

North Miami Branch, North Miami, FL: Delivery Operations

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-066-3-R26 | May 4, 2026



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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

May 4, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR: LISSE A. GARRETT
MANAGER, FLORIDA 3 DISTRICT

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Sean Balduff", is centered on the page.

FROM: Sean Balduff
Director, Field Operations, Central & Southern

SUBJECT: Audit Report – North Miami Branch, North Miami, FL: Delivery
Operations (Report Number 26-066-3-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the North Miami Branch in North Miami, FL.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Ramona Gonzalez, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer & Executive Vice President
Vice President, Delivery Operations
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations
Vice President, Southern Area Retail & Delivery Operations
Director, Retail & Post Office Operations Maintenance
Corporate Audit and Response Management


Results

Background

The U.S. Postal Service’s mission is to provide timely, reliable, secure, and affordable mail and package delivery to more than 160 million residential and business addresses across the country. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews delivery operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback in furtherance of this mission.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the North Miami Branch in North Miami, FL (Project Number 26-066-3). The North Miami Branch is in the Florida 3 District of the Southern Area and serves about 118,982 people in ZIP Codes 33161, 33162, and 33181, which are considered urban areas (see Figure 1).¹

Figure 1. ZIP Codes Serviced by the North Miami Branch



Source: OIG analysis of ZIP Code data.

This delivery unit has 71 city routes. From December 27, 2025 through January 23, 2026, the delivery unit had six supervisors assigned.² Of these supervisors, one was detailed to a different facility during the week of our site visit. In addition, there was one acting supervisor and one relief supervisor during our visit. The North Miami Branch falls under the Miami Post Office for employee availability³ measurement. As of January 23, 2026,⁴ the year-to-date employee availability rate for the Miami Post Office was 89.8 percent, which is less than the Postal Service’s retail and delivery operations employee availability goal of 93.9 percent for fiscal year 2026. The North Miami Branch is one of three delivery units⁵ the OIG reviewed during the week of March 2, 2026, that are serviced by the Royal Palm Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC).

We assessed all units serviced by the Royal Palm P&DC based on the number of Customer 360 (C360)⁶ delivery-related inquiries,⁷ stop-the-clock (STC)⁸ scans performed away from the delivery point and at the unit, undelivered route information, and Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures⁹ between November 1, 2025, and January 31, 2026.

We judgmentally selected the North Miami Branch primarily based on the number of C360 inquiries related to delivery and Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures. The unit also had undelivered routes. See [Table 1](#) for a comparison of some of these metrics between the unit and the rest of the district.

1 We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.
2 Assignments based on the Postal Service’s Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS). TACS is the system used by the Postal Service to automate the collection of employee time and attendance information.
3 The Postal Service calculates employee availability by dividing straight time hours worked by potential straight time hours. Potential straight time hours generally include actual straight time hours worked, sick leave taken, and leave without pay.
4 January 23, 2026, was the last day of Pay Period 03.
5 The other two units were the Blue Lagoon Branch, Miami, FL (Project Number 26-066-1) and the Milam Dairy Branch, Miami, FL (Project Number 26-066-2).
6 Customer 360 is a cloud-based application that enables Postal Service employees to diagnose, resolve, and track customer inquiries.
7 Delivery-related inquiries include a compilation of package inquiry, package pickup, daily mail service, and hold mail inquiries.
8 An STC scan is a scan event that indicates the Postal Service has completed its commitment to deliver or attempt to deliver the mailpiece. Examples of STC scans include “Delivered,” “Available for Pickup,” and “No Access.”
9 Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the origin processing facility on the day that it was intended. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at the final processing facility on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.

Table 1. Delivery Metrics Comparison Between November 1, 2025 and January 31, 2026

Delivery Metric	Unit Average	District Average
C360 Delivery Inquiries per Route	8.5	6.2
Leg 1 Failures	5.8	4.4
Leg 3 Failures	1.9	1.2

Source: OIG analysis of Postal Service's C360 and Informed Visibility data extracted February 3, 2026.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate mail delivery operations and property conditions at the North Miami Branch in North Miami, FL.

