

Efficiency of Operations at the Norfolk Local Processing Center, Norfolk, VA

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-043-R26 | April 9, 2026



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OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

April 9, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR: STEPHEN J. HUMIN
SOUTH ATLANTIC DIVISION SR. DIRECTOR,
PROCESSING OPERATIONS

BETH M. BIRGE
SOUTH ATLANTIC DIVISION DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS

A handwritten signature in black ink that reads "Monica J. Brym".

FROM: Monica J. Brym
Director, Field Operations, Atlantic & WestPac

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Efficiency of Operations at the Norfolk Local Processing Center, Norfolk, VA
(Report Number 26-043-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of the Norfolk Local Processing Center in Norfolk, VA.

All recommendations require U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General's (OIG) concurrence before closure. Consequently, the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. All recommendations should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Rushanthi Leitan, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Chief Processing and Distribution Officer and Executive Vice President
Chief Logistics and Infrastructure Officer and Executive Vice President
Vice President, Processing and Maintenance Operations
Vice President, Logistics
Vice President, Eastern Regional Processing Operations
Atlantic, Regional Director, Logistics
Corporate Audit Response Management

Results

Background

The U.S. Postal Service needs effective and productive operations to fulfill its mission of providing prompt, reliable, and affordable mail service to the American public. It has a vast transportation network that moves mail and equipment among approximately 308 processing facilities and 31,100 post offices, stations, and branches. The Postal Service is transforming its processing and logistics networks to become more scalable, reliable, visible, efficient, automated, and digitally integrated. This includes modernizing operating plans and aligning the workforce to meet marketplace needs; leveraging emerging technologies to provide world-class visibility and tracking of mail and packages in near real time; and optimizing the surface and air transportation network. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews the efficiency of mail processing operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback to further the Postal Service's mission.

This report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the efficiency of operations at the Norfolk Local Processing Center (LPC)¹ in Norfolk, VA (Project Number 26-043). We judgmentally selected the Norfolk LPC in Norfolk VA, based on a review of Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures;² workhours; scanning compliance;³ scanner accountability;⁴ and late, canceled, and extra trips. The Norfolk LPC is in the South Atlantic Division and processes letters and flats. The Norfolk LPC services multiple 3-digit ZIP Codes in urban and rural communities⁵ (see Table 1).

As of January 15, 2026, the unit's employee availability⁶ for mail processing was 88.9 percent and

for logistics was 96.3 percent. The Postal Service's employee availability goal for fiscal year (FY) 2025⁷ is 89 percent for processing and 92.9 percent for logistics.

Table 1. Population Demographics

3-Digit ZIP Codes	Urban Population	Rural Population	Total Population
233-237	1,491,668	120,278	1,611,946
279	61,934	133,595	195,529

Source: Postal Service National Distribution Labeling List and 2020 Census Bureau data.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate the efficiency of operations at the Norfolk LPC. To accomplish our objective, we focused on the following audit areas: mail clearance times;⁸ delayed mail; late, canceled, and extra outbound trips; dock scanning; scanner accountability; security of registry items, and safety and security. We reviewed Surface Visibility Web (SVWeb)⁹ data for late, canceled, and extra trips, as well as scan compliance for the period from January 1, 2025, to December 31, 2025. Further, we identified mail clearance time goals for the Norfolk LPC and compared them with operations shown in the Run Plan Generator report.¹⁰ During our site visit the week of February 9, 2026, we interviewed LPC management and observed mail processing and dock operations. We also conducted a limited scope review of several safety and security items during the site observations.

1 An LPC is a facility that processes destination mail for its service area and transfers mail and packages for delivery.
2 Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the origin processing facility on the day that it was intended. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at a processing facility on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.
3 Scans include load, depart, unload, close, assign, and arrive.
4 If a scanner becomes lost, plant management is responsible for retrieving the scanner from the last signed user, or to retrieve them if lost to another site.
5 We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.
6 Data that compares straight work hours to the work hours that would have been recorded if all employees reported to work as scheduled.
7 As of February 13, 2026, the Postal Service had not published the FY 2026 employee availability goals.
8 Mail clearance time is the latest time committed mail can clear an operation for proper dispatch or delivery.
9 SVWeb is a Postal Service website which provides real-time transportation updates and reports on the movement of trailers in the surface network. The data captured to identify early, on-time, late, or canceled trips is also used to evaluate and improve transportation schedules.
10 The Run Plan Generator is an application mail processing facilities use to plan machine utilization based on volume, clearance times, and other criteria.

