

# Loch Raven Branch, Towson, MD: Delivery Operations

## AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-077-2-R26 | June 17, 2026



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# Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

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June 17, 2026

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** LORA M. MCLUCAS  
MANAGER, MARYLAND DISTRICT

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Monica J. Brym", is positioned below the recipient information.

**FROM:** Monica J. Brym  
Director, Field Operations, Atlantic & WestPac

**SUBJECT:** Audit Report – Loch Raven Branch, Towson, MD: Delivery Operations  
(Report Number 26-077-2-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Loch Raven Branch in Towson, MD.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Ricardo Martinez, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General  
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer & Executive Vice President  
Vice President, Delivery Operations  
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations  
Vice President, Atlantic Area Retail & Delivery Operations  
Director, Retail & Post Office Operations Maintenance  
Corporate Audit and Response Management

# Results


## Background

The U.S. Postal Service’s mission is to provide timely, reliable, secure, and affordable mail and package delivery to more than 160 million residential and business addresses across the country. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews delivery operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback in furtherance of this mission.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Loch Raven Branch in Towson, MD (Project Number 26-077-2). The Loch Raven Branch is in the Maryland District of the Atlantic Area and serves about 47,721 people in ZIP Codes 21204, 21252,<sup>1</sup> and 21286, which are considered a predominantly urban area (see Figure 1).<sup>2</sup> The facility also services ZIP Code 21284 for PO Boxes and business customers.

This delivery unit has 46 city routes. From February 21 through March 20, 2026, the delivery unit had five supervisors assigned.<sup>3</sup> In addition, the unit had a relief supervisor during our visit. The Loch Raven Branch falls under the Baltimore Post Office for employee availability<sup>4</sup> measurement. As of March 31, 2026, the year-to-date employee availability rate for the Baltimore Post Office was 85.12 percent, which is less than the Postal Service’s retail and delivery operations employee availability goal of 93.95 percent for fiscal year 2026. The Loch Raven Branch is one of four delivery units<sup>5</sup> the OIG reviewed during the week of April 13, 2026, that are serviced by the Baltimore Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC).

**Figure 1. ZIP Codes Served by the Loch Raven Branch**



Source: OIG analysis of ZIP Code data.

We assessed all units serviced by the Baltimore P&DC based on the number of Customer 360 (C360)<sup>6</sup> delivery-related inquiries,<sup>7</sup> stop-the-clock (STC)<sup>8</sup> scans performed away from the delivery point and at the unit, undelivered route information, and Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures<sup>9</sup> between November 1, 2025, and March 15, 2026.

We judgmentally selected the Loch Raven Branch primarily based on the number of C360 inquiries related to delivery, STC scans performed at the delivery unit, and Leg 1 failures. The unit also had undelivered routes. See [Table 1](#) for a comparison of some of these metrics between the unit and the rest of the district.

<sup>1</sup> ZIP Code 21252 is a specialized ZIP Code assigned to Towson University in Towson, MD.  
<sup>2</sup> We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.  
<sup>3</sup> Assignments based on the Postal Service’s Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS). TACS is the system used by the Postal Service to automate the collection of employee time and attendance information.  
<sup>4</sup> The Postal Service calculates employee availability by dividing straight time hours worked by potential straight time hours. Potential straight time hours generally include actual straight time hours worked, sick leave taken, and leave without pay.  
<sup>5</sup> The other three units were the Hampden Roland Park Station, Baltimore, MD (Project Number 26-077-1); the Nottingham Branch, Nottingham, MD (Project Number 26-077-3); and the Raspeburg Station, Baltimore, MD (Project Number 26-077-4).  
<sup>6</sup> Customer 360 is a cloud-based application that enables Postal Service employees to diagnose, resolve, and track customer inquiries.  
<sup>7</sup> Delivery-related inquiries include a compilation of package inquiry, package pickup, daily mail service, and hold mail inquiries.  
<sup>8</sup> A STC scan is a scan event that indicates the Postal Service has completed its commitment to deliver or attempt to deliver the mailpiece. Examples of STC scans include “Delivered,” “Available for Pickup,” and “No Access.”  
<sup>9</sup> Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the origin processing facility on the day that it was intended. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at the final processing facility on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.