To accomplish our objective, we combined preliminary data analyses with an on-site inspection performed March 3 through 5, 2026. Prior to the visit, we analyzed staffing levels, mail arrival times, package scanning performance, reported mail delays and arrow key¹⁰ inventories, Voyager card¹¹ exceptions, and property safety and security issues. While on-site, we reviewed operational compliance focusing on mail conditions, package scanning procedures, arrow key accountability, carrier separation and transfer documentation, Voyager card exception justification, property safety and security conditions, and package separation procedures. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on April 16, 2026, and included its comments, where appropriate.

We are issuing this interim report to provide the Postal Service with timely information regarding conditions we identified at the North Miami Branch.

We will issue a separate capping report¹² that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for all three delivery units, as well as the district. The capping report will include actions taken by management to address the issues identified in this interim report. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

Results Summary

We identified issues affecting delivery operations and property conditions at the North Miami Branch. Specifically, we found issues with six of the areas we reviewed (see Table 2).

Table 2. Summary of Results

Audit Area	Deficiencies Identified	
	Yes	No
Delayed Mail	X	
Package Scanning	X	
Arrow Keys	X	
Carrier Separations and Transfers		X
Voyager Card Transactions	X	
Property Conditions	X	
Package Separations	X	

Source: Results of our fieldwork during the week of March 2, 2026.

For carrier separations and transfers, we analyzed employee data from December 13, 2025, through January 23, 2026. All carriers assigned to the unit either reported to work or were accounted for by management during this time, indicating no issues with employee separations and transfers.

¹⁰ Arrow keys are distinctively shaped keys that carriers use to open mail-receiving receptacles, such as street collection boxes and panels of apartment house mailboxes equipped with an arrow lock. Arrow keys are accountable property and are subject to strict controls.

¹¹ The U.S. Postal Service uses credit cards, called Voyager cards, to pay for commercially purchased fuel, oil, and routine maintenance for its vehicles.

¹² The capping report project number is 26-066.

Finding #1: Delayed Mail

What We Found

On the morning of March 3, 2026, we identified 10,617 delayed mailpieces¹³ at 33 out of the 71 carrier cases, the hot case,¹⁴ and in collections. Specifically, we identified 7,577 letters, 2,425 flats, and 615 packages. Management did not accurately report this mail as undelivered in the Delivery Condition Visualization (DCV)¹⁵ system. While it reported 50 delayed

mailpieces, this represented only 0.5 percent of the delayed mail we identified at the unit. See Table 3 for the number of pieces for each mail type and Figure 2 for examples of delayed mail found at the unit. Further, the carriers did not consistently complete Postal Service (PS) Forms 1571, Undelivered Mail Report,¹⁶ to document undelivered mailpieces.

Table 3. Types of Delayed Mail Identified

Type of Mail	Carrier Cases	Hot Case	Collection Mail	Total Count of Delayed Mail
Letters	2,895	2,412	2,270	7,577
Flats	1,046	1,246	133	2,425
Packages	60	0	555	615
Totals	4,001	3,658	2,958	10,617

Source: OIG count of delayed mailpieces identified during our visit on March 3, 2026.

Figure 2. Examples of Delayed Mail



Source: OIG photos taken before carriers arrived on the morning of March 3, 2026.

Why Did It Occur

The unreported delayed mail we identified was due to insufficient management oversight. Specifically,

management did not follow the redline process¹⁷ and check with each carrier when they returned from their deliveries. The closing supervisor stated she could not speak to every carrier returning from the street because she was completing other duties. However, when asked, she did not specify what those other duties were. As a result, she did not conduct a thorough walkthrough of the unit and was not aware of all the mail in the carrier cases and in collections. In addition, she did not have access to DCV, so she could not report the delayed mail. Regarding the mail at the hot case, one supervisor stated they had a shortage of clerks the day prior and did not sort this mail before the carriers left for their street duties.

