Evaluating Mail Recovery Center Package Growth

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 25-150-R26 | September 22, 2026

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Highlights

Background

U.S. Postal Service customers submit complaints about missing packages more than any other issue, with 5 million missing package complaints submitted in fiscal year 2025. When packages go missing, customers turn to the Mail Recovery Center (MRC), which is the Postal Service's lost and found. It handles "dead mail" — packages that cannot be delivered or returned to the sender – which increased 45 percent during a recent 12-month period, driven in part by shippers refusing these packages.

What We Did

Our objective was to evaluate the processes and policies for dead mail packages sent to the MRC. We reviewed policies and visited 11 facilities generating or processing dead mail, including the MRC. We also sampled and analyzed 2,500 packages.

What We Found

We found the MRC received four times more volume than it reported. MRC management reported that it returned 39 percent of packages to customers, but in reality, it returned less than 1 percent. This was due to flawed estimates that obscured the MRC's operational shortcomings. As a result, management did not have accurate visibility, hindering its ability to optimize operations and support customers. Shippers also used the MRC as a free disposal service by refusing return-to-sender items (which often come with postage due) or [redacted] to shift costs to the Postal Service. The Postal Service did not track this data, and 1) lost revenue on return postage and 2) bore the costs of handling discarded packages. As a result, it lost at least $109 million in postage due and $54 million in potential refusal fee revenue from October 2023 through February 2026. The Postal Service could increase revenue by almost $20 million over the next 13 months if it collected postage due from direct shippers and began assessing a refusal fee. Finally, improper upstream handling of dead mail hurt customers' chances of finding lost items.

Recommendations and Management's Comments

We made nine recommendations to address the issues in the report. The Postal Service agreed or partially agreed with eight recommendations and disagreed with one recommendation. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) considers management's comments responsive to recommendations 1, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, and 9, as corrective action should resolve the issues identified. We view management's comments to recommendations 2 and 5 as unresolved and will work with management through the audit resolution process. A summary of management's comments and our evaluation are at the end of each finding and recommendation, and management's comments in their entirety are in Appendix C.

Transmittal Letter

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

September 22, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR: MARK A. GUILFOIL
VICE PRESIDENT, SUPPLY MANAGEMENT

ANGELA D. LAWSON
VICE PRESIDENT, TECHNOLOGY APPLICATIONS

JASON R. DECHAMBEAU
VICE PRESIDENT, PROCESSING OPERATIONS

JENNIFER T. VO
VICE PRESIDENT, RETAIL & POST OFFICE OPERATIONS

MARGARET M. PEPE
EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR, PRODUCT SOLUTIONS

Amanda H. Stafford

FROM: Amanda Stafford
Deputy Assistant Inspector General, Retail, Marketing, &
Supply Management

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Evaluating Mail Recovery Center Package Growth
(Report Number 25-150-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit for Evaluating Mail Recovery Center Package Growth. The objective was to evaluate the processes and policies related to undeliverable packages sent to the Mail Recovery Center.

All recommendations require U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General's (OIG) concurrence before closure. Consequently, the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. All recommendations should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Heidi Einsweiler, Director, Sales, Marketing & International, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Corporate Audit Response Management

Results

Introduction/Objective

This report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the Mail Recovery Center's package growth (Project Number 25-150). Our objective was to evaluate the processes and policies related to undeliverable packages sent to the Mail Recovery Center (MRC). See Appendix A for additional information about this audit.

Background

Missing packages generate more complaints at the U.S. Postal Service than any other service or product, with customer service agents logging about 5 million missing package complaints in fiscal year (FY) 2025. While some packages are delivered after a brief delay, others remain lost, which frustrates customers and hurts the Postal Service's brand. The customer's best hope for finding their package is often the MRC — the Postal Service's official lost and found.

The MRC's Mission is to Complete the Delivery Process

When a package cannot be delivered or returned, it is deemed undeliverable or "dead mail".[1] It is then sent to the MRC as the last opportunity to connect the item to the recipient and complete the delivery process. Upon arrival, clerks check the packages for labels and hand-written indicators, called "endorsements," that would indicate that the packages are dead. Without those indicators, clerks assume the packages are "live mail" that was accidentally sent to the MRC, and they send the "live" package back into the mailstream to be delivered.

Clerks sort the dead mail packages, with authority to open them and look for packing slips that may identify a deliverable address, as shown in Figure 1. If found, the package is sent to the address. If a package cannot be immediately linked to a customer, MRC clerks will attempt to match the item to packages reported as missing. If the contents are worth more than $25 or meet several other factors, they will be held for a minimum of 30 days.[2] However, the vast majority of packages do not meet the criteria. Those packages, along with held packages that could not be matched to a customer, are sold in lots at public auctions, discarded, recycled, or donated.

Figure 1. MRC Clerk Opening Package

Source: U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) photo taken Dec. 9, 2025. MRC staff are the only postal workers permitted to open packages.

1 Dead mail is mail that is undeliverable to the recipient and cannot be returned to the sender. Packages may be undeliverable for reasons such as vacant or unknown addresses.

2 The retention period depends on the package's characteristics and for most can be as long as six months.

When a customer submits a Missing Mail Search Request, their missing item description is logged in a database and checked against the items in the MRC inventory. If there is a match, the MRC notifies the customer and ships the item. Daily checks against the MRC inventory continue until a match is made or the retention period expires.[3] If the system cannot match the customer's search request, the Postal Service notifies the customer that their package was not found.

The Postal Service [redacted] also has an office at the MRC.

MRC Volume has Increased Significantly

The number of packages sent to the MRC reached an estimated 19 million[4] in the 12 months ending February 2026, which was a 45 percent increase compared to the previous year, as shown in Figure 2.

The primary driver of dead mail is return-to-sender items, which accounted for about 62 percent of incoming MRC packages in FY 2025. Return-to-sender items could not be delivered because the return address was invalid, the sender refused the package, or some other reason.[5]

Many of those return-to-sender packages were Parcel Select,[6] which requires the return addressee to pay additional postage for the return service, before receiving the package. Sometimes the return addressee declines to pay return postage, resulting in the packages going to the MRC. The return addressees are often fulfillment centers that store and box e-commerce goods at warehouses and hire a third-party shipper,[7] who then hires the Postal Service to deliver the package the last mile, as explained in Figure 3.