During this time, the OIG also audited four delivery units¹¹ in the Virginia district, three of which were serviced by the Norfolk LPC. We will provide the results of those audits to Postal Service management in separate reports. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

Results Summary

We identified deficiencies that affected the efficiency of operations at the Norfolk LPC. We also observed several safety and security issues (see Table 2).

Table 2. Summary of Results

Audit Area	Issues Identified	
	Yes	No
Clearance Times		X
Delayed Mail	X	
Late, Canceled, and Extra Outbound Trips		X
Scan Compliance		X
Scanner Accountability	X	
Security of Registry Items		X
Safety and Security	X	

Source: Results of OIG data reviewed from FYs 2025-2026 and fieldwork conducted from February 9 to 12, 2026.

For the audit areas where issues were not identified, we performed the following:

- Clearance Times – We analyzed mail processing schedules and data to verify that the plant was meeting the scheduled clearance times. During our visit, we also observed the timely processing of mail. We did not find any systemic issues.
- Late and Extra Outbound Trips – We observed departing trucks and analyzed data related to late and extra outbound trips and did not find any systemic issues.
- Scan Compliance – We analyzed scan data and observed scanning practices at the facility. Our observations confirmed that the data reported in SVWeb was accurate.
- Security of Registry Items – We observed registry cage conditions and interviewed personnel to determine if procedures over the handling and security of Registered Mail were being followed. We did not find any systemic issues.

¹¹ The four delivery units were Norfolk Sorting and Delivery Center, Norfolk, VA, (Project Number 26-044-1); Suffolk Main Post Office, Suffolk, VA (Project number 26-044-3); Virginia Beach Main Post Office, Virginia Beach, VA (Project Number 26-044-4); and Lynchburg Main Post Office, Lynchburg, VA (Project Number 26-044-2). The Lynchburg Main Post Office is serviced by the Roanoke P&DC, which we did not audit.


Finding #1: Delayed Mail

What We Found

We observed delayed mail at the Norfolk LPC each day from February 10 through 12, 2026, in letter and flat manual mail operations. In total, the plant reported 24,543 delayed first-class letters in the Mail Condition Visualization (MCV)¹² system during our visit. In addition, we found 3,592 delayed mailpieces¹³ during the three days that were not reported in the MCV system. Specifically, we found in manual mail operation 202 flat mailpieces on February 10 and 990 flat mailpieces on February 11. In addition, on February 11, we found approximately 2,400 of the delayed letters in manual mail operations. Some of the delayed letters and flat mailpieces in manual mail operations appeared to be machinable.


In addition, on February 10, 2026, we observed 35,122 first class letters on the workroom floor that had arrived after the plant's critical entry time (CET)¹⁴ for on-time processing and were at risk of being delayed. These letters included delayed mail from the Richmond Regional Processing and Distribution Center (RPDC)¹⁵ that were canceled at that facility as early as January 9, 2026 (see Figure 1 and Figure 2). Management did not report this mail as delayed in the MCV system but stated that it typically reports this mail as "on hand" in the system.

Figure 1. Example of a Mail Container at Risk of Being Delayed



Source: OIG photo taken February 10, 2026.

Figure 2. Delayed First Class Letter in Mail Arriving After Critical Entry Time



Source: OIG photo taken February 10, 2026.

¹² The MCV system provides near real-time visibility of a facility's on-hand volume, delayed processing volume, delayed dispatch volume, and oldest mail date by mail category and processing operation and stores historical trailer information.

¹³ OIG estimates based on calculations made using *Mail Condition Visualization, Manual Line-Item Entry Job Aid*, dated October 26, 2020.

¹⁴ CET is the latest time that committed mail can be received in an operation and still be processed before clearance time to meet the service standard for mail processing, dispatch, and final delivery. The Norfolk LPC's CET is 9:00 AM.

¹⁵ RPDCs are multi-purpose distribution centers with common designs, layouts, and processing equipment.

