

# Blue Lagoon Branch, Miami, FL: Delivery Operations

## AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-066-1-R26 | May 4, 2026



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# Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

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May 4, 2026

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** LISSE A. GARRETT  
MANAGER, FLORIDA 3 DISTRICT

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Sean Balduff", is centered below the memorandum header.

**FROM:** Sean Balduff  
Director, Field Operations, Central & Southern

**SUBJECT:** Audit Report – Blue Lagoon Branch, Miami, FL: Delivery Operations  
(Report Number 26-066-1-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Blue Lagoon Branch in Miami, FL.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Jennifer Schneider, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General  
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer & Executive Vice President  
Vice President, Delivery Operations  
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations  
Vice President, Southern Area Retail & Delivery Operations  
Director, Retail & Post Office Operations Maintenance  
Corporate Audit and Response Management

# Results

## Background

The U.S. Postal Service’s mission is to provide timely, reliable, secure, and affordable mail and package delivery to more than 160 million residential and business addresses across the country. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews delivery operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback in furtherance of this mission.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Blue Lagoon Branch in Miami, FL (Project Number 26-066-1). The Blue Lagoon Branch is in the Florida 3 District of the Southern Area and serves about 48,884 people in ZIP Code 33126, which is considered a predominantly urban area (see Figure 1).<sup>1</sup>

This delivery unit has 33 city routes. From December 27, 2025, through January 23, 2026, the delivery unit had two supervisors and one manager assigned.<sup>2</sup> During our visit, the branch manager was on extended leave and the supervisor who was acting as the official in charge (OIC) was also going out on extended leave starting March 5, 2026. There was also one supervisor who was recently appointed and one employee that was acting in a higher-level supervisor detail at this unit. The Blue Lagoon Branch falls under the Miami Post Office for employee availability<sup>3</sup> measurement. As of January 23, 2026,<sup>4</sup> the year-to-date employee availability rate for the Miami Post Office was 89.8 percent, which is less than the Postal Service’s retail and delivery operations employee availability goal of 93.95 percent for fiscal year 2026. The Blue Lagoon Branch is one of three

delivery units<sup>5</sup> the OIG reviewed during the week of March 2, 2026, that are serviced by the Royal Palm Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC).

We assessed all units serviced by the Royal Palm P&DC based on the number of Customer 360 (C360)<sup>6</sup> delivery-related inquiries,<sup>7</sup> stop-the-clock (STC)<sup>8</sup> scans performed away from the delivery point and at the unit, undelivered route information, and Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures<sup>9</sup> between November 1, 2025, and January 31, 2026.

**Figure 1. ZIP Codes Serviced by the Blue Lagoon Branch**



Source: OIG analysis of ZIP Code data.

We judgmentally selected the Blue Lagoon Branch primarily based on the number of C360 delivery-related inquiries and Leg 1 and 3 failures. See [Table 1](#) for a comparison of some of these metrics between the unit and the rest of the district.

1 We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.  
2 Assignments based on the Postal Service’s Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS). TACS is the system used by the Postal Service to automate the collection of employee time and attendance information.  
3 The Postal Service calculates employee availability by dividing straight time hours worked by potential straight time hours. Potential straight time hours generally include actual straight time hours worked, sick leave taken, and leave without pay.  
4 January 23, 2026, was the last day of Pay Period 03.  
5 The other two units were the Milam Dairy Branch, Miami, FL (Project Number 26-066-2) and the North Miami Branch, North Miami, FL (Project Number 26-066-3).  
6 Customer 360 is a cloud-based application that enables Postal Service employees to diagnose, resolve, and track customer inquiries.  
7 Delivery-related inquiries include a compilation of package inquiry, package pickup, daily mail service, and hold mail inquiries.  
8 An STC scan is a scan event that indicates the Postal Service has completed its commitment to deliver or attempt to deliver the mailpiece. Examples of STC scans include “Delivered,” “Available for Pickup,” and “No Access.”  
9 Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the origin processing facility on the day that it was intended. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at a processing facility on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.

**Table 1. Delivery Metrics Comparison Between November 1, 2025, and January 31, 2026**

Delivery Metric	Unit Average	District Average
C360 Delivery Inquiries per Route	11.4	6.2
Leg 1 Failures	9.2	4.4
Leg 3 Failures	2.1	1.2

Source: OIG analysis of Postal Service's C360 and Informed Visibility data extracted February 3, 2026.

### Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate mail delivery operations and property conditions at the Blue Lagoon Branch in Miami, FL.

To accomplish our objective, we combined preliminary data analyses with an on-site inspection performed March 3 through 5, 2026. Prior to the visit, we analyzed staffing levels, mail arrival times, package scanning performance, reported mail delays, arrow key<sup>10</sup> inventories, Voyager card<sup>11</sup> exceptions, and property safety and security issues. While on-site, we reviewed operational compliance focusing on mail conditions, package scanning procedures, arrow key accountability, carrier separation and transfer documentation, Voyager card exception justification, and property safety and security conditions. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on April 16, 2026, and included its comments, where appropriate.

We are issuing this interim report to provide the Postal Service with timely information regarding conditions we identified at the Blue Lagoon Branch. We will issue a separate capping report<sup>12</sup> that

provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for all three delivery units, as well as the district. The capping report will include actions taken by management to address the issues identified in this interim report. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

### Results Summary

We identified issues affecting delivery operations and property conditions at the Blue Lagoon Branch. Specifically, we found issues with five of the areas we reviewed (see Table 2).

**Table 2. Summary of Results**

Audit Area	Deficiencies Identified	
	Yes	No
Delayed Mail	X	
Package Scanning	X	
Arrow Keys	X	
Carrier Separations and Transfers		X
Voyager Card Transactions	X	
Property Conditions	X	

Source: Results of our fieldwork during the week of March 2, 2026.

For carrier separations and transfers, we analyzed employee data from December 13, 2025, through January 23, 2026. All carriers assigned to the unit either reported to work or were accounted for by management during this time, indicating no issues with employee separations and transfers.

<sup>10</sup> Arrow keys are distinctively shaped keys that carriers use to open mail-receiving receptacles, such as street collection boxes and panels of apartment house mailboxes equipped with an arrow lock. Arrow keys are accountable property and are subject to strict controls.  
<sup>11</sup> The U.S. Postal Service uses credit cards, called Voyager cards, to pay for commercially purchased fuel, oil, and routine maintenance for its vehicles.  
<sup>12</sup> The capping report project number is 26-066.

# Finding #1: Delayed Mail

## What We Found

On the morning of March 3, 2026, we identified about 6,062 delayed mailpieces throughout the unit. Specifically, we identified 5,091 letters and 971 flats<sup>13</sup> at 23 out of 33 carrier cases, at the hot case, and in the Business Reply Mail section. In addition, management did not report this mail as undelivered in the Delivery

Condition Visualization (DCV)<sup>14</sup> system. See Table 3 for the number of pieces for each mail type and Figures 2 and 3 for examples of delayed mail found at the hot case and carrier cases. Further, most carriers did not complete a Postal Service (PS) Form 1571, Undelivered Mail Report,<sup>15</sup> to document undelivered mailpieces.

**Table 3. Types of Delayed Mail Identified**

Type of Mail	Carrier Cases	Hot Case	Business Reply Mail	Total Count of Delayed Mail
Letters	560	3,804	727	5,091
Flats	782	189	0	971
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,342</b>	<b>3,993</b>	<b>727</b>	<b>6,062</b>


Source: OIG count of delayed mailpieces identified during our visit on March 3, 2026.

**Figure 2. Delayed Mail in the Hot Case Area**



Source: OIG photos taken before carriers arrived on the morning of March 3, 2026.

**Figure 3. Examples of Delayed Mail at Carrier Cases**



Source: OIG photos taken before carriers arrived on the morning of March 3, 2026.

<sup>13</sup> Count of mail included individual piece counts and OIG estimate based on Postal Service conversion factors in Management Instruction PO-610-2007-1, *Piece Count Recording System*.

<sup>14</sup> DCV is a tool for unit management to manually self-report delayed mail, which provides a snapshot of daily mail conditions at the point in time when carriers have departed for the street.

<sup>15</sup> PS Form 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*, lists all mail distributed to the carrier for delivery that was left in the office or returned undelivered.

## Why Did It Occur

The delayed mail was due to lack of management oversight. Specifically, the AM supervisor was not aware that some carriers did not take all the committed mail out for delivery the prior day. The AM supervisor acknowledged her lack of awareness of the delayed mail in the facility that morning. She stated that she was recently appointed to her current position at the unit and was actively working to identify and prioritize areas requiring correction. Regarding the delayed hot case mail, carriers placed missorted Delivery Point Sequenced<sup>16</sup> mail at the hot case rather than bringing it to management's attention. The supervisor stated that only one clerk was assigned to sort this mail; however, the clerk was frequently redirected to assist with package processing. The hot case clerk stated that she was also assigned to process Business Reply Mail but did not have time to complete it and the hot case sorting before carriers left for the street.

