

Lynchburg Main Post Office, Lynchburg, VA: Delivery Operations

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-044-2-R26 | April 9, 2026



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Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

April 9, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR: ANTHONY A. IMPRONTO
MANAGER, VIRGINIA DISTRICT

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Monica J. Brym", is centered below the "MEMORANDUM FOR" section.

FROM: Monica J. Brym
Director, Field Operations, Atlantic & WestPac

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Lynchburg Main Post Office, Lynchburg, VA: Delivery
Operations (Report Number 26-044-2-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Lynchburg Main Post Office in Lynchburg, VA.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Ricardo Martinez, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer & Executive Vice President
Vice President, Delivery Operations
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations
Vice President, Atlantic Area Retail & Delivery Operations
Director, Retail & Post Office Operations Maintenance
Corporate Audit and Response Management

Results

Background


The U.S. Postal Service’s mission is to provide timely, reliable, secure, and affordable mail and package delivery to more than 160 million residential and business addresses across the country. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews delivery operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback in furtherance of this mission.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Lynchburg Main Post Office (MPO) in Lynchburg, VA (Project Number 26-044-2). The Lynchburg MPO is in the Virginia District of the Atlantic Area and serves about 104,574 people in ZIP Codes 24501, 24502, 24503, and 24504, which are considered a predominantly urban area (see Figure 1). Specifically, 95,077 (91 percent) live in urban communities and 9,497 (9 percent) live in rural communities.¹ The unit also services ZIP Codes 24506, 24513, 24514, and 24515 for PO Box routes and business customers.

This delivery unit has 18 rural routes and 63 city routes. From December 13, 2025, through January 9, 2026, the delivery unit had eight supervisors assigned, composed of five permanent supervisors, one relief supervisor and two employees who were acting in a higher-level supervisor detail.² One of these permanent supervisors was detailed to a different unit during the week of our site visit. The unit’s former postmaster left her position in January 2026, and the acting postmaster was on leave during our site visit February 10-12, 2026. A postmaster from another unit was filling in as the officer-in-charge (OIC) during the acting postmaster’s absence. Additionally, a

postmaster from another unit was detailed to the Lynchburg MPO to assist with clerk management.

Figure 1. ZIP Codes Served by the Lynchburg Main Post Office



Source: OIG analysis of ZIP Code data.

As of January 9, 2026,³ the year-to-date employee availability rate for the Lynchburg MPO was 89.04 percent, which is less than the Postal Service’s retail and delivery operations employee availability goal of 93.95 percent for fiscal year 2026. We reviewed the Lynchburg MPO, which is serviced by the Roanoke Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC),⁴ during the week of February 9, 2026. During the same week, the OIG also reviewed three delivery units⁵ that are serviced by the Norfolk Local Processing Center (LPC).

We assessed units in the Virginia District, in addition to units serviced by the Norfolk LPC, based on the number of Customer 360 (C360)⁶ delivery-related inquiries,⁷ stop-the-clock (STC)⁸ scans performed away from the delivery point and at the unit,

1 We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.
2 Assignments based on the Postal Service’s Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS). TACS is the system used by the Postal Service to automate the collection of employee time and attendance information.
3 January 9, 2026, was the last day of Pay Period 2.
4 We did not review the Roanoke P&DC.
5 The three units were the Norfolk Sorting and Delivery Center, Norfolk, VA (Project Number 26-044-1); the Suffolk MPO, Suffolk, VA (Project Number 26-044-3); and the Virginia Beach MPO, Virginia Beach, VA (Project Number 26-044-4).
6 Customer 360 is a cloud-based application that enables Postal Service employees to diagnose, resolve, and track customer inquiries.
7 Delivery-related inquiries include a compilation of package inquiry, package pickup, daily mail service, and hold mail inquiries.
8 An STC scan is a scan event that indicates the Postal Service has completed its commitment to deliver or attempt to deliver the mailpiece. Examples of STC scans include “Delivered,” “Available for Pickup,” and “No Access.”

undelivered route information, and Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures⁹ between October 1 and December 31, 2025.