The station manager said that she was not aware of any of the delayed mail before we arrived because the closing supervisor did not inform her of it. She explained that they had several vehicle breakdowns

¹³ Count of mail included individual piece counts and OIG estimate based on Postal Service conversion factors in Handbook M-32, *Management Operating Data Systems*, Appendix D and *Management Instructions PO-610-2007-1, Piece Count Recording System*.

¹⁴ A case designated for final withdrawal of mail as carriers leave the office.

¹⁵ DCV is a tool for unit management to manually self-report delayed mail, which provides a snapshot of daily mail conditions at the point in time when carriers have departed for the street.

¹⁶ PS Form 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*, lists all mail distributed to the carrier for delivery that was left in the office or returned undelivered.

¹⁷ The redline process is a standardized framework encompassing manager and carrier responsibilities after carriers return to the delivery unit upon completion of delivery assignments, ensuring that any mail returned from the street is identified with a signed completed PS Form 1571 and that no mail is taken back to the carrier case.

the day before our arrival, which contributed to some of the undelivered mail we found in the carrier cases. For example, two carriers did not get a replacement vehicle until 1 p.m. She also said that the last truck arrives and departs the unit before the retail window closes and carriers are back from the street. Therefore, some collection mail did not make it to the plant the prior night. Furthermore, she stated that management was aware of PS Form 1571 but did not require carriers to complete them for undelivered mail. The station manager entered 50 delayed mailpieces from collections into DCV after we arrived at the unit that morning.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have ensured that all mail was processed and delivered daily. Postal Service policy¹⁸ states that all types of First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express are always committed for delivery on the day of receipt. In addition, managers are required¹⁹ to report all mail in the delivery unit

after the carriers have left for their street duties as either delayed or curtailed in DCV. In addition, policy²⁰ states that delivery units must follow the redline process, which includes carriers completing a PS Form 1571 for any undelivered mail brought back to the delivery unit.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in DCV provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

¹⁸ *Committed Mail & Color Code Policy for Marketing Mail* stand-up talk, February 2019.

¹⁹ *DCV User Guide*, October 2025.

²⁰ *Redline Policy Standard Operating Procedures*.

Finding #2: Package Scanning

What We Found

Employees scanned packages improperly at the delivery unit, scanned packages away from the intended delivery point, and handled packages incorrectly at the unit.

We reviewed package scanning data for scans that occurred at the unit and removed any potentially accurate scans performed.²¹ In total, employees improperly scanned 632 packages at the delivery unit between November 1, 2025, and January 31, 2026 (see Table 4). Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 82.9 percent of them were scanned as “Delivered.”

Table 4. STC Scans at Delivery Unit

STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivered	524	82.9
Delivery Attempted - No Access to Delivery Location	47	7.4
Refused	47	7.4
Return to Sender	7	1.1
No Secure Location Available	4	0.6
Receptacle Full / Item Oversized	3	0.5
Total	632	100%*

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

*Total percentage does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.


On the morning of March 3, 2026, before carriers arrived for the day, we selected 30 packages from the carrier cases to review and analyze scanning and tracking history. Of the 30 sampled packages, 22 (73.3 percent) had improper scans or handling issues, including:

- Nine packages scanned “Delivery Attempted - No Access to Delivery Location,” “Held at Post Office at Customer Request,” and “No Such Number” were scanned between 0.2 and 1.6 miles away from the delivery point (see Figure 3 for an example). Scans

should be made as close to the delivery point as possible.

- Seven packages were scanned “Delivered,” which should only be performed when a package is successfully left at the customer’s delivery address.
- Four packages were missing an “Arrival-at-Unit” scan, which is necessary to provide complete visibility.
- Two packages were scanned “Available for Pickup, for Caller Service” but were held at the carrier cases.

