# Efficiency of Operations at the Eugene Local Processing Center, Springfield, OR

## AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-102-R26 | August 18, 2026

# Table of Contents

# Transmittal Letter

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

August 18, 2026

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** BRIAN C. GAINES
PACIFIC COASTAL DIVISION DIRECTOR,
PROCESSING OPERATIONS

DWAYNE D. LEWIS
PACIFIC COASTAL DIVISION DIRECTOR,
LOGISTICS

**FROM:** Monica J. Brym
Director, Field Operations, Atlantic & WestPac

**SUBJECT:** Audit Report – Efficiency of Operations at the Eugene Local Processing Center, Springfield, OR (Report Number 26-102-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of the Efficiency of Operations at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

All recommendations require U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General's (OIG) concurrence before closure. Consequently, the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. Recommendations should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Rushanthi Leitan, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Chief Processing and Distribution Officer and Executive Vice President
Chief Logistics and Infrastructure Officer and Executive Vice President
Vice President, Processing and Maintenance Operations
Vice President, Logistics
Vice President, Western Regional Processing Operations
WestPac Regional Director, Logistics
Corporate Audit Response Management

# Results

## Background

The U.S. Postal Service needs effective and productive operations to fulfill its mission of providing prompt, reliable, and affordable mail service to the American public. It also has a vast transportation network that moves mail and equipment among approximately 308 processing facilities and 31,100 post offices, stations, and branches. The Postal Service is transforming its processing and logistics network to become scalable, reliable, visible, efficient, automated, and digitally integrated. This includes modernizing operating plans and aligning the workforce; leveraging emerging technologies to provide world-class visibility and tracking of mail packages in near real-time; and optimizing the surface and air transportation network. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews the efficiency of mail processing operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback to further the Postal Service's mission.

This report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the efficiency of operations at the Eugene Local Processing Center (LPC)[1] in Springfield, OR (Project Number 26-102). We judgmentally selected the Eugene LPC based on a review of Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures;[2] workhours; scanning compliance;[3] scanner accountability;[4] and late, canceled, and extra trips. The Eugene LPC is in the Pacific Coastal Division and processes letters, flats, and parcels. The Eugene LPC services two 3-digit ZIP Codes in urban and rural communities[5] (see Table 1).

### Table 1. Population Demographics

| 3-Digit ZIP Codes | Urban Population | Rural Population | Total Population |
|---|---|---|---|
| 974 | 433,360 | 160,454 | 593,814 |
| 977 | 164,944 | 94,152 | 259,096 |

Source: Postal Service National Distribution Labeling List and 2020 Census Bureau data.

## Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate the efficiency of operations at the Eugene LPC.

To accomplish our objective, we focused on the following audit areas: mail clearance times;[6] delayed mail; late, canceled, and extra outbound trips; dock scanning; scanner accountability; security of registry items; and safety and security. We reviewed Surface Visibility Web (SVWeb)[7] data for late, canceled, and extra trips, as well as scan compliance for the period from June 1, 2025, to May 31, 2026. Further, we identified mail clearance time goals for the Eugene LPC and compared them with operations shown in the Run Plan Generator report.[8] During our site visit the week of June 22, 2026, we interviewed LPC management and observed mail processing and dock operations. We also conducted a limited scope review of several safety and security items during the site observations.

During this time, the OIG also audited three delivery units[9] serviced by the Eugene LPC. We will provide the results of those audits to Postal Service management in separate reports. See Appendix A for additional information about our scope and methodology.

1 An LPC is a facility that processes destination mail for its service area and transfers mail and packages for delivery.
2 Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and there is a delay from the time it was collected to initial processing. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at the processing and distribution center on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.
3 Scans include load, depart, unload, close, assign, and arrive.
4 If a scanner becomes lost, plant management is responsible for retrieving the scanner from the last signed user, or to retrieve them if lost to another site.
5 We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.
6 Mail clearance time is the latest time committed mail can clear an operation for proper dispatch or delivery.
7 SVWeb is a Postal Service website, which provides real-time transportation updates and reports on the movement of trailers in the surface network. The data captured to identify early, on-time, late, or canceled trips is also used to evaluate and improve transportation schedules.
8 The Run Plan Generator is an application that mail processing facilities use to plan machine utilization based on volume, clearance times, and other criteria.
9 The three delivery units were the River Road Station, Eugene, OR (Project Number 26-103-1); the Roseburg Main Post Office, Roseburg, OR (Project number 26-103-2); and the Southside Station, Eugene, OR (Project Number 26-103-3).

