

Follow Up to U.S. Postal Service's and U.S. Postal Inspection Service's Response to Mail Theft

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 25-137-R26 | May 19, 2026



Table of Contents

Cover

Highlights	1
Background	1
What We Did	1
What We Found	1
Recommendations and Management Comments	1

Transmittal Letter	2
---------------------------------	---

Results	3
----------------------	---

Introduction/Objective.....	3
-----------------------------	---

Background	3
------------------	---

Findings Summary	5
------------------------	---

Finding #1: Update on Mail Theft Response Actions.....	6
--	---

Postal Service Response.....	9
------------------------------	---

OIG Evaluation.....	9
---------------------	---

Finding #2: Arrow Key Oversight and Training.....	10
---	----

Recommendation #1:	13
--------------------------	----

Recommendation #2:	13
--------------------------	----

Postal Service Response.....	13
------------------------------	----

OIG Evaluation.....	13
---------------------	----

Finding #3: Blue Collection and Green Relay Boxes.....	14
--	----

Recommendation #3:	16
--------------------------	----

Recommendation #4:	16
--------------------------	----

Postal Service Response.....	16
------------------------------	----

OIG Evaluation.....	16
---------------------	----

Looking Forward.....	16
----------------------	----

Appendices	17
-------------------------	----

Appendix A: Additional Information.....	18
---	----

Scope and Methodology	18
-----------------------------	----

Prior Audit Coverage	19
----------------------------	----

Appendix B: Management’s Comments	20
---	----

Contact Information	24
----------------------------------	----



Highlights

Background

The U.S. Postal Inspection Service's mission is to support and protect the U.S. Postal Service and its employees, infrastructure, and customers; enforce the laws that defend the nation's mail system from illegal or dangerous use; and ensure public trust in the mail. According to the Postal Inspection Service mail theft strategy, employees have come under increased attack by criminals seeking to perpetrate financial crimes using stolen mail. In 2023, the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) conducted the *U.S. Postal Service's Response to Mail Theft* audit, which discussed the Postal Service's and Postal Inspection Service's strategic and technical solutions to address mail theft and combat carrier robberies occurring across the nation.

What We Did

Our objective was to evaluate the Postal Service's and the Postal Inspection Service's progress on its mail theft strategy, including actions taken in response to our 2023 report. To assess the effectiveness of the agencies' mail security processes, we also examined controls over arrow keys — often a target in carrier robberies and used to commit mail theft — and collection box security and management at several Postal Service facilities within associated Postal Inspection Service divisions.

What We Found

In response to our 2023 report, the Postal Inspection Service finalized its Mail Theft strategy and developed standard operating procedures to define its Mail Theft Analytics Program. The Postal Service also developed a plan to acquire and deploy enhanced security measures to replace outdated technologies. While we found that these actions improved some policies, operations, and decision making related to mail theft, greater controls are needed to protect the mail and employees. Specifically, we found many of the same deficiencies identified in prior OIG reports regarding arrow key inventory, scanning, safeguarding, and reporting processes, and we identified a need to increase oversight of arrow key accountability training completion. We also found that collection box system data was not always accurate, the condition of collection boxes should be improved, and updated security information was not always shared internally.

Recommendations and Management Comments

We made four recommendations to address the findings and management agreed with recommendations 1, 3, and 4 but disagreed with recommendation 2. Management's comments and our evaluation are at the end of each finding and recommendation. Regardless of the disagreement with recommendation 2, we consider management's comments responsive. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.



Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

May 19, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR: GARY R. BARKSDALE
CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR

ELVIN MERCADO,
CHIEF RETAIL AND DELIVERY OFFICER AND
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Jan E. Hamm", is centered below the recipient information.

FROM: Jan E. Hamm
Deputy Assistant Inspector General
for Field Operations

SUBJECT: Follow Up to U.S. Postal Service's and U.S. Postal Inspection Service's
Response to Mail Theft (Report Number 25-137-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit, Follow Up to U.S. Postal Service's and U.S. Postal Inspection Service's Response to Mail Theft.

All recommendations require U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General's (OIG) concurrence before closure. Consequently, the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. All recommendations should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact John Littlejohn, Director, Mail Safety and Security, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Corporate Audit Response Management

Results

Introduction/Objective

This report presents the results of our self-initiated audit, Follow Up to U.S. Postal Service's and U.S. Postal Inspection Service's Response to Mail Theft (Project Number 25-137). Our objective was to evaluate the U.S. Postal Service's and the U.S. Postal Inspection Service's progress on its mail theft strategy, including actions taken in response to our September 28, 2023, report, *U.S. Postal Service's Response to Mail Theft*, (22-178-R23). As part of this follow-up audit, we examined arrow key and collection box security controls at four facilities within two Postal Inspection Service divisions: the New York Division (New York, NY) and the Washington Division (Baltimore, MD). We also considered progress made since our five reports that assessed the Postal Service's actions to mitigate and respond to mail theft in specific locations.¹ See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our objective.

Background

The Postal Service's mission is to provide the nation with trusted, safe, and secure communications and mail services. The Postal Service processed approximately 116 billion, 112 billion, and 109 billion mailpieces in fiscal years (FY) 2023, 2024, and 2025, respectively. The Postal Inspection Service is the law enforcement, crime prevention, and security arm of the Postal Service. Postal inspectors, postal police officers, and support personnel protect postal employees, customers, facilities, and the nation's mail from physical attack or criminal misuse. The Postal Inspection Service has 16 divisions covering all 50 states and territories.


Mail Theft Strategy, Complaints, and Cases

In May 2023, following a rise in carrier robberies and mail theft, the Postal Inspection Service announced the launch of its Project Safe Delivery crime prevention and enforcement initiative, which included strategies (described below) to prevent mail and package theft. The Postal Inspection Service's FY 2025-2027 Strategic Plan identified robberies of carriers and mail theft as among its key mission priorities, and the Postal Service's FY 2025 Annual Report to Congress identified employee safety as its top priority, citing efforts to combat mail theft under Project Safe Delivery. Media outlets have continued reporting mail theft incidents and concerns, and Congress has focused on mail theft during hearings and through inquiries to the U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG). For example, on July 23, 2025, the OIG's Deputy Inspector General and the Postal Inspection Service's Inspector in Charge testified at a hearing on mail theft and crime before the Subcommittee on Government Operations of the House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform.