Figure 2. Mail Recovery Center Volume

Surge of Packages at USPS Lost & Found

Quarterly MRC package volume more than doubled in two years.



Source: OIG estimate based on bulk weight of MRC packages and average weight of packages scanned as sent to the MRC.

3 Missing Mail Search Requests are active until the missing package's retention period expires, plus an additional six months.
4 While the MRC captures the bulk weight of incoming packages, it does not scan them during intake to get an exact count.
5 Other reasons a package may be undeliverable include a vacant property, an illegible address, or the addressee is not known at the place of address.
6 Parcel Select is highly discounted because shippers must presort packages and drop them close to the delivery point, with the Postal Service taking packages the "last mile." Parcel Select does not include return service. As such, returned-to-sender packages come with postage due billed at the USPS Ground Advantage Commercial price.
7 The shippers described in this example are consolidators who aggregate packages from many customers and hand them off to the Postal Service for last-mile delivery.

Figure 3. Return-to-Sender Packages Handled by Many Parties

Returned Packages Refused by Fulfillment Centers Go to the MRC

Fulfillment centers that handle online orders frequently refuse to pay postage due for undeliverable packages. With no other mechanism for collecting payment, the Postal Service sends those packages to the MRC.



Source: OIG graphic based on Postal Service standard work instructions and field observations.

Post Offices Send Dead Mail Packages to the MRC

Post office[8] staff are responsible for detecting dead mail, and once they do, they begin procedures to forward these packages to the MRC. If a package is damaged but still deliverable, staff are expected to repair the packaging onsite and deliver it. If, however, the package is not deliverable, clerks should scan the dead package as "sent to MRC", write "dead mail" on it, affix a small label that includes the MRC's physical address, then put it in a container with other dead mail. Clerks use an internal label generator tool to make an MRC placard,[9] which identifies the container as dead mail from that post office.

The container then goes to the local plant for manual consolidation with other dead mail headed for the MRC. Each container gets a new placard and is sent to one of nine MRC hubs for consolidation into full trailers that are sent to a staging site and then moved to the MRC at a rate of 13 trailers per day, as shown in Figure 4.

As part of this audit, we sought to evaluate the key factors and processes driving MRC volume growth and assess whether the MRC effectively adapted to the increase while continuing to fulfill its core mission.

8 Postal Service facilities that house mail carriers are known as delivery units. Most delivery units are post offices, and we will use the term post offices to refer to delivery units in this report.
9 A placard is a sheet of paper used to identify a container of mail.

Figure 4. Path to the MRC

Dead Mail Flows to the MRC Through a Hub Network

The Postal Service identifies dead mail, separates it, and sends it in its own containers through postal plants and a network of nine MRC hubs.

Source: OIG graphic based on Postal Service standard work instructions and field observations.

Finding #1: Poor Data Led Management to Underestimate the MRC's Volume and Overestimate its Success

From October 2023 through February 2026, the MRC received four times more packages than it reported receiving. It is infeasible for the MRC to count every incoming item, so it developed a method to estimate volume based on bulk weight, and this method resulted in inaccurate volumes.[10] Additionally, the MRC significantly overestimated the portion of packages it successfully returned to customers — a core metric aligned with the MRC's mission — reporting that it returned 39 percent of packages when it returned less than 1 percent, as shown in Figure 5. Collectively, these significant data errors created misconceptions about the MRC's success.

Figure 5. Reported Versus Realistic Return Rate

The MRC Overstated its Customer Return Rate

The MRC's mission is to return lost items to customers, and it reported to its executives a 39 percent success rate for packages between October 2023 and February 2026. However, we estimated the more accurate return rate to be less than 1 percent.

Source: OIG analysis of Postal Service data.

Faulty, Unnecessary Sampling Led to Undercounting Total Packages

The MRC undercounted the number of packages it received by four times because it used a flawed method for estimating the volume of inbound packages. The MRC is not designed to scan inbound packages. It instead collects the bulk weight and estimates the number of packages based on the "typical package weight." However, the Postal Service incorrectly sampled MRC containers to estimate a typical package weight. Specifically:

- As part of the intake process, the MRC separates packages and weighs the containers. Instead of sampling package-only containers, the MRC sampled unsorted, mixed containers. The non-package mailpieces were bundled together and counted as single heavy packages for the purposes of the sample.
- The MRC bundled together loose items that had become separated from their packaging (such as a toy or phone that was no longer in a box) and counted them as a single item, even though the MRC should process each loose item as though it were an individual package.

10 Postal Service facilities typically scan inbound packages. However, the MRC receives many items that cannot be scanned because the label is damaged or missing.

Rather than sampling containers to determine the typical package weight, the MRC could have queried available data for packages with "sent to MRC" scans created by post office clerks.[11] This data showed an average weight of 0.89 pounds — a figure consistent with our observations at multiple facilities.

Figure 6. How the MRC Counts Packages

Estimating the Number of MRC Packages

The MRC does not count or scan inbound packages. Instead, it sorts packages into a container and weighs it, then divides the container's weight by the weight of a typical package.

How many packages are in a 200-pound container?*

MRC says typical package weights 3.56 lbs → 200 lbs / 3.56 lbs per package = 56 packages

Data says typical package weighs 0.89 lbs → 200 lbs / 0.89 lbs per package = 225 packages

*The container image is for illustrative purposes. We did not weigh it or count the packages inside.
Source: OIG analysis of USPS data.

Instead, the MRC's flawed sampling process resulted in a 3.56-pound estimate — quadruple the weight indicated by more reliable scan data, as shown in Figure 6. This error led the MRC to estimate 9 million inbound packages from October 2023 through February 2026, when actual volume was about 36 million.[12] Approximately 27 million packages were omitted from the records of the MRC's operations, impacting the MRC's internal production rate and cost per transaction metrics. This deprived management of critical operational insights that could have informed overall efficiency. The understated package count may also leave the MRC vulnerable to fraud or theft, if it cannot account for the packages in its possession.