## Results Summary

We identified deficiencies that affected the efficiency of operations at the Eugene LPC. We also observed several safety and security issues (see Table 2).

### Table 2. Summary of Results

| Audit Area | Issues Identified | |
|---|---|---|
| | Yes | No |
| Clearance Times | | X |
| Delayed Mail | X | |
| Late, Canceled, and Extra Outbound Trips | | X |
| Scan Compliance | | X |
| Scanner Accountability | X | |
| Security of Registry Items | X | |
| Safety and Security | X | |

Source: Results of OIG data reviewed from fiscal years 2025-2026 and fieldwork conducted from June 22 to 25, 2026.

For the audit areas where issues were not identified, we performed the following:

- Clearance Times – We analyzed mail processing schedules and data to verify that the plant was meeting the scheduled clearance times. During our visit, we also observed the timely processing of mail. We did not find any systemic issues.
- Late, Canceled, and Extra Outbound Trips – We observed departing trucks and analyzed data related to late, canceled, and extra outbound trips and did not find any systemic issues.
- Scan Compliance – We analyzed scan data and observed employees scanning the mail before loading it onto trucks. Our observations confirmed that the data reported in SVWeb was accurate.

# Finding #1: Delayed Mail

### What We Found

During our observations on June 24, 2026, we identified about 3,103 delayed packages near the Single Induction Package Sorter (SIPS)[10] area. These packages were collection mail from the delivery units that had arrived prior to the facility's critical entry time[11] of 3:00 p.m. but had not been processed for timely dispatch. In addition, management did not report these packages as delayed inventory in the Mail Condition Visualization (MCV)[12] system.

### Why Did it Occur

This occurred because management did not ensure that employees follow established mail staging and delayed mail reporting procedures. Specifically, mailhandlers did not stage mail in the order it arrived at the facility, resulting in delayed packages remaining in the SIPS area after the scheduled dispatch time. In addition, the relief supervisor responsible for conducting the mail condition review and entering delayed mail information into the MCV system was unfamiliar with the reporting process. Plant management acknowledged that these packages should have been reported as delayed mail in the MCV system.

### What Should Have Happened

As part of Postal Service practice, a delayed-mail count should be performed and accurately reported in the MCV system daily.[13] This practice indicates that mail not processed in time for the next operation should be reported as delayed mail. Postal Service policy[14] also states that management should continually gauge how well it is managing the flow of mail and have managerial control over the workload, personnel, and equipment needed for a well-run operation.

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is not processed in accordance with proper procedures, there is increased likelihood of delays. When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in the MCV system provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

### Management Actions

Following our observations regarding the recording of delayed mail, management revised the in-house mail count sheet to account for delayed mail.

#### Recommendation #1

We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations,** verify that the mail is properly staged for timely processing at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

#### Recommendation #2

We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations**, verify that delayed mail counts are completed and entered correctly into the Mail Condition Visualization system daily at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

#### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding and recommendations 1 and 2.

10 The Small Delivery Unit Sorter/Single Induction Package Sorter sorts packages and bundles of mail at a rate of 4,400 pieces an hour with 99.95 percent accuracy.
11 Critical entry time is the latest time that committed mail can be received in an operation and still be processed before clearance time to meet the service standard for mail processing, dispatch, and final delivery.
12 The MCV system provides near real-time visibility of a facility's on-hand volume, delayed processing volume, delayed dispatch volume, oldest mail date by mail category and processing operation, and stores historical trailer information.
13 *MCV Manual Line-Item Entry Job* Aid, updated March 30, 2026.
14 *USPS Plant Manager Handbook*, dated July 2024.

Regarding recommendation 1, management stated that a plan exists to ensure mail is processed on time and staged accurately. Management also stated that it will monitor delayed mail daily to ensure compliance with staged mail processing procedures. The target implementation date is October 31, 2026. See Appendix B for management's comments in their entirety.