We judgmentally selected the Lynchburg MPO primarily based on the number of C360 inquiries related to delivery. Specifically, the unit had an average of 10.9 inquiries per route, which exceeded the district average of 4.2 inquires per route. We also chose this unit based on Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures and undelivered routes.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate mail delivery operations and property conditions at the Lynchburg MPO in Lynchburg, VA.

To accomplish our objective, we combined preliminary data analyses with an on-site inspection performed February 10-12, 2026. Prior to the visit, we analyzed staffing levels, mail arrival times, package scanning performance, reported mail delays, arrow key¹⁰ inventories, Voyager card exceptions, and property safety and security issues. While on-site, we reviewed operational compliance focusing on mail conditions, package scanning procedures, arrow key accountability, carrier separation and transfer documentation, Voyager card exception justification, property safety and security conditions, and package separation procedures. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on March 24, 2026, and included its comments, where appropriate.

We are issuing this interim report to provide the Postal Service with timely information regarding conditions we identified at the Lynchburg MPO. We will issue a separate capping report¹¹ that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for all four delivery units, as well as the district. The capping report will include actions taken by management to address the issues identified in this interim report. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

⁹ Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the processing facility on the day that it was intended. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at the processing facility on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.
¹⁰ Arrow keys are distinctively shaped keys that carriers use to open mail-receiving receptacles, such as street collection boxes and panels of apartment house mailboxes equipped with an arrow lock. Arrow keys are accountable property and are subject to strict controls.
¹¹ The capping report project number is 26-044.

Results Summary

We identified issues affecting delivery operations and property conditions at the Lynchburg MPO. Specifically, we found issues with six of the areas we reviewed (see Table 1).

Table 1. Summary of Results

Audit Area	Deficiencies Identified	
	Yes	No
Delayed Mail	X	
Package Scanning	X	
Arrow Keys	X	
Carrier Separations and Transfers		X
Voyager Card Transactions	X	
Property Conditions	X	
Package Separations	X	

Source: Results of our fieldwork during the week of February 9, 2026.

For the audit areas where issues were not identified, we performed the following:

- Carrier Separations and Transfers – We analyzed employee data from November 29, 2025, through January 9, 2026. All carriers assigned to the unit either reported to work or were accounted for by management during this time, indicating no issues with employee separations and transfers.

Finding #1: Delayed Mail

What We Found

On the morning of February 10, 2026, we identified 23,521 delayed mailpieces at 56 of 81 carrier cases and the hot case.¹² Specifically, we identified 15,561 letters, 7,735 flats, and 225 packages.¹³ In addition, management did not report this mail as undelivered

in the Delivery Condition Visualization (DCV)¹⁴ system. See Table 2 for the number of pieces for each mail type and Figure 2 for examples of delayed mail found at carrier cases. Further, the carriers did not complete Postal Service (PS) Forms 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*,¹⁵ to document undelivered mailpieces.

Table 2. Types of Delayed Mail Identified

Type of Mail	Carrier Case	Hot Case	Total Count of Delayed Mail
Letters	14,573	988	15,561
Flats	7,696	39	7,735
Packages	224	1	225
Totals	22,493	1,028	23,521

Source: OIG count of delayed mailpieces identified during our visit on February 10, 2026.

Figure 2. Delayed Mail in the Carrier Cases



Source: OIG photos taken before carriers arrived on the morning of February 10, 2026.

¹² The hot case is a case designated for final withdrawal of mail as carriers leave the office.

¹³ Count of mail included individual piece counts and OIG estimate based on Postal Service conversion factors in Management Instruction PO-610-2007-1, *Piece Count Recording System*.

¹⁴ DCV is a tool for unit management to manually self-report delayed mail, which provides a snapshot of daily mail conditions at the point in time when carriers have departed for the street.

¹⁵ PS Form 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*, lists all mail distributed to the carrier for delivery that was left in the office or returned undelivered.