**Table 1. Delivery Metric Comparison Between November 1, 2025, and March 15, 2026**

Delivery Metric	Unit	District
C360 Delivery Inquiries (average per route)	5.9	5.2
STC Scans at the Unit (average per route)	19.3	9.4
Leg 1 Failures (percent of sampled pieces)	26.1	10.2

Source: OIG analysis of Postal Service's C360, Informed Visibility, and Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data extracted March 19, 2026. Informed Visibility provides service performance measurements and diagnostics of market-dominant products, mail inventory, and predictive workloads of all mail. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

### Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate mail delivery operations and property conditions at the Loch Raven Branch in Towson, MD.

To accomplish our objective, we combined preliminary data analyses with an on-site inspection performed April 14–16, 2026. Prior to the visit, we analyzed staffing levels, mail arrival times, package scanning performance, reported mail delays and arrow key<sup>10</sup> inventories, Voyager card<sup>11</sup> exceptions, and property safety and security issues. While on-site, we reviewed operational compliance focusing on mail conditions, package scanning procedures, arrow key accountability, carrier separation and transfer documentation, Voyager card exception justification, property safety and security conditions. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on May 28, 2026, and included its comments, where appropriate.

We are issuing this interim report to provide the Postal Service with timely information regarding conditions we identified at the Loch Raven Branch. We will issue a separate capping report<sup>12</sup> that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for all four delivery units, as well as the district. The capping report will include actions taken by management to address the issues

<sup>10</sup> Arrow keys are distinctively shaped keys that carriers use to open mail-receiving receptacles, such as street collection boxes and panels of apartment house mailboxes equipped with an arrow lock. Arrow keys are accountable property and are subject to strict controls.

<sup>11</sup> The U.S. Postal Service uses credit cards, called Voyager cards, to pay for commercially purchased fuel, oil, and routine maintenance for its vehicles.

<sup>12</sup> The capping report project number is 26-077.

identified in this interim report. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

### Results Summary

We identified issues affecting delivery operations and property conditions at the Loch Raven Branch. Specifically, we found issues with four of the areas we reviewed (see Table 2).

**Table 2. Summary of Results**

Audit Area	Deficiencies Identified	
	Yes	No
Delayed Mail	X	
Package Scanning	X	
Arrow Keys	X	
Carrier Separations and Transfers		X
Voyager Card Transactions		X
Property Conditions	X	

Source: Results of our fieldwork during the week of April 13, 2026.

For the audit areas where issues were not identified, we performed the following:

- Carrier Separations and Transfers – We analyzed employee data from February 7 through March 20, 2026. All carriers assigned to the unit either reported to work or were accounted for by management during this time, indicating no issues with employee separations and transfers.
- Voyager Card Transactions – We analyzed Voyager card premium fuel transactions from October 6, 2025, through April 2, 2026, and identified six premium fuel purchases. We did not identify any recurring systemic issues.
- We did not identify issues with the safeguarding of arrow keys but did identify issues with the management of arrow keys (see [Finding #3](#)).

# Finding #1: Delayed Mail

## What We Found

On the morning of April 14, 2026, we identified 4,465 delayed mailpieces<sup>13</sup> at 29 out of 46 carrier cases, the hot case,<sup>14</sup> and an overflow area designated for Hold Mail<sup>15</sup> service. Specifically, we identified 1,181 letters, 3,258 flats, and 26 packages. In the Hold Mail overflow area, we observed mail dating as far back as 2019 with no evidence of an active customer Hold

Mail request. In addition, management did not report this mail as undelivered in the Delivery Condition Visualization (DCV)<sup>16</sup> system. See Table 3 for the number of pieces for each mail type and Figures 2 and 3 for examples of delayed mail found at a carrier case and the hot case. Further, the carriers did not complete Postal Service (PS) Forms 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*,<sup>17</sup> to document undelivered mailpieces.