Regarding recommendation 2, management stated that, in coordination with the newly assigned supervisor, it has completed training in delayed mail operating procedures and MCV entry protocols. Additionally, management stated that it will conduct reviews to monitor compliance. The target implementation date is November 30, 2026.

### OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations, and corrective actions should resolve the issues identified.

# Finding #2: Scanner Accountability

### What We Found

We identified eight out of 75 (11 percent) Surface Visibility (SV) scanners[15] assigned to the Eugene LPC in the Ethos system[16] that had not been used since March 3, 2026, or earlier. In addition, management did not conduct monthly inventory audits and did not consistently perform checks to verify that employees had returned scanners at the end of the tour.

### Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight for missing scanners and verify adherence to accountability requirements. Management was aware that these eight scanners were missing and confirmed during the site visit that these scanners were lost. However, management did not update the Ethos system to reflect these lost scanners. In addition, processing support management stated that it forgot to conduct monthly audits.

### What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy states that management establish minimum requirements for maintaining such accountability, including maintaining scanners in secure locations, tracking employee sign-in and sign-out, properly labeling scanners, requiring end of tour scanner returns, implementing standard follow-up procedures for missing scanners, and conducting monthly inventory audits.[17] Postal Service policy[18] also states that if a scanner becomes lost, site management is responsible for retrieving the scanner from the last signed-in user, or to retrieve it if lost to another site.

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Lack of controls and oversight of scanner accountability could lead to lost or stolen scanners. We consider the eight scanners that have not been used for over three months and could not be found as questioned costs[19] of $4,600. We also consider 67 scanners, valued at $38,525, at risk of being lost or stolen.[20] In addition, a lack of scanner accountability could impact scanning compliance. If there are not enough scanners for employees to perform load and unload scans, especially during peak dispatch hours, it could contribute to inaccurate trip utilization data, missent mail, and operational inefficiencies.

#### Recommendation #3

We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations**, remove all lost scanners from the Ethos system to ensure that the system accurately reflects the current inventory at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

#### Recommendation #4

We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations**, conduct monthly inventories of scanners and verify that all scanners are returned at the end of their tour at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

#### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding, recommendations 3 and 4, and the monetary impact.

Regarding recommendation 3, management stated that it has updated the Ethos system and requires daily sign-in and sign-out for all scanners to ensure accountability and operational efficiency. The target implementation date is January 31, 2027.

15 Scanners enable facilities to scan trays, tubs, and sacks of mail into containers and onto trailers and to track the mail across the surface network via wi-fi.
16 Ethos is a collection of applications that help track deployments, surveys, and other field communications for the deployment of major equipment programs.
17 *National Performance Initiative Playbook: SV Scanner Accountability,* August 2025.
18 *Surface Visibility Lost Scanner Recovery Quick Reference Guide*, updated May 21, 2025.
19 A questioned cost is a type of cost that the OIG believes is unnecessary, unreasonable, or an alleged violation of law, regulation, or contract. To calculate the total cost of these missing assets, we multiplied the eight scanners that had not been used in over three months and not located by the Postal Service's assigned value of $575 per scanner.
20 To calculate the value of the scanners at risk, we multiplied the 67 scanners by the Postal Service's assigned value of $575 per scanner.

Regarding recommendation 4, management stated that it will conduct monthly audits to physically review all scanners and ensure accountability. Additionally, management will conduct end of tour checks validating timely return of scanners. The target implementation date is November 30, 2026.

### OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations, and corrective actions should resolve the issues identified.

# Finding #3: Security of Registry Items

## What We Found

Management followed procedures to secure registry items at the Eugene LPC; however, we found that employees did not maintain a separate form when signing in and out employees and visitors who are not assigned to the registry section. In addition, on June 24 and 25, we observed a spare key for the registry cage that was not properly secured. The spare key was kept in a key cabinet located in a management office adjacent to the workroom floor. The office door had been left open, and the key to the cabinet was left inserted in the cabinet lock (see Figure 1).

### Figure 1. Open Management Office and Unsecure Key Cabinet


Source: OIG photos taken June 24, 2026.

## Why Did it Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to verify that proper sign-in and sign-out procedures were followed and to secure the spare registry key. Additionally, registry employees were unaware of the requirement to maintain two separate forms to document registry cage access by employees and visitors.