From FY 2023 through FY 2025, the Postal Inspection Service received over 800,000 mail theft complaints. Overall, mail theft complaints decreased from FY 2023 to FY 2024 but then increased in FY 2025 in every division except Seattle (see [Figure 1](#)).

¹ We conducted mail theft response reviews in Houston, TX (*Mail Theft Mitigation and Response - Houston, TX* Report Number 25-023-R25, dated March 2025); Sacramento, CA (*Mail Theft Mitigation and Response - Sacramento, CA* Report Number 24-163-R25, dated March 2025); Chicago, IL (*Mail Theft Mitigation and Response - Chicago, IL* Report Number 24-100-R24, dated September 2024); San Francisco, CA (*Mail Theft Mitigation and Response - San Francisco, CA* Report Number 24-099-R24, dated August 2024); and Queens, NY (*Mail Theft Mitigation and Response - Queens, NY* Report Number 24-037-R24, dated May 2024).


Figure 1. Mail Theft Complaints for FY 2023 - FY 2025 by Inspection Service Division



Source: OIG analysis of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service Financial Crimes Database.

In addition, from FY 2023 through FY 2025, there were 6,510 mail theft cases and 1,903 robbery cases, with the highest volume in the New York division. To conduct site visits and observations, we selected the New York Division, which had 959 mail theft cases and 96 robbery cases, and the Washington Division, which had 270 mail theft cases and 154 robbery cases (see Figure 2).

Figure 2. Mail Theft and Robbery Cases for FY 2023 - FY 2025 by Postal Inspection Service Division



Source: OIG analysis of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service Case Management System.

Prior Mail Theft Audit

In our 2023 audit,² we found that the Postal Service did not have deployment timelines with actionable milestones to fully implement its five planned initiatives to address mail theft (described below). We also found that the Postal Service lacked accountability for its arrow keys,³ which are often a target in carrier robberies and are used to commit mail theft. Additionally, while the Postal Inspection Service implemented efforts to address mail theft and was working to finalize a mail theft strategy, we reported that management faced challenges with staffing and had not assessed and assigned personnel resources nationally to address this issue. We also reported that postal inspectors who solely worked on mail theft cases were not required to complete specialized training. Lastly, we found that the Postal Inspection Service did not clearly define the purpose of its Mail Theft Analytics Program. We calculated that the Postal Service could have used over \$1 million more effectively in FYs 2023 and 2024 if the purpose of the program was clarified around its efforts to analyze mail theft complaints.

We made seven recommendations in our 2023 report. Three recommended that Postal Service management develop a plan with actionable milestones to implement planned initiatives to address mail theft and establish guidance and training for employees to fulfill arrow key

accountability requirements. The remaining four recommended that the Postal Inspection Service require specialized training for postal inspectors assigned to investigate mail theft, finalize its Mail Theft Strategy, assess Postal Inspection Service staffing at an agency-wide level, and develop a purpose and metrics for the Mail Theft Analytics Program.

Findings Summary

We found that the corrective actions that the Postal Service and the Postal Inspection Service implemented to address our 2023 report recommendations improved some policies, operations, and decision making related to mail theft, but we identified areas needing further management controls. Specifically, the Postal Service should improve its processes for accountability of arrow, modified arrow lock (MAL),⁴ and high security electronic lock (HSEL)⁵ keys, and related training. We also found deficiencies associated with arrow key inventory, scanning, safeguarding, and reporting at the locations we visited — a problem we have documented in multiple OIG reports. Lastly, we found that collection box data in the Collection Point Management System (CPMS)⁶ was not always accurate, the condition of collection boxes could be improved, and updated collection box security information was not always communicated.

² U.S. Postal Service's Response to Mail Theft, (22-178-R23) dated September 28, 2023.

³ Arrow keys are universal master keys used to open collection boxes, cluster box units, and other mail receptacles.

⁴ The MAL has a higher security cylinder for use in areas that sustain or are subject to high incidents of mail attacks or losses. The eLocks add an extra layer of security by requiring dual authentication — [REDACTED]. They are designed to deter counterfeiting of keys and are used in areas that sustain or are subject to high incidents of mail attacks or losses.

⁵ The HSEL is an improved version of the eLock and was designed to be useable for different types of mailboxes.

⁶ The Collection Point Management System is an official system of record used to identify the placement and status of blue collection boxes and manage collection schedules.

Finding #1: Update on Mail Theft Response Actions

Overall, we found that Postal Service and Postal Inspection Service management took corrective actions in response to the recommendations we made in our 2023 report. As of March 2026, we had closed all but one of the seven recommendations we made in September 2023. The following sections highlight the actions the Postal Service and the Postal Inspection Service have taken since 2023 to improve its response to mail theft.

Project Safe Delivery

In March 2024, the Postal Inspection Service reported to the OIG that, pursuant to our recommendation, it finalized its Mail Theft Strategy, titled Project Safe Delivery, which includes five strategic goals:

- **Enhance delivery security:** Identify security enhancements to mail receptacles and delivery vehicles, including deploying more secure mail collection boxes, installing better locking mechanisms, and implementing increased accountability and electronic systems for arrow keys.
- **Advance intelligence-led investigations:** Continue leveraging internal and external data sources and the latest technologies to strategically focus investigations, gain investigative insights, and ultimately bring perpetrators of mail theft and associated financial and violent crimes to justice.
- **Deploy communications and increase prevention awareness:** Communicate internally with Postal Service employees and externally with the American public about mail theft and associated financial and violent crimes. Continue prevention awareness messaging on mail theft and employee safety with key stakeholders and improve victim notification and support.
- **Invest in tools, technology, and data analytics:** Identify relevant mail theft-related data sources,

Project Safe Delivery

Project Safe Delivery is also the name of the joint initiative launched in May 2023 by the Postal Service and Postal Inspection Service that includes prevention efforts aimed at reducing mail theft and carrier robberies. See the Postal Inspection Service's [Project Safe Delivery Mail Theft Strategy](#).

organize the data into an efficient environment where applied analytics may be performed, and leverage analytics personnel to apply data analytics techniques and perform continuous data analysis. Enhance the collection of mail theft-related data and leverage data from Postal Service, Postal Inspection Service, and external sources.