Why Did It Occur

The delayed mail in manual mail operations was primarily due to a lack of management oversight to process mail timely for dispatch. In addition, management did not provide oversight to ensure that employees directed letter mail labeled as missent to machines for processing, rather than to manual mail operations. This mail was sent directly to manual letter operations, which did not have a gatekeeper to identify and redirect it to the machines for processing. Plant management agreed that this mail should have been staged for processing on the machines and stated that it would reassess the process for flowing mail into manual operations.

In addition, management did not provide proper oversight to identify and report delayed mail. Management did not know how to correctly report in the MCV system committed mail that the plant received after its CET window. Supervisors should have included these mailpieces in their “delayed” counts, with notations explaining that the mail had arrived late to the facility. Plant management told us that it often receives mail that is delayed or potentially delayed upon arrival from the Richmond RPDC. Plant management said that on previous occasions it used the Mail Arrival Quality/Plant Arrival Quality system (MAQ/PAQ)¹⁶ to communicate issues with late arriving mail to the Richmond RPDC, but ceased doing so due to a lack of response. The Norfolk LPC Processing Support Manager tracks late arriving and delayed first class mail received from the Richmond RPDC throughout FYs 2025 and 2026 and communicates the information with her counterpart at the RPDC.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy¹⁷ states that management should continually gauge how well they are managing the flow of mail and have managerial control over the workload, personnel, and equipment needed for a well-run operation. Postal Service policy¹⁸ also states that management should align

staffing to the workload and work with local human resources and labor relations leadership to identify necessary complement changes. Further, according to Postal Service procedure, plant operations should be managed hourly to ensure that the correct machines are operating with the right staff at the right times. Finally, management should minimize the use of manual operations and should only sort mailpieces that are not machinable.¹⁹ Processing mail manually is generally less productive and more costly than processing mail on machines, impacting overall efficiency.

As part of Postal Service practice, a delayed mail count should be performed and accurately reported in the MCV system daily.²⁰ This practice indicates that unprocessed mail due for delivery that day should be reported as delayed mail. Additionally, management should use the MAQ/PAQ system to communicate and resolve issues with mail arriving delayed from other processing facilities.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is not processed in accordance with proper procedures, there is an increased likelihood that mail will not be taken to the dock in time for dispatch to delivery units, which can result in delays and service failures. Also, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in the MCV system provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues. When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand.

Management Actions

Following our site visit, plant management took action to remediate delayed mail volume in manual operations. These actions corrected the mail flow for looped and missent mail by redirecting machinable mail that was incorrectly put into the manual mail flow from other operations. These

¹⁶ The Mail Arrival Quality/Plant Arrival Quality system facilitates communication and resolution of issues with the movement of mail, including collection mail, between postal facilities.

¹⁷ *Plant Manager Handbook*, dated July 2024.

¹⁸ *Plant Manager Handbook*, Section 6.f, dated July 2024.

¹⁹ *Plant Manager Handbook*, dated July 2024.

²⁰ *MCV Manual Line-Item Entry Job Aid*, updated October 26, 2020.

actions should reduce the issue of delayed mail in manual operation; therefore, we are not making a recommendation on this issue.

Recommendation #1:

We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations**, verify that delayed mail counts are entered correctly into the Mail Condition Visualization system at the Norfolk Local Processing Center.

Recommendation #2:

We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations**, develop and implement a plan to reduce the delayed processing of mail arriving at the Norfolk Local Processing Center after the critical entry time.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding and recommendations 1 and 2.

Regarding recommendation 1, management stated that it implemented a training for delayed mail reporting, including how to annotate “late arriving” volume. Management also stated that it established a manual operations gatekeeper position and daily manual sweeps to ensure that all delayed mail is captured for reporting purposes. The target implementation date is June 30, 2026. See [Appendix B](#) for management’s comments in their entirety.

