

# Norfolk Sorting and Delivery Center, Norfolk, VA: Delivery Operations

## AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-044-1-R26 | April 9, 2026



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# Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

April 9, 2026

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** ANTHONY A. IMPRONGO  
MANAGER, VIRGINIA DISTRICT

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Monica J. Brym", is positioned below the "MEMORANDUM FOR" section.

**FROM:** Monica J. Brym  
Director, Field Operations, Atlantic & WestPac

**SUBJECT:** Audit Report – Norfolk Sorting and Delivery Center, Norfolk, VA: Delivery  
Operations (Report Number 26-044-1-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Norfolk Sorting and Delivery Center in Norfolk, VA.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Frank McElligott, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General  
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer & Executive Vice President  
Vice President, Delivery Operations  
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations  
Vice President, Atlantic Area Retail & Delivery Operations  
Director, Retail & Post Office Operations Maintenance  
Corporate Audit and Response Management

# Results

## Background


The U.S. Postal Service’s mission is to provide timely, reliable, secure, and affordable mail and package delivery to more than 160 million residential and business addresses across the country. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews delivery operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback in furtherance of this mission.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Norfolk Sorting and Delivery Center (S&DC) in Norfolk, VA (Project Number 26-044-1). The Norfolk S&DC is in the Virginia District of the Atlantic Area and serves about 170,203 people in ZIP Codes 23523, 23324, 23325, 23504, 23507, 23508, 23509, 23510, 23517, 23323 and 23551, which are considered a predominantly urban area (see Figure 1). Specifically, 166,886 (98 percent) live in urban communities and 3,317 (2 percent) live in rural communities.<sup>1</sup>

This delivery unit has 10 rural routes and 88 city routes. From December 13 through January 9, 2026, the delivery unit had 12 supervisors assigned.<sup>2</sup> There was one supervisor detailed to a different facility during the week of our site visit. The Norfolk S&DC falls under the Norfolk Post Office for employee availability<sup>3</sup> measurement. As of January 9, 2026,<sup>4</sup> the year-to-date employee availability rate for the Norfolk Post Office was 91.2 percent, which is less than the Postal Service’s retail and delivery operations employee availability goal of 93.95 percent for fiscal year 2026. The Norfolk S&DC is one of three delivery units<sup>5</sup> the OIG reviewed during the week of February 9, 2026, that are serviced by the Norfolk

Local Processing Center (LPC). During the same week, the OIG also reviewed a fourth delivery unit<sup>6</sup> within the Virginia District that is serviced by the Roanoke Processing and Distribution Center.

**Figure 1. ZIP Codes Serviced by the Norfolk S&DC**



Source: OIG analysis of ZIP Code data.

We assessed units serviced by the Norfolk LPC and units in the Virginia District based on the number of Customer 360 (C360)<sup>7</sup> delivery-related inquiries,<sup>8</sup> stop-the-clock (STC)<sup>9</sup> scans performed away from the delivery point and at the unit, undelivered route information, and Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures<sup>10</sup> between October 1 and December 31, 2025.

We judgmentally selected the Norfolk S&DC primarily based on the number of C360 inquiries related to delivery. Specifically, the Norfolk S&DC had an average of 7.7 C360 inquiries per route, which was above the district average of 4.2 inquiries per route. We also chose this unit based on Leg 3 failures.

<sup>1</sup> We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.  
<sup>2</sup> Assignments based on the Postal Service’s Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS). TACS is the system used by the Postal Service to automate the collection of employee time and attendance information.  
<sup>3</sup> The Postal Service calculates employee availability by dividing straight time hours worked by potential straight time hours. Potential straight time hours generally include actual straight time hours worked, sick leave taken, and leave without pay.  
<sup>4</sup> January 9, 2026, was the last day of Pay Period 2.  
<sup>5</sup> The other two units were the Suffolk MPO, Suffolk, VA (Project Number 26-044-3) and the Virginia Beach MPO, Virginia Beach, VA (Project Number 26-044-4).  
<sup>6</sup> The Lynchburg MPO, Lynchburg, VA (Project Number 26-044-2).  
<sup>7</sup> Customer 360 is a cloud-based application that enables Postal Service employees to diagnose, resolve, and track customer inquiries.  
<sup>8</sup> Delivery-related inquiries include a compilation of package inquiry, package pickup, daily mail service, and hold mail inquiries.  
<sup>9</sup> An STC scan is a scan event that indicates the Postal Service has completed its commitment to deliver or attempt to deliver the mailpiece. Examples of STC scans include “Delivered,” “Available for Pickup,” and “No Access.”  
<sup>10</sup> Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the processing facility on the day that it was intended. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at the processing facility on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.

## Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate mail delivery operations and property conditions at the Norfolk S&DC in Norfolk, VA.

To accomplish our objective, we combined preliminary data analyses with an on-site inspection performed February 10–12, 2026. Prior to the visit, we analyzed staffing levels, mail arrival times, package scanning performance, reported mail delays, arrow key<sup>11</sup> inventories, and Voyager card exceptions. While on-site, we reviewed operational compliance focusing on mail conditions, package scanning procedures, arrow key accountability, carrier separation and transfer documentation, Voyager card exception justification, property safety and security conditions, and package separation procedures. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on March 24, 2026, and included its comments, where appropriate (see Table 1).

We are issuing this interim report to provide the Postal Service with timely information regarding conditions we identified at the Norfolk S&DC. We will issue a separate capping report<sup>12</sup> that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for all four delivery units, as well as the district. The capping report will include actions taken by management to address the issues identified in this interim report. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

## Results Summary

We identified issues affecting delivery operations and property conditions at the Norfolk S&DC. Specifically, we found issues in each of the areas we reviewed (see Table 1).

**Table 1. Summary of Results**

Audit Area	Deficiencies Identified	
	Yes	No
Delayed Mail	X	
Package Scanning	X	
Arrow Keys	X	
Carrier Separations and Transfers	X	
Voyager Card Transactions	X	
Property Conditions		N/A
Package Separations	X	

Source: Results of our fieldwork during the week of February 9, 2026.

- We did not include property conditions in this audit because management at the Norfolk LPC is responsible for maintenance of the entire facility, which houses both the Norfolk S&DC and Norfolk LPC. Security issues were identified in the facility and are addressed in our audit report of the Norfolk LPC.<sup>13</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Arrow keys are distinctively shaped keys that carriers use to open mail-receiving receptacles, such as street collection boxes and panels of apartment house mailboxes equipped with an arrow lock. Arrow keys are accountable property and are subject to strict controls.

<sup>12</sup> The capping report project number is 26-044.

<sup>13</sup> See audit report, *Efficiency of Operations at the Norfolk Local Processing Center, Norfolk, VA* (Project Number 26-043).

# Finding #1: Delayed Mail

## What We Found

On the morning of February 10, 2026, we identified 39,203 delayed mailpieces<sup>14</sup> at 58 of 98 carrier cases and the hot case<sup>15</sup> area. Specifically, we identified 30,699 letters, 8,474 flats, and 30 packages. In addition, management did not accurately report this mail as undelivered in the Delivery Condition Visualization (DCV)<sup>16</sup> system. While unit management reported 6,848 pieces of delayed mail, this represented only 17.5 percent of the delayed mail we found at the unit. See Table 2 for the number of pieces for each mail type and Figures 2 and 3 for examples of delayed mail found at the hot case and carrier cases. Further, most of the carriers did not complete Postal Service (PS) Forms 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*,<sup>17</sup> to document undelivered mailpieces.

**Table 2. Types of Delayed Mail Identified**

Type of Mail	Carrier Case	Hot Case Area	Total Count of Delayed Mail
Letters	13,523	17,176	30,699
Flats	5,239	3,235	8,474
Packages	30	0	30
<b>Totals</b>	<b>18,792</b>	<b>20,411</b>	<b>39,203</b>


Source: OIG count of delayed mailpieces identified during our visit on February 10, 2026.

**Figure 2. Delayed Mail at the Hot Case Area**



Source: OIG photo taken before carriers arrived in the morning of February 10, 2026.

**Figure 3. Examples of Delayed Mail in Carrier Cases**



Source: OIG photos taken on the morning of February 10, 2026, before carriers arrived.

