

# Southfield Station, Shreveport, LA: Delivery Operations

## AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-027-3-R26 | March 11, 2026



# Table of Contents

## Cover

<b>Transmittal Letter</b> .....	1
---------------------------------	---

<b>Results</b> .....	2
----------------------	---

Background .....	2
------------------	---

Objective, Scope, and Methodology .....	3
---	---

Results Summary .....	3
-----------------------	---

Finding #1: Delayed Mail.....	4
-------------------------------	---

Postal Service Response.....	5
------------------------------	---

Finding #2: Package Scanning .....	6
------------------------------------	---

Postal Service Response.....	6
------------------------------	---

Finding #3: Arrow Keys .....	7
------------------------------	---

Postal Service Response.....	7
------------------------------	---

Finding #4: Premium Fuel Voyager Card Transactions.....	8
---	---

Postal Service Response.....	8
------------------------------	---

Finding # 5: Property Conditions.....	9
---------------------------------------	---

Postal Service Response.....	9
------------------------------	---

Finding # 6: Separation of Packages for Dispatch .....	10
--	----

Postal Service Response.....	10
------------------------------	----

<b>Appendix A: Additional Information</b> .....	11
---	----

<b>Appendix B: Management’s Comments</b> .....	12
--	----

<b>Contact Information</b> .....	13
----------------------------------	----

# Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

---

March 11, 2026

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** JAMES R. CHAMBERS  
MANAGER, LOUISIANA DISTRICT

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Sean Balduff", is centered below the recipient information.

**FROM:** Sean Balduff  
Director, Field Operations, Central & Southern

**SUBJECT:** Audit Report – Southfield Station, Shreveport, LA: Delivery Operations  
(Project Number 26-027-3-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Southfield Station in Shreveport, LA.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Ramona Gonzalez, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General  
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer & Executive Vice President  
Vice President, Delivery Operations  
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations  
Vice President, Southern Area Retail & Delivery Operations  
Director, Retail & Post Office Operations Maintenance  
Corporate Audit and Response Management

# Results

## Background


The U.S. Postal Service’s mission is to provide timely, reliable, secure, and affordable mail and package delivery to more than 160 million residential and business addresses across the country. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews delivery operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback in furtherance of this mission.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Southfield Station in Shreveport, LA (Project Number 26-027-3). The Southfield Station is in the Louisiana District of the Southern Area and serves about 50,519 people in ZIP Codes 71104, 71105, and 71115, which are considered a predominantly urban area (see Figure 1). Specifically, 49,571 (98.1 percent) live in urban communities and 948 (1.9 percent) live in rural communities.<sup>1</sup>

This delivery unit has 41 city routes and one rural route. From November 29 through December 26, 2025, the delivery unit had three supervisors assigned.<sup>2</sup> There was also one employee who was acting in a higher-level supervisor detail at this facility. The Southfield Station falls under the Shreveport Post Office for employee availability<sup>3</sup> measurement. As of November 14, 2025,<sup>4</sup> the year-to-date employee availability rate for the Southfield Station was 90.4 percent, which is less than the Postal Service’s retail and delivery operations employee availability goal of 93.7 percent for fiscal year 2025. The Southfield Station is one of three delivery units<sup>5</sup> the OIG reviewed during the week of January 5, 2026, that are serviced by the Shreveport Processing

and Distribution Center (P&DC) and the Shreveport Package Support Annex (PSA).

**Figure 1. ZIP Codes Serviced by the Southfield Station**



Source: OIG analysis of ZIP Code data.

We assessed all units serviced by the Shreveport P&DC and Shreveport PSA based on the number of Customer 360 (C360)<sup>6</sup> delivery-related inquiries,<sup>7</sup> stop-the-clock (STC)<sup>8</sup> scans performed away from the delivery point and at the unit, undelivered route information, and Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures<sup>9</sup> between September 1 and November 30, 2025.

