Office	Code or Serial Number Incorrect	12	91	103
	Damaged	13	200	213
	Lost	3	2	5
	Not At This Office	1	2	3
	Stolen		4	4
	Taken by USPIS		1	1
	Subtotal	29	300	329
Westridge Post Office	Code or Serial Number Incorrect	1	14	15
	Damaged	7	78	85
	Duplicate		4	4
	Lost	3	59	62
	Returned	2	2	4
	Subtotal	13	157	170
	Total	**42**	**457**	**499**

Source: OIG analysis based on observations and reviews of June 2026 Monthly RADAR Certifications.

Also, we observed a combined total of 183 additional keys in the registry cage that were not recorded in RADAR, including 126 keys at the Meadow Mesa and 57 keys at the Westridge Post Offices. Further, 21 of the keys we observed on-site, including 18 at Meadow Mesa Post Office and three at Westridge Post Office, were damaged but had not been sent to the National Material Customer Service (NMCS)[16] help desk, as required. We also observed one key and its duplicate at the Westridge Post Office —both keys were found in the registry cage and in use.

Additionally, we found that local post office management did not always update RADAR to reflect the correct key status for the keys we observed at both facilities. Specifically, 53 of the 178 (30 percent) keys we found at the Meadow Mesa Post Office and 40 of the 249 (16 percent) keys we found at the Westridge Post Office had an inaccurate key status recorded in RADAR, as shown in Table 3.

16 The National Material Customer Service is responsible for receiving and returning damaged arrow keys to the vendor.

Table 3. Keys With Inaccurate Key Use Status in RADAR

Facility and RADAR Recorded Status	OIG Physical Observation - Key Status			Totals
	Damaged	In-Use	New Keys (Not in Use and in Registry Cage)	
Meadow Mesa Post Office				
Code or Serial Number Incorrect	1	8	3	**12**
Damaged		9		**9**
In-Use	4			**4**
In-Vault	1	22	1	**24**
Lost		3		**3**
Not At This Office		1		**1**
Subtotal	6	43	4	**53**
Westridge Post Office				
Code or Serial Number Incorrect		1		**1**
Damaged		7		**7**
In-Use	3			**3**
In-Vault		24		**24**
Lost		3		**3**
Returned		2		**2**
Subtotal	3	37		**40**
Total	**9**	**80**	**4**	**93**

Source: OIG analysis based on observations and reviews of June 2026 Monthly RADAR Certifications.

Safeguarding Keys

We found that Meadow Mesa and Westridge Post Office management did not properly safeguard all their arrow keys in accordance with Postal Service policy. Management at both post offices used different methods to document arrow key accountability and neither used the standard form required by Postal Service policy.[17] Specifically, the Meadow Mesa Post Office used a form that appeared to have been internally created as shown in Figure 2 to track when keys are issued to carriers. Although required to follow the 24-hour arrow key accountability process as a designated Tier 1 facility,[18] Westridge Post Office management implemented a manual process but used an incorrect postal form as shown in Figure 3. In both cases, the forms used were incomplete and did not accurately reflect the status of the arrow and MAL keys.

17 Arrow Key Guidebook, Standard Work Instructions Updated: March 2025, Page 7, Employee Duties and Responsibilities states "For all Arrow/MAL keys, employees must sign out using PS Form 1106, Arrow Key- Daily Accountable Log, use key check if applicable, or perform electronic equivalent."
18 Tier 1 is a category of postal units that falls under the jurisdiction of the highest-level postmaster.

Figure 2. Incorrect Key Check-In/Check-Out Form at Meadow Mesa



Source: OIG photograph taken on June 24, 2026.

Figure 3. Incorrect Key Check-In/Check-Out Form at Westridge



Source: OIG photograph taken on June 23, 2026

In addition, at the Meadow Mesa Post Office, two missing keys were found by management in postal vehicles during our audit. Further, at the Westridge Post Office we found keys in a registry cage. However, while the keys were secured in a registry cage that was locked when we first arrived, the cage remained open all morning. We observed multiple carriers enter the cage and manually sign out their keys without any oversight.