- **Deploy advanced training:** Expand the cadre of Postal Inspection Service personnel who have advanced training in investigations involving mail theft and financial, cyber, and violent crimes to ensure that Postal Inspection Service personnel are highly trained and competent to investigate, prevent, and address the challenges posed by mail theft and associated financial and violent crimes.

As we described in our 2023 report, the Postal Inspection Service instituted SURGE operations designed to focus on enforcement, prevention, and protection through investigative and enforcement operations and arrow key audits. SURGE locations are determined by areas across the country with high mail theft and robberies. In FY 2025, postal inspectors and other support staff continued SURGE operations

in several major cities across the United States, including:


- Los Angeles and San Francisco/Oakland, CA
- Miami-Dade/Palm Beach, FL
- Louisville, KY
- Brooklyn and Queens, NY
- Cleveland, Cincinnati, and Columbus, OH
- Portland, OR
- Seattle, WA

According to the Postal Inspection Service, these SURGE operations included intensive prevention and enforcement actions to increase the security of Postal Service employees, safeguard postal property, advance ongoing investigations, and disrupt organized mail theft and robbery activity. Since the expansion of these efforts, the Postal Inspection Service reported a 57 percent reduction in letter carrier robberies, a 15 percent reduction in high-volume mail thefts, and a 25 percent reduction in mail theft complaints.

Mail Security Initiatives

The Postal Service’s and the Postal Inspection Service’s mail security initiatives under Project Safe Delivery’s first strategic goal to enhance delivery security includes four technologies: electronic arrow locks (eLocks), HSELs, high security collection boxes (HSCB), and high security relay boxes (HSRB). Below we describe these technologies and the agencies’ progress on each since our 2023 report. Figure 3 provides an overview of the status of these initiatives.

Figure 3. Status of Project Safe Delivery Mail Security Initiatives



Source: U.S. Postal Inspection Service’s Project Safe Delivery and OIG analysis.

Electronic Arrow Locks

Thieves often target traditional arrow keys to gain access to mail receptacles along a carrier’s route to steal mail. An eLock can replace an existing lock that is accessed with an arrow key and adds an extra layer of security through dual authentication – for example, [REDACTED]

This eliminates the utility of a lone key and provides a safer environment for postal employees to collect and deliver mail. As part of Project Safe Delivery in

2023, the Postal Service planned an initial deployment of about 49,800 eLocks, with intentions to roll out additional eLocks in succeeding phases based on funding availability.

In our 2023 report, we recommended that the Postal Service develop a plan to include proposed quantities, projected cost, and actionable milestones to fully deploy eLock initiatives and include measures to assess their effectiveness. In response, Postal Service management agreed to deploy

the remaining eLocks that were in inventory. As of December 2025, the Postal Service had installed about 47,360 eLocks across the nation in high crime areas. In January 2026, Postal Service management reported to the OIG that it had completed eLock installations and was closing out the program. Postal Service management planned to transition its focus to another type of lock that has an improved technological design, the HSEL (described below). Postal Service management reported to the OIG that it is tracking eLock deployment and installation progress through a dashboard. As of March 2026, the Postal Service was completing this work, and the recommendation remained open.⁷

High Security Electronic Locks

In January 2024, the Postal Service announced the “Go Forward Plan,” which detailed the deployment of the HSEL, an improved version of the eLock designed to increase the security of mail receptacles while decreasing the value of a carrier’s keys. The HSEL opens in milliseconds, resulting in no operational delay, unlike the eLock’s delay, which caused major concern for the Postal Service. HSELS are also suitable for all types of mail receptacles such as collection boxes, apartment panels, and green relay boxes. Postal facilities are required to store the HSEL keys in a secure cabinet and validate the keys daily. The keys also contain technology allowing them to be deactivated and rendered useless if lost or stolen. Per Postal Service management, a small number of HSELS have already been successfully deployed in a variety of locations to test their operation.⁸ For the first phase, the Postal Service plans to install over 50,000 HSELS to postal facilities in five districts by May 2026.

High Security Collection Boxes and High Security Relay Boxes

The Postal Service uses blue collection boxes for mail collection at postal facilities, residential neighborhoods, businesses, and other locations. Individuals have targeted blue collection boxes by pulling mail out of the drop slot, prying them open

with a crowbar, and opening them with a stolen or counterfeit arrow key. The HSCB, compared to a standard blue collection box, has enhanced security features such as a narrow mail slot without the lever/door, finger rakes to deter mail fishing, and reinforced steel. The Postal Service planned to roll out HSCBs in phases based on funding availability. In 2023, as part of Project Safe Delivery, the Postal Service began deploying about 12,600 HSCBs in high crime areas. As of January 2026, the Postal Service finished its initial and second phases, with an additional deployment of 11,400 HSCBs, for a total of about 24,000 deployed HSCBs. The Postal Service is currently in its third phase, which includes plans to deploy about 9,000 more HSCBs. Postal Service management reported to the OIG that approximately 850 HSCBs remain for phase three, which it projected would be installed by April 2026.⁹

Continuing the deployment of advanced technologies, the Postal Service plans to begin the deployment of over 10,000 HSRBs in its third phase. Relay boxes are lockable receptacles where carriers can leave mail along their routes for later pickup and delivery.

As of January 2026, the Postal Service stated that no HSRBs had been deployed as it was in the process of developing the implementation schedule and determining resources for installation.

Arrow Key and Mail Theft Training

In response to our 2023 audit recommendations, the Postal Service developed required training¹⁰ for the arrow key accountability process throughout the daily cycle. The daily cycle includes opening, employee assignment, key usage and collecting, closing, and night processes for securing arrow keys and what to do if a key is lost or stolen. The training, which went live on June 18, 2024, in HERO,¹¹ targeted current managers, supervisors, and those assigned to detail assignments having responsibility for daily

⁷ The OIG is monitoring the Postal Service’s progress on the dashboard and will determine its responsiveness to the recommendation once the planned eLock installations are complete.

⁸ The New York Division was a location where HSELS were initially deployed. See [Finding 3](#) for the results of our observations in that area.

⁹ Actions on HSCB deployments and installations were taken, in part, in response to our 2023 report recommendation for the Postal Service to develop a plan with proposed quantities, projected cost, and actionable milestones for high security mailbox initiatives and include measures to assess their effectiveness.