In addition, management did not fully enforce the redline process.<sup>17</sup> Specifically, the PM supervisor did not review all mail returned by carriers, conduct a review of the workroom floor, or confirm PS Forms 1571 were completed by all carriers for undelivered items. The PM supervisor stated that she was the only one there that evening and competing responsibilities, such as monitoring the STC dashboard, preparing collection mail for dispatch, and monitoring carrier progress on their routes, prevented her from completing these reviews.

The PM supervisor also did not report undelivered mail in the DCV system as required, stating that she believed this was a process completed only in the morning after carriers left for the street.

## What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy<sup>18</sup> states that all types of First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express are always committed for delivery on the day of receipt. Policy<sup>19</sup> states that delivery units must follow the redline process, which includes carriers completing a PS Form 1571 for any undelivered mail brought back to the delivery unit, and that carriers must not take any mail back to their cases in the PM. In addition, a PM review of all areas of the facility must be completed to ensure it is free from undelivered mail.<sup>20</sup> Managers are also required<sup>21</sup> to report all mail in the delivery unit after the carriers have left for their street duties as either delayed or curtailed in DCV. Further, management must update DCV if volumes have changed prior to the end of the business day.

## Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in DCV provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

<sup>16</sup> Delivery Point Sequence is an automated process of sorting mail by carrier routes into delivery order, eliminating the need for carriers to sort the mail manually in the delivery unit prior to their departure to the routes.

<sup>17</sup> The redline process is a standardized framework encompassing manager and carrier responsibilities after carriers return to the delivery unit upon completion of delivery assignments, ensuring that any mail returned from the street is identified with a signed completed PS Form 1571 and that no mail is taken back to the carrier case.

<sup>18</sup> *Committed Mail & Color Code Policy for Marketing Mail* stand-up talk, February 2019.

<sup>19</sup> *Redline Policy Standard Operating Procedures*.

<sup>20</sup> *USPS DMS Delivery Management System, Standard Work Instruction, PM All Clear Tasks*, September 24, 2018.

<sup>21</sup> *DCV User Guide*, October 2025.

# Finding #2: Package Scanning

## What We Found

Employees scanned packages improperly at the delivery unit, scanned packages away from the intended delivery point, and handled packages incorrectly at the unit.

We reviewed package scanning data for scans that occurred at the unit and removed any potentially accurate scans performed.<sup>22</sup> In total, employees improperly scanned 47 packages at the delivery unit between November 1, 2025, and January 31, 2026 (see Table 4). Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 68.1 percent were scanned “Delivered.”

**Table 4. STC Scans at Delivery Unit**

STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivered	32	68.1
Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location	11	23.4
Refused	2	4.3
No Secure Location Available	1	2.1
Return to Sender	1	2.1
<b>Total</b>	<b>47</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

We also reviewed 91 scans occurring away from the delivery unit and more than 1,000 feet<sup>23</sup> from the intended delivery point between November 1, 2025, and January 31, 2026 (see Table 5). We removed scans that could have been performed within policy, such as “Animal Interference” and “Unsafe conditions.” Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 68.1 percent were scanned “Delivered.”

**Table 5. STC Scans More Than 1,000 Feet Away From the Delivery Point**

STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivered	62	68.1
Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location	15	16.5
Unable to Fwd/Fwd Order Expired	10	11.0
Return to Sender	4	4.4
<b>Total</b>	<b>91</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s PTR System data.

On the morning of March 3, 2026, before carriers arrived for the day, we selected all 26 packages from the carrier cases to review and analyze scanning and tracking history. Of the 26 sampled packages, 19 (73 percent) had improper scans or handling issues, including:

- Five packages were missing an STC scan on the expected day of delivery to let the customer know the status of the package.
- Four packages scanned “Delivered, In/At Mailbox” or “Delivered, Front Door/Porch” were scanned between 0.2 and 1.5 miles away from the delivery point (see Figure 4 for an example). A “Delivered” scan should only be performed when a package is successfully left at the customer’s delivery address.
- Four packages were scanned “No Such Number” with an in-office scanner, all for different routes, and within one minute of each other. All four packages were scanned “Delivered” the following day.
- Four packages were scanned “Insufficient Address” or “Addressee Unknown” but were held at the carrier case instead of being returned to the sender.