Reporting Lost or Stolen Keys

Local management reported 71 lost and stolen keys from the Meadow Mesa and Westridge Post Offices on its June 2026 RADAR inventory certification. However, local management was unable to confirm whether the lost and stolen keys were reported to the Postal Inspection Service. We inquired with Postal Inspection Service managers having oversight of the stations and confirmed that they had not received reports of lost or stolen keys from the Meadow Mesa or Westridge Post Offices since January 2025. Specifically, local management at both facilities did not document the Computer Aided Dispatch (CAD) Number in RADAR, which is issued by the Postal Inspection Service and used to track the status of reported keys. In addition, while all 71 keys were recorded as not verified in the June RADAR monthly inventory, we found six of the keys still in use at the facilities. Specifically, we found three keys reported as lost in the registry at Meadow Mesa Post Office, and three keys reported as lost in the registry at Westridge Post Office.

Response to Postal Inspection Service Key Audits

Postal Inspection Service Phoenix Division personnel perform periodic key audits at select facilities. After completing the audits, it issues 30-day letters to facility management that outline deficiencies identified, applicable guidance, and related recommendations. It also requests that facility management describe any actions or intended actions to correct the deficiencies identified during the reviews. During FY 2025 and FY 2026, the Postal Inspection Service told us that it completed 11 key audits in the Phoenix division (which includes Las Vegas, NV), however it did not complete an audit of the Meadow Mesa or Westridge Post Offices. Also, Postal Inspection Service management stated that it does not have a lot of recourse to enforce its audit recommendations.

Why Did It Occur

Local and district management did not provide sufficient oversight of the daily accountability, safeguarding, and key certification process. Additionally, managers and supervisors responsible for daily arrow key accountability at both facilities were unaware of the training, and at the time of our visit, not all employees assigned the training had completed the required annual Daily Arrow Key Accountability training for FY 2026.[19]

Local management did not always reconcile, add, or update key statuses during monthly and semi-annual key certifications. Specifically, Meadow Mesa Post Office management stated that it reviewed a sample of keys during monthly and semi-annual key certifications and does not add new keys into RADAR until they are issued to the carriers. Also, management did not update the status of damaged keys from "damaged" to "returned"[20] once the keys are returned to NMCS. Westridge Post Office management had an unused and outdated barcode book but were aware that the 24-hour arrow key accountability process should be used.

Additionally, during our site visit, neither facility had a dedicated clerk to sign keys in and out to the carriers. Meadow Mesa Post Office management stated that it did not assign a dedicated clerk to sign out keys. Instead, it positioned the cart containing the keys near the supervisors' desks and allowed the carriers to sign out the keys themselves. Westridge Post Office management noted that it typically rotates clerks to manage the key process, however, management stated that it was short staffed the day of our visit. In addition, Meadow Mesa Post Office management was aware of the (PS) Form 1106, Arrow-Key-Daily Accountability Log; however, could not explain why it was not used to account for the keys.

Further, while management at both facilities acknowledged the requirement to send damaged keys to NMCS, Meadow Mesa Post Office management stated that it collects and holds damaged keys until it has several to return at once. Also, management at both facilities was either not trained in the process of reporting lost or stolen keys in RADAR to the Postal Inspection Service or unaware if the reporting had been completed.

In addition, the NV-UT district management did not have a process in place for the reconciliation of the key inventories that would allow for keys that are no longer in physical inventory to be removed from RADAR.[21] Specifically, some key line items remained in inventory when there were no keys in physical inventory.

What Should Have Happened

In March 2025, Postal Service Headquarters management updated its arrow key procedures[22] that included standard work instructions for arrow and MAL key accountability and the 24-hour arrow key accountability process. According to the procedures, local management is required to complete the assigned training[23] and follow Postal Service policy for accountability and safeguarding of key inventory. Specifically, the process requires local management to maintain accurate inventory and secure control over keys. Key accountability should be carried out according to the 24-hour arrow key accountability guidance,[24] or if issues arise, management should revert to the manual process using the PS Form 1106 for the daily key check-in/check-out. Local management should report lost or stolen keys immediately to the Postal Inspection Service and document them in RADAR. It should also notify the Postal Inspection Service immediately if these lost or stolen keys are found or returned.