¹⁰ National Training is called the *Daily Arrow Key Accountability* (Course Number 2024DLOP6468VO01).

¹¹ HERO is a Postal Service integrated training and development platform designed to be a single source for employees to access human resource services.

arrow key accountability. To track completion of the training, the Postal Service used a compliance report in HERO.

In response to our recommendation that postal inspectors complete basic mail theft training within one year of being assigned to a mail theft team, the Postal Inspection Service created a training needs assessment with course offerings aligned to its national priorities, including mail theft. Survey assessments were sent to every executive to capture the training needs in their division/group. The process is designed to ensure that inspectors with the greatest need are provided opportunities and receive related training. See [Finding 2](#) for our assessment of the Postal Service's and the Postal Inspection Service's arrow key oversight and training efforts.

Work Force Assessment

Postal Inspection Service management heightened its actions in response to the recommendation from our prior report to assess staffing resources to support the Mail Theft Program and align resources with its Mail Theft Strategy. On August 15, 2024, the Postal Inspection Service provided guidance to the field inspectors in charge on how to align their resources with the agency's overall mission priorities, as well as the unique needs of their specific division. The guidance highlighted relevant factors for consideration and how to document their annual workforce assessment. We believe that this guidance should help division leadership better determine the staffing levels and related resource distribution to meet its operational needs.¹²

Mail Theft Analytics Program

The Postal Inspection Service developed the Mail Theft Analytics Program (MTAP) to measure its effectiveness in responding to mail loss complaints from Postal Service customers and to triage those complaints that are most likely related to mail theft. MTAP is comprised of Level I and Level II contractors. Level I contractors are responsible for performing the initial review of complaints and then determining the complaint category while Level II contractors are

tasked with fulfilling and supporting investigative requests from the field.

In our 2023 report, we found that the Postal Inspection Service did not clearly define the purpose or establish metrics for overseeing the MTAP program. In response, Postal Inspection Service management agreed to develop and implement a written Standard Operating Procedure (SOP) document to 1) define the MTAP purpose to improve complaint data quality and usefulness for division personnel, 2) document internal controls such as guidance and an oversight mechanism, and 3) establish metrics to assess performance. The Postal Inspection Service created SOPs for both MTAP Level I and Level II in April 2024. We reviewed the SOPs, which were also updated in January 2025, and found that they adequately defined the purpose of the program, documented internal controls, and established performance measures. Additionally, Postal Inspection Service management stated that the SOPs have helped define MTAP and the contractors' responsibilities.

As these are all positive developments in the Postal Service's and Postal Inspection Service's continued focus on combating mail theft across the nation, we are not making any recommendations tied to the areas discussed in this finding. However, during this follow-up audit, we also assessed other aspects of the Postal Service's and the Postal Inspection Service's mail theft strategy and initiative implementation and identified areas needing further management controls and accountability, as outlined below.

Postal Service Response

Management agreed with Finding 1.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the finding.

¹² This audit did not include an assessment of the impacts of the guidance on workforce allocation processes. In May 2024, the General Accountability Office (GAO) recommended that the Postal Inspection Service document processes for determining the size and location of the postal inspector workforce and postal police workforce and set a time frame for completing a security force assessment for the postal police workforce. As of March 2026, all recommendations were still open. See *U.S. Postal Inspection Service Should Document Its Law Enforcement Workforce Decision-Making Process* (Report Number GAO-24-106497, dated May 2024).

Finding #2: Arrow Key Oversight and Training

The OIG has examined the Postal Service’s safeguarding, management, and accountability of arrow keys via multiple audits and consistently reported inaccurate arrow key inventories, deficient internal controls over arrow keys, and units not following proper procedures for reporting missing keys to the Postal Inspection Service. During this follow-up audit, we found those same problems. We also found that personnel did not complete the required FY 2025 Daily Arrow Key Accountability training.

Arrow Key Inventory and Accountability

In its Project Safe Delivery Mail Theft Strategy, the Postal Inspection Service acknowledges that arrow keys are a critical access control component for the Postal Service’s delivery network and require a high level of accountability among the postal employees who have access to and handle them. The Postal Service has robust policies and procedures around arrow key accountability, including requiring monthly and semi-annual arrow key certifications in the Retail and Delivery Analytics and Reports (RADAR)¹³ system as of June 2023.

The OIG has conducted significant oversight of arrow key inventories and accountability processes, including what we reported in prior reports. For example,

- In September 2023,¹⁴ we reported that 13 of 16 OIG reports issued from October 2022 to April 2023 had findings related to arrow keys. Specifically, across

all 16 delivery units audited, there should have been a total of 550 arrow keys, but we found that 155 arrow keys (28 percent) were missing.

- In August 2025,¹⁵ we reported that 18 of 21 previously audited facilities (86 percent) lacked accurate arrow key inventories. For example, 108 keys located at 17 units were not listed in the RADAR system.
- Between May 2024 and December 2025, we reported and observed that 376 of 1,962 keys (19 percent) listed in RADAR were missing or could not be verified during observations.¹⁶

Recognizing the challenges with manual processes, in February 2023, the Postal Service implemented a new 24-Hour Arrow Key Accountability pilot process for all Tier 1 facilities¹⁷ with arrow and MAL keys¹⁸ assigned to city routes. This process has four steps to provide oversight of the daily usage, visibility, and accountability for each employee handling arrow keys (see Figure 4). The process uses a carrier’s handheld scanner and a barcode system instead of a manual check in/out form.¹⁹ Each arrow key must have an assigned barcode via Regional Intelligent Mail Servers, and supervisors verify the arrow key inventory by scanning each arrow key barcode for daily morning and evening inventory checks.²⁰ Per Postal Service policy,²¹ if employees experience any technical or scanning issues using the 24-hour arrow key accountability process, they must use the manual form to check in/out arrow keys.

¹³ The Postal Service’s RADAR system provides a national platform of current inventory of arrow and MAL keys at all facilities.

¹⁴ *U.S. Postal Service’s Response to Mail Theft* (22-178-R23) dated September 28, 2023.

¹⁵ *Field Operations Service Review: Delivery Operations* (25-066-R25) dated August 28, 2025.

¹⁶ These numbers include findings from our five mail theft response audits and results from observations conducted during this follow-up audit in New York and Baltimore.

¹⁷ Tier 1 is a category of postal units that fall under the jurisdiction of the highest-level postmaster.