<sup>14</sup> Count of mail included individual piece counts and OIG estimate based on Postal Service conversion factors in Management Instruction PO-610-2007-1, *Piece Count Recording System*, and Handbook M-32, *Management Operating Data Systems*, Appendix D.

<sup>15</sup> The hot case is a case designated for the final withdrawal of mail as carriers leave the office.

<sup>16</sup> DCV is a tool for unit management to manually self-report delayed mail, which provides a snapshot of daily mail conditions at the point in time when carriers have departed for the street.

<sup>17</sup> PS Form 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*, lists all mail distributed to the carrier for delivery that was left in the office or returned undelivered.

## Why Did It Occur

These issues occurred because management did not follow required procedures to check for and report delayed mail, and did not provide necessary oversight to verify that mail was delivered timely. The unit manager stated that he relied on unit supervisors to oversee carrier operations and report any delayed mail in DCV. He also stated that the morning supervisors were supposed to manage the clerks in the hot case area. However, the morning supervisors and clerks in the hot case area did not know they were responsible for managing the clerks at the hot case.

Additionally, some of the delayed mail in the hot case was mail that was missent by the Norfolk LPC and brought back by the carriers after their routes. Supervisors and carriers stated that they often receive pockets of missent mail in their carrier-routed mail, and supervisors stated that they reported this issue to management. Unit management stated that supervisors should use Mail Arrival Quality/Plant Arrival Quality (MAQ/PAQ) to report issues with mail arriving from a plant, such as large volumes of missent mail.<sup>18</sup> However, MAQ/PAQ was not used by unit supervisors or management to report this issue to the Norfolk LPC. Finally, supervisors did not verify that all carriers completed PS Forms 1571 and documented the reasons mail could not be delivered. During our visit, we observed a carrier taking undelivered mail and packages back to his case, circumventing the redline process.<sup>19</sup> After we made the PM supervisor aware of what we had observed, the supervisor stated that this behavior has been an issue with several carriers, and she again reported this issue to unit management and the AM supervisors. The unit manager acknowledged that

management and supervisors need to do a better job at enforcing the procedures and taking disciplinary action when needed.

## What Should Have Happened

Management should have verified that all mail was processed and delivered daily. Postal Service policy<sup>20</sup> states that all types of First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express are always committed for delivery on the day of receipt. Postal Policy<sup>21</sup> also states management should use the MAQ/PAQ system to communicate and resolve issues with mail conditions.

In addition, managers are required<sup>22</sup> to report all mail in the delivery unit after the carriers have left for their street duties as either delayed or curtailed in DCV. Further, management must update DCV if volumes have changed prior to the end of the business day. Finally, policy<sup>23</sup> states that delivery units must follow the redline process, which includes carriers completing a PS Form 1571 for any undelivered mail brought back to the delivery unit.

## Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in DCV provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

<sup>18</sup> The MAQ/PAQ system facilitates communication and resolution of issues with the movement of mail, including collection mail, between postal facilities.

<sup>19</sup> The redline process is a standardized framework encompassing manager and carrier responsibilities after carriers return to the delivery unit upon completion of delivery assignments, ensuring that any mail returned from the street is identified with a signed completed PS Form 1571 and that no mail is taken back to the carrier case.

<sup>20</sup> *Committed Mail & Color Code Policy for Marketing Mail* stand-up talk, February 2019.

<sup>21</sup> MAQ/PAQ Discrepancy Process - Standard Work Instruction.

<sup>22</sup> *DCV User Guide*, October 2025.

<sup>23</sup> *Redline Policy Standard Operating Procedures*.

# Finding #2: Package Scanning

## What We Found

Employees scanned packages improperly at the delivery unit, scanned packages away from the intended delivery point, and handled packages incorrectly at the unit.

We reviewed package scanning data for scans that occurred at the unit and removed any potentially accurate scans performed.<sup>24</sup> In total, employees improperly scanned 358 packages at the delivery unit between October and December 2025 (see Table 3). Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 85.5 percent of them were scanned “Delivered.” In addition, 13.4 percent of them were scanned “Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location.”