19 National Training is called the Daily Arrow Key Accountability (Course Number 2024DLOP6468VO01).
20 *USPS Arrow Key Guidebook Standards Work Instructions Updated: March 2025* – Page 31.
21 OIG also observed this during another audit, *Mail Theft Mitigation and Response: Seattle, WA* (Project Number 26-100).
22 *USPS Arrow Key Guidebook Standard Work Instructions Updated: March 2025.*
23 The Learning Management System enables employees to complete training activities. The user-friendly platform enables quick navigation and access to search for self-development resources, take assigned training, and view learning transcripts, including active, completed, and archived training.
24 See Figure 4, *Follow Up to U.S. Postal Service's and U.S. Postal Inspection Service's Response to Mail Theft* (Report Number 25-137-R26, dated May 19, 2026).

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there is insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items and key inventory is not accurately maintained and properly reported, there is an increased risk of lost or stolen keys. Because keys open mailboxes across an entire area or ZIP Code, unaccounted keys can result in mail theft or the inability to collect or deliver mail. This may damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system.

Recommendation #1

We recommend the **NV-UT District Manager** establish internal controls to ensure that all keys are accurately recorded in the Retail and Delivery Analytics and Reports system and, when necessary, returned to the National Materials Customer Service, and/or reported to the Postal Inspection Service for the Westridge and Meadow Mesa Post Offices.

Recommendation #2

We recommend the **NV-UT District Manager** establish internal controls to verify that appropriate personnel complete the Daily Arrow Key Accountability Training annually and facilities are following the 24-hour arrow key accountability process for city routes at Tier 1 facilities, or using the Postal Service Form 1106, as required.

Postal Service Response

Management agreed with finding 1 and recommendations 1 and 2.

Regarding recommendation 1, management stated that it established internal controls to ensure that all keys are accurately recorded in the RADAR system, returned to the NMCS, and/or reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, when necessary. Management also stated that it will conduct unit reviews to ensure compliance. The target implementation date is November 30, 2026.

Regarding recommendation 2, management stated that it developed internal controls to verify that appropriate personnel complete the Daily Arrow Key Accountability Annual training, adding that 100 percent of NV-UT District personnel completed the training. Management also stated that it established verifications to ensure that Tier 1 facilities use either the 24-hour arrow key accountability process or Postal Service Form 1106. The target implementation date is November 30, 2026.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to recommendations 1 and 2 as corrective actions should resolve the issues identified in the report.

Finding #2: Collection Box Reviews

What We Found

We found that [redacted] management did not take steps to properly safeguard the mail when customers deposited it in Postal Service collection boxes.

We reviewed a total of 20 mail receptacles in Las Vegas, NV, including five blue collection boxes, of which three were jumbo snorkel boxes (as shown in Figure 4), and 15 were CBUs.[25] We identified one jumbo snorkel box that had visible damage. Specifically, one collection box located outside of the [redacted] was vandalized to allow mail to be removed as also shown in Figure 4.

Figure 4. Jumbo Snorkel Box With Damaged Snorkel

Source: OIG photographs taken at [redacted] on June 25, 2026, demonstrating how someone can reach into the mailbox through the snorkel.

Also, management stated that it had not collected the mail from the collection box the morning of our visit. [redacted] management stated that it collects mail from the box daily at 9 a.m. and 4:30 p.m. When the collection box was opened, we noted that the mail hamper inside was full of mail, possibly indicating significant customer use, as shown in Figure 5. We observed the station supervisor and an employee opening the collection box and removing a small parcel and a letter from behind the blocked mail in the finger rakes that prevented it from dropping fully into the collection box, as shown in Figure 6.

25 The collection boxes selected for review were based on customer complaint data and spread across several ZIP Codes in the Las Vegas, NV, area. The sample selection included collection boxes managed by other post offices. The damaged box was managed by the [redacted].

