

Suffolk Main Post Office, Suffolk, VA: Delivery Operations

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-044-3-R26 | April 9, 2026



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Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

April 9, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR: ANTHONY A. IMPRONTO
MANAGER, VIRGINIA DISTRICT

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Monica J. Brym", is centered below the recipient information.

FROM: Monica J. Brym
Director, Field Operations, Atlantic & WestPac

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Suffolk Main Post Office, Suffolk, VA: Delivery Operations
(Report Number 26-044-3-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Suffolk Main Post Office in Suffolk, VA.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Ricardo Martinez, Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer & Executive Vice President
Vice President, Delivery Operations
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations
Vice President, Atlantic Area Retail & Delivery Operations
Director, Retail & Post Office Operations Maintenance
Corporate Audit and Response Management

Results

Background

The U.S. Postal Service’s mission is to provide timely, reliable, secure, and affordable mail and package delivery to more than 160 million residential and business addresses across the country. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews delivery operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback in furtherance of this mission.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Suffolk Main Post Office (MPO) in Suffolk, VA. (Project Number 26-044-3). The Suffolk MPO is in the Virginia District of the Atlantic Area and serves about 51,286 people in ZIP Code 23434, which is considered a predominantly urban area (see Figure 1). Specifically, 41,605 (81 percent) live in urban communities and 9,681 (19 percent) live in rural communities.¹ The unit also services ZIP Code 23439 used for PO Boxes.


This delivery unit has 14 rural routes and 17 city routes. From December 13, 2025, through January 9, 2026, the delivery unit had one postmaster and two supervisors assigned.² During our visit, the management team working at the unit consisted of the postmaster, two acting supervisors, and a customer service supervisor who splits time between the Suffolk MPO and another facility.

As of January 9, 2026,³ the year-to-date employee availability rate for the Suffolk MPO was 87.55 percent, which is less than the Postal Service’s retail and delivery operations employee availability goal of 93.95 percent for fiscal year 2026. The Suffolk MPO is one of three delivery units⁴ the OIG reviewed during

the week of February 9, 2026, that are serviced by the Norfolk Local Processing Center (LPC). During the same week, the OIG also reviewed a fourth delivery unit⁵ within the Virginia District that is serviced by the Roanoke Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC).

We assessed units serviced by the Norfolk LPC and units in the Virginia District based on the number of Customer 360 (C360)⁶ delivery-related inquiries,⁷ stop-the-clock (STC)⁸ scans performed away from the delivery point and at the unit, undelivered route information, and Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures⁹ between October 1 and December 31, 2025.

Figure 1. ZIP Codes Serviced by the Suffolk MPO



Source: OIG analysis of ZIP Code data.

We judgmentally selected the Suffolk MPO primarily based on the number of C360 inquiries related to delivery, and STC scans performed away from the delivery point. We also chose this unit based on Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures. See [Table 1](#) for a comparison of

1 We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.
2 Assignments based on the Postal Service’s Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS). TACS is the system used by the Postal Service to automate the collection of employee time and attendance information.
3 January 9, 2026, was the last day of Pay Period 2.
4 The other two units were the Norfolk Sorting and Delivery Center, Norfolk, VA (Project Number 26-044-1) and the Virginia Beach MPO, Virginia Beach, VA (Project Number 26-044-4).
5 The Lynchburg MPO, Lynchburg, VA (Project Number 26-044-2).
6 Customer 360 is a cloud-based application that enables Postal Service employees to diagnose, resolve, and track customer inquiries.
7 Delivery-related inquiries include a compilation of package inquiry, package pickup, daily mail service, and hold mail inquiries.
8 An STC scan is a scan event that indicates the Postal Service has completed its commitment to deliver or attempt to deliver the mailpiece. Examples of STC scans include “Delivered,” “Available for Pickup,” and “No Access.”
9 Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the P&DC on the day that it was intended. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at the P&DC on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.

some of these metrics between the unit and the rest of the district.

Table 1. Delivery Metric Comparison From October 1 Through December 31, 2025

Delivery Metric	Unit Average per Route	District Average per Route
C360 Delivery Inquiries	6.5	4.2
Scans More Than 1,000 Feet From Delivery Point	8.1	7.8

Source: OIG analysis of Postal Service’s C360, and Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data extracted January 12, 2026. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate mail delivery operations and property conditions at the Suffolk Main Post Office in Suffolk, VA.