Flawed Return Rate Methodology Overstated Mission Success

In addition to calculating inaccurate volume data, the MRC also overstated the portion of packages returned to customers. While it received about 36 million packages from October 2023 through February 2026, it did not use this as its baseline. Instead, it based its calculation on 607,233 packages,[13] thereby excluding 98 percent of packages from its calculation. It used this lower number because those packages were eligible to be returned to customers, based on an enclosed customer address or meeting other MRC inventory criteria.[14] Additionally, the Excel spreadsheet the MRC used to track internal metrics had a long-standing formula error that double-counted some of the packages that were returned to customers, inflating the return rate. Developed in 2016, the spreadsheet error went undetected until our audit.[15]

The MRC's return rate was prominently featured in its monthly metrics report and cited by executives as representing all packages. Inaccurate return rate data led leadership to have significant misconceptions about the MRC's operational success and the resources needed to meet its core mission of completing the delivery process. Before the OIG's audit, the MRC began planning a phased automation project to reduce data entry errors and improve accuracy. These automations should help reduce Excel errors that contributed to the flawed return rate calculation, and the MRC should continue those efforts. Phase one has five major milestones and is expected to be completed in April 2027. However, management should also identify other metrics

11 While most MRC packages did not get a "sent to MRC" scan, as discussed in Finding 3, more than 3 million packages did. This was sufficient to determine the average package weight, which was within about 4 ounces of the average weight for a USPS Ground Advantage package. Ground Advantage accounted for the bulk of MRC volume.
12 The OIG created this volume estimate using the monthly bulk weight of inbound MRC packages divided by the average weight of packages scanned as "sent to MRC" that month. The monthly volume estimates were summed to get the total volume.
13 This count is not an estimate but refers to specific packages processed and tallied by the MRC.
14 The threshold for inclusion into inventory is based on value, mail class, customer, and type of item.
15 The understated count of incoming packages, as described above, was not a factor in the MRC's return rate calculation.

that accurately reflect the MRC's operations and mission. Such metrics could include the length of time packages sit awaiting processing, a breakdown of how the MRC ultimately dealt with the packages it handled (e.g., the percentage that was returned to customers, auctioned, donated, or discarded), and the performance of the MRC's contractor that handles auctions.

As a result of the inaccurate data about its return rate and volume, management's ability to optimize operations and effectively support the MRC's core mission were hindered. Better data would not only allow management to direct resources toward improving the return rate—increasing customer satisfaction—but detect potential theft and address shipper misuse of the MRC, as explained in Finding 2.

Recommendation #1

We recommend the **Vice President, Supply Management,** annually update the Mail Recovery Center's volume estimates using the average weight of all packages with a "sent to Mail Recovery Center" scan.

Recommendation #2

We recommend the **Vice President, Supply Management,** revise the Mail Recovery Center's package return rate to include all incoming packages and avoid double counting.

Recommendation #3

We recommend the **Vice President, Supply Management,** track and complete the Mail Recovery Center's milestones for automating the data collection process.

Recommendation #4

We recommend the **Vice President, Supply Management,** use revised data about the Mail Recovery Center's operations to assess the facility's metrics, operations, and mission, and update them as appropriate.

Postal Service Response

Management disagreed with portions of the finding, agreed in part with recommendations 1 and 2, and agreed with recommendations 3 and 4.

Regarding the finding, management said it proactively improved MRC processes by expanding the facility footprint, staffing, and the use of new equipment. It disagreed with the OIG's characterization that it underestimated volume and overestimated its success because its established metrics track and align to operational procedures, but acknowledged that volume measurements could be improved. It said that its current return rate metric — which is limited to packages that are eligible for return to customers — was proper, and that including all packages in the calculation would skew the results.

Regarding recommendation 1, management agreed to evaluate how it calculates the package conversion factor and will ensure volume estimates are updated on no less than an annual basis. It will update the average package weight annually using the actual total incoming MRC volume, rather than packages scanned as "sent to MRC." The target implementation date is April 30, 2027.

Regarding recommendation 2, management said it was in the process of updating its measurement system but would limit the return rate to packages that are eligible for return to the customer. The target implementation date is November 30, 2027.

Regarding recommendation 3, management said it has established milestones for updating its data collection system and would maximize automation where feasible. The target implementation date is November 30, 2027.

Regarding recommendation 4, management will use the MRC's new measurement system to assess and update the MRC's metrics, operations, and mission. The target implementation date is November 30, 2028.

OIG Evaluation

Regarding finding 1, the current metric captures only the return rate for the small portion of packages that are eligible for return. While this is a valid metric, tracking the portion of all incoming packages that were returned to customers is critical to assessing the MRC's primary mission of completing the delivery process. The vast majority of incoming MRC packages are auctioned, recycled, donated, or discarded. However, management did not know this. Management cited a 30-40 percent return rate, believing it included all incoming packages, rather than a subset of eligible items. Reporting the overall return rate gives management clear visibility into the true scope of MRC operations.

Regarding recommendations 1, 3, and 4, the OIG considers management's comments to be responsive, as the corrective actions should resolve the issues identified in the report. However, for recommendation 2, we do not view management's approach as fully responsive. While capturing the return rate for eligible items is important, management should also include an overall return rate among its metrics. We view this as unresolved and will pursue it through the formal audit resolution process.

Finding #2: Shippers Used the MRC as a Free Disposal Service

Through observations[16] and sampling[17] at key post offices where much of the MRC volume originates, we found 75 percent of their dead mail packages came from commercial shippers repeatedly using the MRC as a free disposal service.[18] The shippers fell into two categories: 1) those refusing to accept return-to-sender packages and pay the postage due, and 2) those deliberately [redacted] to avoid receiving returned packages.[19] Because federal law requires the Postal Service to cover its costs,[20] the MRC should identify alternatives to collect postage due for Parcel Select and charge for disposal service. This issue occurred because the Postal Service did not track sender-refused packages or how much shippers relied upon the MRC for disposal.