Figure 5. Employee Removing Collection Box Hamper With Mail

Source: OIG photograph taken at [redacted] on June 25, 2026.

Figure 6. Small Parcel and Flat Letter Stuck in Finger Rakes

Source: OIG photograph taken at [redacted] on June 25, 2026.

[redacted] management noted that vandalism is an ongoing issue and stated that it has submitted repeated Field Maintenance Operations (FMO) requests for repair of this box. Further, the Postal Inspection Service previously advised [redacted] management to purchase a new snorkel box. [redacted] management was unable to provide documentation regarding the requests, and FMO management confirmed that it had not received a repair or replacement request regarding collection boxes from the [redacted] location since February 2026.[26]

While we did not observe any damage to any of the CBUs we observed, Meadow Mesa Post Office management discussed CBU vandalism and the amount of mail theft complaints in the Las Vegas area. Between October 1, 2025, and March 31, 2026, customers submitted 1,077 mail theft-related complaints to the Postal Service in Las Vegas, NV. Some complaints in the Las Vegas area were related to broken CBU locks. For instance, Meadow Mesa Post Office management noted that it has experienced an increased number of customer requests for lock replacements. As a result of the customer requests, the NV-UT district replaced 23,595 locks between October 1, 2025, and July 27, 2026.[27] Including those locks replaced in the NV-UT district, the Postal Service replaced a total of 358,566 locks nationwide during the same period.

We found that no process was in place to determine whether the costs of such lock replacements are covered by the Postal Service or its customers. Therefore, management could not determine its total lock replacement expenses for the broken CBU locks that occurred due to vandalization, and it was not consistently charging customers for lock replacements.

Why Did It Occur

[redacted] management was unaware of the requirement to conduct an annual inspection of the blue collection boxes. Also, management did not have sufficient internal controls to ensure that the

26 The Financial Management Office system does not maintain records beyond six months of the current date.
27 This includes CBUs, Arrow, MAL, and eLocks.

mail was collected timely from the collection box or followed up on prior FMO requests for collection box repair or replacement.

The Postal Service could not determine its total lock replacement expenses because management does not consistently apply its national policy regarding responsibility for customer CBU lock replacement. Postal Service policy does not specifically address lock replacements resulting from vandalism or mail theft. We did not identify internal controls in place that would help govern consistent application of lock replacement fees.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy states that collection and relay boxes must have a uniform appearance and be maintained in good condition. Policy also states that supervisors must conduct annual safety inspections on all collection boxes, remove any defective box from service for immediate repair, and maintain a log detailing the dates and results of the inspections.[28]

The mail should have been collected from the box based on the scheduled collection times posted on the box at 8:30 a.m., 12:30 p.m., 4 p.m., and 5 p.m., Monday through Saturday, as shown in Figure 7, rather than only twice a day at 9 a.m. and 4:30 p.m.

Regarding lock replacements, Postal Service policy for new developments — both residential and commercial — states that the builder or property owner is responsible for providing lock and key service for privately owned CBUs; the Postal Service furnishes the master access lock, and the local Growth Manager[29] coordinates installation of the lock.[30] For Postal Service owned CBUs, policy states that the Postal Service installs new locks at the customers' expense for lost keys.[31]

Figure 7. Collection Times for Jumbo Snorkel Box With Damaged Snorkel



Source: OIG photograph taken at [redacted] on June 25, 2026.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Without securing and collecting mail in a timely manner and ensuring damaged boxes are either repaired or removed, the Postal Service and its customers will continue to be at high risk for mail theft. These thefts damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system.

While the lock replacement costs — estimated at $50 per lock[32] — are generally passed on to Postal Service customers, this cost is not applied consistently nationwide. Should the Postal Service enact a standard lock replacement fee for customers, the fee would need to be coordinated with the Postal Service Pricing and Costing team and likely be subject to review by the Postal Regulatory Commission. From October 1, 2025, to July 27, 2026, the Postal Service replaced 23,595 locks in the NV-UT district, and we conservatively estimate the Postal Service potentially missed collecting as much as $1.2 million in revenue for those lock replacements. In addition, for the 334,971 other locks replaced nationally, we estimate additional potential missed revenue as much as $16.7 million related to lock replacements.