¹⁸ HSEL keys will not be a part of the 24-hour arrow key accountability process because they have a separate daily validation within a secured cabinet.

¹⁹ PS Form 1106 *Arrow Key Daily - Accountable Log*.

²⁰ *USPS Arrow Key Guidebook Standard Work Instructions*, updated March 2025.

²¹ *USPS Arrow Key Guidebook Standard Work Instructions*, updated March 2025.

Figure 4. 24-Hour Arrow Key Accountability 4-Step Process



Source: U.S. Postal Service Arrow Key Guidebook Standard Work Instructions: 24-Hour Arrow Accountability Process, March 2025.

The Daily Arrow Key Accountability training is a mandatory yearly requirement for all Retail and Delivery Operations supervisors, managers, postmasters, managers of customer services, managers of post office operations and those acting in these positions. Employees in these positions are required to complete the training each fiscal year by the required due date. Further, the Postal Service implemented the 24-hour arrow key management system dashboard report²² in May 2024 to provide greater visibility of arrow key processes to management.

Safeguarding Arrow, MAL, and HSEL Keys

In our 2023 report, we noted that Postal Service policy²³ requires arrow keys to remain secure until they are individually assigned to personnel. A supervisor or clerk must supervise employees signing out keys on the inventory log. Upon return, arrow keys should be deposited in a secure location, and a supervisor or clerk must verify that all keys have been returned and accounted for daily.

However, we continue to find that personnel did not properly safeguard arrow keys in accordance with Postal Service policies.²⁴ For example, our reports have documented finding arrow keys in or near open, unsecured arrow key cabinets, unsecured registry cages, unlocked supervisors' desks, carriers' cases, or in the carrier's possession during non-workhours.

Reporting Lost or Stolen Keys

When arrow keys are stolen or fraudulently duplicated, the Postal Service cannot prevent their use or know who is using them. This can make it difficult to definitively connect mail theft incidents to reported robberies of carriers for their arrow keys. Therefore, it is imperative that the Postal Service reports lost, missing or stolen keys to the Postal Inspection Service timely, and that the Postal Inspection Service enters all reported lost, missing, or stolen keys in the Case Management System (CMS) timely.

²² The dashboard provides a 24-hour arrow key visibility report sent to all postmasters, district managers, manager of integrations, and manager of post office operations Monday through Saturday.

²³ USPS Arrow Key Standard Work, January 2022.

²⁴ USPS Arrow Key Guidebook Standard Work Instructions, updated March 2025 and High Security Electronic Lock (HSEL) Guide, dated September 15, 2025.

As with the above issues, we have repeatedly reported on Postal Service units not following proper procedures for reporting missing or lost arrow keys to the Postal Inspection Service in accordance with policy.²⁵ Specifically:

- In September 2023, we reported that six of 10 (60 percent) delivery units did not report any missing arrow keys to the Postal Inspection Service.²⁶
- In August 2025, we reported that five of 21 (24 percent) units did not follow the proper procedures for reporting missing keys to the Postal Inspection Service.²⁷
- In October and December 2025, as part of this follow-up audit, we found that of 14 arrow keys recorded as lost or stolen, six (43 percent) were not reported to the Postal Inspection Service.

Further, we found that when keys were reported as lost or stolen, Postal Inspection Service management did not always document the reported lost or stolen keys in CMS for tracking purposes. Also, when lost keys were found, Postal Service management did not inform the Postal Inspection Service.

As our prior reports have documented, these issues occurred because Postal Service management at the local facility level often do not have sufficient controls and oversight in place to effectively manage and safeguard arrow keys. Also, Postal Service management at headquarters lacks monitoring controls to validate that inventory scans accurately reflect daily arrow key accountability. In addition, while the Postal Inspection Service's Case Management Reporting Guidelines direct staff to enter reports of lost, missing, or stolen postal keys in CMS within seven days of the reported loss, the guidelines do not include procedures for how to input or verify the reported keys. Postal Inspection Service division management stated that it does not have a fluid input or validation process in place when reporting missing, lost and stolen keys in CMS. Division management acknowledged that the responsibility to enter the reported keys "got

lost in the shuffle" when employees matriculated through the division. Postal Inspection Service headquarters management noted the staff turnover and stated that it continuously reminds divisions of the guideline requirements. Updated written procedures prescribing how Postal Inspection Service divisions must input and verify the reported keys should help increase awareness and accountability of this important responsibility, which headquarters management should continue reinforcing. When missing, lost, or stolen arrow keys are not reported or tracked, mail theft risk can increase.

Arrow Key Training and Dashboard

During this follow-up audit, we found that management did not ensure that FY 2025 Daily Arrow Key Accountability training was assigned as required training to managers and supervisors. Specifically, the training system migrated from HERO to MyHR, and no request was submitted for this required training in the new system. Further, local post office management routinely delegated primary arrow key responsibility to clerks who were not required to take the prescribed Daily Arrow Key Accountability training because they are not included in one of the personnel groups for which the training is mandated. As a result, clerks often performed the function without the benefit of the training or sufficient oversight.

Additionally, Postal Service management did not implement controls or establish periodic monitoring to validate or reconcile the 24-hour arrow key management system dashboard to the actual inventory scans from the post offices. This resulted in reported compliance status conditions that did not accurately reflect the results of actual scans.

When insufficient oversight and supervision exist for accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is an increased risk of lost or stolen items. Because arrow keys open mailboxes across multiple ZIP Codes, lost or damaged keys can result in mail theft or the inability to collect or deliver mail that will impact many customers. This may damage the

²⁵ USPS Arrow Key Guidebook Standard Work Instructions, updated March 2025.

²⁶ U.S. Postal Service's Response to Mail Theft (22-178-R23) dated September 28, 2023.

²⁷ Field Operations Service Review: Delivery Operations (25-066-R25) dated August 28, 2025.

Postal Service’s reputation and diminish public trust in the nation’s mail system.

Postal Service management has generally agreed with our prior recommendations and began implementing corrective actions, such as developing automated features to aid in the reporting of lost or missing keys entered in RADAR and other system enhancements that, once fully implemented, should reduce input errors.²⁸ Other corrective actions included increasing district-level targeted arrow key inventory reviews and reiterating arrow key and security policies and responsibilities at the district level. In this follow-up audit, we make two additional recommendations to the Postal Service and Postal Inspection Service to further improve arrow key accountability.