**Table 3. Types of Delayed Mail Identified**

Type of Mail	Carrier Cases	Hot Case	Hold Mail Overflow	Total Count of Delayed Mail
Letters	1,052	11	118	1,181
Flats	1,385	1,017	856	3,258
Packages	6	0	20	26
<b>Totals</b>	<b>2,443</b>	<b>1,028</b>	<b>994</b>	<b>4,465</b>

Source: OIG count of delayed mailpieces identified during our visit on April 14, 2026.

**Figure 2. Delayed Mail at a Carrier Case**



Source: OIG photo taken before carriers arrived on the morning of April 14, 2026.

**Figure 3. Delayed Mail at the Hot Case**



Source: OIG photo taken before carriers arrived on the morning of April 14, 2026.

<sup>13</sup> Count of mail included individual piece counts and OIG estimate based on Postal Service conversion factors in Handbook M-32, *Management Operating Data Systems*, September 2022, Appendix D.

<sup>14</sup> The hot case is a case designated for final withdrawal of mail as carriers leave the office.

<sup>15</sup> Hold Mail is a service provided by the Postal Service that allows customers to request that the Postal Service hold their mail instead of delivering it, for a minimum of 3 days and a maximum of 30 days.

<sup>16</sup> The DCV system is a tool for unit management to manually self-report delayed mail, which provides a snapshot of daily mail conditions at the point in time when carriers have departed for the street.

<sup>17</sup> PS Form 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*, lists all mail distributed to the carrier for delivery that was left in the office or returned undelivered.

## Why Did It Occur

Management did not follow established procedures and did not provide sufficient oversight to verify that all mail was cleared from the unit. Specifically, the PM supervisor did not enforce the redline<sup>18</sup> process that requires interacting with each carrier as they returned from their routes with undelivered mail and verifying if carriers completed PS Forms 1571. The supervisor's desk did not allow for a clear line of sight to see all carriers as they returned from their routes and supervisors did not conduct a walkthrough to confirm that carrier cases were cleared of mail. As a result, supervisors were unaware of undelivered mail that needed to be reported in the DCV system. Also, the unit manager relied on the carriers to clear mail from the Hold Mail overflow area but did not monitor this area to verify that mail with expired holds received appropriate disposition.

## What Should Have Happened

Management should have followed required procedures to ensure that all committed mail was delivered daily. Postal Service policy<sup>19</sup> states that all types of First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express are always committed for delivery on the day of receipt. Also, policy<sup>20</sup> states that delivery units must follow the redline process, which

includes carriers completing a PS Form 1571 for any undelivered mail brought back to the delivery unit. Additionally, management is required<sup>21</sup> to report all mail in the delivery unit after the carriers have left for their street duties as either delayed or curtailed in the DCV system. Further, management should have monitored the Hold Mail overflow area to ensure that mail with an expired hold was delivered, returned to sender, or received other appropriate disposition per Postal policy.<sup>22</sup>

## Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in the DCV system provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

<sup>18</sup> The redline process is a standardized framework encompassing manager and carrier responsibilities after carriers return to the delivery unit upon completion of delivery assignments, ensuring that any mail returned from the street is identified with a signed completed PS Form 1571 and that no mail is taken back to the carrier case.

<sup>19</sup> *Committed Mail & Color Code Policy for Marketing Mail* stand-up talk, February 2019.

<sup>20</sup> *Redline Policy Standard Operating Procedures*.

<sup>21</sup> *Informed Visibility Delivery Conditions Visualization*, Report Notes, October 8, 2025.

<sup>22</sup> *Domestic Mail Manual*, April 2026.