28 *Handbook EL-801, 3-3.6, Street Delivery and Collection Boxes*, July 2020.
29 A Growth Manager is a Postal Service employee assigned to help developers and builders with planning mail service for new developments.
30 *U.S. Postal Service National Delivery Planning Standards, A Guide for Builders and Developers*, Section 3.2 and 3.3 published 12/21/2017.
31 *Postal Operations Manual, Updated May 31, 2024*, Section 632.22(a) and (b) – Locks and Keys.
32 Repair technician hourly rates vary depending on the Postal Service district. Therefore, estimated increased revenue is based on a more conservative Postal Service management recommendation of $50 per lock.

Recommendation #3

We recommend that the **NV-UT District Manager** develop internal controls to ensure that the required annual safety inspections are completed and requests for collection box repairs or removals are coordinated with the District Field Maintenance Office.

Recommendation #4

We recommend that the **NV-UT District Manager** direct local management to take immediate action to address the condition of the [redacted] collection box and implement an ongoing schedule to monitor and verify adherence to posted collection times across the district.

Recommendation #5

We recommend the **Chief Retail and Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President** complete an analysis of U.S. Postal Service and customer fee responsibility to replace locks on U.S. Postal Service and privately owned cluster box units after mail theft and non-mail theft related incidents. Also, update policy accordingly and establish internal controls to ensure consistent application.

Postal Service Response

Management agreed with finding 2, recommendations 3, 4, and 5, and our monetary impact.

Regarding recommendation 3, management stated that it established internal controls to ensure that annual safety inspections are completed and collection box repair and removal requests are coordinated with the District Field Maintenance Office. The target implementation date is January 31, 2027.

Regarding recommendation 4, management stated that it replaced the [redacted] collection box on August 13, 2026, and it will implement a schedule to monitor and verify compliance with posted collection times across the district. The target implementation date is December 31, 2026.

Regarding recommendation 5, management stated that it will conduct a feasibility study to evaluate U.S. Postal Service and customer fee responsibility to replace locks on cluster box units. The study will evaluate whether the necessary policy changes can be implemented and whether a nationally consistent fee structure can be established. Management stated that it will determine the appropriate path forward based on the results of its study. The target implementation date is March 31, 2027.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to recommendations 3, 4, and 5 as corrective actions should resolve the issues identified in the report.

Appendices

Appendix A: Additional Information 15
Scope and Methodology 15
Prior Audit Coverage 16
Appendix B: Management's Comments 17



Appendix A: Additional Information

Scope and Methodology

The scope of our audit included a review of the Postal Service's processes and procedures for reporting and responding to mail theft, carrier robberies, key accountability, the physical condition of blue collection boxes, green relay boxes, and cluster box units, deployment of mail theft initiatives, and mail theft complaints received from October 1, 2025, through March 31, 2026, in Las Vegas, NV.

Based on information obtained from OIG staff and the number of customers' mail theft-related complaints submitted, we selected a sample of postal facilities, including Postal Service annex and delivery units and mail receptacles in Las Vegas, NV. To make our site selections, we considered data from C360 (customer complaints), Financial Crimes Database (FCD), and the OIG Hotline,[33] and we reviewed arrow key data from Arrow Key Hotline and Regional Intelligent Mail Server and Arrow Key Inventory from October 2025 to March 2026.