Recommendation #1:

We recommend the **Chief Retail and Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President** develop and implement a comprehensive plan to improve arrow key controls that provides annual Daily Arrow Key Accountability training for all employees with oversight responsibility, including clerks; an accurate 24-Hour arrow key management system dashboard; and review of dashboard metrics to achieve corrective actions for noncompliant conditions.

Recommendation #2:

We recommend the **Inspector in Charge, Criminal Investigations**, update the Case Management Reporting Guidelines to include procedures for how to input and verify reported lost, missing, and stolen arrow keys in the Case Management System.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding and recommendation 1 but disagreed with recommendation 2. Regarding recommendation 1, management stated it updated the Daily Arrow Key Accountability training to include RADAR system changes and High Security Key Lock

changes related to the arrow key accountability process. In addition, management stated that it will clarify training for the clerks’ role within the arrow key accountability process. The target implementation date is April 30, 2027.

Regarding recommendation 2, management stated that it has documented procedures in the Case Management Reporting Guidelines and sends reminders that reference divisions to these procedures annually. Also, management stated that it will continue to update the procedures as appropriate and it is willing to send additional messages to the divisions as reminders to comply with these procedures. Because management disagreed with this recommendation, it did not provide a target implementation date for these actions.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management’s comments responsive to recommendation 1, and although management disagreed with recommendation 2, we consider the comments responsive to that recommendation as well, as the corrective actions management described for both recommendations should resolve the issues identified in the report. Regarding recommendation 2, the Case Management Reporting Guidelines are available for divisions to follow when recording lost, stolen, or missing keys. While we generally consider the guidelines less prescriptive than detailed written procedures, they do provide reasonable guidance and more frequent messaging should aid in compliance with requirements. We will work with management to understand its timelines for implementing these actions in lieu of it not providing a target implementation date.

28 One recommendation related to arrow key accountability (recommendation 4) in the 2025 Delivery Operations Service Review report remained open as of March 2026.

Finding #3: Blue Collection and Green Relay Boxes

The Postal Inspection Service states in its Project Safe Delivery Mail Theft Strategy that even with efforts to strengthen the physical security of blue collection boxes — including employing anti-fishing devices, HSCBs, and MALs — blue collection boxes and other mail receptacles remain an attractive target for criminals who have sought to exploit design vulnerabilities.

In our series of mail theft mitigation and response audits during 2024 and 2025,²⁹ we found blue collection and green relay box deficiencies. At all five locations, we found similar box deficiencies that increased the risk of mail theft. For example, in our Queens, NY, report,³⁰ we recommended, and the Postal Service agreed, to identify blue collection and HSCBs in CPMS, which is important for visibility into the status and condition of collection boxes. In all five locations, we identified blue collection boxes in poor condition. In Queens, NY, and San Francisco, CA, we also identified green relay boxes in poor condition. For example, 91 percent of the blue collection boxes and 25 percent of the green relay boxes we observed in the Queens, NY, area had at least one deficiency (corrosion, cracks, door gaps, and missing leg bolts).

Based on these past findings, we assessed the accuracy of blue collection box information in CPMS and the status of green relay boxes — most of which were installed with HSELs. We continued to find inaccurate CPMS information and some of the same

deficiencies in the condition of boxes. We also found that Postal Service offices did not establish a formal coordination process to ensure that offices with interdependent responsibilities consistently shared and updated information on newly installed HSCBs in the system.

Regarding blue collection boxes, we randomly selected 38 to confirm whether the security type recorded in the system reflected the physical security enhancements installed on each box. We found that 17 of 38 (45 percent) blue collection boxes had an incorrect security type recorded in CPMS.

Regarding green relay boxes, we randomly selected 20 locations with green relay boxes to confirm whether the box address and the physical security enhancements were installed on each of the boxes. For the 20 unique green relay box locations selected, we found a total of 28 green relay boxes.³¹ We found that while most green relay boxes had HSELs installed, some green relay boxes were not located at the stated location or were not maintained in good condition. Specifically, we were unable to locate green relay boxes at four (20 percent) locations. In addition, four of the 28 (14 percent) boxes we observed were in poor condition with rusted holes or a bent and detached leg. Further, some boxes had a large rusted-through hole in the bottom that could allow mail to be removed without unlocking the box (see Figure 5).

²⁹ See [Prior Audit Coverage](#) for the five mail theft mitigation and response reports we conducted in Houston, TX; Sacramento, CA; Chicago, IL; San Francisco, CA; and Queens, NY.

³⁰ *Mail Theft Mitigation and Response- Queens, NY* (24-037-R24) dated May 21, 2024.

³¹ While we initially selected 20 unique green relay box addresses for review, some addresses had multiple green relay boxes at the location. Therefore, we observed a total of 28 individual green relay boxes.

Figure 5. Green Relay Box with HSEL and Rusted-Through Hole at the Bottom



Source: OIG photograph taken in the [REDACTED] area December 10, 2025.

We also found that Retail and Post Office Operations' Field Maintenance Operations (FMO) management did not effectively coordinate and share key information for newly installed HSCBs. Specifically, FMO management did not track or communicate HSCB installations due to not having a security type description on work orders. This prevented notification of completed HSCB installation information to the Chief Retail Delivery Operations, City Delivery Strategy and Policy team, and other internal users.

This occurred because a documented process was not codified for sharing and updating key information on newly installed HSCBs. FMO management stated that it plans to add a question for technicians to answer upon completing a work order that would capture the security type for blue collection boxes.

During discussions with the OIG, management acknowledged that the Administration Module User's Guide did not include procedure steps for updating

the box security type. Postal Service management stated that the related update was not included due to it not having been through the approval process. As of February 2, 2026, management stated that the guide was undergoing review.

Postal Service policy³² requires that each district office maintain its portion of the national system database that contains information for all the collection points managed by the post offices or stations within the district. Further, Postal Service policy³³ requires district managers to enter all collection points in the system accurately and completely and review the information annually. Organizational units are required³⁴ to ensure that policies and procedures are current and complete, and periodic reviews must occur at regular intervals to ensure that they reflect current practices.³⁵ Specifically, policy should be updated once every two years, and processes and guidelines should be updated once every year.