Why Did It Occur

These issues occurred because management did not follow required procedures to check for and report delayed mail and did not provide necessary oversight to verify that mail was delivered timely. Supervisors did not consistently enforce the redline process¹⁶ with all staff because they trusted the more experienced carriers to follow the appropriate end-of-day processes without oversight. Management also did not do an effective walkthrough to look for delayed mail or enforce delivery. For example, we found 17 undelivered packages in the carrier cases that were scanned “Weather Delay” between February 3 through 9, 2026. The carrier stated that the roads were not accessible due to ice and snow. However, we judgmentally selected delivery addresses on four of the packages and verified that only one road was covered with ice or snow on February 11, 2026, yet the four packages remained undelivered the next day. In another example, bundles of advertising circulars scheduled for delivery on January 28, 2026, were undelivered and remained in several carrier cases the week of our visit through February 12, 2026.

Additionally, management fully delegated responsibility for DCV delayed mail reporting to supervisors but did not provide oversight to ensure that delayed mail was reported. Further, management stated that competing priorities, such as getting mail ready for the carriers in the mornings, contributed to supervisors not adhering to process requirements. Lastly, supervisors did not require carriers to complete PS Forms 1571, documenting the reason why the mail could not be delivered because the prior postmaster did not enforce use of the forms.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have followed required procedures to ensure that all committed mail was delivered daily. Postal Service policy¹⁷ states that all types of First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express are always committed for delivery on the day of receipt. In addition, managers are required¹⁸

to report all mail in the delivery unit after the carriers have left for their street duties as either delayed or curtailed in the DCV system. Management must also update the DCV system if volumes have changed prior to the end of the business day. In addition, policy¹⁹ states that delivery units must follow the redline process, which includes carriers completing a PS Form 1571 for any undelivered mail brought back to the delivery unit. Policy²⁰ also states that unit management must review mail on and around each carrier case daily before carriers arrive.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in the DCV system provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding. See [Appendix B](#) for management’s comments in their entirety.

¹⁶ The redline process is a standardized framework encompassing manager and carrier responsibilities after carriers return to the delivery unit upon completion of delivery assignments, ensuring that any mail returned from the street is identified with a signed completed PS Form 1571 and that no mail is taken back to the carrier case.

¹⁷ *Committed Mail & Color Code Policy for Marketing Mail* stand-up talk, February 2019.

¹⁸ *DCV User Guide*, October 2025.

¹⁹ *Redline Policy Standard Operating Procedures*.

²⁰ Handbook M-39, *Management of Delivery Services*, dated June 2019.

Finding #2: Package Scanning

What We Found

Employees scanned packages improperly at the delivery unit.

We reviewed package scanning data for scans that occurred at the unit and removed any potentially accurate scans performed.²¹ In total, employees improperly scanned 282 packages at the delivery unit between October and December 2025 (see Table 3). Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 52.8 percent of them were scanned “Delivered.”

Table 3. STC Scans at Delivery Unit

STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivered	149	52.8
Receptacle Full / Item Oversized	71	25.2
Delivery Attempted - No Access to Delivery Location	49	17.4
Return To Sender	8	2.8
No Authorized Recipient	3	1.1
Refused	1	0.4
No Secure Location Available	1	0.4
Total	282	100*

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

*Does not equal 100 due to rounding.


On the morning of February 10, 2026, before carriers arrived for the day, we selected 30 packages from the carrier cases to review and analyze scanning and tracking history. Of the 30 sampled packages,²² 16 (53 percent) had improper scans, including:

- 13 packages were scanned “Delivery Attempted - No Access to Delivery Location,” between 0.2

and 3.6 miles away from the delivery point. Scans should be made as close to the delivery point as possible. For example, one package was scanned 1.1 miles away from the delivery point (see Figure 3).

- Two packages were missing a scan on the expected day of delivery to let the customer know the status of the package.
- One package was scanned “Delivered, Front Desk/ Reception/Mail Room,” which should only be performed when a package is successfully left at the customer’s delivery address.

Figure 3. Scan Away From the Delivery Point in Lynchburg, Virginia



Source: Postal Service Single Package Look Up.

