

Hampden Roland Park Station, Baltimore, MD: Delivery Operations

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-077-1-R26 | June 17, 2026



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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

June 17, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR: LORA M. MCLUCAS
MANAGER, MARYLAND DISTRICT

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Monica J. Brym", is positioned below the recipient information.

FROM: Monica J. Brym
Director, Field Operations, Atlantic & WestPac

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Hampden Roland Park Station, Baltimore, MD: Delivery
Operations (Report Number 26-077-1-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Hampden Roland Park Station in Baltimore, MD.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Ricardo Martinez, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer & Executive Vice President
Vice President, Delivery Operations
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations
Vice President, Atlantic Area Retail & Delivery Operations
Director, Retail & Post Office Operations Maintenance
Corporate Audit and Response Management

Results


Background

The U.S. Postal Service’s mission is to provide timely, reliable, secure, and affordable mail and package delivery to more than 160 million residential and business addresses across the country. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews delivery operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback in furtherance of this mission.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Hampden Roland Park Station in Baltimore, MD (Project Number 26-077-1). The Hampden Roland Park Station is in the Maryland District of the Atlantic Area and serves about 31,941 people in ZIP Codes 21210 and 21211, which are considered urban communities (see Figure 1).¹

This delivery unit has 29 city routes. From February 21, 2026, through March 20, 2026, the delivery unit had one station manager and three supervisors assigned.² During our visit, the management team working at the unit consisted of the station manager, three supervisors and one relief supervisor. The Hampden Roland Park Station falls under the Baltimore Post Office for employee availability³ measurement. As of March 2026, the year-to-date employee availability rate for the Baltimore Post Office was 85.12 percent, which is less than the Postal Service’s retail and delivery operations employee availability goal of 93.95 percent for fiscal year 2026. The Hampden Roland Park Station is one of four delivery units⁴ the OIG reviewed during the week of April 13, 2026, that are serviced by the Baltimore Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC).

Figure 1. ZIP Codes Served by the Hampden Roland Park Station



Source: OIG analysis of ZIP Code data.

We assessed all units serviced by the Baltimore P&DC based on the number of Customer 360 (C360)⁵ delivery-related inquiries,⁶ stop-the-clock (STC)⁷ scans performed away from the delivery point and at the unit, undelivered route information, and Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures⁸ between November 1, 2025, and March 15, 2026.

We judgmentally selected the Hampden Roland Park Station primarily based on the number of C360 inquiries related to delivery, STC scans performed away from the delivery point, and Leg 3 failures. The unit also had undelivered routes. See [Table 1](#) for a comparison of some of these metrics between the unit and the rest of the district.

¹ We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.
² Assignments based on the Postal Service’s Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS). TACS is the system used by the Postal Service to automate the collection of employee time and attendance information.
³ The Postal Service calculates employee availability by dividing straight time hours worked by potential straight time hours. Potential straight time hours generally include actual straight time hours worked, sick leave taken, and leave without pay.
⁴ The other three units were the Loch Raven Branch, Towson, MD (Project Number 26-077-2); the Nottingham Branch, Nottingham, MD (Project Number 26-077-3); and the Raspeburg Station, Baltimore, MD (Project Number 26-077-4).
⁵ Customer 360 is a cloud-based application that enables Postal Service employees to diagnose, resolve, and track customer inquiries.
⁶ Delivery-related inquiries include a compilation of package inquiry, package pickup, daily mail service, and hold mail inquiries.
⁷ An STC scan is a scan event that indicates the Postal Service has completed its commitment to deliver or attempt to deliver the mailpiece. Examples of STC scans include “Delivered,” “Available for Pickup,” and “No Access.”
⁸ Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the origin processing facility on the day that it was intended. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at the final processing facility on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.

Table 1. Delivery Metric Comparison Between November 1, 2025, Through March 15, 2026

| Delivery Metric | Unit | District |
|--|-------|----------|
| C360 Delivery Inquiries (average per route) | 5.6 | 5.2 |
| Scans More Than 1,000 Feet From Delivery Point (average per route) | 186.5 | 10.3 |
| Leg 3 Failures (percent of sampled pieces) | 2.6 | 1.7 |

Source: OIG analysis of Postal Service's C360, Informed Visibility, and Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data extracted March 19, 2026. Informed Visibility provides service performance measurement and diagnostics of market-dominant products, mail inventory, and predictive workloads of all mail. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate mail delivery operations and property conditions at the Hampden Roland Park Station in Baltimore, MD.