To accomplish our objective, we combined preliminary data analyses with an on-site inspection performed February 10-12, 2026. Prior to the visit, we analyzed staffing levels, mail arrival times, package scanning performance, reported mail delays and arrow key¹⁰ inventories, Voyager card exceptions, and property safety and security issues. While on-site, we reviewed operational compliance focusing on mail conditions, package scanning procedures, arrow key accountability, carrier separation and transfer documentation, Voyager card exception justification, property safety and security conditions, and package separation procedures. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on March 24, 2026, and included its comments, where appropriate (see Table 2).

We are issuing this interim report to provide the Postal Service with timely information regarding conditions we identified at the Suffolk MPO. We will issue a separate capping report¹¹ that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and

¹⁰ Arrow keys are distinctively shaped keys that carriers use to open mail-receiving receptacles, such as street collection boxes and panels of apartment house mailboxes equipped with an arrow lock. Arrow keys are accountable property and are subject to strict controls.

¹¹ The capping report project number is 26-044.

recommendations for all four delivery units, as well as the district. The capping report will include actions taken by management to address the issues identified in this interim report. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

Results Summary

We identified issues affecting delivery operations and property conditions at the Suffolk MPO. Specifically, we found issues with six of the areas we reviewed (see Table 2).

Table 2. Summary of Results

Audit Area	Deficiencies Identified	
	Yes	No
Delayed Mail	X	
Package Scanning	X	
Arrow Keys	X	
Carrier Separations and Transfers		X
Voyager Card Transactions	X	
Property Conditions	X	
Package Separations	X	

Source: Results of our fieldwork during the week of February 9, 2026.

For the audit areas where issues were not identified, we performed the following:

- Carrier Separations and Transfers – We analyzed employee data from November 29, 2025, through January 9, 2026. All carriers assigned to the unit either reported to work or were accounted for by management during this time, indicating no issues with employee separations and transfers.
- Arrow Keys – We observed the procedures for safeguarding arrow keys and did not identify any issues but did identify issues with the management of arrow keys (see [Finding #3](#)).

Finding #1: Delayed Mail

What We Found

On the morning of February 10, 2026, we identified 26,430 delayed mailpieces at 23 of 31 carrier cases, the hot case, and the workroom floor.¹² Specifically, we identified 17,564 letters, 8,840 flats, and 26 packages. In addition, management did not report this mail as undelivered in the Delivery Condition Visualization (DCV)¹³ system. See Table 3 for the number of pieces for each mail type and Figures 2 and 3 for examples of delayed mail found at carrier cases, the hot case, and the workroom floor. Further, the carriers did not complete Postal Service (PS) Forms 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*,¹⁴ to document undelivered mailpieces.

Figure 2. Delayed Mail in a Carrier Case



Source: OIG photo taken before carriers arrived on the morning of February 10, 2026.

Table 3. Types of Delayed Mail Identified

Type of Mail	Carrier Cases	Hot Case	Workroom Floor	Total Count of Delayed Mail
Letters	13,215	3,544	805	17,564
Flats	4,944	2,689	1,207	8,840
Packages	26	0	0	26
Totals	18,185	6,233	2,012	26,430

Source: OIG count of delayed mailpieces identified during our visit on February 10, 2026.

Figure 3. Examples of Delayed Mail in the Unit

Delayed Mail at the Hot Case



Delayed Mail on the Workroom Floor



Source: OIG photos taken before carriers arrived on the morning of February 10, 2026.

¹² Count of mail included individual piece counts and OIG estimate based on Postal Service conversion factors in Management Instruction PO-610-2007-1, *Piece Count Recording System* and Postal Service conversion factors in Handbook M-32, *Management Operating Data Systems*, Appendix D.

¹³ DCV is a tool for unit management to manually self-report delayed mail, which provides a snapshot of daily mail conditions at the point in time when carriers have departed for the street.

¹⁴ PS Form 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*, lists all mail distributed to the carrier for delivery that was left in the office or returned undelivered.