Why Did It Occur

These scanning issues occurred because unit management did not adequately monitor and enforce proper package scanning and handling procedures. The acting station manager stated that he normally reviews scanning compliance, but he hadn’t reviewed the report in a while, and therefore, he was not aware of any scanning issues.

21 This data does not include scans that could properly be made at a delivery unit, such as “Delivered - PO Box” and “Customer (Vacation) Hold.” Additionally, PO Box scans at the unit were only counted when the delivery point was an address away from the unit. This category does not include mail addressed for a PO Box.

22 Our 30 sampled packages do not include the 17 undelivered packages identified in finding #1 that were scanned “Weather Delay” between February 3 through 9, 2026.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have monitored scan performance daily and enforced compliance. The Postal Service's goal is to ensure proper delivery attempts for mailpieces to the correct address,²³ which includes scanning packages at the time and location of delivery.²⁴

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Customers rely on accurate scan data to track their packages in real time. When employees do not scan mailpieces correctly, customers are unable to determine the actual status of their packages. By improving scanning operations, management can improve mail visibility, increase customer satisfaction, and enhance the customer experience and the Postal Service brand.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²³ *Delivery Done Right the First Time* stand-up talk, March 2020.

²⁴ *Carriers Delivering the Customer Experience* stand-up talk, July 2017.

Finding #3: Arrow Keys

What We Found

Unit management did not properly update the arrow key inventory log and safeguard arrow keys. On the morning of February 11, 2026, we reviewed the unit's arrow key certification list in the Retail and Delivery Applications and Reports (RADAR)²⁵ system and conducted a physical inventory of keys at the unit. Unit management reported 108 keys in RADAR as "In-Use" or "In-Vault." Based on our physical review of arrow keys at the unit, 10 of the 108 keys were missing, and an additional four keys found at the unit were not recorded in RADAR. However, unit management had not reported the 10 missing keys to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

In addition, arrow keys were not always kept secure. Specifically, the 35 keys reported to be "In-Vault" were kept in [REDACTED] that was unattended on numerous occasions. Additionally, the keys reported to be "In-Use" were kept inside a locked room, but the key to this room was [REDACTED] which was often unattended. We also observed several instances where [REDACTED] housing arrow keys were left unattended [REDACTED] allowing carriers to retrieve keys without signing the keys out. We also found that carriers and clerks/supervisors were not consistently signing the daily log to acknowledge distribution and return of assigned keys.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to properly manage and safeguard the arrow keys. Specifically, management was unaware of the missing or extra keys because a supervisor certified the arrow key list in RADAR without properly reconciling the list to the physical keys on hand. Due to ongoing building renovations, the Lynchburg unit moved the arrow keys from the registry cage to a room with a lock but overlooked the risk of leaving the room key [REDACTED]. In addition, management delegated arrow key responsibilities

— including staff training — to supervisors, but did not verify whether staff was following arrow key accountability requirements and procedures.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have verified that arrow key security and accountability procedures were properly followed. According to Postal Service policy,²⁶ management must keep an accurate inventory of all arrow keys. Any missing keys must be immediately reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

In addition, policy states that arrow keys must remain secured until they are individually assigned to personnel. A supervisor or clerk must supervise employees signing out keys on the inventory log. Upon return, arrow keys should be deposited in a secure location, and a supervisor or clerk must verify all keys have been returned and accounted for daily. Unassigned keys must also be secured in a location accessible only by the postmaster or the postmaster's designee. To ensure individual accountability daily, both the carrier and a supervisor or clerk must sign their name for each key distributed or returned.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there is insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is increased risk of mail theft. These thefts damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system. Additionally, because arrow keys open mail receptacles, lost or damaged keys can result in undelivered mail.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁵ The arrow key certification in RADAR provides a national platform for all facilities to verify current inventory and account for all arrow keys.

²⁶ Standard Work Instruction: U.S. Postal Service Arrow Key Guidebook, dated March 2025.