1 We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.  
2 Assignments based on the Postal Service’s Time and Attendance Collection system (TACS). TACS is the system used by the Postal Service to automate the collection of employee time and attendance information.  
3 The Postal Service calculates employee availability by dividing straight time hours worked by potential straight time hours. Potential straight time hours generally include actual straight time hours worked, sick leave taken, and leave without pay.  
4 November 14, 2025, was the last day of Pay Period 24.  
5 The other two units were the Huntington Station, Shreveport, LA (Project Number 26-027-1); and the Plantation Station, Bossier City, LA (Project Number 26-027-2).  
6 Customer 360 is a cloud-based application that enables Postal Service employees to diagnose, resolve, and track customer inquiries.  
7 Delivery-related inquiries include a compilation of package inquiry, package pickup, daily mail service, and hold mail inquiries.  
8 An STC scan is a scan event that indicates the Postal Service has completed its commitment to deliver or attempt to deliver the mailpiece. Examples of STC scans include “Delivered,” “Available for Pickup,” and “No Access.”  
9 Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the P&DC on the day that it was intended. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at the P&DC on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.

We judgmentally selected the Southfield Station primarily based on the number of Leg 3 failures. Specifically, the unit had 16 Leg 3 failures for 1,068 sampled mailpieces (1.5 percent), which exceeded the district average of 1.1 percent.

### Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate mail delivery operations and property conditions at the Southfield Station in Shreveport, LA.

To accomplish our objective, we focused on the following audit areas: delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys,<sup>10</sup> carrier separations and transfers, Voyager card<sup>11</sup> transactions, property safety and security conditions, and package separations. Specifically, we reviewed delivery metrics, including the number of routes and carriers, mail arrival time, amount of reported delayed mail, package scanning, and carrier complement. During our site visit January 6–8, 2026, we reviewed mail conditions, package scanning procedures, arrow key security procedures, carrier separation and transfer procedures, Voyager card transactions, property safety and security conditions, and package separation procedures. We also analyzed the scan status of packages at the carrier cases and interviewed unit management and employees. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on February 17, 2026, and included its comments, where appropriate.

We are issuing this interim report to provide the Postal Service with timely information regarding conditions we identified at the Southfield Station. We will issue a separate capping report<sup>12</sup> that provides

the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for all three delivery units, as well as the district. The capping report will include actions taken by management to address the issues identified in this interim report. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

### Results Summary

We identified issues affecting delivery operations and property conditions at the Southfield Station. Specifically, we found issues with six of the areas we reviewed (see Table 1).

**Table 1. Summary of Results**

Audit Area	Deficiencies Identified	
	Yes	No
Delayed Mail	X	
Package Scanning	X	
Arrow Keys	X	
Carrier Separations and Transfers		X
Voyager Card Transactions	X	
Property Conditions	X	
Package Separations	X	

Source: Results of our fieldwork during the week of January 5, 2026.

For carrier separations and transfers, we analyzed employee data from October 18 through November 28, 2025. All carriers assigned to the unit either reported to work or were accounted for by management during this time.

<sup>10</sup> Arrow keys are distinctively shaped keys that carriers use to open mail-receiving receptacles, such as street collection boxes and panels of apartment house mailboxes equipped with an arrow lock. Arrow keys are accountable property and are subject to strict controls.

<sup>11</sup> The U.S. Postal Service uses credit cards, called Voyager cards, to pay for commercially purchased fuel, oil, and routine maintenance for its vehicles.

<sup>12</sup> The capping report project number is 26-027.

# Finding #1: Delayed Mail

## What We Found

On the morning of January 6, 2026, we identified 1,340 delayed mailpieces<sup>13</sup> at 19 carrier cases and at the missent, missorted, and missequenced (3M) case.<sup>14</sup> Specifically, we identified 1,254 letters and 86 flats. In addition, unit management did not accurately report this mail as undelivered in the Delivery Condition Visualization (DCV)<sup>15</sup> system. While unit management reported 139 pieces of delayed 3M mail, this represented only 10.4 percent of the delayed mail we found at the unit. See Table 2 for the number of pieces for each mail type and Figure 2 for examples of delayed mail found in the carrier cases. Further, the carriers did not complete Postal Service (PS) Forms 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*,<sup>16</sup> to document undelivered mailpieces.

**Table 2. Types of Delayed Mail Identified**

Type of Mail	Carrier Case	3M Case	Total Count of Delayed Mail
Letters	1,118	136	1,254
Flats	86	0	86
<b>Totals</b>	<b>1,204</b>	<b>136</b>	<b>1,340</b>

Source: OIG count of delayed mailpieces identified during our visit on January 6, 2026.