Figure 3. Scan Away From the Delivery Point in North Miami, Florida



Source: Postal Service Single Package Look Up.

Why Did It Occur

These scanning issues occurred because unit management did not adequately monitor and enforce proper package scanning and handling procedures. A carrier stated that they routinely scanned packages as “delivered” at the unit instead of the delivery point due to convenience. Management was aware that the carrier was scanning the packages at the unit but did not express any concern about this practice. The station manager and supervisor stated that they confirmed packages

²¹ This data does not include scans that could properly be made at a delivery unit, such as “Delivered - PO Box” and “Customer (Vacation) Hold.” Additionally, PO Box scans at the unit were counted only when the delivery point was an address away from the unit. This category does not include mail addressed for a PO Box.

received an STC scan but checking where the scan was made was not part of their daily process.

The PM supervisor explained that, as the only closing supervisor, she cannot always interact with every carrier returning packages or conduct a thorough nightly walkthrough of the unit. She stated that on the day prior to our visit, she was attending to several issues and could not greet each carrier when they returned from their deliveries.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have monitored scan performance daily and enforced compliance. The Postal Service's goal is to ensure proper delivery

attempts for mailpieces to the correct address,²² which includes scanning packages at the time and location of delivery.²³

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Customers rely on accurate scan data to track their packages in real time. When employees do not scan mailpieces correctly, customers are unable to determine the actual status of their packages. By improving scanning operations, management can improve mail visibility, increase customer satisfaction, and enhance the customer experience and the Postal Service brand.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²² *Delivery Done Right the First Time* stand-up talk, March 2020.

²³ *Carriers Delivering the Customer Experience* stand-up talk, July 2017.

Finding #3: Arrow Keys

What We Found

Unit management did not properly update the arrow key inventory log. On the morning of March 5, 2026, we reviewed the unit's arrow key certification list in the Retail and Delivery Applications and Reports (RADAR)²⁴ system and conducted a physical inventory of keys at the unit. Unit management reported 47 keys in RADAR as "In-Use" or "Damaged." Based on our physical review of arrow keys at the unit, 36 of the 47 keys were missing, and an additional 25 keys found at the unit were not recorded in RADAR. In addition, unit management could not provide any documentation to support that the missing keys were reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service or that the 13 damaged keys were returned to National Materials Customer Service (NMCS).

We also found that management did not enforce the requirement for carriers to sign for their arrow keys to acknowledge their receipt and did not verify all keys were returned at the end of the day.

Why Did It Occur

The station manager explained that she maintained her own inventory of arrow keys and used it to conduct the monthly reconciliation in RADAR instead of verifying the physical keys. The manager stated she signed the monthly RADAR certification without correcting any known discrepancies. As a result, she did not determine which keys were missing to report to the Postal Inspection Service. In addition, the manager was aware of the correct process for sending damaged keys to NMCS but decided to send

pictures of the damaged keys to the area manager, believing this was sufficient.

Furthermore, the station manager stated that she was aware of the requirement for employees to properly sign out the keys on the log each morning but could not provide an explanation as to why she did not enforce the policy or oversee the process.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have verified that arrow key security procedures were properly followed. According to Postal Service policy,²⁵ management must keep an accurate inventory of all arrow keys. Any missing keys must be immediately reported to the Postal Inspection Service. Further, broken keys must be updated on the RADAR inventory log.

A supervisor or clerk must supervise employees signing out keys on the inventory log. Upon return, arrow keys should be deposited in a secure location, and a supervisor or clerk must verify all keys have been returned and accounted for daily.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there is insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is increased risk of mail theft. These thefts damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system. Additionally, because arrow keys open mail receptacles, lost or damaged keys can result in undelivered mail.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁴ The arrow key certification in RADAR provides a national platform for all facilities to verify current inventory and account for all arrow keys.