Why Did It Occur

Delivery issues occurred because management relied on inexperienced carriers and did not follow required procedures to document the extent of undelivered mail. Specifically, the unit faced operational disruptions due to high carrier turnover and inexperienced staff. For example, 19 City Carrier Assistants (CCA)¹⁵ were hired since October 2025, out of a total complement of 37 city carriers, resulting in a workforce of 51 percent that was new and inexperienced. On February 9, 2026, four carriers took unscheduled leave, and management assigned the delivery of those routes to inexperienced CCAs who were unfamiliar with the routes and brought back undelivered mail. However, management did not provide sufficient oversight to verify that delayed mail was identified and reported. Specifically, management did not enforce the use of PS Forms 1571, documenting the reason for delayed mail. The night supervisor responsible for reporting delayed mail in the DCV system did not have access, and the morning supervisor did not report the delayed mail in the DCV system because other duties took priority, such as getting the mail out.

Management also did not have an effective contingency plan to obtain replacement vehicles, which contributed to delayed mail. Operations that week were strained by a shortage of delivery vehicles as several vehicles were being repaired. Management split the delivery of some routes between carriers while other carriers had to wait for carriers to return from their route to use a delivery vehicle, which delayed their start time and the amount of time the carriers had to complete delivery.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have provided sufficient oversight. Postal Service policy¹⁶ states that all types of First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express are always committed for delivery on the day of receipt. Managers are also required¹⁷ to report all mail in the delivery unit after the carriers have left for their street duties as either delayed or curtailed in the DCV system. Further, management must update the DCV system if volumes have changed prior to the end of the business day. In addition, policy¹⁸ states that delivery units must follow the redline process, which includes carriers completing a PS Form 1571 for any undelivered mail brought back to the delivery unit. In addition, Postal Service policy¹⁹ requires managers to assure that necessary vehicles are available, which includes having a contingency plan to obtain replacement vehicles.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in the DCV system provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

¹⁵ The Postal Service standard job description defines a City Carrier Assistant as a non-career employee position responsible for performing city mail delivery and collection duties that support the city-carrier workforce.

¹⁶ *Committed Mail & Color Code Policy for Marketing Mail* stand-up talk, February 2019.

¹⁷ *DCV User Guide*, October 2025.

¹⁸ *Redline Policy Standard Operating Procedures*.

¹⁹ Handbook M-39, *Management of Delivery Services*, June 2019

Finding #2: Package Scanning

What We Found

Employees scanned packages improperly at the delivery unit and scanned packages away from the intended delivery point.

We reviewed package scanning data for scans that occurred at the unit and removed any potentially accurate scans performed.²⁰ In total, employees improperly scanned 262 packages at the delivery unit between October and December 2025 (see Table 4). Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 64.5 percent were scanned “Delivery Attempted–No Access to Delivery Location,” and 23.3 percent were scanned “Delivered.”

Table 4. STC Scans at Delivery Unit

STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location	169	64.5
Delivered	61	23.3
Return to Sender	20	7.6
No Secure Location Available	10	3.8
Receptacle Full / Item Oversized	2	0.8
Total	262	100

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

We also reviewed 251 scans occurring away from the delivery unit and more than 1,000 feet²¹ from the intended delivery point between October and December 2025 (see Table 5). We removed scans that could have been performed within policy, such as “Animal Interference” and “Unsafe Conditions.” Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 90.8 percent of them were scanned “Delivered.”

²⁰ This data does not include scans that could properly be made at a delivery unit, such as “Delivered – PO Box” and “Customer (Vacation) Hold.” Additionally, PO Box scans at the unit were only counted when the delivery point was an address away from the unit. This category does not include mail addressed for a PO Box.

²¹ Packages are expected to be scanned within a designated buffer distance from the delivery point. The OIG evaluates any package that was scanned more than 1,000 feet from the delivery point.


Table 5. STC Scans More Than 1,000 Feet Away From the Delivery Point

STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivered	228	90.8
Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location	20	8.0
No Authorized Recipient	2	0.8
Receptacle Full / Item Oversized	1	0.4
Total	251	100

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s PTR System data.

For example, the map in Figure 4 shows an instance where a carrier scanned a package as delivered 3.6 miles away from the delivery point.

Figure 4. Scan Away From the Delivery Point in Suffolk, Virginia



Source: Postal Service Single Package Look Up.

On the morning of February 10, 2026, before carriers arrived for the day, we selected 30 packages from the carrier cases to review and analyze scanning and tracking history. Of the 30 sampled packages, six (20 percent) had improper scans, including:

- One package was scanned “Delivered,” which should only be performed when a package

is successfully left at the customer's delivery address.

- Five packages, scanned "Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location," were scanned between 0.2 and 3.6 miles away from the delivery point. Scans should be made as close to the delivery point as possible.