Regarding recommendation 2, management stated that the Richmond RPDC management and processing support team will ensure that all Norfolk volume traveling through their parent facility will be unloaded timely, moved to the designated Norfolk staging lanes, and loaded on the first available trip to Norfolk LPC. Management further stated that Richmond RPDC processing support personnel will monitor all incoming trips by using SVWeb arrival data to assess the timeliness of network trips carrying Norfolk mail. Management stated that data about late arrivals will be communicated to the Division, Norfolk, and the departing facility to express impact to the Norfolk LPC. Management also stated that the Norfolk team will investigate all mail arriving after the critical entry time, to ensure the mail is processed when possible and recorded as delayed when necessary. The target implementation date is July 31, 2026.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management’s comments responsive to the recommendation, and corrective actions should resolve the issue identified.

Finding #2: Scanner Accountability

What We Found

Norfolk LPC management did not effectively maintain accountability over assigned scanners. We found that 33 of the 149 (22.1 percent) assigned scanners were not in use and potentially missing. Specifically, we identified 27 out of 115 Surface Visibility (SV) scanners²¹ and six out of 34 Postal Vehicle Service (PVS) scanners²² assigned

to the facility that have not been used since November 1, 2025. Management could not locate 11 out of 27 SV and all six PVS scanners during our visit. As of March 12, 2026, the Norfolk LPC has 17 of the 149 (11.4 percent) scanners not in use and potentially missing. We identified scanners that had not been used for more than three months and not located by management as potentially missing (see Table 3).

Table 3. Scanner Accountability Issues at the Norfolk LPC

Scanner Type	Scanners Listed in Ethos	Scanners Last Used Prior to November 2025	Scanners Not Located by Management
SV	115	27	11
PVS	34	6	6
Total	149	33	17

Source: OIG analysis of Norfolk LPC Ethos²³ inventory and plant records.

In addition, the Norfolk LPC had 52 (12 SV and 40 PVS) extra scanners that were not accounted for in its Ethos inventory. Plant management was unaware of Postal Service guidance on monitoring and accounting for scanners in Ethos.

We identified several other issues with management's accountability controls for SV and PVS scanners. Specifically,

For SV scanners:

- Management did not use Ethos inventory data to validate its on-hand scanners.
- Plant management kept scanners in an unsecured storage cabinet without a formal process for signing in or out scanners (see [Figure 3](#)).
- Management did not consistently number scanners or require them to be docked in corresponding cradles (see [Figure 4](#)).

For PVS scanners:

- Management did not use Ethos inventory data to validate its on-hand scanners.
- While management kept PVS scanners in a monitored cabinet and established a process for signing in and out scanners, some scanners that had been signed in were not present in the cabinet.
- PVS drivers did not always write scanner ID numbers correctly when they checked scanners in or out.
- Management did not physically number scanners or assign them to designated cradles (see [Figure 5](#)).
- Management was unable to account for instances when scanners are passed between PVS personnel or kept checked out from one tour to another.

²¹ SV scanners enable facilities to scan trays, tubs, and sacks of mail into containers and onto trailers and to track the mail across the surface network via wi-fi.

²² PVS scanners enable PVS drivers to scan and track mail across the network via a cellular connection.

²³ Ethos is a collection of applications that help track deployments, surveys, and other field communications for the deployment of major equipment program.

Figure 3. Unsecured Storage Cabinet for SV Scanners




Source: OIG photos taken February 10, 2026.

Figure 4. SV Scanners Inconsistently Numbered and Not in Corresponding Cradles



Source: OIG photo taken February 11, 2026.

Figure 5. PVS Scanners Not Physically Numbered



Source: OIG photo taken February 10, 2026.

Why Did It Occur

Plant management did not have internal controls in place to properly account for and safeguard its SV and PVS scanners. For example, management has not followed Postal Guidelines for establishing sign-in and sign-out procedures to secure scanner inventory. Although management stated that it has ordered a secure locker for scanners, it is still awaiting its delivery and installation.

Additionally, operations and transportation management was unaware of the Postal Service's scanner accountability procedures for SV and PVS scanners.²⁴ Specifically, management stated that it was not aware that the Ethos inventory should have been used to validate its count of on-hand scanners.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy²⁵ states that facility management is responsible for ensuring that scanners are organized and located in a secure area, and that controls are used to manage device inventory. Postal Service policy²⁶ also states that if a scanner becomes lost, site management is responsible for retrieving the scanner from the last signed-in user, or to retrieve it if lost to another site. Finally, Postal Service procedure²⁷ states that existing scanners should be numbered in Ethos as the site has them physically numbered on the workroom floor for easy identification.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Lack of controls and oversight of scanner accountability could lead to lost or stolen scanners. We consider the 17 scanners that have not been used for over three months and could not be found as questioned costs²⁸ of \$9,775. We also consider 132 scanners, valued at \$75,900, at risk of being lost or stolen.²⁹ In addition, a lack of scanner accountability could impact scanning compliance. If there are not enough scanners for employees to perform load and unload scans, especially during peak dispatch hours,

²⁴ National Performance Initiative Playbook: SV Scanner Accountability, issued in August 2025.