# Finding #2: Package Scanning

## What We Found

Employees scanned packages improperly at the delivery unit, scanned packages away from the intended delivery point, and handled packages incorrectly at the unit. We also found issues with employee scanner barcode management.

We reviewed package scanning data for scans that occurred at the unit and removed any potentially accurate scans performed.<sup>23</sup> In total, employees improperly scanned 604 packages at the delivery unit between December 2025 and February 2026 (see Table 4). Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 95.2 percent of them were scanned “Delivered.”

**Table 4. STC Scans at Delivery Unit**

STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivered	575	95.2
Delivery Attempted - No Access to Delivery Location	26	4.3
Receptacle Full/Item Oversized	2	0.3
No Secure Location Available	1	0.2
<b>Total</b>	<b>604</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

We also reviewed 127 scans occurring away from the delivery unit and more than 1,000 feet<sup>24</sup> from the intended delivery point between December 2025 and February 2026 (see Table 5). We removed scans that could have been performed within policy, such as “Animal Interference” and “Unsafe Conditions.” Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 81.9 percent of them were scanned “Delivered.”

**Table 5. STC Scans More Than 1,000 Feet Away From the Delivery Point**

STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivered	104	81.9
Delivery Attempted - No Access to Delivery Location	12	9.4
Delivered to Agent for Final Delivery	11	8.7
<b>Total</b>	<b>127</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s PTR System data.


On the morning of April 14, 2026, before carriers arrived for the day, we selected 30 packages from the carrier cases and Hold Mail overflow area to review and analyze scanning and tracking history. Of the 30 sampled packages, six (20 percent) had improper scans or handling issues, including:

- One package was scanned “Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location” .3 miles away from the delivery point. Scans should be made as close to the delivery point as possible.
- Two packages were scanned “Held at Post Office at Customer Request” between 1.1 and 2.3 miles away (see Figure 4) from the point of delivery. There were no customer Hold Mail requests for these packages.
- Three packages were scanned, “Delivered, In/At Mailbox”, which should only be performed when a package is successfully left at the customer’s delivery point.

<sup>23</sup> This data does not include scans that could properly be made at a delivery unit, such as “Delivered - PO Box” and “Customer (Vacation) Hold.” Additionally, PO Box scans at the unit were only counted when the delivery point was an address away from the unit. This category does not include mail addressed for a PO Box.

<sup>24</sup> Packages are expected to be scanned within a designated buffer distance from the delivery point. The OIG evaluates any package that was scanned more than 1,000 feet from the delivery point.

**Figure 4. Scan 2.3 Miles Away From the Delivery Point in Towson, Maryland**



Source: Postal Service Single Package Look Up.

Additionally, employee scanner login barcodes were not properly managed at the facility. Specifically, several carrier cases contained a sticker with the employee badge barcode, which could allow employees to log into a scanner as someone else.

### Why Did It Occur

The scanning issues occurred because unit management did not monitor the type of scan or location where carriers scanned packages. Management stated that its review of scanning exceptions focused on verifying that all packages received an STC scan, and they relied on the district to alert them of other scanning issues. Management also stated that for most<sup>25</sup> of the identified improper scans, the carriers should have used firm sheets<sup>26</sup> to correctly capture the STC scan when delivering multiple packages at one delivery address. In

addition, some carriers stated that they sometimes forgot to scan packages when a delivery attempt was unsuccessful and later scanned the package to stop the clock.

Finally, management did not notice that the employee login barcodes were left unsecured on the carrier cases.

### What Should Have Happened

Management should have monitored scan performance daily and enforced compliance. The Postal Service's goal is to ensure proper delivery attempts for mailpieces to the correct address,<sup>27</sup> which includes scanning packages at the time and location of delivery.<sup>28</sup> In addition, the facility head must control and issue temporary badges to authorized personnel who arrive without their assigned badge during normal duty hours.<sup>29</sup>

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Customers rely on accurate scan data to track their packages in real time. When employees do not scan mailpieces correctly, customers are unable to determine the actual status of their packages. By improving scanning operations, management can improve mail visibility, increase customer satisfaction, and enhance the customer experience and the Postal Service brand.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>25</sup> 547 out of 604 (91 percent) of the combined scans in Table 4.