Why Did It Occur

These scanning issues occurred because management did not effectively monitor scan performance daily and enforce compliance with scanning procedures. Management acknowledged that it inconsistently enforced package scanning and handling procedures and stated that it would provide refresher training to carriers.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have monitored scan performance daily and enforced compliance. The Postal Service's goal is to ensure proper delivery attempts for mailpieces to the correct address,²² which includes scanning packages at the time and location of delivery.²³

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Customers rely on accurate scan data to track their packages in real time. When employees do not scan mailpieces correctly, customers are unable to determine the actual status of their packages. By improving scanning operations, management can improve mail visibility, increase customer satisfaction, and enhance the customer experience and the Postal Service brand.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²² *Delivery Done Right the First Time* stand-up talk, March 2020.

²³ *Carriers Delivering the Customer Experience* stand-up talk, July 2017.

Finding #3: Arrow Keys

What We Found

Unit management did not properly update the arrow key inventory log. On the morning of February 11, 2026, we reviewed the unit's arrow key certification list in the Retail and Delivery Applications and Reports (RADAR)²⁴ system and conducted a physical inventory of keys at the unit. Unit management reported 31 keys in RADAR as "In-Use," "In-Vault," or "Damaged." Based on our physical review of arrow keys at the unit, six of the 31 keys were missing, and an additional five keys found at the unit were not recorded in RADAR. Unit management had not reported any of the keys we identified as missing to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to properly manage the arrow keys. A supervisor certified the arrow key list in RADAR without properly reconciling to the physical keys on hand. The postmaster relied on the supervisor to complete the inventory and certification without verifying that it was done correctly, and therefore, was unaware of the missing and extra keys.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have verified that arrow key security procedures were properly followed. According to Postal Service policy,²⁵ management must keep an accurate inventory of all arrow keys. Any missing keys must be immediately reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there is insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is increased risk of mail theft. These thefts damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system. Additionally, because arrow keys open mail receptacles, lost or damaged keys can result in undelivered mail.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁴ The arrow key certification in RADAR provides a national platform for all facilities to verify current inventory and account for all arrow keys.

²⁵ *Standard Work Instruction: U.S. Postal Service Arrow Key Guidebook*, dated March 2025.

Finding #4: Voyager Card Transactions

What We Found

Unit management did not always reconcile Voyager card transactions to validate that transactions were legitimate. Specifically, we reviewed the Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS) for high-risk transactions, from July 26, 2025, through January 22, 2026, and determined that there were 27 transactions valued at \$1,999.07 that required reconciliation during September 2025. We found that none of the 27 transactions were reconciled by unit management. Unit management did reconcile all required transactions during August and October through December 2025.²⁶

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight for reconciling Voyager card transactions. The Customer Service Supervisor stated that this was an oversight on his part. After we raised this issue with him, he stated that he planned to reconcile the ones he missed for September 2025.

What Should Have Happened

According to Postal Service policy,²⁷ at least once per month, the site manager is responsible for ensuring that their driver receipts are reconciled in the FAMS eFleet “Reconciliation Exception Report” module. In addition, if there is a problem with an individual charge, the site manager has only 60 days from the transaction posting date to dispute the transaction.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When Voyager card transactions are not properly reconciled, there is an increased risk that the Postal Service will not identify unauthorized purchases, may not have the ability to dispute transactions, and may pay higher prices for questionable and unnecessary purchases.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁶ This included seven premium fuel transactions valued at \$169.93 that were properly reconciled, and corrective action was taken.

²⁷ *Voyager Fleet Card Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)*, Section 4.2 Responsibilities, October 2023.

Finding #5: Property Conditions

What We Found

We found safety and security issues related to property conditions at the Suffolk MPO.

Property Safety


- Four fire extinguishers missed their monthly inspections, with the last inspection completed in November 2025. Unit management acknowledged that the monthly inspections had not been carried out on these fire extinguishers.
- An electrical panel blocked. See Figure 5.
- One of two sets of swinging doors to the dock was chained shut and blocked by large bins. See Figure 5.

Figure 5. Blocked Electrical Panel and Blocked Doors

Blocked Electrical Panel



Blocked Swinging Doors



Source: OIG photos taken on February 11, 2026.