**Table 3. STC Scans at Delivery Unit**

STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivered	306	85.5
Delivery Attempted - No Access to Delivery Location	48	13.4
Receptacle Full / Item Oversized	3	0.8
Refused	1	0.3
<b>Total</b>	<b>358</b>	<b>100</b>

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

On the morning of February 10, 2026, before carriers arrived for the day, we selected 30 packages from the carrier cases to review and analyze scanning and tracking history. Of the 30 sampled packages, 23 (77 percent) had improper scans or handling issues, including:

- Ten packages were scanned, “Available for pickup, PO Box,” which should only be performed when

placed in the PO Box section. All ten packages had a street address and did not have a PO Box in the address.

- Eight packages scanned “Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location,” were scanned between 0.2 and 2.5 miles away from the delivery point. Scans should be made as close to the delivery point as possible.
- Two packages were scanned “Delivered,” which should be performed only when a package is successfully left at the customer’s delivery address.
- Two packages were scanned “No Such Number,” which is necessary when some component of the delivery address was missing or invalid. These packages should be returned to sender and not to the carrier case.
- One package was scanned, “Held at Post Office at Customer Request,” which should only be performed when the customer has made a request to that affect.

## Why Did It Occur

These scanning and handling issues occurred because unit management did not provide regular training or adequately monitor and enforce proper package scanning and handling procedures. Management stated that training materials on proper scanning procedures are provided to supervisors; however, management did not verify that those instructions were consistently delivered or followed by the carriers. Additionally, management did not maintain effective end-of-day controls over returned packages. Specifically, carriers were able to bypass supervisory oversight and place packages at their carrier cases with inaccurate or unsupported scan events.

<sup>24</sup> This data does not include scans that could properly be made at a delivery unit, such as “Delivered - PO Box” and “Customer (Vacation) Hold.” Additionally, PO Box scans at the unit were counted only when the delivery point was an address away from the unit. This category does not include mail addressed for a PO Box.

## What Should Have Happened

Management should have monitored scan performance daily and enforced compliance. The Postal Service's goal is to provide for proper delivery attempts for mailpieces to the correct address,<sup>25</sup> which includes scanning packages at the time and location of delivery.<sup>26</sup>

## Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Customers rely on accurate scan data to track their packages in real time. When employees do not

scan mailpieces correctly, customers are unable to determine the actual status of their packages. By improving scanning operations, management can improve mail visibility, increase customer satisfaction, and enhance the customer experience and the Postal Service brand.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>25</sup> *Delivery Done Right the First Time* stand-up talk, March 2020.

<sup>26</sup> *Carriers Delivering the Customer Experience* stand-up talk, July 2017.

## Finding #3: Arrow Keys

### What We Found

Unit management did not properly manage and safeguard the arrow keys. On the morning of February 11, 2026, we reviewed the unit's arrow key certification list in the Retail and Delivery Applications and Reports (RADAR)<sup>27</sup> system and conducted a physical inventory of keys at the unit. Unit management reported 115 keys in RADAR as "In-Use," "Damaged," or "in-Vault."

Based on our physical review of arrow keys at the unit, 22 of the 115 keys were missing, and one additional key was found at the unit that was not recorded in RADAR. Unit management did not report any of the missing keys to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, as required. Although a daily accountable log sheet was used for carriers to sign out the keys, the AM and PM supervisors' signatures were missing.

Figure 4. One of Three [REDACTED]



Source: OIG photo taken Wednesday, February 11, 2026.

In addition, arrow keys were not always kept secure. Specifically, arrow keys stored [REDACTED] in three separate zones were frequently left unattended, allowing access to keys without supervision (see Figure 4). Further, arrow keys were not in a secure location; the unit manager identified that numerous people in the facility [REDACTED] where the arrow keys were stored, including employees of the Norfolk LPC.

### Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to manage and safeguard the arrow keys. Specifically, unit management certified the arrow key list in RADAR without properly reconciling it to the physical keys on hand. In addition, management relied on the supervisors to perform the daily arrow key accountability procedures; however, the supervisors did not verify that all arrow keys were returned and accounted for daily. Further, management did not implement adequate controls to restrict access to arrow keys on the workroom floor. Supervisors stated they had left the arrow keys [REDACTED] because they had to step away to address other issues. Finally, [REDACTED] where arrow keys were secured was previously part of the Norfolk LPC, and [REDACTED] were reportedly not updated when the Norfolk S&DC [REDACTED]

### What Should Have Happened

Management should have verified that arrow key security procedures were properly followed. According to Postal Service policy,<sup>28</sup> management must keep an accurate inventory of all arrow keys. Any missing keys must be immediately reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

In addition, policy states that arrow keys must remain secured until they are individually assigned to personnel. A supervisor or clerk must supervise employees signing out keys on the inventory log.