²⁵ SV Supervisor Booklet, dated October 18, 2023.

²⁶ Surface Visibility Lost Scanner Recovery Quick Reference Guide, updated May 21, 2025.

²⁷ SV & PVS Scanner and Ethos FAQ, updated June 2025.

²⁸ A questioned cost is a type of cost that the OIG believes is unnecessary, unreasonable, or an alleged violation of law, regulation, or contract. To calculate the total cost of these missing assets, we multiplied the 17 scanners that had not been used in over three months and not located by the Postal Service's assigned value of \$575 per scanner.

²⁹ To calculate the value of the scanners at risk, we subtracted the 17 lost scanners from the plant's Ethos inventory of 149 scanners and multiplied the remaining 132 scanners by the Postal Service's assigned value of \$575 per scanner.

it could contribute to inaccurate trip utilization data, missent mail, and operational inefficiencies.

Management Actions

Following our site visit, plant management stated that it temporarily secured SV scanners in the Registry Cage while waiting for the delivery and installation of secured scanner lockers.

Recommendation #3:

We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Directors, Processing Operations, and Logistics Operations**, take measurable actions to retrieve all lost scanners at the Norfolk Local Processing Center.

Recommendation #4:

We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Directors, Processing Operations, and Logistics Operations**, establish and implement procedures to account for Surface Visibility and Postal Vehicle Service scanners at the Norfolk Local Processing Center.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding, recommendations 3 and 4, and the monetary impact.

Regarding recommendation 3, logistics management stated that Norfolk logistics is aware of the Ethos inventory requirement, has retrieved and properly labeled in Ethos one scanner, and reported lost five remaining scanners, which will be replaced. In addition, management stated that logistics has verified the current scanner inventory to be accurate. Further, processing management stated that

the Norfolk processing team searched for each scanner listed in Ethos, returned recovered scanners to inventory, and will replace the remaining unaccounted scanners, which will be reflected as lost in Ethos. Management also stated that the processing team will continue to monitor Ethos to ensure the physical scanner inventory reconciles with the Ethos list. The target implementation date is July 31, 2026.

Regarding recommendation 4, logistics management stated that Norfolk logistics is aware of the Postal Service policy for scanners and Ethos inventory, used scanner serial numbers to sign scanners in and out, and has numbered cradles and scanners and put in use new sign-in/sign-out sheets. Processing management stated that all scanners and corresponding cradles are labeled and moved to the registry cage when not in use, and that a new sign-in/sign-out process has been implemented to improve accountability. Processing management also stated that service talks about the new sign-in/sign-out procedures were provided, and documented, to all Norfolk employees. Management stated that the Norfolk Plant Manager has submitted a requisition, pending approval, for a scanner Auto-crib that uses badges to gain access to scanners. The target implementation date is July 31, 2026.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations, and corrective actions should resolve the issues identified.

Finding #3: Safety and Security

What We Found

During our site observations, we observed several safety and security issues.


We observed the following security issues that allowed anyone to access the Norfolk LPC and Norfolk S&DC³⁰ without a badge:

- The [REDACTED] had an inoperable electronic key card reader and the [REDACTED] was manually left open for extended periods during our visit. According to the Electronic Facilities Management System (eFMS),³¹ the plant reported this issue in July 2025 (see Figure 6).
- Another [REDACTED] without a key card reader was continuously left open during our site visit, allowing access to the facility.
- The [REDACTED] had an inoperable electronic key reader and could not be locked. According to eFMS, the plant reported this issue in November 2025 (see Figure 7).
- A [REDACTED] had an inoperable key reader that employees had propped open on two occasions. (see Figure 8).