To accomplish our objective, we combined preliminary data analyses with an on-site inspection performed April 14–16, 2026. Prior to the visit, we analyzed staffing levels, mail arrival times, package scanning performance, reported mail delays and arrow key⁹ inventories, Voyager card¹⁰ exceptions, and property safety and security issues. While on-site, we reviewed operational compliance focusing on mail conditions, package scanning procedures, arrow key accountability, carrier separation and transfer documentation, Voyager card exception justification, property safety and security conditions. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on May 28, 2026, and included its comments, where appropriate.

We are issuing this interim report to provide the Postal Service with timely information regarding conditions we identified at the Hampden Roland Park Station. We will issue a separate capping report¹¹ that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for all four delivery units, as well as the district. The capping report will include

actions taken by management to address the issues identified in this interim report. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

Results Summary

We identified issues affecting delivery operations and property conditions at the Hampden Roland Park Station. Specifically, we found issues with four of the areas we reviewed (see Table 2).

Table 2. Summary of Results

| Audit Area | Deficiencies Identified | |
|-----------------------------------|-------------------------|----|
| | Yes | No |
| Delayed Mail | X | |
| Package Scanning | X | |
| Arrow Keys | X | |
| Carrier Separations and Transfers | | X |
| Voyager Card Transactions | | X |
| Property Conditions | X | |

Source: Results of our fieldwork during the week of April 13, 2026.

For the audit areas where issues were not identified, we performed the following:

- Arrow Keys – We did not identify issues with the management of arrow keys but did identify an issue with the safeguarding of arrow keys (see [Finding 3](#)).
- Carrier Separations and Transfers – We analyzed employee data from February 7 through March 20, 2026. All carriers assigned to the unit either reported to work or were accounted for by management during this time, indicating no issues with employee separations and transfers.
- Voyager Card Transactions – We analyzed Voyager card premium fuel transactions from October 6, 2025, through April 2, 2026, and identified three premium fuel purchases. We did not identify any recurring systemic issues.

⁹ Arrow keys are distinctively shaped keys that carriers use to open mail-receiving receptacles, such as street collection boxes and panels of apartment house mailboxes equipped with an arrow lock. Arrow keys are accountable property and are subject to strict controls.

¹⁰ The U.S. Postal Service uses credit cards, called Voyager cards, to pay for commercially purchased fuel, oil, and routine maintenance for its vehicles.

¹¹ The capping report project number is 26-077.

Finding #1: Delayed Mail

What We Found

On the morning of April 14, 2026, we identified 295 delayed mailpieces,¹² primarily at one of 29 carrier cases. Management did not report this mail as undelivered in the Delivery Condition Visualization (DCV)¹³ system. While the delayed mail pieces in the carrier case was a nominal amount, we also found 1,712 pieces of undelivered missent, missorted, and missequenced Delivery Point Sequenced¹⁴ mail, which management also did not report in the DCV system. According to the DCV system, the unit had not reported any undelivered mail since February 9, 2026.

Why Did It Occur

These issues occurred because management did not follow required procedures to check for and report delayed mail and did not provide necessary oversight to verify that mail was delivered timely. The PM supervisor stated that the route that had most of the delayed mail was assigned to a newer City Carrier Assistant unfamiliar with the route,¹⁵ and the supervisor did not check this mail when the carrier returned to the unit.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have followed required procedures to ensure that all committed mail was delivered daily. Postal Service policy¹⁶ states that all types of First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express are always committed for delivery on the day of receipt. In addition, managers are required¹⁷ to report all mail in the delivery unit after the carriers have left for their street duties as either delayed or curtailed in the DCV system. Further, management must update the DCV system if volumes have changed prior to the end of the business day.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in the DCV system provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

¹² We identified 279 letters and 16 flats.