Finding #4: Voyager Card Transactions

What We Found

Unit management did not reconcile Voyager card transactions to validate that transactions were legitimate. Specifically, we reviewed the Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS) reconciliation exception report for high-risk transactions, from July 26, 2025, through January 22, 2026, and determined there were 391 transactions valued at \$16,538 that required reconciliation during this timeframe. We found that none of the 391 transactions were reconciled by unit management. In addition, 19 of these transactions, valued at \$583, were premium fuel transactions. The last reconciliation of Voyager card transactions by the unit occurred in March 2025.

Why Did It Occur

This occurred because the prior postmaster, who left her position in January 2026, did not provide sufficient oversight to reconcile Voyager card transactions or to prevent the purchase of premium fuel. The OIC stated that reconciling these past transactions was the responsibility of the acting postmaster, who was on leave during our visit.

What Should Have Happened

According to Postal Service policy,²⁷ at least once per month, the site manager is responsible for ensuring that their driver receipts are reconciled in the FAMS eFleet “*Reconciliation Exception Report*” module. In addition, if there is a problem with an individual charge, the site manager has only 60 days from the transaction posting date to dispute the transaction.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When Voyager card transactions are not properly reconciled, there is an increased risk that the Postal Service will not identify unauthorized purchases, may not have the ability to dispute transactions, and may pay higher prices for questionable and unnecessary purchases.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁷ *Voyager Fleet Card Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)*, Section 4.2 Responsibilities, October 2023.

Finding #5: Property Conditions

What We Found

We found safety and security issues related to property conditions at the Lynchburg MPO.

Property Safety

- A fire alarm annunciator panel by the lobby was beeping and displayed a problem code.
- Access to one electrical panel was blocked.
- All 35 fire extinguishers we reviewed²⁸ lacked evidence of monthly inspections. Monthly inspection tags for 33 fire extinguishers were dated March 2025, one fire extinguisher had no tag to indicate the last monthly inspection date, and another fire extinguisher had an illegible tag. One fire extinguisher had no tag to indicate the last annual inspection date.
- Ten of 35 fire extinguishers were not mounted.
- An exit door requiring badge access to open was not readily openable from the egress side during an emergency.
- A fall hazard in an area accessible from the work floor lacked adequate warning or protection.
- Traffic signs in multiple areas of the property were faded. See Figure 4.
- The carrier route delivery vehicle parking lot lacked adequate lighting.

Property Security

- One [REDACTED] was left unsecured, and the badge reader was broken.
- The [REDACTED] was inoperable. The control panel for the [REDACTED] and the control panel for the [REDACTED], were both inoperable and showed visible damage. See Figure 5.
- A “Vehicles Subject to Search” sign was not posted at the employee parking lot.

Figure 4. Faded Signs

Faded signs near rear docks





Faded stop sign in employee parking lot



Source: OIG photos taken on February 12, 2026.

²⁸ The audit team judgmentally selected 35 fire extinguishers for review.

Figure 5. [REDACTED] Control Panels



Source: OIG photos taken on February 12, 2026.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight and take the necessary actions to verify that

property condition issues were corrected because it either overlooked the issue due to ongoing building renovations and competing priorities, or it did not consider the issue a problem that required immediate attention. Specifically:

- Management did not look for and address safety issues caused by ongoing building renovations, which resulted in issues with the lobby fire annunciator, the blocked electrical panel, the unmounted fire extinguishers, and the fall hazard.
- Management was not aware of the missing fire extinguisher inspections because it delegated responsibility to the unit custodian to manage this process and did not provide oversight to verify that inspections were conducted as required.
- Management did not know the secured door we observed on the exit route was required to be readily openable from the egress side during an emergency.
- Management did not address issues with the unsecured [REDACTED], and signs because it did not consider them to be safety/security concerns and was unaware of the Postal Service requirements.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have provided sufficient oversight of personnel responsible for maintaining facilities, reported safety and security issues as they arose, and followed up for completion. The Postal Service requires management to maintain a safe environment for employees and customers.²⁹