We observed the following safety issues for the Norfolk LPC:


- Fourteen out of 34 trucks parked at the dock were not chocked (see Figure 9).
- Three interior observation doors and one fire alarm were blocked (see Figure 10).

Figure 6. [REDACTED]



Source: OIG photos taken February 12, 2026.

Figure 7. [REDACTED]




Source: OIG photo taken February 11, 2026.

³⁰ The Norfolk LPC and Norfolk S&DC are co-located in a single facility. The Norfolk LPC management is responsible for the facility maintenance.

³¹ The eFMS program is the official USPS record for real property inventory and the management system for administering all Property related projects including acquisition, design, construction, disposal, repairs, health and safety mitigation, and Property inspections.

Figure 8. [REDACTED]



Source: OIG photos taken February 10 and 11, 2026.

Figure 9. Examples of Trucks and Trailers Without Wheel Chocks



Source: OIG photos taken February 11, 2026.

Figure 10. Examples of Blocked Access to Observation Door and Fire Alarm



Source: OIG photos taken February 10, 2026.

Why Did it Occur

These issues were caused by a lack of management oversight. Specifically, management has not taken steps to close longstanding repair requests for the facility [REDACTED]. On February 11, 2026, our team met with the Inspection Service’s Physical Security Specialist for the plant to discuss our observations, and on February 13, 2026, we escalated these issues to Postal Service senior management. Additionally, plant management stated that a security guard

drives around the facility to monitor [REDACTED]. However, we observed that the security guard was not continuously present during our visit. As of March 12, 2026, LPC management reported that a contractor has inspected [REDACTED] and ordered parts to make the repairs. The [REDACTED] remain unsecure.

Additionally, employees at the Norfolk LPC did not consistently follow safety and security rules to properly secure trucks and trailers at the docks and keep exit doors free from obstructions. In addition, management did not provide sufficient oversight to ensure that safety and security rules were consistently followed. Specifically, supervisors were not monitoring drivers or enforcing the use of wheel chocks or checking to make sure that doors were closed and secure. While we observed supervisors monitoring PVS drivers' dock operations, including scanning, loading, and load-securing, these supervisors were not going outside to monitor and enforce the use of wheel chocks or check whether dock doors were secure.

Regarding the blocked access to doors and equipment, plant management took steps during our visit, including promptly unblocking several observation doors and one fire alarm pull-station.

What Should Have Happened

The Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) requires employers to provide a safe and healthy workplace free of recognized hazards.³² The Postal Service must preserve the security of the mail and ensure drivers comply with security policies regarding the transportation of mail in trailers. Postal Service policy also states that door locks must not be disabled or doors propped open.³³ Further, Postal Service policy states that the entryway must be designed to deny customers and other outsiders access to the facility.³⁴ Additionally, Postal Service policy³⁵ states that drivers must prevent trailers from rolling away from docks by using wheel chocks.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When employees do not observe safe working practices and safety rules, there is an increased risk of employee accidents and injuries. Management's attention to maintenance, safety, and security deficiencies can reduce the risk of injuries to employees; reduce related costs, such as workers' compensation claims, lawsuits, and OSHA penalties. Also, when the Postal Service does not preserve and protect the security of the mail in its custody there is an increased risk of unauthorized opening, inspection, reading, tampering, delaying, or committing other unauthorized acts.

Recommendation #5:

We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations**, repair all [REDACTED] at the Norfolk Local Processing Center and the Norfolk Sorting and Delivery Center.

Recommendation #6:

We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations**, coordinate with the **South Atlantic Division Director, Logistics Operations**, to communicate the policy requirement for secure [REDACTED] to facility personnel and verify that [REDACTED] are secured at the Norfolk Local Processing Center and the Norfolk Sorting and Delivery Center.

Recommendation #7:

We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Director, Logistics**, verify that all drivers are using wheel chocks at the Norfolk Local Processing Center.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding and recommendations 5, 6, and 7.

Regarding recommendation 5, management stated that concerns with [REDACTED]

³² OSHA Act of 1970 and Handbook EL-801, Supervisor's Safety Handbook, dated July 2020.

³³ Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, section 8-16, dated July 2020.

³⁴ Handbook RE-5, *Building and Site Security Requirements*, Section 4-3.1, General Security Standards, dated September 2009.