## What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy[21] requires employees regularly assigned to the registry section to sign-in and out of the registry section using Postal Service (PS) Form 1625, *Record of Entry - Registry Section,* and a separate PS Form 1625 to be used for any other employees or visitors. The policy also states that backup keys[22] must be secured onsite and restricted to designated staff, handed off directly, and documented at each shift changes.

21 Handbook DM-901, *Registry Mail*, Section 7-1.3.1, and 7-1.2 dated January 2016.
22 A backup key is a duplicate key used to access the registry cage.

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Registered Mail provides added protection to the customer by providing evidence of secure mail and delivery for valuable and important items. When Registered Mail is not secured in accordance with proper procedures, there is an increased risk of loss or theft of items, insurance claims, and customer dissatisfaction with the Registered Mail service, potentially impacting the brand.

### Management Actions

In response to our observations, management implemented a separate sign-in sheet for employees and visitors who are not assigned to the registry section and secured the backup key. Therefore, we are not making a recommendation on these issues.

# Finding #4: Safety and Security

### What We Found

During our site observations, we observed the following security and safety issues at the Eugene LPC:

- The truck entrance gate was left open (see Figure 2).
- Two dock access doors were propped open in the dock area (see Figure 3).
- Three of 12 drivers did not secure trailer doors when departing from the facility (see Figure 4).
- Eleven of 35 trucks and trailers parked at the docks did not have wheel chocks placed next to the tire to prevent them from rolling away (see Figure 5).
- One dock plate[23] extension did not retract properly, and another dock plate had skirting that was disconnected (see Figures 6 and 7).

#### Figure 2. Unsecured Truck Entrance

Source: OIG photo taken on June 24, 2026.

#### Figure 3. Two Doors Propped Open in the Dock Area




Source: OIG photos taken on June 24, 2026.

23 Dock plates are used to bridge the gap between a trailer and the loading dock for loading and unloading wheeled equipment from vehicles.

## Figure 4. Unsecured Trailer Door


Source: OIG photo taken June 24, 2026.

## Figure 5. Trailer Without Wheel Chock

Source: OIG photo taken June 24, 2026.

## Figure 6. Dock Extension Plate Is Not Retracted

Source: OIG photo taken June 24, 2026.

## Figure 7. Dock Plate Skirting Is Disconnected

Source: OIG photo taken June 24, 2026.

### Why Did It Occur

These issues were caused by lack of management oversight. Plant management acknowledged that the open truck entrance should be closed and stated that it was left open because the electronic badge reader for the truck entrance gate was not positioned correctly to allow the drivers to reach the badge reader from their trucks. On June 25, 2026, the day after we discovered this issue, we notified Postal Service headquarters senior management about the open truck entrance gate and dock doors, in accordance with the OIG's safety and security escalation protocol for reportable facility conditions.

In addition, management did not enforce or monitor the use of wheel chocks or verify that vehicles were secured in their daily yard check. Further, management did not monitor the use of locks to secure the mail when trucks depart from the dock.

Regarding the dock bays and plate repairs, management had not yet submitted a work order for repairs to the damaged dock plate and skirting. During the week of our visit, management submitted work orders and maintenance are following up on security upgrades for the truck entrance gate.

### What Should Have Happened

The Postal Service must preserve the security of the mail and ensure drivers comply with security policies regarding the transportation of mail in trailers. Postal Service policy[24] states that all doors to the cargo compartment must be equipped with locks and kept locked while enroute. Additionally, Postal Service policy[25] states that drivers must prevent trailers from rolling away from docks by using wheel chocks. In addition, The Postal Service requires[26] management to maintain a safe environment for employees and customers. Further, Postal Service Policy[27] requires entryways be designed to prevent customers, outsiders, off-duty employees, and visitors from entering the building.

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When employees do not observe safe working practices and safety rules, there is an increased risk of employee accidents and injuries. Also, when the Postal Service does not preserve and protect the security of the mail in its custody there is an increased risk of unauthorized opening, inspection, reading, tampering, delaying, or committing other unauthorized acts.

### Management Actions

Management took actions and provided evidence that it secured the truck entrance, as of June 26, 2026. In addition, on July 13, 2026, management provided evidence for support to show the two dock access doors were secured.