¹³ DCV is a tool for unit management to manually self-report delayed mail, which provides a snapshot of daily mail conditions at the point in time when carriers have departed for the street.

¹⁴ Delivery Point Sequence is an automated process of sorting mail by carrier routes into delivery order, eliminating the need for carriers to sort the mail manually in the delivery unit prior to their departure to the routes.

¹⁵ City Carrier Assistants are temporary workers that the Postal Service hires to supplement its regular workforce.

¹⁶ *Committed Mail & Color Code Policy for Marketing Mail* stand-up talk, February 2019.

¹⁷ *DCV User Guide*, October 2025.

Finding #2: Package Scanning

What We Found

Employees scanned packages improperly at the delivery unit, scanned packages away from the intended delivery point, and handled packages incorrectly at the unit.

We reviewed package scanning data for scans that occurred at the unit and removed any potentially accurate scans performed.¹⁸ In total, employees improperly scanned 104 packages at the delivery unit between December 2025 and February 2026 (see Table 3). Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 78.8 percent of them were scanned “Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location.”

Table 3. STC Scans at Delivery Unit

| STC Scan Type | Count | Percent |
|---|------------|-------------|
| Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location | 82 | 78.8 |
| Delivered | 17 | 16.3 |
| Receptacle Full / Item Oversized | 5 | 4.8 |
| Total | 104 | 100* |

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

*Total percentage does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

We also reviewed 4,043 scans occurring away from the delivery unit and more than 1,000 feet¹⁹ from the intended delivery point between December 2025 and February 2026 (see Table 4). We removed scans that could have been performed within policy, such as “Animal Interference” and “Unsafe Conditions.” Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 99.3 percent of them were scanned “Delivered,” of which 4,005 (99 percent) related to two large business customers.

Table 4. STC Scans More Than 1,000 Feet Away From the Delivery Point

| STC Scan Type | Count | Percent |
|---|--------------|------------|
| Delivered | 4,015 | 99.3 |
| Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location | 25 | 0.6 |
| Receptacle Full / Item Oversized | 3 | 0.1 |
| Total | 4,043 | 100 |

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s PTR System data.


On the morning of April 14, 2026, before carriers arrived for the day, we selected 30 packages from the carrier cases to review and analyze scanning and tracking history. Of the 30 sampled packages, 16 (53.3 percent) had improper scans or handling issues, including:

- Thirteen packages scanned “Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location” were scanned between 0.2 and 2.5 miles (See Figure 2) away from the delivery point. Scans should be made as close to the delivery point as possible.
- Two packages were scanned “Delivered,” which should only be performed when a package is successfully left at the customer’s delivery address.
- One package was scanned “Held at Post Office at Customer Request,” which should only be performed when the customer has made a request to that effect.

¹⁸ This data does not include scans that could properly be made at a delivery unit, such as “Delivered – PO Box” and “Customer (Vacation) Hold.” Additionally, PO Box scans at the unit were only counted when the delivery point was an address away from the unit. This category does not include mail addressed for a PO Box.

¹⁹ Packages are expected to be scanned within a designated buffer distance from the delivery point. The OIG evaluates any package that was scanned more than 1,000 feet from the delivery point.

Figure 2. Scan 2.5 Miles Away From the Delivery Point in Baltimore, Maryland



Source: Postal Service Single Package Look Up.

Why Did It Occur

The scanning issues occurred because unit management did not monitor the type of scan or location where carriers scanned packages. Management stated that its review of scanning exceptions focused on verifying that all packages received an STC scan. For the scans over 1,000 feet away for the two business customers, the geofence²⁰ location for the carrier scanners' did not correspond to the actual point of delivery where carriers physically deliver the mail. Since the unit was unaware of the scanning errors, it did not take steps to determine and update the delivery points' geofence location.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have monitored scan performance daily and enforced compliance. Management should have also verified and updated incorrect geofencing coordinates for delivery points. The Postal Service's goal is to ensure proper delivery attempts for mailpieces to the correct address,²¹ which includes scanning packages at the time and location of delivery.²²

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Customers rely on accurate scan data to track their packages in real time. When management does not monitor scanning at the unit or 1,000 feet away from the delivery point, management has decreased assurance that it will detect and address improper scans. When employees do not scan mailpieces correctly, customers are unable to determine the actual status of their packages. By improving scanning operations, management can improve mail visibility, increase customer satisfaction, and enhance the customer experience and the Postal Service brand.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁰ A geofence system is based on the concept of virtual geographic zones.