The Postal Service Did Not Track Sender-Refused Packages

The Postal Service did not identify returned packages refused by the sender, and did not track the scope of the issue. Local post office staff knew their dead mail packages often came from a few repeat return addresses because of repeat refusals,[21] but management did not. The Postal Service could implement a new "sender refused" scan option to flag such items. In lieu of a standard "sent to MRC" scan, clerks could apply a "sender refused & sent to MRC" scan, which management could track to reveal trends. Incorporating the scan into the standard work instruction for clerks and making the scan visible on public tracking records would also give customers clearer tracking information showing why a returned package was sent to the MRC. Management said it could identify sender-refused packages using existing scans, though it requires a developer to manually extract and analyze the data. The Postal Service could develop user-friendly analysis tools, such as a dashboard, to improve visibility of sender-refused packages.

Without visibility of the issue, the Postal Service did not recognize the extent that it needed to take further action to avoid losing revenue on return postage and bearing the disposal costs for unwanted packages.

Return Addressees Had No Incentive to Pay Return Postage

Fulfillment centers, such as the one described in Figure 7, are listed as the return addressee and often refuse returned-to-sender Parcel Select packages because return postage is costly and avoidable. As of July 2026, return postage was at least $12.63 per package and processing returns can cost the fulfillment center 20–65 percent of an item's value. This gives fulfillment centers a strong incentive to reject returns and avoid both postage and processing costs.

Figure 7. Fulfillment Center Example

Refusing 250 Packages per Week

The return-to-sender package below was refused by a fulfillment center outside Los Angeles that declined to pay the $17.42 in postage due. It refused about 250 similar packages per week going back 3-4 years, all of which went to the MRC.



Source: OIG photo taken January 6, 2026.

16 We visited 11 facilities, including eight high-volume post offices, some of which generated hundreds of MRC packages per day. At these facilities, most dead mail was tied to a handful of high-volume return addresses.
17 As shown in Appendix B, the post offices we sampled accounted for the lion's share of dead mail.
18 Disposal could include auctioning, recycling, donating, or discarding.
19 According to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, [redacted], which are outside the scope of this audit due to separate OIG work that will address those issues. See *Efforts to Mitigate Counterfeit Postage*, issued September 2026.
20 39 U.S.C. § 3622(c)(2).
21 Clerks must scan each package as "sent to MRC," even if a shipper refuses dozens of return-to-sender packages per day.

From October 2023 through February 2026, the Postal Service lost an estimated $109 million[22] in postage due from refused Parcel Select returned-to-sender packages and will lose another $9 million over the following 13 months if past trends continue.[23] As explained in Figure 3, the Postal Service's direct customer for these packages is often a shipper hired by the fulfillment center. If the Postal Service were to automatically collect return postage from the direct customer, it would ensure the Postal Service is compensated for the return-to-sender leg of the package's journey. Fulfillment centers may also be more likely to accept the return, given that the packages would be delivered normally along with the rest of the fulfillment center's daily mail. The OIG recommended automating the postage due collection process in a 2025 audit, and the Postal Service was working to implement that recommendation as of August 2026.[24]

The Postal Service Did Not Charge a Refusal Fee to Commercial Shippers that Refused Returned Packages

When businesses offload unwanted items, they generally must pay someone to recycle or dispose of them. However, the Postal Service, through the MRC, provided this service for free — even though it cost the Postal Service about [redacted][25] per package to get a package to the MRC and process it once it is there. Without better data around shipper-refused packages — such as a "sender refused & sent to MRC" scan — the Postal Service did not know how many shipper-refused packages it received and could not determine whether it should charge a refusal fee for refused packages to cover the associated costs.

Had it charged such a fee, the Postal Service would have gained an estimated $54 million in refusal fee revenue from Parcel Select packages alone from October 2023 through February 2026.[26] It would gain another $10.8 million over the following 13 months if past trends continue.[27] However, we note that this financial benefit would extend beyond just the Parcel Select product, as many non-Parcel Select packages were also refused by commercial senders.[28]

Recommendation #5

We recommend the **Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations** evaluate scanning options for tracking sender-refused packages and implement a solution that improves visibility of the refusals through a dashboard or other accessible reporting mechanism.

Recommendation #6

We recommend the **Executive Director, Product Solutions**, in coordination with the **Vice President, Technology Applications**, automatically charge the direct customer, which may not be the return addressee, for return-to-sender packages.

Recommendation #7

We recommend the **Executive Director, Product Solutions**, track sender-refused package data and use the data to generate a cost-benefit analysis for amending the Domestic Mail Manual to assess a fee for shipper-refused return-to-sender packages.

Postal Service Response

Management disagreed with finding 2, recommendation 5, and the monetary impact,

22 While this reflects the full monetary impact for the scope period reviewed, we are only claiming monetary impact for the most recent 24 months for which there are data (March 2024 through February 2026) as an unrecoverable revenue loss of $86,237,735. Revenue loss applies to funds such as postage, retail sales, rent leases, or fees the Postal Service is entitled to receive but was underpaid or not realized because policies, procedures, agreements, or requirements were lacking or not followed.
23 Parcel Select volume declined significantly after the Postal Service changed policies and substantially increased Parcel Select prices in January 2025. The projected revenue loss of $9,032,593 is based on volume trends after those changes took effect. Also, the Postal Service began automatically collecting postage due from a single large customer in July 2025, and we excluded that customer's volume after that point.
24 OIG, *Protecting Revenue for Returned Parcel Select Packages*, 24-044-R25, September 17, 2025, https://www.uspsoig.gov/sites/default/files/reports/2025-09/25-053-r25.pdf. We found that the Postal Service omitted large package charges that cause revenue loss, but also found the payment system as a whole was unauditable and recommended automating return postage collection.
25 From October 2023 through February 2026.
26 While this reflects the full monetary impact for the scope period reviewed, we are only claiming monetary impact for the most recent 24 months for which there are data (March 2024 through February 2026) as increased revenue of $43,554,492. Increased revenue is revenue from existing functions or revenue generated from new sources.
27 Parcel Select volume declined significantly after the Postal Service changed policies and substantially increased Parcel Select prices in January 2025. The projected increased revenue of $10,792,231 is based on volume trends after those changes took effect.
28 We observed non-Parcel Select packages that were refused by senders during our site visits. However, due to improper handling of dead mail packages, as explained in Finding 3 below, we were unable to estimate the total number of sender-refused items during this audit.

but agreed in part with recommendations 6 and 7.