**Recommendation #5**

We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Logistics**, verify that all drivers are using wheel chocks at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

**Recommendation #6**

We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations**, verify that repairs are made to the dock plates at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

24 Handbook PO-515, *Highway Contractor Safety*, Section 448.2, dated July 2010.
25 Handbook EL-803, *Maintenance Employee's Guide to Safety*, Section 1, subsection C, dated July 2020.
26 Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook,* July 2020.
27 Handbook RE-5, *Building and Site Security Requirements*, Section 4-3.1 General Security Standards.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding and recommendations 5 and 6.

Regarding recommendation 5, management stated that it will conduct daily audits to ensure that all vehicles comply with safety and security protocols. The target implementation date is November 30, 2026.

Regarding recommendation 6, management stated that it has formally submitted PS Form 4805, *Maintenance Work Order Request*, to initiate the required repairs for the loading dock plates. The target implementation date is October 31, 2026.

### OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations, and corrective actions should resolve the issues identified.

# Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from June through August 2026, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on July 31, 2026, and included its comments where appropriate

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the mail processing operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following four components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Environment
- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to control environment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. Our recommendations, if implemented, should correct the weaknesses we identified.

We assessed the reliability of MCV, SVWeb, and Ethos data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data was sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

# Appendix B: Management's Comments

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

August 7, 2026

Laura Lozon
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: Efficiency of Operations at the Eugene Local Processing Center, Springfield, OR (26-102-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings and recommendations contained in the draft audit report, *Efficiency of Operations at the Eugene Local Processing Center, Springfield, OR*.

Management generally agrees with the findings in the report:

Finding #1: Delayed Mail
Finding #2: Scanner Accountability
Finding #3: Security of Registry Items
Finding #4: Safety and Security

Management also agrees with monetary impact related to scanner accountability

Following are our comments on each of the six recommendations.

**Recommendation 1:**
We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations,** verify that the mail is properly staged for timely processing at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.
A plan exists to ensure that the mail is processed on time and is staged accurately. Management will monitor daily to ensure compliance with staged mail processing procedures is timely.

Target Implementation Date: 10/31/2026

Responsible Official:
Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations

**Recommendation 2:**
We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations**, verify that delayed mail counts are completed and entered correctly into the Mail Condition Visualization system daily at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.
Management in coordination with the newly assigned supervisor, have successfully completed formal training on delayed mail operating procedures and proper MCV entry protocols. Additionally, management will conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

Target Implementation Date: 11/30/2026

Responsible Official:
Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations

Recommendation 3:
We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations**, remove all lost scanners from the Ethos system to ensure that the system accurately reflects the current inventory at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.
Management has updated Ethos system by removing missing scanners and requires daily sign-in and sign-out for all scanners to ensure accountability and operational efficiency.

Target Implementation Date: 01/31/2027

Responsible Official:
Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations

Recommendation 4:
We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations**, conduct monthly inventories of scanners and verify that all scanners are returned at the end of their tour at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.
Management will conduct monthly audits physical reviews for all scanners to ensure accountability. Management will conduct end of tour checks validating timely return of scanners to stock.

Target Implementation Date: 11/30/2026

Responsible Official:
Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations

Recommendation 5:
We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Logistics**, verify that all drivers are using wheel chocks at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.
Management will conduct daily audits to ensure all vehicles comply with safety and security protocols.

Target Implementation Date: 11/30/2026

Responsible Official:
Pacific Coastal Division Director, Logistics

**Recommendation 6:**
We recommend the **Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations**, verify that repairs are made to the dock plates at the Eugene Local Processing Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.
Management has formally submitted PS Form 4805 (Maintenance Work Order Request) to initiate the required repairs for the loading dock plates.

Target Implementation Date: 10/31/2026

Responsible Official:
Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations

E-SIGNED by BRIAN.C GAINES
on 2026-08-07 13:15:39 EDT

BRIAN C. GAINES
Pacific Coastal Division Director, Processing Operations

E-SIGNED by Dwayne.D Lewis
on 2026-08-07 12:50:39 EDT

DWAYNE D. LEWIS
Pacific Coastal Division Director, Logistics

cc: *Corporate Audit & Response Management*

Contact us via our Hotline and FOIA forms. Follow us on social networks. Stay informed.

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