²¹ *Delivery Done Right the First Time* stand-up talk, March 2020.

²² *Carriers Delivering the Customer Experience* stand-up talk, July 2017.

Finding #3: Arrow Keys

What We Found

Unit management did not properly safeguard arrow keys. Specifically, arrow keys were kept inside a locked cabinet; however, the key to the cabinet was in [REDACTED], which was often unattended.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not properly safeguard arrow keys because the station manager believed it was acceptable to keep the key to the arrow key cabinet in [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The station manager acknowledged that the key was in [REDACTED]; however, he stated that a supervisor is usually [REDACTED] and did not believe anyone other than a supervisor would be able to gain access to the key.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy²³ states that arrow keys must remain secured until they are individually assigned to personnel. In addition, unassigned keys must be stored in a secure place accessible only to the postmaster or the postmaster's designee.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there is insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is increased risk of mail theft. These thefts damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²³ Standard Work Instruction: U.S. Postal Service Arrow Key Guidebook, dated March 2025.

Finding #4: Property Conditions

What We Found


We found safety issues related to property conditions at the Hampden Roland Park Station.

Property Safety

- Four of five fire extinguishers were missing monthly inspections and were last inspected in October 2025. The fifth fire extinguisher had no tag to indicate the last monthly inspection date.
- A blocked Inspection Service door (see Figure 3).
- A set of dock doors blocked by large bins and pallets (see Figure 3).

Figure 3. Blocked Doors

Blocked Inspection Service Door



Blocked Dock Doors



Source: OIG photos taken on April 15, 2026.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight or take the necessary actions to verify property condition issues were corrected because other duties, such as getting the mail out for delivery each day, took priority over addressing maintenance issues. The station manager stated that he was unaware that the fire extinguishers had not received their monthly inspections and that the Inspection Service door was blocked because he was focused on mail delivery. In addition, the station manager stated that although he was aware that the dock doors were blocked, he did not consider it to be a safety issue because the unit does not use these doors.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have provided sufficient oversight of personnel responsible for maintaining facilities, reported safety and security issues as they arose, and followed up for completion. The Postal Service requires management to maintain a safe environment for employees and customers.²⁴

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Management's attention to safety and security deficiencies can reduce the risk of injuries to employees and customers; reduce related costs, such as workers' compensation claims, lawsuits, and penalties and enhance the customer experience and Postal Service brand.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁴ Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, July 2020.

Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from March through June 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the delivery operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. We will issue a separate report that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for the Loch Raven Branch, Nottingham Branch, and the Raspeburg Station, as well as the district.

We assessed the reliability of PTR and DCV data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Appendix B: Management's Comments



June 1, 2026

LAURA LOZON
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: Hampden Roland Park Station, Baltimore, MD: Delivery Operations (Report Number 26-077-1-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings contained in the draft audit report, *Hampden Roland Park Station, Baltimore, MD: Delivery Operations*

Management generally agrees with the four findings related to delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys, and property conditions.

Management has begun taking steps to address the four findings.

Delayed Mail: Management will conduct a service talk on proper handling and recording of delayed mail in DCV. Management will also reiterate the requirement to use PS Form 1571 *Undelivered Mail Report* and follow the *Redline process*. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Package Scanning: Management will provide a service talk on proper scanning procedures and conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

Arrow Keys: Management will conduct training on proper management and security of arrow keys. Additionally, reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Property Conditions: Management has abated the safety issues found during the audit.

E-SIGNED by Lora Mclucas
on 2026-06-01 09:57:15 EDT

Lora M. McLucas
District Manager, Maryland District

cc: Vice President, Area Retail & Delivery Operations (Atlantic)
Corporate Audit Response Management

OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR
GENERAL

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE



This document contains sensitive information that has been redacted for public release. These redactions were coordinated with USPS and agreed to by the OIG.

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1735 North Lynn Street, Arlington, VA 22209-2020
(703) 248-2100

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