Regarding the finding, management considers existing "refused" event scans as sufficient for tracking sender-refused packages. Management stated it demonstrated scanning options that already exist to apply a "Refused" event for refused packages. Management disagreed that return addressees had no incentive to pay returned postage. However, management confirmed it is reviewing the feasibility of assessing a fee for returned packages.

Regarding recommendation 5, management said employees can already apply a "Refused" event scan if a package is refused by the customer or if the return is refused. Management said it would make this data readily available as needed.

Regarding recommendation 6, management said it would review the feasibility of assessing a fee and automatically holding the direct shipper responsible through vehicles such as negotiated service agreements. The target implementation date is August 31, 2027.

Regarding recommendation 7, management said it would conduct a cost-benefit analysis and evaluate amending the Domestic Mail Manual to assess a fee for shipper-refused return-to-sender packages. The target implementation date is March 31, 2027.

Regarding monetary impact, management disagreed with the OIG's calculation and stated it could not replicate the numbers. Management also stated that resale revenues should offset processing costs and noted that the OIG estimate does not incorporate this offset or management's planned internal improvements. Additionally, management disagreed with a monetary impact associated with a fee that leadership has not yet implemented.

OIG Evaluation

Regarding the finding, our report acknowledged that the Postal Service has existing scans to identify sender-refused packages. The OIG did not contend that the scans did not exist. While the Postal Service provided some high-level data on sender-refused scans, we had significant questions about its analysis and could not validate that the data accurately captured sender-refused packages. If the Postal Service accurately identifies sender-refused packages, it could track the scope of the issue and the effectiveness of potential remedies. Additionally, management provided no supporting rationale for disagreeing that return addressees lack incentives to pay return postage.

Regarding recommendation 5, management's reliance on ad hoc extractions of scan data does not provide the visibility needed to address this issue. Without routine, systematic tracking, leadership cannot measure whether corrective actions — such as assessing refusal fees on the shipper of record — effectively reduce sender-refused package volumes. We consider management's approach unresponsive and will pursue this recommendation through the formal audit resolution process.

Regarding recommendations 6 and 7, the OIG considers management's comments to be responsive, and the corrective actions should resolve the issues identified in the report.

Regarding monetary impact, management's inability to replicate the monetary impact does not undermine its validity. The OIG intentionally excluded item resale revenue from the analysis because handling and transporting costs occur independently of potential sale proceeds. Also, reducing fees for a service based on uncertain revenue offsets would be financially imprudent. Monetary impacts must reflect the gap between existing operations and the recommended corrective action, and OIG stands behind our calculation as it follows rigorous standards of evidence.

Finding #3: Improper Handling of Dead Mail Hurt Customers' Chances of Finding Lost Items

Post offices and plants made widespread errors in their handling of dead mail packages, including scanning, labelling, endorsing, sending damaged (but otherwise deliverable) packages to the MRC, placarding, and dispatching trailers. These combined errors hurt customers' chances of finding their lost items.

- **Scanning**: Only 7.6 percent[29] of all packages scanned at the MRC from October 2023 through February 2026 also received "sent to MRC" scans, which are required by management to provide an indicator to customers in their package tracking history about where their package may be located.[30] Without a "sent to MRC" scan, neither the customer nor the Postal Service knew that the package was sent to the MRC. If a customer does not know from the tracking history that their package went to the MRC, they may not submit a timely Missing Mail Search Request. The MRC uses those requests to match packages to customers, and without them customers are less likely to get their packages back.
- **Labeling**: Of the eight high-volume post offices we visited, only three applied the MRC address label to dead mail, as required.[31] MRC address labels help ensure packages get to the MRC even if the container of dead mail is inadvertently dumped into a plant's mail processing equipment — something that happens frequently. Without the MRC address labels, mail processing equipment routes packages back to the return address on the original package label, causing further delays for customers and adding unnecessary costs for the Postal Service.
- **Endorsing**: Four of the eight post offices we visited did not endorse MRC packages as "dead mail,"[32] which is an important indicator for the MRC. When the MRC receives unendorsed packages, it treats them as live mail and sends them back into the mailstream. Mail processing equipment routes the packages back to the facility that sent them to the MRC, a process known as "looping." We observed unendorsed dead mail packages that looped several times, including the Priority Mail package in Figure 8, which was sent to the MRC five times over nearly four months. Looping causes significant delays for the customer and additional costs for the Postal Service.

Figure 8. Same Package Sent to MRC Five Times

Source: OIG photo taken January 8, 2026.

- **Sending damaged packages**: We observed a significant backlog of damaged packages at the MRC, as shown in Figure 9. These packages should have been repaired at the location where the damage was discovered and forwarded to the customer, rather than sent to the MRC.[33] Sending damaged packages to the MRC for repair causes significant delays. As of May 2026, the MRC had a four-month backlog of damaged packages; it was processing packages that had arrived at the facility in January.

29 This percentage is based on the full population of packages scanned as arrived at the MRC and the full population of packages scanned as sent to the MRC.
30 The manager of Post Office Strategy and Optimization confirmed that MRC packages should be scanned "sent to MRC."
31 Remote Forwarding Service Delivery Unit Training, July 2025. The requirement has been in place since at least May 2021.
32 The manager of Post Office Strategy and Optimization confirmed that MRC packages should be endorsed as "dead mail."
33 Standard Work Instruction: Rewrap Operations, June 2025.

Figure 9. Backlog of Damaged Packages at the MRC



Source: OIG photo taken May 5, 2026.

- **Placarding**: None of the eight post offices we visited used the correct MRC placard for outgoing dead mail, as required by the standard work instruction.[34] Lack of placarding means that downstream dead mail facilities cannot determine the origin of upstream preparation problems, such as the inclusion of damaged packages that require time consuming repair, which has a significant backlog. Without accurate placards, there is no way to identify the upstream facility at fault and correct the issue. Poorly prepared containers drain resources that could otherwise be spent reuniting packages and their owners.