<sup>22</sup> This data does not include scans that could properly be made at a delivery unit, such as “Delivered – PO Box” and “Customer (Vacation) Hold.” Additionally, PO Box scans at the unit were counted only when the delivery point was an address away from the unit. This category does not include mail addressed for a PO Box.

<sup>23</sup> Packages are expected to be scanned within a designated buffer distance from the delivery point. The OIG evaluates any package that was scanned more than 1,000 feet from the delivery point.



## Finding #3: Arrow Keys

### What We Found

Unit management did not properly update the arrow key inventory log and safeguard arrow keys. On the morning of March 5, 2026, we reviewed the unit's arrow key certification list in the Retail and Delivery Applications and Reports (RADAR)<sup>28</sup> system and conducted a physical inventory of keys at the unit. We located 18 of the 21 keys listed as "In-Use" at the unit and determined that three were missing. Unit management did not report the three missing keys to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. During our review, we also found 39 additional keys that were not recorded in RADAR and one key that was reported as "Lost" in RADAR.

In addition, arrow keys were not always kept secure. Specifically, arrow keys were kept [REDACTED], which was often left unattended throughout our visit. Management also did not use a daily log for carriers to sign for their keys to acknowledge receipt or verify carriers returned their keys at the end of the day.

### Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to properly manage arrow keys. Specifically, the OIC stated he did not take the proper time to physically verify each key in the unit when completing the monthly certification report because he was scheduled to be on leave beginning March 5 and needed to complete it before he left. Further, the

OIC explained that, due to the daily workload of processing the mail, no clerk or supervisor was available to control the keys as required.

### What Should Have Happened

Management should have verified that arrow key security procedures were properly followed. According to Postal Service policy,<sup>29</sup> management must keep an accurate inventory of all arrow keys. Any missing keys must be immediately reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

In addition, policy states that arrow keys must remain secured until they are individually assigned to personnel. A supervisor or clerk must supervise employees signing out keys on the inventory log. Upon return, arrow keys should be deposited in a secure location, and a supervisor or clerk must verify all keys have been returned and accounted for daily.

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there is insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is increased risk of mail theft. These thefts damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system. Additionally, because arrow keys open mail receptacles, lost or damaged keys can result in undelivered mail.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>28</sup> The arrow key certification in RADAR provides a national platform for all facilities to verify current inventory and account for all arrow keys.

<sup>29</sup> *Standard Work Instruction: U.S. Postal Service Arrow Key Guidebook*, dated March 2025.

## Finding #4: Voyager Card Transactions

### What We Found

Unit management did not always properly reconcile Voyager card transactions to validate that transactions were legitimate. We reviewed the Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS) reconciliation exception report for premium fuel transactions, which are considered high-risk transactions, from August 9, 2025, through January 31, 2026, and identified 10 premium fuel transactions valued at \$545. Although the transaction exceptions were marked as reconciled by unit management, all the comments we reviewed lacked proper explanation for the unauthorized premium fuel purchases. These purchases were made by eight employees. One of these employees made three purchases, and the other seven employees made one purchase each.

### Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to prevent the purchase of premium fuel. Although unit management was aware that premium fuel should not be used for Postal Service vehicles, the OIC stated that the city carrier assistants may not be aware of this rule because most are new. In addition, the OIC stated that he had not completed the required Voyager card training and was not

aware of the option to enter a comment if none of the prepopulated reasons apply.

### What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy<sup>30</sup> requires any individual responsible for reconciling Fleet (Voyager) card activities to complete the eFleet Card for Site Manager training annually. The Voyager Program – Fleet Commander Online (FCO) training is also required to be completed prior to the approval of access to FAMS and/or FCO. In addition, all high-risk transactions must be fully reconciled with a comment that explains the reason for the transaction.<sup>31</sup>

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When premium fuel transactions are not properly reviewed and documented, there is an increased risk that the Postal Service may pay higher prices for questionable and unnecessary purchases. In addition, when site managers are not properly trained to manage Voyager cards, there is an increased risk of unauthorized purchases or internal control issues.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>30</sup> *Voyager Fleet Card SOP*, Section 1.4, Training and Accountability, October 2023.

<sup>31</sup> *FAMS User Guide*, Reconciliation by Exception Process, March 5, 2013.