<sup>27</sup> The arrow key certification in RADAR provides a national platform for all facilities to verify current inventory and account for all arrow keys.

<sup>28</sup> *Standard Work Instruction: U.S. Postal Service Arrow Key Guidebook*, dated March 2025.

Upon return, arrow keys should be deposited in a secure location, and a supervisor or clerk must verify all keys have been returned and accounted for daily.

#### **Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers**

When there are insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is increased risk of mail theft. These thefts damage the

Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system. Additionally, because arrow keys open mail receptacles, lost or damaged keys can result in undelivered mail.

#### **Postal Service Response**

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

## Finding #4: Carrier Separations and Transfers

### What We Found

We determined that four of the 151 carriers assigned to the unit worked at another delivery unit for at least six weeks between November 29, 2025, to January 9, 2026. In addition, we found seven of 217 total employees on the rolls with zero hours worked during this scope period, and we could not determine their employment status. Further, we found one employee in TACS who was not in WebCOINS.<sup>29</sup> The employee was last active in FY 2023 but reappeared in TACS the first pay period of FY 2026.

### Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight for monitoring carrier separations. Unit management stated that there was a delay in reassigning four carriers from the Norfolk S&DC to their assigned delivery unit and this delay was due to miscommunication when the request was made with Postal Service Human Resources.

Additionally, unit management was unable to explain the status of the seven employees who had zero workhours or the reason why an employee reappeared in TACS in FY 2026. As of February 26, 2026, unit management had not provided information about the employment status of these employees.

### What Should Have Happened

Postal Service management must process timely separations to properly reflect employee status and to maximize the office's employee carrier complement.<sup>30</sup>

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When inactive employees are not removed from the employee rolls, replacements are unable to be hired.

#### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>29</sup> A Web interface that displays and stores information about employee details down to the office or unit level. The system gives local management a resource for monitoring and tracking employee complement.

<sup>30</sup> RADAR, *On the Roles Not Available*, Report Notes.

## Finding #5: Voyager Card Transactions

### What We Found

Unit management did not reconcile Voyager card transactions to validate that transactions were legitimate. Specifically, the unit did not reconcile five months of Voyager card transactions. We reviewed the Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS) for high-risk transactions, from July 26, 2025, through January 22, 2026, and determined that there were 29 transactions valued at \$804 that required reconciliation during this period. We found that none of the 29 transactions were reconciled by unit management. Unit management last reconciled Voyager card transactions in June 2025.

### Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to reconcile Voyager card transactions. According to the Norfolk S&DC manager, he began his role at the unit in December 2025 and was not aware that the reconciliations had not been completed nor was he aware who was assigned responsibility for performing the reconciliations. He further stated that vehicles typically fuel at the adjacent Vehicle

Maintenance Facility (VMF), which limits the routine use of Voyager cards to purchase fuel, and therefore, he did not actively monitor Voyager card fuel transactions. The manager acknowledged that it was an oversight to not monitor and reconcile Voyager card transactions.

### What Should Have Happened

According to Postal Service policy,<sup>31</sup> at least once per month, the site manager is responsible for ensuring that their driver receipts are reconciled in the FAMS eFleet "Reconciliation Exception Report" module. In addition, if there is a problem with an individual charge, the site manager has only 60 days from the transaction posting date to dispute the transaction.

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When Voyager card transactions are not properly reconciled, there is an increased risk that the Postal Service will not identify unauthorized purchases, may not have the ability to dispute transactions, and may pay higher prices for questionable and unnecessary purchases.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>31</sup> *Voyager Fleet Card Standard Operating Procedure (SOP)*, Section 4.2 Responsibilities, October 2023.