³⁵ Handbook EL-803, *Maintenance Employee's Guide to Safety*, Section 1, subsection C dated July 2020.

██████ functionality have been forwarded to Headquarters Facilities and the United States Postal Inspection Service Washington Division. For the issue with ██████████, management stated that it ordered replacement card readers and that power to the ████████ has been restored. Management stated that bollards will be ordered and installed to protect the ████████ and card reader housing from potential damage. In addition, management stated that work orders have been submitted to address all ██████████ issues, and a third-party contractor was acquired to assess for final repairs. Management stated that the local maintenance team will monitor progress of all repairs. The target implementation date is August 31, 2026.

Regarding recommendation 6, logistics management stated that it is aware of the security policy and that policy is clear to not prop doors open at any time. Management stated that a work order has been provided to facilities and a security guard has been on site due to ██████████ not working. Management also stated that service talks will be provided and given to

all logistics employees. Processing management stated that a third-party security company is performing security checks on all malfunctioning ██████████ and an additional security guard was requested and will be in place on March 30, 2026, at the ██████████ until all repairs are made to all ██████████. The target implementation date is May 31, 2026.

Regarding recommendation 7, management stated that logistics is aware of the requirement to chock tires and management will monitor safety processes for compliance on each tour. In addition, management stated that service talks will be given on chocking tires, and documented, for all Postal drivers. The target implementation date is May 31, 2026.

OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations, and corrective actions should resolve the issues identified.

Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from January 2026 through April 2026, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on March 26, 2026, and included its comments where appropriate.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the mail processing operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following four components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Environment
- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to control environment, control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. Our recommendations, if implemented, should correct the weaknesses we identified.

We assessed the reliability of Mail Condition Visualization and Ethos data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Appendix B: Management's Comments



April 1, 2026

LAURA LOZON
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: *Norfolk Local Processing Center*

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings and recommendations contained in the draft audit report, *Efficiency of Operations at the Norfolk Local Processing Center (26-043-DRAFT)*

Management agrees with the three findings in the report.

Finding #1: Delayed Mail
Finding #2: Scanner Accountability
Finding #3: Safety and Security

Management agrees with the monetary impact.

Following, are our comments on each of the seven recommendations.

Recommendation 1: We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations**, verify that delayed mail counts are entered correctly into the Mail Condition Visualization system at the Norfolk Local Processing Center

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation. Local team implemented a supervisor/PSS training regimen on MCV manual entries for delayed mail reporting, including how to annotate "late arriving" volume. The team also established a manual operations "gatekeeper" ad hoc position to prevent machinable mail from entering the manual operation. Daily manual sweeps were implemented to ensure all delayed mail is captured for reporting purposes.

Target Implementation Date: 06/30/2026

Responsible Official:

South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations

Recommendation 2: We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations**, develop and implement a plan to reduce the delayed processing of mail arriving at the Norfolk Local Processing Center after the critical entry time.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

The Richmond RPDC management and processing support team will ensure that all Norfolk volume traveling through their parent facility will be unloaded timely, moved to the designated Norfolk staging lanes, and loaded on the first available trip to Norfolk LPC. Processing Support personnel in Richmond RPDC will monitor all incoming trips by using SVWeb arrival data to assess the timeliness of all network trips carrying Norfolk mail. All data surrounding late arrivals will be communicated up to the Division, to Norfolk, and to the departing facility to express the impact to the downstream Norfolk LPC. The Norfolk team will investigate all mail arriving on trips inbound after the critical entry time, to ensure the volume is processed when possible and recorded as delayed when necessary.

Target Implementation Date: 07/31/2026

Responsible Official:

South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations

Recommendation 3: We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Directors, Processing Operations, and Logistics Operations**, take measurable actions to retrieve all lost scanners at the Norfolk Local Processing Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

Logistics response - Norfolk logistics is aware of the Ethos inventory requirement. Processing was using one of the scanners in question, it was returned to logistics and relabeled in Ethos as required. The remaining 5 scanners were reported as lost and will be replaced. That process was not conducted timely and has been addressed with the leadership in Norfolk. The current scanner inventory has been verified as accurate.