<sup>26</sup> A firm sheet combines deliveries for a single address on one form so a carrier can scan just one barcode when delivering multiple packages to a single address.

<sup>27</sup> *Delivery Done Right the First Time* stand-up talk, March 2020.

<sup>28</sup> *Carriers Delivering the Customer Experience* stand-up talk, July 2017.

<sup>29</sup> AS-805 *Information Security*, September 2022.

## Finding #3: Arrow Keys

### What We Found

Unit management did not properly update the arrow key inventory log. On the morning of April 15, 2026, we reviewed the unit's arrow key certification list in the Retail and Delivery Applications and Reports (RADAR)<sup>30</sup> system and conducted a physical inventory of keys at the unit. Unit management reported 66 keys in RADAR as "In-Use", "Damaged" or "In-Vault." Based on our physical review of the arrow keys at the unit, 18 of the 66 keys were missing, and we found an additional 15 keys at the unit that were not recorded in RADAR. Unit management did not report any of the 18 missing keys to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

### Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to properly account for arrow keys at the unit. Specifically, the unit manager was not aware of the missing and extra keys because she relied on the supervisors to certify the arrow key list in RADAR and she did not verify that the supervisors properly reconciled the list to the physical keys on hand.

Also, management did not report the missing keys to the Inspection Service since it was unaware they were missing.

### What Should Have Happened

Management should have verified that arrow key management procedures were properly followed. According to Postal Service policy,<sup>31</sup> management must keep an accurate inventory of all arrow keys. Any missing keys must be immediately reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there is insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is increased risk of mail theft. These thefts damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system. Additionally, because arrow keys open mail receptacles, lost or damaged keys can result in undelivered mail.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>30</sup> The arrow key certification in RADAR provides a national platform for all facilities to verify current inventory and account for all arrow keys.

<sup>31</sup> *Standard Work Instruction: U.S. Postal Service Arrow Key Guidebook*, dated March 2025.

# Finding #4: Property Conditions

## What We Found

We found safety and security issues related to property conditions at the Loch Raven Branch.

### Property Safety

- All 11 fire extinguishers lacked evidence of annual inspections. Annual inspection tags for seven fire extinguishers were dated September 2019 (see Figure 5) and four fire extinguishers had no tag to indicate the last annual inspection date. Two of 11 fire extinguishers had no tag to indicate the last monthly inspection date.
- Two of 11 fire extinguishers were blocked (see Figure 6).
- A large pile of wood pallets and cardboard for disposal/recycling was present in the dock area, adjacent to stored flammables (see Figure 7).
- The color and lettering on a ‘Stop’ sign by the employee parking lot exit was faded (see Figure 8).

**Figure 5. Fire Extinguisher Missing Annual Inspection**



Source: OIG photo taken on April 15, 2026.

**Figure 6. Blocked Fire Extinguisher**



Source: OIG photo taken on April 15, 2026.

**Figure 7. Wood Pallets and Cardboard in the Dock Area**

Pallets and Cardboard Located Near Stored Flammables



Stored Flammables



Source: OIG photos taken on April 15, 2026.

**Figure 8. Faded Stop Sign**



Source: OIG photo taken on April 15, 2026.

**Property Security**


- Security fencing was severely damaged in multiple areas (see Figure 9).
- The [REDACTED] leaving the [REDACTED] unsecured during non-business hours (see Figures 10 and 11).
- The 'Vehicles Subject to Search' sign posted at the employee parking lot entrance was faded and not legible (see Figure 12).

**Figure 9. Damaged Security Fence**




Source: OIG photo taken on April 15, 2026.

**Figure 10. [REDACTED]**



Source: OIG photo taken on April 15, 2026.