## Finding #6: Separation of Packages for Dispatch

### What We Found

Employees at the Norfolk S&DC did not properly separate packages destined for the Richmond Regional Processing Distribution Center (RPDC). Specifically, on February 11, 2026, during the unit's evening operations, we observed Ground Advantage<sup>32</sup> and Priority Mail<sup>33</sup> packages commingled in containers designated for Priority Mail. See Figure 5 for a placard for Priority Mail and Figure 6 for commingling of Ground Advantage and Priority Mail in mail transportation equipment (MTE) that was designated for Priority Mail only.

Figure 5. Placard for Priority Mail Packages



Source: OIG photo taken Wednesday, February 11, 2026.

Figure 6. Package Commingling in Container Designated for Priority Packages



Source: OIG photo taken Wednesday, February 11, 2026.

### Why Did It Occur

Management was not aware that Priority Mail packages were to be separated from non-Priority Mail packages for dispatch to the Richmond RPDC. In addition, the mail handler and the evening supervisor did not realize that packages should be separated for dispatch to the RPDC. According to unit management, Priority Mail and Ground Advantage have been commingled in the same MTE for the past three years.

### What Should Have Happened

The Postal Service requires all level 22 units and above to separate Priority Mail from non-Priority Mail packages and use a specific placard when dispatching to the processing facility.<sup>34</sup>

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Proper mail preparation is required for visibility throughout the Postal Service network. When mail is not properly separated for dispatch to the processing facility, in accordance with procedures, there is an increased likelihood that mail will require additional processing steps. Furthermore, this can result in delays and service failures and an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>32</sup> Ground Advantage is a service providing an affordable and reliable way to send parcels inside the U.S. Parcels under 70 pounds arrive in two to five business days.

<sup>33</sup> Priority Mail is an expedited service that may contain any mailable matter weighing no more than 70 pounds.

<sup>34</sup> *Learn and Grow RDC/RSC Updates*, May 2024.

# Appendix A: Additional Information

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We conducted this audit from January through April 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the delivery operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to establish that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. We will issue a separate report that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for the Norfolk S&DC and Lynchburg, Suffolk, and Virginia Beach MPOs, as well as the district.

We assessed the reliability of PTR, DCV, Voyager, WebCOINS, and the TACS data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

# Appendix B: Management's Comments



March 27, 2026

LAURA LOZON  
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: Norfolk Sorting & Delivery Center, Norfolk, VA: Delivery Operations (Report Number 26-044-1-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings contained in the draft audit report, *Norfolk Sorting & Delivery Center, Norfolk, VA: Delivery Operations*

Management generally agrees with the six findings related to delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys, carrier separations and transfers, Voyager Card transactions, and separation of packages.

Management has begun taking steps to address the six findings.

*Delayed Mail:* Management will conduct a service talk on proper handling and recording of delayed mail in DCV. Management will also reiterate the requirement to use PS Form 1571 *Undelivered Mail Report* and follow the *Redline process*. Additionally, the use of the Mail Arrival Quality/Plant Arrival Quality (MAQ/PAQ) discrepancy process will be reiterated to management. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

*Package Scanning:* Management will provide a service talk on proper scanning procedures and conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

*Arrow Keys:* Management will update the inventory log to reflect all arrow keys on hand and report all missing keys to the US Postal Inspection Service. Management will also conduct training on proper management and security of arrow keys. Additionally, reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

*Carrier Separations and Transfers:* Management will continue to monitor carrier separations and work on the employment status of the identified employees.

*Voyager Card Transactions:* Management will provide a service talk on guidelines for the purchase of unleaded fuel for Postal Service vehicles. In addition, management will reiterate the responsibility of the site manager to ensure driver receipts, and "high-risk" transactions are reconciled within Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS). Additionally, management will reconcile the Voyager Card transactions identified during the audit.

*Separation of Packages for Dispatch:* Management will provide service talks to reinforce package separation practices to ensure Priority Mail is not comingled with non-priority mail. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance

E-SIGNED by ANTHONY A IMPRONGO  
on 2026-03-27 11:15:03 EDT

Anthony A. Improngo  
a/District Manager, Virginia District

cc: Vice President, Area Retail & Delivery Operations (Atlantic)  
Corporate Audit Response Management

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This document contains sensitive information that has been redacted for public release. These redactions were coordinated with USPS and agreed to by the OIG.

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