Processing response - The Norfolk processing team investigated the scanners listed in the Norfolk inventory in Ethos and performed searches for each scanner. The scanners that were found were returned to the inventory for use and the remaining unaccounted scanners will be entered in Ethos and will be reflected as lost. The team will continue to monitor Ethos to ensure the physical scanner inventory reconciles with the Ethos scanner list.

Target Implementation Date: 07/31/2026

Responsible Official:

South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations

South Atlantic Division Director, Logistics Operations

Recommendation 4: We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Directors, Processing Operations, and Logistics Operations**, establish and implement procedures to account for Surface Visibility and Postal Vehicle Service scanners at the Norfolk Local Processing Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

Logistics response - Norfolk logistics is aware of the Postal policy for scanners and Ethos inventory. Scanner serial numbers were used to sign scanners in and out. Logistics has numbered cradles and scanners to make the sign in/out process easier. New sign in/out sheets created and in use.

Processing response – All scanners and corresponding cradles are labeled and moved to the registry cage for accountability when not in use. The Norfolk team implemented a new sign-out/sign-in process at the registry cage to enhance individual accountability. Service talks were provided and documented to all Norfolk employees to inform of the new sign-out/sign-in process. The Norfolk Plant Manager has submitted a requisition, pending approval, for a scanner Auto-crib that utilizes an ePACS badge swipe to gain access to scanners

Target Implementation Date: 07/31/2026

Responsible Official:

South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations
South Atlantic Division Director, Logistics Operations

Recommendation 5: We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations**, repair all [REDACTED] at the Norfolk Local Processing Center and the Norfolk Sorting and Delivery Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

The concerns with [REDACTED] functionality have been forwarded HQ Facilities as well as the USPIS Washington Division. As for the [REDACTED] issues – the replacement card readers have been ordered and power to the [REDACTED] has been restored. Bollards will be ordered and installed to protect [REDACTED] and card reader housing from potential damage. Work orders have been submitted to address all [REDACTED] issues, and a third-party contractor has been acquired to assess the parts needed for final repairs. The local maintenance team will monitor progress of all repairs.

Target Implementation Date: 08/31/2026

Responsible Official:

South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations

Recommendation 6: We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations, coordinate with the South Atlantic Division Director, Logistics Operations**, to communicate the policy requirement for secure [REDACTED] to facility personnel and verify that [REDACTED] are secured at the Norfolk Local Processing Center and the Norfolk Sorting and Delivery Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

Logistics response – Logistics is aware of the security policy. A work order was created, and the work has been given to facilities to repair. There has been a security guard on site due to [REDACTED] not working. Postal policy is clear to not prop doors open at any time. Service talks will be given to ensure it is documented that all logistics employees have been given the talk. Management are required to address any security issue immediately with appropriate corrective action.

Processing response – Third-party on-site security company (Prosecur) is performing security checks on all malfunctioning [REDACTED]. The contracting officer responsible for oversight of Prosecur was contacted and an additional security guard was requested to be posted at the [REDACTED] until all repairs are made to all [REDACTED]. The request was granted and the guard will be in place Monday 3/30/26.

Target Implementation Date: 05/31/2026

Responsible Official:

South Atlantic Division Director, Processing Operations
South Atlantic Division Director, Logistics Operations

Recommendation 7: We recommend the **South Atlantic Division Director, Logistics**, verify that all drivers are using wheel chocks at the Norfolk Local Processing Center.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

Logistics are aware of the requirement to choke tires. EAS will monitor safety processes for compliance on each tour. Service talks will be given on choking tires and documented for all Postal drivers.

Target Implementation Date: 05/31/2026

Responsible Official:

South Atlantic Division Director, Logistics Operations

E-SIGNED by STEPHEN J HUMIN
on 2026-04-01 14:14:34 EDT

STEPHEN J. HUMIN
SOUTH ATLANTIC DIVISION SR. DIRECTOR,
PROCESSING OPERATIONS

E-SIGNED by BETH.M BIRGE
on 2026-04-01 16:20:31 EDT

BETH M. BIRGE
SOUTH ATLANTIC DIVISION DIRECTOR, LOGISTICS

cc: *Corporate Audit & Response Management*

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INSPECTOR
GENERAL

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