## Why Did It Occur

The delayed mail was due to insufficient training and limited management oversight. The station manager stated that she did not train new carriers to endorse undeliverable mail because she had competing priorities, such as handling customer inquiries and distributing mail to carriers. In addition, she stated that she had been focused on training the two new supervisors that joined the unit in the past six months. The PM supervisor stated that she did not thoroughly check carrier cases and didn't realize there was

any delayed mail to enter into DCV. As the only evening supervisor, she faced challenges completing the redline process<sup>17</sup> accurately while managing other tasks like monitoring scans, checking in keys, assisting at the retail window, and conducting investigative interviews.

**Figure 2. Examples of Delayed Mail in Carrier Cases**



Source: OIG photos taken before carriers arrived on the morning of January 6, 2026.

<sup>13</sup> Count of mail included individual piece counts and OIG estimate based on Postal Service conversion factors in Handbook M-32, *Management Operating Data Systems*, Appendix D.

<sup>14</sup> The 3M case is the area of the delivery unit where carriers should place their missent, missorted, and missequenced mail to be sorted by clerks for further processing.

<sup>15</sup> DCV is a tool for unit management to manually self-report delayed mail, which provides a snapshot of daily mail conditions at the point in time when carriers have departed for the street.

<sup>16</sup> PS Form 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*, lists all mail distributed to the carrier for delivery that was left in the office or returned undelivered.

<sup>17</sup> The redline process is a standardized framework encompassing manager and carrier responsibilities after carriers return to the delivery unit upon completion of delivery assignments, ensuring that any mail returned from the street is identified with a signed completed PS Form 1571 and that no mail is taken back to the carrier case.

Furthermore, the station manager stated that since she has been a manager at the unit, it has not been a common practice to use the PS Forms 1571. She also stated that she was not aware that the forms should be used for undelivered mail brought back to the unit.

### What Should Have Happened

Management should have ensured that all mail was processed and delivered daily. Postal Service policy<sup>18</sup> states that all types of First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express are always committed for delivery on the day of receipt. In addition, managers are required<sup>19</sup> to report all mail in the delivery unit after the carriers have left for their street duties as either delayed or curtailed in DCV. Further, management must update DCV if volumes have changed prior to the end of the business day. In addition, policy<sup>20</sup> states that delivery units must

follow the redline process, which includes carriers completing a PS Form 1571 for any undelivered mail brought back to the delivery unit.

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in DCV provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

<sup>18</sup> *Committed Mail & Color Code Policy for Marketing Mail* stand-up talk, February 2019.

<sup>19</sup> *DCV User Guide*, October 2025.

<sup>20</sup> *Redline Policy Standard Operating Procedures*.


## Finding #2: Package Scanning

### What We Found

Employees scanned packages improperly and scanned packages away from the intended delivery point. On the morning of January 6, 2026, before carriers arrived for the day, we selected all 18 packages from the carrier cases to review and analyze scanning and tracking history. Of the 18 packages, six (33.3 percent) had improper scans, including:

- Five packages scanned “Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location,” “Insufficient Address,” or “Held at Post Office at Customer Request” were scanned between 0.2 and 0.8 miles away from the delivery point (see Figure 3 for an example). Scans should be made as close to the delivery point as possible.
- One package was scanned, “Delivered, In/At Mailbox,” which should be performed only when a package is successfully left at the customer’s delivery address.

**Figure 3. Scan Away From the Delivery Point in Shreveport, LA**



Source: Postal Service Single Package Look Up.

### Why Did It Occur

These scanning issues occurred because unit management did not adequately monitor and enforce proper package scanning procedures. Management stated that it typically confirmed packages received an STC scan but checking scan integrity was not part of its daily process unless it received a customer complaint.

The PM supervisor explained that, as the only closing supervisor, she cannot always interact with every carrier returning packages or conduct a thorough walkthrough. This was due to competing priorities, including checking in arrow keys and Voyager cards, assisting at the retail window, and conducting investigative interviews.