# Finding #5: Property Conditions

## What We Found

We found safety issues related to property conditions at the Blue Lagoon Branch, including:


- Electrical panels that were blocked. During our audit, management cleared the area in front of the panels (see Figure 5).
- Monthly fire extinguisher inspections that were not completed since January 2026. During our audit, management conducted the monthly inspections (see Figure 6).
- Annual fire extinguisher inspections that were not completed since January 2025, and one extinguisher that was past due since November 2020 (see Figure 7).
- A Postal Inspection Service door that was blocked (see Figure 8).
- Multiple roof leaks resulting in damage throughout the facility (see Figure 9).

**Figure 5. Blocked Electrical Panels**




Source: OIG photos taken March 4 and 5, 2026.

**Figure 6. Monthly Fire Extinguisher Inspections**



Source: OIG photos taken March 4 and 5, 2026.

**Figure 7. Annual Fire Extinguisher Inspections**



Source: OIG photos taken March 4, 2026.

**Figure 8. Blocked Postal Inspection Service Door**



Source: OIG photo taken March 5, 2026.

**Package Sorting Area**



Source: OIG photo taken March 4, 2026.


**Figure 9. Examples of Roof Leaks and Related Damage**

**Breakroom Entrance**



Source: OIG photo taken March 4, 2026.

**Walkway to Dock**



Source: OIG photo taken March 4, 2026.

## Breakroom



Source: OIG photo taken March 4, 2026.

### Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight of property conditions or take the necessary actions to verify that property condition issues were corrected. The maintenance employee stated that the active roof leak had previously been reported, and provided examples of work orders from September 2022, but the work that was completed did not remediate the issue.

Management stated that its daily walkthroughs did not focus on some of these items. Additionally, the newly appointed AM Supervisor was unaware of the Postal Inspection Service door being blocked and stated that the managers mainly check the doors that carriers use to bring mail in and out of the building. Regarding the fire extinguishers and blocked electrical panels, she stated that she was unaware of the issues because she was new to the facility and focused on ensuring mail delivery.

### What Should Have Happened

Management should have provided sufficient oversight of personnel responsible for maintaining facilities, reported safety issues as they arose, and followed up for completion. The Postal Service requires management to maintain a safe environment for employees and customers.<sup>32</sup>

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Management's attention to safety and security deficiencies can reduce the risk of injuries to employees and customers; reduce related costs, such as workers' compensation claims, lawsuits, and penalties; reduce the likelihood of theft and mail tampering; and enhance the customer experience and the Postal Service brand.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>32</sup> Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, July 2020.

# Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from February through May 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the delivery operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to all three components that were significant within the context of our objectives. We will issue a separate report that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for the Blue Lagoon Branch, Milam Dairy Branch, and the North Miami Branch, as well as the district.

We assessed the reliability of DCV, PTR, and FAMS data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

# Appendix B: Management's Comments



April 20, 2026

LAURA LOZON  
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: Blue Lagoon Branch, Miami, FL: Delivery Operations  
(Report Number 26-066-1-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings contained in the draft audit report, *Blue Lagoon Branch, Miami, FL: Delivery Operations*

Management generally agrees with the five findings related to delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys, Voyager Card transactions, and property conditions.

Management has begun taking steps to address the five findings.

*Delayed Mail:* Management will conduct a service talk on proper handling and recording of delayed mail in DCV. Management will also reiterate the requirement to use PS Form 1571 *Undelivered Mail Report* and follow the *Redline process*. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

*Package Scanning:* Management will provide a service talk on proper scanning procedures and conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

*Arrow Keys:* Management will update the inventory log to reflect all arrow keys on hand and report all missing keys to the US Postal Inspection Service. Management will also conduct training on proper management and security of arrow keys. Additionally, reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

*Voyager Card Transactions:* Management will provide a service talk on guidelines for the purchase of unleaded fuel for Postal Service vehicles. In addition, management will reiterate the responsibility of the site manager to ensure driver receipts, and "high-risk" transactions are reconciled within Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS).

*Property Conditions:* Management has abated four safety issues and is working to abate the other safety issue found during the audit, which requires the submission of workorders for assistance from other resources.

E-SIGNED by LISSE.A GARRETT  
on 2026-04-24 07:29:32 EDT

Lisse A. Garrett  
a/District Manager, Florida 3 District

cc: Vice President, Area Retail & Delivery Operations (Southern)  
Corporate Audit Response Management

# OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE



This document contains sensitive information that has been redacted for public release. These redactions were coordinated with USPS and agreed to by the OIG.

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