²⁵ *Standard Work Instruction: U.S. Postal Service Arrow Key Guidebook*, dated March 2025.

Finding #4: Voyager Card Transactions

What We Found

Unit management did not always properly reconcile Voyager card premium fuel transactions. Specifically, we reviewed the Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS) reconciliation exception report for premium fuel transactions, which are considered high-risk transactions, from August 9, 2025, through January 29, 2026, and identified 608 unauthorized premium fuel transactions valued at \$26,411.50. Although all the transaction exceptions were marked as reconciled by unit management, 41 of the comments did not properly address the unauthorized premium fuel purchases.

In addition, there were multiple carriers with repeat premium fuel transactions. While unit management was aware that premium fuel should not be used for Postal Service vehicles, there was no indication in the FAMS reconciliation comments that the matter was addressed.

Why Did It Occur

The station manager did not provide sufficient oversight to prevent the purchase of premium fuel. The manager stated that she just clicked the

“Reconcile” button in FAMS instead of reviewing the premium fuel transactions in FAMS. As a result, nine carriers repeatedly purchased premium fuel, ranging from 21 to 49 transactions each. Although unit management stated that it communicated to carriers during stand-up talks that premium fuel should not be purchased for Postal Service vehicles, it could not provide any documentation to support that corrective action was taken. According to the manager, the incorrect comments for the FAMS reconciliation were selected in error.

What Should Have Happened

According to Postal Service policy,²⁶ all high-risk transactions must be fully reconciled with a comment that explains the reason for the transaction.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When premium fuel transactions are not properly reviewed and documented, there is an increased risk that the Postal Service may pay higher prices for questionable and unnecessary purchases.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁶ FAMS User Guide, Reconciliation by Exception Process, March 5, 2013.

Finding #5: Property Conditions

What We Found

We found safety and security issues related to property conditions at the North Miami Branch.

Property Safety

- Nine fire extinguishers were missing monthly and annual inspections.
- Two fire extinguishers, a fire alarm pull, an exit door (see Figure 4), and a Postal Inspection Service door were blocked.
- The fire exit path door for employees was locked.
- The awning covering the Postal Service vehicles was damaged and falling.
- Four exit signs are not illuminated.

Property Security


- There was not a sign posted in the employee parking lot stating that vehicles are subject to search.
- Customers could access the workroom floor from the retail lobby area during retail hours through a propped open door (see Figure 5).
- Customers dropped off packages at the dock during various times of day without an employee present.

In addition, a maintenance request for a broken air conditioner had been unresolved since August 27, 2025.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight and take the necessary actions to verify that property conditions were corrected. The custodian stated he did not complete the monthly fire extinguisher inspections because he did not receive sufficient training. The station manager stated that she did not verify that the inspections were being conducted because she believed the custodian was completing them. The manager also stated that she paid for the annual fire inspections; however, she did not follow up when the inspections were not completed.

Figure 4. Examples of Safety Issues



Source: OIG photos taken on March 4, 2026.

Figure 5. Workroom Floor Accessible to Customer Lobby



Source: OIG photo taken on March 4, 2026.

The station manager stated that she was aware of the ongoing air conditioning issues, and she attempted multiple times to have it repaired. Maintenance worked on the air conditioner and had it temporarily working; however, it continues to break down. The manager also acknowledged that customers routinely drop off packages on the dock without employee supervision and recognized the associated security risk but did not take any corrective action. The manager stated that she was not aware of the other safety and security deficiencies at the facility.