According to policy,³⁰ secured doors on an exit route must be readily openable from the egress side during an emergency. The policy also states that facility management is responsible for installing and maintaining adequate lighting and conducting periodic checks of the building and grounds to verify gates are functioning as designed. Door locks must also not be disabled, or doors propped open, and

²⁹ Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, July 2020.
³⁰ Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, July 2020.

the Postal Service is required to provide signage that vehicles may be subject to search.³¹

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Management's attention to safety and security deficiencies can reduce the risk of injuries to employees and customers; reduce related costs, such as workers' compensation claims, lawsuits, and penalties; reduce the likelihood of theft and mail tampering; and enhance the customer experience and Postal Service brand. In addition, proper signage in the employee parking lot could reduce the risk of employee theft and associated costs.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

³¹ Postal Service Handbook RE-5, *Building and Site Security Requirements*, September 2009.

Finding #6: Separation of Packages for Dispatch

What We Found

Employees at the Lynchburg MPO did not properly separate packages destined for the Roanoke P&DC. Specifically, on February 11, 2026, during the unit's evening operations, we observed that Ground Advantage³² packages and Priority Mail³³ were commingled in the same containers.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure employees properly separated packages for dispatch to the P&DC. Management stated that it was unaware that its unit, a level 22 unit, was required to separate Priority Mail from non-Priority Mail packages.

What Should Have Happened

The Postal Service requires all level 22 units and above to separate Priority Mail from non-Priority Mail packages and use specific placards when dispatching to the processing facility.³⁴

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Proper mail preparation is required for visibility throughout the Postal Service network. When mail is not properly separated for dispatch to the processing facility, in accordance with procedures, there is an increased likelihood that mail will require additional processing steps. Furthermore, this can result in delays and service failures and an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

³² Ground Advantage is a service providing an affordable and reliable way to send parcels inside the U.S. Parcels under 70 pounds arrive in two to five business days.

³³ Priority Mail is an expedited service that may contain any mailable matter weighing no more than 70 pounds.

³⁴ *Learn and Grow RDC/RSC Updates*, May 2024.

Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from January through April 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the delivery operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. We will issue a separate report that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for the Norfolk S&DC, Suffolk and Virginia Beach Main Post Offices, as well as the district.

We assessed the reliability of PTR, DCV, and Voyager data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Appendix B: Management's Comments



March 27, 2026

LAURA LOZON
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: Lynchburg Main Post Office, Lynchburg, VA: Delivery Operations (Report Number 26-044-2-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings contained in the draft audit report, *Lynchburg Main Post Office, Lynchburg, VA: Delivery Operations*

Management generally agrees with the six findings related to delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys, Voyager Card transactions, property conditions, and separation of packages.

Management has begun taking steps to address the six findings.

Delayed Mail: Management will conduct a service talk on proper handling and recording of delayed mail in DCV. Management will also reiterate the requirement to use PS Form 1571 *Undelivered Mail Report* and follow the *Redline* process. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Package Scanning: Management will provide a service talk on proper scanning procedures and conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

Arrow Keys: Management will update the inventory log to reflect all arrow keys on hand and report all missing keys to the US Postal Inspection Service. Management will also conduct training on proper management and security of arrow keys. Additionally, reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Voyager Card Transactions: Management will provide a service talk on guidelines for the purchase of unleaded fuel for Postal Service vehicles. In addition, management will reiterate the responsibility of the site manager to ensure driver receipts, and "high-risk" transactions are reconciled within Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS). Additionally, management will reconcile the Voyager Card transactions identified during the audit.

Property Conditions: Management has abated three safety issues and is working to abate the other safety and security issues found during the audit, which requires the submission of workorders for assistance from other resources during the construction phase, projected to be completed in June 2026.

Separation of Packages for Dispatch: Management will provide service talks to reinforce package separation practices to ensure Priority Mail is not comingled with non-priority mail. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

E-SIGNED BY ANTHONY A IMPRONGO
ON 2026-03-27 11:15 13 EDT

Anthony A. Improngo
a/District Manager, Virginia District

cc: Vice President, Ares Retail & Delivery Operations (Atlantic)
Corporate Audit Response Management

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