### What Should Have Happened

Management should have monitored scan performance daily and enforced compliance. The Postal Service’s goal is to ensure proper delivery attempts for mailpieces to the correct address,<sup>21</sup> which includes scanning packages at the time and location of delivery.<sup>22</sup>

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Customers rely on accurate scan data to track their packages in real time. When employees do not scan mailpieces correctly, customers are unable to determine the actual status of their packages. By improving scanning operations, management can improve mail visibility, increase customer satisfaction, and enhance the customer experience and the Postal Service brand.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>21</sup> *Delivery Done Right the First Time* stand-up talk, March 2020.

<sup>22</sup> *Carriers Delivering the Customer Experience* stand-up talk, July 2017.

## Finding #3: Arrow Keys

### What We Found

Management did not properly document and safeguard arrow keys. On the morning of January 8, 2026, we reviewed the unit's arrow key certification list in the Retail and Delivery Applications and Reports (RADAR)<sup>23</sup> system and conducted a physical inventory of keys at the unit. We located all 19 keys reported in RADAR as "In-Use." However, there were 20 keys listed as "Lost" or "Damaged" for which management could not provide any documentation to support that the keys were reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service or returned to National Materials Customer Service (NMCS).

In addition, arrow keys were not always kept secure. Specifically, arrow keys were kept in [REDACTED]. We also found that carriers were not consistently signing the daily log to acknowledge their acceptance and return of their assigned keys.

### Why Did It Occur

Management stated that only one supervisor currently holds the keys to the [REDACTED]. When that supervisor was not on duty the [REDACTED]. Additionally, the AM supervisor said daily logs are not used consistently because the keys are shared between carriers and routes throughout the day.

Furthermore, the station manager stated that she was aware that lost keys must be reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service and claimed that the damaged keys were returned to NMCS. However, she could not recall the last time a lost key was reported

and was unable to provide documentation showing that the damaged keys were returned.

### What Should Have Happened

Management should have verified that arrow key security procedures were properly followed. According to Postal Service policy,<sup>24</sup> management must keep an accurate inventory of all arrow keys. Any missing keys must be immediately reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. Further, when damaged arrow keys are returned to NMCS, the key status in RADAR should be changed from "Damaged" to "Returned," and the tracking number should be retained.

In addition, policy states that arrow keys must remain secured until they are individually assigned to personnel. A supervisor or clerk must supervise employees signing out keys on the inventory log. Upon return, arrow keys should be deposited in a secure location, and a supervisor or clerk must verify that all keys have been returned and accounted for daily.

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there is insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is increased risk of mail theft. These thefts damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system. Additionally, because arrow keys open mail receptacles, lost or damaged keys can result in undelivered mail.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>23</sup> The arrow key certification in RADAR provides a national platform for all facilities to verify current inventory and account for all arrow keys.

<sup>24</sup> *Standard Work Instruction: U.S. Postal Service Arrow Key Guidebook*, dated March 2025.

## Finding #4: Premium Fuel Voyager Card Transactions

### What We Found

Management did not always properly reconcile unauthorized Voyager card premium fuel transactions. Specifically, we reviewed the Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS) reconciliation exception report for premium fuel transactions, which are considered high-risk transactions, from May through September 2025, and identified 20 unauthorized premium fuel transactions valued at \$801.87. Although the transaction exceptions were marked as reconciled by unit management, the comments did not address the unauthorized premium fuel purchases.

In addition, 13 of these premium fuel transactions were made by one carrier. While management was aware that premium fuel should not be used for Postal Service vehicles, there was no indication in the FAMS reconciliation comments that the matter was addressed.

### Why Did It Occur

Management stated that it did not provide enough oversight to prevent incorrect reconciliation

comments or premium fuel purchases. The station manager stated that some of the supervisors have not received adequate training to properly reconcile these transactions. Although the station manager knew that premium fuel should not be used for Postal Service vehicles, she did not properly annotate corrective actions taken in the FAMS reconciliation comments. In addition, management could not provide any documentation to support that corrective action was taken with the carriers.

### What Should Have Happened

According to Postal Service policy,<sup>25</sup> all high-risk transactions must be fully reconciled with a comment that explains the reason for the transaction.