- **Dispatching**: The facility that stages and dispatches dead mail trailers directly to the MRC did not implement a first-in-first-out (FIFO) system, per policy.[35] The supervisor mistakenly prioritized the trailers that he thought incurred the highest daily rental fees. During our visit to the staging facility, we could not determine which of the 22 trailers in the yard had been there the longest. We could only identify how long four of the trailers had been there. Two had arrived the previous day, and two had been there more than 30 days. By not implementing its FIFO policy, the dispatching facility delayed some packages from arriving at the MRC timely, preventing the MRC from attempting package returns to the customer at the earliest opportunity. Management has since implemented the FIFO policy at the staging site, which should prevent this issue in the future.

These issues occurred because of three weaknesses. First, problems with scanning, labeling, and endorsing occurred because work instructions for processing dead mail did not specifically address how these tasks should be completed. The Postal Service should update its work instruction to be more comprehensive, distribute the updated instructions to relevant staff in the field, and require its implementation upon receipt. Second, improperly sending damaged packages to the MRC and not correctly placing placards occurred because field staff did not receive proper training. With respect to placarding, employees inconsistently received on-the-job training from other staff or developed their own procedures by trial and error, but not from official training sources. Third, not dispatching in accordance with policy occurred due to poor record keeping. The logistics supervisor who selected the trailers to dispatch to the MRC did not keep records of how long trailers had been in the yard and therefore could not ensure that the oldest trailers were dispatched first.

Errors Led to Delays

The overall effect of improper handling was delays that limited customers' chances of finding their lost items. Even when customers were united with their packages, the delays caused real harm. For example, the package shown in Figure 10 was shipped from Cleveland on December 19, 2025, for $93.70. It arrived damaged at the MRC and was initially processed there on January 15, 2026. It sat in the damaged package staging area until May 6 — the day after we identified and photographed the package — when it was repaired and forwarded to the customer. A package that was likely intended to arrive before Christmas was instead delivered May 11 — 143 days after it was shipped. These types of delays could motivate customers to abandon the Postal Service in favor of its competitors.

34 Standard Work Instruction: Mail Recovery Center Acceptable Items, August 2024.
35 AS-701, Asset Management Process, January 2025.

Figure 10. Damaged Package Sat 112 Days at the MRC

Source: OIG photo taken May 5, 2026.

Collectively, the issues we identified in this audit created an environment in which management could not tell that the MRC's operations had become disconnected from its core mission of completing the delivery process. While the vast majority of packages at the MRC were ineligible for customer return, those that were eligible faced months-long delays, hurting customers' chances of finding lost items and increasing their potential frustration toward the Postal Service for losing their packages, which could hurt the Postal Service brand.

Recommendation #8

We recommend the **Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations,** develop updated standard work instructions for scanning, labeling, and endorsing dead mail at delivery units; provide the instructions to relevant personnel in the field; and verify they are implemented once received.

Recommendation #9

We recommend the **Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations** and the **Vice President of Processing Operations**, train field staff on updated dead mail placarding procedures and on repairing damaged packages internally instead of improperly sending them to the Mail Recovery Center.

Postal Service Response

Management disagreed in part with finding 3 and agreed with recommendations 8 and 9.

Regarding the finding, while management agreed that proper package handling is critical to directing undeliverable packages, it disagreed with the OIG's characterization of undeliverable mail handling, recordkeeping, and logistics oversight. Management emphasized that post offices are instructed to deliver all packages regardless of condition. It also said that policy requires sending items to the MRC only if they cannot be delivered, forwarded, or returned, and anomalies where an item was sent to the MRC due to damage is not official policy. Additionally, Postal Service plants already have policies to send only specific items to the MRC for recovery, as well as policies for proper placarding and disposal. It also said that Logistics works closely with the MRC to ensure the correct number of trailers is sent each day.

Regarding recommendation 8, management said it would review and reissue instructions to relevant personnel on the proper handling of undeliverable mail and require certification. The target implementation date is January 31, 2027.

Regarding recommendation 9, management said it would reiterate damaged package repair and placarding procedures. The target implementation date is January 31, 2027.

OIG Evaluation

Regarding finding 3, the OIG maintains that it accurately reflects the data analyzed and conditions observed during our site visits.

Although management noted that sending mail to the MRC reflects isolated, post office-level procedural non-compliance rather than official policy, the OIG observed a four-month backlog of damaged packages at the MRC, as shown in Figure 9. After the OIG's site visit to the staging facility, Logistics provided evidence that the staging facility implemented a FIFO trailer dispatch system, which our report acknowledged.

Regarding recommendations 8 and 9, the OIG considers management's comments to be responsive, as the corrective actions should resolve the issues identified in the report.

Appendices

Appendix A: Additional Information

Scope and Methodology

The scope included packages sent to the MRC, processes and financial results associated with the MRC, and the processes and financial results surrounding undeliverable packages. The time period was from October 2023 through February 2026, which is the period during which key data for the project were available.

Our methodology for the audit included:

- **Site visits**: We visited 11 facilities from December 2025 through May 2026. This included two visits to the MRC, visits to eight high-volume delivery units in the Los Angeles and Atlanta areas, a visit to a processing plant that handles a large amount of dead mail, and a visit to the staging facility for MRC trailers, which is part of the MRC hub network and also receives loose containers of dead mail.
- **Dead mail sampling**: We took a random sample of 50 packages scanned as "sent to MRC" from December 2025 through February 2026 from each of the 50 highest-volume post offices for dead mail, sampling a total of 2,500 packages. These 50 facilities accounted for 42 percent of all "sent to MRC" scans during the period of the sample and 43 percent of the sent to MRC scans from post offices.
- **Data analysis**: We reviewed internal MRC data regarding its operations; independently queried the Enterprise Data Warehouse for data from the Product Tracking and Reporting system and the Postal Service General Ledger; queried the Facilities Database; reviewed the nonpublic versions of the Cost and Revenue Analysis, Cost Segments and Components, and Competitive Billing Determinants reports; queried data on customer complaints; and used a statistical regression model to forecast revenue losses and increased revenue.
- **Interviews**: We interviewed relevant Postal Service officials, including supervisors and other employees at the MRC and other field visit locations. We also interviewed executives who oversee the MRC, the collection of postage due, and the dead mail processes at delivery units, plants, and hubs.
- **Policies and procedures**: We reviewed policies and procedures regarding dead mail. We also reviewed the Domestic Mail Manual and analyzed published prices.
- **Private sector returns statistics**: We researched ecommerce businesses' costs for processing returns.