To accomplish our objective, we:

- Reviewed policies and procedures related to reporting and responding to mail theft, carrier robberies, arrow key accountability, and box condition and accountability.
- Assessed the deployment and installation of mail theft initiatives to include HSCBs and eLocks in Las Vegas, NV.
- Assessed the current and future pilots of HSEL deployments nationwide and in Las Vegas, NV.
- Performed arrow key and MAL key accountability reviews at the two sites in Las Vegas, NV.
- Performed physical condition reviews for blue collection boxes, green relay boxes, and cluster box units in the surrounding areas of the two sites in Las Vegas, NV.
- Interviewed Postal Service Headquarters, NV-UT District, and local management to understand roles and responsibilities for reporting mail theft, carrier robberies, missing, lost, or stolen arrow keys, key accountability, addressing physical conditions for blue collection boxes and cluster box units, and deployment of current and future mail theft initiatives.
- Interviewed Postal Inspection Service Headquarters and Las Vegas division management to understand roles and responsibilities for reporting, responding to, and tracking mail theft, carrier robberies, and missing, lost, or stolen keys.

We conducted this performance audit from June 2026 through September 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on September 9, 2026, and included their comments where appropriate.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of Postal Service internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following five components were significant to our audit objective: control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring.

33 Customers can access the OIG Hotline via https://hotlineform.uspsoig.gov/en-US/.

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to information and communication, control activities, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. Our recommendations, if implemented, should correct the weaknesses we identified.

We assessed the reliability of RADAR and FCD by performing tests for data completeness, reasonableness, accuracy, and validity. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Prior Audit Coverage

Report Title	Objective	Report Number	Final Report Date	Monetary Impact
Follow Up to U.S. Postal Service's and U.S. Postal Inspection Service's Response to Mail Theft	To evaluate the U.S. Postal Service's and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service's progress on its mail theft strategy, including actions taken in response to our September 28, 2023, report, U.S. Postal Service's Response to Mail Theft, (22-178-R23).	25-137-R26	5/29/2026	None
Mail Theft Mitigation and Response; Houston, TX	To assess the U.S. Postal Service's actions taken to mitigate and respond to mail theft at selected delivery facilities in Houston, TX.	25-023-R25	3/20/2025	None
Mail Theft Mitigation and Response: Sacramento, CA	To assess the U.S. Postal Service's actions taken to mitigate and respond to mail theft at selected delivery facilities in the Sacramento, CA area.	24-163-R25	3/20/2025	None
Mail Theft Mitigation and Response – Chicago, IL	To assess the U.S. Postal Service's actions taken to mitigate and respond to mail theft in Chicago, IL.	24-100-R24	9/18/2024	None
Mail Theft Mitigation and Response – San Francisco, CA	To assess the U.S. Postal Service's actions taken to mitigate and respond to mail theft in San Francisco, CA.	24-099-R24	8/30/2024	None
Mail Theft Mitigation and Response – Queens, NY	To assess the U.S. Postal Service's actions taken to mitigate and respond to mail theft in Queens, NY.	24-037-R24	5/21/2024	None
U.S. Postal Service's Response to Mail Theft	To evaluate the Postal Service's efforts to respond to mail theft.	22-178-R23	9/28/2023	$1,008,976

Appendix B: Management's Comments

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

September 23, 2026

VICTORIA SMITH
ACTING DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: *Mail Theft Mitigation and Response: Las Vegas, NV (26-101-DRAFT)*

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings and recommendations contained in the draft audit report, *Mail Theft Mitigation and Response: Las Vegas*

Management **agrees** with Finding #1: Arrow and MAL Key Accountability and Finding #2: Collection Box Reviews.

Management **agrees** with Monetary Impact for Recommendation #5.

Following are our comments on each of the five recommendations.

Recommendation 1:
We recommend the **NV-UT District Manager** establish internal controls to ensure that all keys are accurately recorded in the Retail and Delivery Analytics and Reports system and, when necessary, returned to the National Materials Customer Service, and/or reported to the Postal Inspection Service for the Westridge and Meadow Mesa Post Offices.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management **agrees** with this recommendation.

Internal controls have been established to ensure that all keys are accurately recorded in the Retail and Delivery Analytics and Reports (RADAR) system and, when necessary, returned to the National Materials Customer Service (NMCS), and/or reported to the Postal Inspection Service for the Westridge and Meadow Mesa Post Offices. Unit reviews will be conducted to ensure units are in compliance. Audit and abatements on key controls were finalized in Meadow Mesa 8/26/2026; and Audit and abatements on key controls were finalized in Westridge Station 9/3/2026.