The Postal Service must preserve and protect the security of the mail in its custody from unauthorized opening, inspection, and reading of contents. The Postal Service must also prevent tampering, delays, or other unauthorized acts.³⁶ Boxes identified with rusted-through holes or excessively bent or broken legs are considered unrepairable and should be replaced, in accordance with policy.³⁷

By not properly identifying HSCBs in the system, Postal Service management is unable to determine which postal facilities are complete and which still need the correct type of box. This could create deployment delays and further contribute to the potential for an inaccurate assessment of the progress made on mail theft initiatives.

When HSELs are installed on damaged green relay boxes, it decreases the operational effectiveness of newly installed technology aimed at improving the security of mail receptacles. It also generates increased costs associated with reinstallation of

³² *Collection Point Management System Admin Module User's Guide*, dated May 2023.

³³ *Postal Operations Manual*, Issue 9, Section 314 Collection Point Management System, Collection Test, and Density Test (Volume Reviews), dated July 2002, updated September 2025.

³⁴ *Administrative Service Manual*, Section 313.12: Originating Organizational Units, updated January 31, 2024.

³⁵ *Policy AS-310 Management of Postal Service Policies and Related Documents*, updated September 2023.

³⁶ *Handbook PO-209 - Retail Operations Handbook*, Section 4-2 Sanctity and Security of the Mail, dated August 2023.

³⁷ *Maintenance Management Order*, Refurbishment and Disposal Procedures for Collection Boxes (MMO-039-23), dated May 5, 2023.

HSEs, due to box replacements, and adversely affects the Postal Service brand.

In our Queens, NY, mail theft mitigation and response report, we recommended developing a process to define roles, responsibilities, and frequency for inspecting green relay boxes, and to record and track the location and condition of green relay boxes. The Postal Service agreed with this recommendation and developed a system that replicates the same ability as CPMS for the green relay boxes. We closed this recommendation on March 17, 2026, and therefore, do not make a recommendation on the process over roles and responsibilities for inspecting and tracking green relay boxes.

Recommendation #3:

We recommend the **Chief Retail and Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President** implement a process outlining the operational workflow across Retail and Post Office Operations, Delivery Operations, and Delivery and Retail Modernization offices, including defined roles, responsibilities, information handoffs, and system updates involved in high security collection box deployment and tracking.

Recommendation #4:

We recommend the **Director, Chief Retail Delivery Operations, City Delivery Strategy and Policy**, update the Collection Point Management System Admin Module User's Guide outlining steps for district managers on how to enter the security type for blue collection boxes.

Postal Service Response

Postal Service agreed to this finding and both recommendations. Regarding recommendation 3, management stated that it would update the High Security Collection Box, Decision Analysis Report 2 to incorporate informational safeguards and system updates to improve the communication between Field Maintenance Operations and the Collection Point Management System support team. The target implementation date is April 30, 2027.

Regarding recommendation 4, management stated that it will update the Collection Point Management System Admin Module User Guide to include instructions to update the blue security box security type. The target implementation date is October 31, 2026.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to recommendations 3 and 4 as corrective actions should resolve the issues identified in the report.

Looking Forward

The Postal Service and Postal Inspection Service face ongoing challenges mitigating and responding to mail theft. The success of the mail theft initiatives the agencies identified in Project Safe Delivery is essential to protecting the Postal Service's employees, reputation, and brand. Addressing the systemic arrow key control weaknesses and box security management issues we highlight in this report would be a critical foundation for future success of the mail theft strategy. As we noted, overall mail theft complaints from customers – which represent a key indicator of mail theft strategy effectiveness – decreased from FY 2023 to FY 2024 but then increased in FY 2025 in nearly every Postal Inspection Service division. Initial inferences regarding strategy determinations and related measures implemented may need adjustment to counter the ever-evolving mail theft threat. The Postal Service and the Postal Inspection Service should strongly consider the indications of this fluctuating trend as it expands implementation of its mail theft initiatives into additional major metropolitan areas.

Appendices

Appendix A: Additional Information	18
Scope and Methodology.....	18
Prior Audit Coverage.....	19
Appendix B: Management's Comments	20



Appendix A: Additional Information

Scope and Methodology

The scope of this follow-up audit is included in the U.S. Postal Service's Response to Mail Theft (Report Number 22-178-R23), report recommendation status. This audit included a review of the Postal Service's processes and procedures for addressing mail theft, and the Postal Inspection Service's arrow key reporting, mail theft complaints, and cases related to mail theft, carrier robberies and mail theft complaints received from October 2022 through September 2025. Based on information obtained from congressional staff and the number of mail theft complaints in high crime ZIP Codes, we selected the Highlandtown Post Office and Arlington Post Office in the Baltimore, MD, area and based on the complaints and installation of HSEL, we selected Church Street Post Office and Planetarium Post Office in New York, NY.

To accomplish our objective, we:

- Reviewed and analyzed prior OIG Mail Theft Mitigation and Response audit reports issued since 2024.
- Assessed the status of recommendations for our U.S. Postal Service's Response to Mail Theft report (22-178-R23) dated September 28, 2023.
- Reviewed policies and procedures related to reporting and responding to mail theft, carrier robberies, arrow key accountability, and box security features.
- Assessed the deployment and installation of mail theft initiatives to include HSCBs in Baltimore, MD, and New York, NY.
- Assessed the status of HSEL deployments in New York, NY.
- Performed arrow key and MAL key accountability reviews at each of the two sites in Baltimore, MD, and New York, NY.
- Performed arrow key, MAL, and HSEL key accountability reviews at the two sites in New York, NY.

- Performed security feature reviews for blue collection boxes at each of the two sites in Baltimore, MD, and New York, NY.
- Performed HSEL security feature reviews for green relay boxes at two post office sites in New York, NY.
- Interviewed Postal Service Headquarters, Maryland District, New York 1 District, and local management to understand roles and responsibilities for reporting mail theft; carrier robberies; lost or stolen arrow keys; MAL, HSEL and arrow key accountability; security features for blue collection boxes; and deployment of current and future mail theft initiatives.
- Interviewed Postal Inspection Service Headquarters, Washington Division, and New York Division management to understand roles and responsibilities for reporting, responding to, and tracking mail theft, carrier robberies, and lost or stolen MAL, HSEL, and arrow keys.