We conducted this performance audit from December 2025 through August 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on August 25, 2026, and included its comments where appropriate.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the Postal Service's internal control structure surrounding dead mail to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective: Control Activities, Information and Communication, and Monitoring.

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to Control Activities, Information and Communication, and Monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. Our recommendations, if implemented, should correct the weaknesses we identified.

We assessed the reliability of Product Tracking and Reporting and internal MRC operations data by testing the completeness, reasonableness, accuracy, and validity. We determined that the Product Tracking and Reporting data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report. We also assessed the reliability of internal MRC operations data by evaluating volume, weight, and customer return rate metrics. We interviewed MRC officials about the internal MRC operations data, reviewed the methodologies, and compared the data to other available data sets and our observations. For the purposes of this report, we determined that data related to volume, weight, and the return rate were not reliable. We included this finding in our report and recommend that Postal Service officials take appropriate corrective action.

Prior Audit Coverage

Report Title	Objective	Report Number	Final Report Date	Monetary Impact
Protecting Revenue for Returned Parcel Select Packages	To evaluate the processes and execution around returned-to-sender Parcel Select packages.	25-053-r25	September 17, 2025	$45,994,799

Appendix B: Concentration of Dead Mail

From December 2025 through February 2026, 7,136 post offices scanned packages as "sent to MRC." However, they did so very unevenly, with the lion's share of scans coming from a relatively small number of post offices that drove MRC volume. We focused our observations on the 50 highest-volume facilities, from which we sampled 2,500 packages.[36] These facilities accounted for 43 percent of MRC packages that came from post offices, as shown in Figure 11. We found that 75 percent of dead mail at these high-volume locations was tied to 1) fulfillment centers that refused returns either to avoid paying postage, avoid processing returned items, or both; or 2) shippers that deliberately put [redacted] on their packages.

Figure 11. High-Volume Post Offices Drive MRC Volume

Dead Mail Package Volume Is Highly Concentrated Among a Small Number of Post Offices

The top 50 post offices (0.7% of all offices that sent dead mail) accounted for 43% of dead mail volume. Each circle represents one post office, with the size of the circle reflecting volume.



Source: OIG analysis of Postal Service scanning data.

36 The label images are only kept for 90 days, limiting us to a sample of three months. While we randomly sampled packages from each post office, the sample is not statistically representative of all post offices or all MRC volume.

Appendix C: Management's Comments

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

September 14, 2026

LAURA LOZON
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: *Evaluating Mail Recovery Center Package Growth 25-150-DRAFT*

Thank you for the opportunity to provide comments to the Office of Inspector General's (OIG's) subject draft audit report titled, "*Evaluating Mail Recovery Center Package Growth*" (Project Number 25-150-DRAFT), dated August 27, 2026. Management has reviewed the report along with its findings and recommendations. Management views that clarifications and additional information are required for areas of the report. Management agrees in part with Recommendations 1, 2, 6 and 7 and agrees with Recommendations 3, 4, 8, and 9. Management disagrees with Recommendation 5. Management also disagrees with portions of the Findings and the Monetary Impact.

Finding #1: Poor Data Led Management to Underestimate the MRC's Volume and Overestimate its Success
Management Disagrees

Management recognizes the OIG's continued efforts to support the effectiveness of the Mail Recovery Center's operations and identifying opportunities for improvement to ensure the center continues to operate efficiently. Management has been proactive in improving processes and finding solutions to increase productivity by expanding operational tours, the introduction of updated equipment including new robotic technology, and increasing the physical footprint of the processing facility.

In the report, the OIG states that "poor or flawed data led management to underestimate the MRC's volume and overestimate its success." Management disagrees with this characterization. The established metrics track and necessarily align to the operational procedures in place. Management acknowledges that the volume measurement system can be updated and improved. However, in calculating return rates, it is necessary to derive these metrics aligned to the incoming parcels which meet the definition and criteria for return. The MRC receives volumes for which there is no opportunity for a return to a customer. To include these volumes in a return rate calculation would inaccurately skew results and not align performance to established procedures.

Finding #2: Shippers Used the MRC as a Free Disposal Service

The Postal Service Did Not Track Sender-Refused Packages
Management Disagrees

Management believes scanning data visibility is sufficient for the purposes it was intended. The OIG states that the Postal Service did not track sender-refused packages nor track the scope of the issue. However, in meetings with the OIG preceding issuance of the draft report, Management was able to demonstrate that scanning options already exist where employees have ability to apply a “Refused” event scan if the package is refused by the customer. In addition, the event/reason code of “Refused” for returns is recorded – further validating the capability of Management to functionally track such packages.

Return Addressees Had No Incentive to Pay Return Postage
Management Disagrees

Management is already reviewing the feasibility of assessing a fee.

Finding 3: Improper Handling Hurt Customers’ Chances of Finding Lost Items
Management Disagrees in Part

Management agrees with OIG that the proper handling of packages - including scanning, labelling and endorsing - is critical to ensuring undeliverable packages are appropriately directed.

However, Management views as inaccurate the OIG’s broad-stroke statements found in the draft of how undeliverable mail is handled or how logistics maintains records and/or oversees its operations.

Delivery Units are instructed to deliver all packages regardless of condition. Postal Policy requires items to be sent to the MRC only if they can’t be delivered, forwarded or returned. Anomalies where an item is sent to the MRC because it was damaged should not be interpreted as official policy but rather as an isolated event where a delivery unit was not following proper procedures.

Likewise, in regard to dispatching, Logistics works closely with the MRC on a daily basis to ensure there are the correct number of trailers sent each day for processing – to include tracking down to the route/trip/time and driver for each load.