Property Security:

- No signs were posted in the employee parking lot stating that vehicles may be subject to search.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight and take the necessary actions to verify that issues with property conditions were corrected. Management was not aware that the fire extinguishers had not received their monthly inspections and that access to the electrical panels were blocked in the utility room. The postmaster stated that other duties, such as getting the mail out for delivery each day, took priority over addressing maintenance issues.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have provided sufficient oversight of personnel responsible for maintaining facilities, reported safety and security issues as they arose, and followed up for completion. The Postal Service requires management to maintain a safe environment for employees and customers.²⁸ According to policy,²⁹ the Postal Service is required to provide signage that vehicles may be subject to search.

²⁸ Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, July 2020.

²⁹ Handbook RE-5, *Building and Site Requirements*, Site Security, 2-2.4 - Site Signage, September 2009.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Management's attention to safety and security deficiencies can reduce the risk of injuries to employees and customers; reduce related costs, such as workers' compensation claims, lawsuits, and penalties; reduce the likelihood of theft and mail tampering; and enhance the customer experience and Postal Service brand. In addition, proper signage in the employee parking lot could reduce the risk of employee theft and associated costs.

Postal Service Response


The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

Finding #6: Separation of Packages for Dispatch

What We Found

Employees at the Suffolk MPO did not properly separate packages destined for the Richmond Regional Processing and Distribution Center (RPDC). Specifically, on February 11, 2026, during the unit's evening operations, we observed that Ground Advantage³⁰ packages and Priority Mail³¹ were commingled in the same containers (see Figure 6).

Figure 6. Example of Commingled Mail



Source: OIG photo taken February 11, 2026.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to verify that employees properly separated packages for dispatch to the RPDC. Management believed that the district had exempted it from this requirement but could not produce a district memo or RPDC approval. Management also stated that it continued commingling packages because no one from the RPDC had raised concerns to the postmaster about the practice.

What Should Have Happened

The Postal Service requires all level 22 units and above to separate Priority Mail from non-Priority Mail packages and use specific placards when dispatching to the processing facility.³²

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Proper mail preparation is required for visibility throughout the Postal Service network. When mail is not properly separated for dispatch to the processing facility, in accordance with procedures, there is an increased likelihood that mail will require additional processing steps. Furthermore, this can result in delays and service failures and an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

³⁰ Ground Advantage is a service providing an affordable and reliable way to send parcels inside the U.S. Parcels under 70 pounds arrive in two to five business days.

³¹ Priority Mail is an expedited service that may contain any mailable matter weighing no more than 70 pounds.

³² *Learn and Grow RDC/RSC Updates*, May 2024.

Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from January through April 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the delivery operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. We will issue a separate report that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for the Norfolk S&DC, Lynchburg and Virginia MPOs, as well as the district.

We assessed the reliability of PTR, DCV, TACS, and Voyager data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Appendix B: Management's Comments



March 27, 2026

LAURA LOZON
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: Suffolk Main Post Office, Suffolk, VA: Delivery Operations
(Report Number 26-044-3-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings contained in the draft audit report, *Suffolk Main Post Office, Suffolk, VA: Delivery Operations*

Management generally agrees with the six findings related to delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys, Voyager Card transactions, property conditions, and separation of packages.

Management has begun taking steps to address the six findings.

Delayed Mail: Management will conduct a service talk on proper handling and recording of delayed mail in DCV. Management will also reiterate the requirement to use PS Form 1571 *Undelivered Mail Report* and follow the *Redline process*. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Package Scanning: Management will provide a service talk on proper scanning procedures and conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

Arrow Keys: Management will update the inventory log to reflect all arrow keys on hand and report all missing keys to the US Postal Inspection Service. Management will also conduct training on proper management and security of arrow keys. Additionally, reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Voyager Card Transactions: Management will provide a service talk on guidelines for the purchase of unleaded fuel for Postal Service vehicles. In addition, management will reiterate the responsibility of the site manager to ensure driver receipts, and "high-risk" transactions are reconciled within Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS). Additionally, management will reconcile the Voyager Card transactions identified during the audit.

Property Conditions: Management has abated the safety and security issues found during the audit.

Separation of Packages for Dispatch: Management will provide service talks to reinforce package separation practices to ensure Priority Mail is not comingled with non-priority mail. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance

E-SIGNED by ANTHONY A IMPRONGO
on 2026-03-27 11:15:22 EDT

Anthony A. Improngo
a/District Manager, Virginia District

*cc: Vice President, Area Retail & Delivery Operations (Atlantic)
Corporate Audit Response Management*

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