**Figure 11. [REDACTED]**



Source: OIG photo taken on April 15, 2026.

**Figure 12. Faded Sign**



Source: OIG photo taken on April 15, 2026.

### Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight and take the necessary actions to verify that property condition issues were corrected. Specifically:

- Management did not have a process to verify that all facility fire extinguishers were identified and inspections were completed as required by policy.
- Management did not address blocked fire extinguishers because it did not consider them to be safety/security concerns and was unaware of Postal requirements.
- Management did not address the pile of pallets and cardboard on the dock because it overlooked the safety concern of their proximity to stored flammables.
- Management did not address the damaged fencing or faded stop sign because it did not know how to address repairs on the leased property and did not further follow up with district management to address the issue.

- Management did not follow up on a maintenance request ticket related to the [REDACTED] after the ticket was closed without repairs being completed.
- Management did not replace the "Vehicles Subject to Search" sign because it did not realize the extent to which the sign had faded.

### What Should Have Happened

The Postal Service requires management to maintain a safe environment for employees and customers. Management should have provided sufficient oversight of personnel responsible for maintaining facilities, reported safety and security issues as they arose, and followed up for completion.<sup>32</sup>

In accordance with OSHA requirements,<sup>33</sup> all portable fire extinguishers must receive both annual and monthly inspections and access should be unblocked. Also, according to policy,<sup>34</sup> security fencing is required for every postal facility greater than 10,000 square feet and the Postal Service is required to provide signage that vehicles may be subject to search. In accordance with Maryland Department of Transportation requirements,<sup>35</sup> the STOP sign should have a red background and white letters and border.

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Management's attention to safety and security deficiencies can reduce the risk of injuries to employees and customers; reduce related costs, such as workers' compensation claims, lawsuits, and penalties; reduce the likelihood of theft and mail tampering; and enhance the customer experience and Postal Service brand. In addition, proper signage in the employee parking lot could reduce the risk of employee theft and associated costs.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>32</sup> Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, July 2020.

<sup>33</sup> Occupational Safety and Health Administration, 29 CFR Part 1910.157.

<sup>34</sup> Handbook RE-5, *Building and Site Requirements*, September 2009.

<sup>35</sup> Maryland Department of Transportation, *Manual on Uniform Traffic Control Devices*, 2011 Edition.

# Appendix A: Additional Information

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We conducted this audit from March through June 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the delivery operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. We will issue a separate report that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for the Hampden Roland Park Station, the Nottingham Branch, and the Raspeburg Station, as well as the district.

We assessed the reliability of PTR and DCV data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

# Appendix B: Management's Comments



June 1, 2026

LAURA LOZON  
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: Loch Raven Branch, Towson, MD: Delivery Operations  
(Report Number 26-077-2-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings contained in the draft audit report, *Loch Raven Branch, Towson, MD: Delivery Operations*

Management generally agrees with the four findings related to delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys, and property conditions.

Management has begun taking steps to address the four findings.

*Delayed Mail:* Management will conduct a service talk on proper handling and recording of delayed mail in DCV. Management will also reiterate the requirement to use PS Form 1571 *Undelivered Mail Report* and follow the *Redline process*. Management has put a process in place to monitor hold mail overflow area. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

*Package Scanning:* Management will provide a service talk on proper scanning procedures and conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

*Arrow Keys:* Management will update the inventory log to reflect all arrow keys on hand and report all missing keys to the US Postal Inspection Service. Management will also conduct training on proper management and security of arrow keys. Additionally, reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

*Property Conditions:* Management has abated five safety and security issues and is working to abate the other security issues found during the audit, which requires the submission of workorders for assistance from other resources.

E-SIGNED by Lora Mclucas  
on 2026-06-01 09:57:23 EDT

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Lora M. McLucas  
District Manager, Maryland District

cc: *Vice President, Area Retail & Delivery Operations (Atlantic)*  
*Corporate Audit Response Management*

# OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE



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