Finally, Processing Operations already has policies in place to send only specific items to MRC for recovery. These instructions can be found in the latest communication to the field including the use of proper placards and what can be disposed of at the plant.

Monetary Impact:
Management Disagrees

1. Management does not agree with the methodology, and it could not replicate the numbers.

2. Management confirmed with the OIG during the exit conference that they did not consider the incoming revenue from the resale of items – which would offset the amounts.

3. The increase in revenue is a subjective factor that does not include management's plan for internal improvements and the potentiality of assessing fees.

Management disagrees with claimed Monetary Impact associated with the concept of charging a disposal fee revenue. This is not an existing fee which management has implemented, and management views it is inaccurate and overstated for the OIG to represent monetary impact on a pricing matter which postal leadership has not implemented.

The following are management's responses on the nine recommendations:

Recommendation 1:
We recommend the **Vice President, Supply Management,** annually update the Mail Recovery Center's volume estimates using the average weight of all packages with a "sent to Mail Recovery Center" scan.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees in part with this recommendation. Management agrees to evaluate how it calculates the package conversion factor and will ensure incoming package volume estimates are updated on no less than an annual basis. Starting in FY2027 data will be collected throughout each month. Monthly, annual, and rolling conversion factors will be calculated from the assembled data and will feed automatically into daily and monthly reports. However, to ensure the most accurate conversion, the calculation will be based on the weight of all actual incoming volume, as opposed to only the "sent to Mail Recovery Center" scan volume which would result in an underestimation of the actual package volume processed by the MRC.

Target Implementation Date: 4/30/2027

Responsible Official: Executive Manager, Asset Performance & Accountability

Recommendation 2:
We recommend the **Vice President, Supply Management,** revise the Mail Recovery Center's package return rate to include all incoming packages and avoid double counting.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees in part with this recommendation and is currently in the process of updating the measurement system inclusive of packages. The revised return rate will be calculated on all volume for which there is opportunity to provide for a return to customers and which meets the criteria for returns.

Target Implementation Date: 11/30/2027

Responsible Official: Executive Manager, Asset Performance & Accountability

Recommendation 3:
We recommend the **Vice President, Supply Management,** track and complete the Mail Recovery Center's milestones for automating the data collection process.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation and has established milestones as part of the phased approach related to update of the measurement system. Due to the nature of certain operational processes, not all measurements can be automated; however, automation will be maximized and reduce the need for manual calculations improving data accuracy.

Target Implementation Date: 11/30/2027

Responsible Official: Executive Manager, Asset Performance & Accountability

Recommendation 4:
We recommend the **Vice President, Supply Management,** use revised data about the Mail Recovery Center's operations to assess the facility's metrics, operations, and mission, and update them as appropriate.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation and will use the implementation of the new measurement system to assess the facility's metrics, operations, and mission, and update them as appropriate.

Target Implementation Date: 11/30/2028

Responsible Official: Executive Manager, Asset Performance & Accountability

Recommendation 5:
We recommend the **Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations** evaluate scanning options for tracking sender-refused packages and implement a solution that improves visibility of the refusals through a dashboard or other accessible reporting mechanism.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management **disagrees** with this recommendation.

Management has demonstrated that scanning options already exist where employees have ability to apply a "Refused" event scan if a package is refused by the customer. It likewise has an event/reason code for "Refused" returns. Management will make the data readily available as needed - for review, cost-benefit analysis and decision-making.

Target Implementation Date: NA

Responsible Official: NA

Recommendation 6:
We recommend the **Executive Director, Product Solutions**, in coordination with the **Vice President, Technology Applications**, automatically charge the direct customer, which may not be the return addressee, for return-to-sender packages.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees in part with this recommendation. Management will review the feasibility of assessing a fee and automatically hold the direct shipper responsible for fees associated with return-to-sender parcels through vehicles such as Negotiated Service Agreements (NSA).

Target Implementation Date: 8/31/2027

Responsible Official: **Executive Director, Product Solutions** and **Vice President, Technology Applications**

Recommendation 7:
We recommend the **Executive Director, Product Solutions**, track sender-refused package data and use the data to generate a cost-benefit analysis for amending the Domestic Mail Manual to assess a fee for shipper-refused return-to-sender packages.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees in part with this recommendation. Management will conduct the analysis and evaluate amending the Domestic Mail Manual and assessing a fee for shipper-refused return-to-sender.

Target Implementation Date: 3/31/2027

Responsible Official: Executive Director, Product Solutions

Recommendation 8:
We recommend the **Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations,** develop updated standard work instructions for scanning, labeling, and endorsing dead mail at delivery units; provide the instructions to relevant personnel in the field; and verify they are implemented once received.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management **agrees** with this recommendation. Management will review and reissue instructions to relevant personnel at Delivery Units on the proper handling of undeliverable mail and require certification.

Target Implementation Date: 1/31/2027

Responsible Official: Director, Post Office Operations

Recommendation 9:
We recommend the **Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations** and the **Vice President of Processing Operations,** train field staff on updated dead mail placarding procedures and on repairing damaged packages internally instead of improperly sending them to the Mail Recovery Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management **agrees** with this recommendation. Management will reiterate damaged package repair and placarding procedures as appropriate to the operational group.

Target Implementation Date: 1/31/2027

Responsible Official: Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations and Vice President, Processing Operations

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on 2026-09-14 16:29:17 EDT

Mark A. Guilfoil
Vice President, Supply Management

E-SIGNED by angela.d LAWSON
on 2026-09-14 20:31:14 EDT

Angela D. Lawson
Vice President, Technology Applications

E-SIGNED by JASON.R DE CHAMBEAU
on 2026-09-14 21:43:20 EDT

Jason R. DeChambeau
Vice President, Processing Operations

E-SIGNED by Jennifer.T. Vo
on 2026-09-14 15:43:52 EDT

Jennifer T. Vo
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations

E-SIGNED by CHRISTOPHER.J KARPENKO
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Christopher J Karpenko
A/Executive Director, Product Solutions

cc: *Corporate Audit & Response Management*

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