Validation Audit will be conducted with MPOO and PCES Tier 1 PM to ensure controls have been adhered to that have been established.

Target Implementation Date: 11/30/2026

Responsible Official: Manager, Postmaster, MPOO, and PCES PM

Recommendation 2:
We recommend the **NV-UT District Manager** establish internal controls to verify that appropriate personnel complete the Daily Arrow Key Accountability Training annually and facilities are following the 24-hour arrow key accountability process for city routes at Tier 1 facilities, or using the Postal Service Form 1106, as required.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management **agrees** with this recommendation.

Internal controls have been established to verify that appropriate personnel complete the Daily Arrow Key Accountability Annual training. NV-UT District 100%. Process verification have been established to ensure the 24-hour arrow key accountability process for city routes at Tier 1 facilities, or using the Postal Service Form 1106, as required. Audit and abatements on key controls were finalized in Meadow Mesa 8/26/2026; and Audit and abatements on key controls were finalized in Westridge Station 9/3/2026.

Validation Audit will be conducted with MPOO and PCES Tier 1 PM to ensure controls have been adhered to that have been established.

Target Implementation Date: 11/30/2026

Responsible Official: Manager, Postmaster, MPOO, and PCES PM

Recommendation 3:
We recommend that the **NV-UT District Manager** develop internal controls to ensure that the required annual safety inspections are completed and requests for collection box repairs or removals are coordinated with the District Field Maintenance Office.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management **agrees** with this recommendation.

Internal controls have been established to ensure the required annual safety inspections are completed and requests for collection box repairs or removals are coordinated with the District Field Maintenance Office. National Collection Maintenance Review driven by HQ *Annual CPMS Density Test and National Collection Maintenance Review*.

Validation Audit will be conducted with MPOO and PCES Tier 1 PM to ensure controls have been adhered to that have been established.

Target Implementation Date: 1/31/2027

Responsible Official: Manager, Postmaster, MPOO, and PCES PM

Recommendation 4:
We recommend that the **NV-UT District Manager** direct local management to take immediate action to address the condition of the [redacted] collection box and implement an ongoing schedule to monitor and verify adherence to posted collection times across the district.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management **agrees** with this recommendation.

NV-UT direct local management to take immediate action and replaced the [redacted] collection box; and implement an ongoing schedule to monitor and verify adherence to posted collection times across the district.

[redacted] Collection box was replaced on Thursday, August 13, 2026.

Target Implementation Date: 12/31/26

Responsible Official: Manager, and PCES PM

Recommendation 5:
We recommend the **Chief Retail and Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President** complete an analysis of U.S. Postal Service and customer fee responsibility to replace locks on U.S. Postal Service and privately owned cluster box units after mail theft and non-mail theft related incidents. Also, update policy accordingly and establish internal controls to ensure consistent application.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management **agrees** with this recommendation

At this time, management is unable to commit to implementing the proposed structure of fee responsibility without first determining its operational, policy and financial feasibility. Management will conduct analysis to explore the feasibility of the recommendation in coordination with the appropriate stakeholders.

This assessment will evaluate whether the necessary policy changes can be implemented and whether a nationally consistent fee structure can be established. Based on the results, management will determine the appropriate path forward.

Target Implementation Date: 3/31/2027

Responsible Official: Chief Retail and Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President

E-SIGNED by DONALD.D KRAVOS
on 2026-09-24 18:42:58 EDT

Don Kravos
District Manager, NV-UT District

E-SIGNED by EDUARDO.H RUIZ
on 2026-09-25 13:32:55 EDT

Eduardo Ruiz
Vice President Retail & Delivery Operations - WestPac Area

E-SIGNED by ELVIN MERCADO
on 2026-09-28 09:48:02 EDT

Elvin Mercado
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President

Cc: Corporate Audit Response Management

Contact us via our Hotline and FOIA forms. Follow us on social networks. Stay informed.

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This document contains sensitive information that has been redacted for public release. These redactions were coordinated with USPS and agreed to by the OIG.