We conducted this performance audit from August 2025 through May 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on April 17, 2026, and included its comments where appropriate.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the Postal Service's Chief Delivery and Retail Office and Postal Inspection Service's internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks.

Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following five components were significant to our audit objective: control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring.

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to control environment, risk assessment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. Our recommendations, if implemented, should correct the weaknesses we identified.

We assessed the reliability of RADAR, Collection Point Management System, and Case Management data by performing tests for data completeness, reasonableness, accuracy, and validity. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Prior Audit Coverage

Report Title	Objective	Report Number	Final Report Date	Monetary Impact
<i>Field Operations Service Review: Delivery Operations</i>	To evaluate trends with service and operational performance at previously audited delivery units and determine potential areas of improvement.	25-066-R25	8/28/2025	None
<i>Mail Theft Mitigation and Response-Houston, TX</i>	To assess the U.S. Postal Service's actions taken to mitigate and respond to mail theft in Houston, TX.	25-023-R25	3/20/2025	None
<i>Mail Theft Mitigation and Response-Sacramento, CA</i>	To assess the U.S. Postal Service's actions taken to mitigate and respond to mail theft at selected delivery units in the Sacramento, CA, area.	24-163-R25	3/20/2025	None
<i>Mail Theft Mitigation and Response-Chicago, IL</i>	To assess the U.S. Postal Service's actions taken to mitigate and respond to mail theft in Chicago, IL.	24-100-R24	9/18/2024	None
<i>Mail Theft Mitigation and Response-San Francisco, CA</i>	To assess the U.S. Postal Service's actions taken to mitigate and respond to mail theft in San Francisco, CA.	24-099-R24	8/30/2024	None
<i>Mail Theft Mitigation and Response - Queens, NY</i>	To assess the U.S. Postal Service's actions taken to mitigate and respond to mail theft in Queens, NY.	24-037-R24	5/21/2024	None
<i>U.S. Postal Service's Response to Mail Theft</i>	To evaluate the Postal Service's efforts to respond to mail theft.	22-178-R23	9/28/2023	\$1,008,976
<i>U.S. Postal Inspection Service Pandemic Response to Mail Fraud and Mail Theft</i>	To assess the Postal Inspection Service's response to mail fraud and mail theft during the COVID-19 pandemic.	20-305-R21	5/20/2021	None

Appendix B: Management's Comments



May 13, 2026

LAURA LOZON
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: ***Follow Up to U.S. Postal Service's and U.S. Postal Inspection Service's Response to Mail Theft (#25-137-DRAFT)***

After reviewing, please find below our comments on the findings and conclusions contained in the draft audit report, *Operational and Financial Performance Across Postal Service Regions*.

Finding #1: Update on Mail Theft Response Actions

Management Response:

Management agrees with Finding 1.

Finding #2: Arrow Key Oversight and Training

Management Response:

Management agrees with Finding 2.

Finding #3: Blue Collection and Green Relay Boxes

The Postal Inspection Service states in its Project Safe Delivery Mail Theft Strategy that even with efforts to strengthen the physical security of blue collection boxes – including employing anti-fishing devices, HSCBs, and MALs – blue collection boxes and other mail receptacles remain an attractive target for criminals who have sought to exploit design vulnerabilities.

Management Response:

Management agrees with Finding 3.

The following are our comments on each of the recommendations.

Recommendation 1:

We recommend the Chief Retail and Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President develop and implement a comprehensive plan to improve arrow key controls that provides annual Daily Arrow Key Accountability training for all employees with oversight responsibility, including clerks; an accurate 24-Hour arrow key management system dashboard; and review of dashboard metrics to achieve corrective actions for noncompliant conditions.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

Management has begun implementing changes and will continue to develop additional comprehensive plans to improve arrow key controls. The Daily Arrow Key Accountability training has been updated to incorporate system changes within the RADAR application, as well as process changes resulting from High Security Key Locks (HSEL) associated with the arrow key accountability. Currently the training is mandated for EAS only, clerks do not have oversight responsibility; their roles are limited to executing check-in and check-out process via PS Form 1160 in accordance with established procedures. Headquarters will modify and enhance training around this process.

Target Implementation Date: 4/30/2027

Responsible Official:

Chief Retail and Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President

Recommendation 2:

We recommend the Inspector in Charge, Criminal Investigations, update the Case Management Reporting Guidelines to include procedures for how to input and verify reported lost, missing, and stolen arrow keys in the Case Management System.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management disagrees with this recommendation.

The Inspection Service has an established written procedure, located in the Case Management Reporting Guidelines (CMRG). Reminders and references to the CMRG and proper reporting qualification are disseminated appropriately to all field personnel on a consistent annual basis. The CMRG will continue to be reviewed and updated as appropriate. The Criminal Investigations Group is willing to disseminate additional management communication to field personnel, reminding them of the CMRG requirements.

Target Implementation Date: N/A

Responsible Official: N/A

Recommendation 3:

We recommend the Chief Retail and Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President implement a process outlining the operational workflow across Retail and Post Office Operations, Delivery Operations, and Delivery and Retail Modernization offices, including defined roles, responsibilities, information handoffs, and system updates involved in high security collection box deployment and tracking.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

We will enhance the HSCB DAR2 report to strengthen communication between Field Maintenance Operations (FMO) and Collection Point Management System (CPMS), incorporate informational safeguards, and include timely system updates as they become available.

Target Implementation Date: 4/30/2027

Responsible Official:

Director, Chief Retail Delivery Operations, City Delivery Strategy and Policy

Recommendation 4:

We recommend the Director, Chief Retail Delivery Operations, City Delivery Strategy and Policy, update the Collection Point Management System Admin Module User's Guide, outlining steps for district managers on how to enter the security type for blue collection boxes.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

Management will update the Collection Point Management System Admin Module User's Guide to include the process for admin users to update the security type for blue collection boxes.

Target Implementation Date: 10/31/2026

Responsible Official:

Director, Chief Retail Delivery Operations, City Delivery Strategy and Policy

E-SIGNED by GARY R BARKSDALE
on 2026-05-13 17:01:57 EDT

Gary R. Barksdale
Chief Postal Inspector

E-SIGNED by ELVIN MERCADO
on 2026-05-13 11:27:11 EDT

Elvin Mercado
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President

cc: Corporate Audit & Response Management

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