During the audit, management took corrective action and completed monthly inspections for eight of the nine fire extinguishers. It also unblocked the two fire extinguishers, the manual fire alarm pull, the exit door, and Postal Inspection Service door.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have provided sufficient oversight of personnel responsible for maintaining facilities, reported safety and security issues as they arose, and followed up for completion. The Postal Service requires management to maintain a safe environment for employees and customers.²⁷ In addition, the Postal Service is required to provide signage that vehicles may be subject to search.²⁸

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Management's attention to safety and security deficiencies can reduce the risk of injuries to employees and customers; reduce related costs, such as workers' compensation claims, lawsuits, and penalties; reduce the likelihood of theft and mail tampering; and enhance the customer experience and Postal Service brand. In addition, proper signage in the employee parking lot could reduce the risk of employee theft and associated costs.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁷ Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, July 2020.

²⁸ Handbook RE-5, *Building and Site Requirements*, Site Security, 2-2.4 - Site Signage, September 2009.

Finding #6: Separation of Packages for Dispatch

What We Found

Employees at the North Miami Branch did not properly separate packages destined for the Royal Palm P&DC. Specifically, on March 4, 2026, during the unit's evening operations, we observed that Ground Advantage²⁹ packages and Priority Mail³⁰ were commingled in the same containers (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Commingled Packages



Source: OIG photo taken on March 4, 2026.

Why Did It Occur

The station manager stated employees previously separated packages but received guidance from the Royal Palm P&DC to stop separating Priority Mail from non-Priority Mail. However, the manager was unable to provide any documentation to support the change in guidance.

What Should Have Happened

The Postal Service requires all level 22 units and above to separate Priority Mail from non-Priority Mail packages and use a specific placard when dispatching to the processing facility.³¹

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Proper mail preparation is required for visibility throughout the Postal Service network. When mail is not properly separated for dispatch to the processing facility, in accordance with procedures, there is an increased likelihood that mail will require additional processing steps. Furthermore, this can result in delays and service failures and an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁹ Ground Advantage is a service providing an affordable and reliable way to send parcels inside the U.S. Parcels under 70 pounds arrive in two to five business days.

³⁰ Priority Mail is an expedited service that may contain any mailable matter weighing no more than 70 pounds.

³¹ *Learn and Grow RDC/RSC Updates*, May 2024.

Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from February through May 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the delivery operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. We will issue a separate report that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for the Blue Lagoon Branch, Milam Dairy Branch, and North Miami Branch, as well as the district.

We assessed the reliability of DCV, PTR, and FAMS data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Appendix B: Management's Comments



April 20, 2026

LAURA LOZON
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: North Miami Branch, North Miami, FL: Delivery Operations
(Report Number 26-066-3-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings contained in the draft audit report, *North Miami Branch, North Miami, FL: Delivery Operations*

Management generally agrees with the six findings related to delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys, Voyager Card transactions, property conditions, and separation of packages.

Management has begun taking steps to address the six findings.

Delayed Mail: Management will conduct a service talk on proper handling and recording of delayed mail in DCV. Management will also reiterate the requirement to use PS Form 1571 *Undelivered Mail Report* and follow the *Redline process*. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Package Scanning: Management will provide a service talk on proper scanning procedures and conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

Arrow Keys: Management will update the inventory log to reflect all arrow keys on hand and report all missing keys to the US Postal Inspection Service. Management will also conduct training on proper management and security of arrow keys. Additionally, reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Voyager Card Transactions: Management will provide a service talk on guidelines for the purchase of unleaded fuel for Postal Service vehicles. In addition, management will reiterate the responsibility of the site manager to ensure driver receipts, and "high-risk" transactions are reconciled within Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS).

Property Conditions: Management has abated four safety and security issues and is working to abate the other safety issues found during the audit, which requires the submission of workorders for assistance from other resources.

Separation of Packages for Dispatch: Management will provide a service talk to reinforce package separation practices to ensure Priority Mail is not comingled with non-priority mail. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

E-SIGNED by LISSE.A GARRETT
on 2026-04-24 07:29:55 EDT

Lisse A. Garrett
a/District Manager, Florida 3 District

cc: Vice President, Area Retail & Delivery Operations (Southern)
Corporate Audit Response Management

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