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When premium fuel transactions are not properly reviewed and documented, there is an increased risk that the Postal Service may pay higher prices for questionable and unnecessary purchases.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>25</sup> FAMS User Guide, Reconciliation by Exception Process, March 5, 2013.

# Finding # 5: Property Conditions

## What We Found

We found safety issues related to property conditions at the Southfield Station, including:

- Eight fire extinguishers that were missing monthly and annual inspections.
- One Postal Inspection Service door that was blocked.

## Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight or take actions to verify that property condition issues were corrected. The station manager explained that a maintenance team previously handled fire extinguisher inspections, but the responsibility shifted to her, and she did not prioritize them. She also overlooked the blocked Postal Inspection Service door. During our audit, management took corrective action and unblocked the Postal Inspection Service Door.

## What Should Have Happened

Management should have provided sufficient oversight of personnel responsible for maintaining facilities, reported safety and security issues as they arose, and followed up for completion. The Postal Service requires management to maintain a safe environment for employees and customers.<sup>26</sup>

## Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Management's attention to safety and security deficiencies can reduce the risk of injuries to employees and customers; reduce related costs, such as workers' compensation claims, lawsuits, and penalties; and enhance the customer experience and Postal Service brand.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.


<sup>26</sup> Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, July 2020.

## Finding # 6: Separation of Packages for Dispatch

### What We Found

Employees at the Southfield Station did not properly separate packages designated for the Shreveport P&DC. Specifically, on January 7, 2026, during the unit's evening operations, we observed that Ground Advantage<sup>27</sup> packages and Priority Mail<sup>28</sup> were commingled in the same containers (see Figure 4).

Figure 4. Commingled Packages



Source: OIG photo taken on January 7, 2026.

### Why Did It Occur

Management stated that it never received instructions to separate Priority Mail from non-Priority Mail. The station manager added that the unit usually receives a very low volume of Priority Mail and that the Shreveport P&DC had not raised any concerns about the commingled packages.

### What Should Have Happened

The Postal Service requires all level 22 units and above to separate Priority Mail from non-Priority Mail packages and use a specific placard when dispatching Priority Mail to the processing facility.<sup>29</sup>

### Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Proper mail preparation is required for visibility throughout the Postal Service network. When mail is not properly separated for dispatch to the processing facility, in accordance with procedures, there is an increased likelihood that mail will require additional processing steps. Furthermore, this can result in delays and service failures and an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand.

### Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

<sup>27</sup> Ground Advantage is a service providing an affordable and reliable way to send parcels inside the U.S. Parcels under 70 pounds arrive in two to five business days.

<sup>28</sup> Priority Mail is an expedited service that may contain any mailable matter weighing no more than 70 pounds.

<sup>29</sup> *Learn and Grow RDC/RSC Updates*, May 2024.

# Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from December 2025 through March 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the delivery operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to control activities, information and communication, and monitoring that were significant within the context of our objectives. We will issue a separate report that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for the Southfield Station, Huntington Station, and Plantation Station, as well as the district.

We assessed the reliability of the Product Tracking and Reporting system,<sup>30</sup> DCV, and FAMS by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

<sup>30</sup> Product Tracking and Reporting is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

# Appendix B: Management's Comments



February 18, 2026

LAURA LOZON  
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: Southfield Station, Shreveport, LA: Delivery Operations  
(Report Number 26-027-3-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings contained in the draft audit report, *Southfield Station, Shreveport, LA: Delivery Operations*

Management generally agrees with the six findings related to delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys, Voyager Card transactions, property conditions, and separation of packages.

Management has begun taking steps to address the six findings.

*Delayed Mail:* Management will conduct a service talk on proper handling and recording of delayed mail in DCV. Management will also reiterate the requirement to use PS Form 1571 *Undelivered Mail Report* and follow the *Redline process*. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

*Package Scanning:* Management will provide a service talk on proper scanning procedures and conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

*Arrow Keys:* Management will update the inventory log to reflect all arrow keys on hand and report all missing keys to the US Postal Inspection Service. Management will also conduct training on proper management and security of arrow keys. Additionally, reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

*Voyager Card Transactions:* Management will provide a service talk on guidelines for the purchase of unleaded fuel for Postal Service vehicles. In addition, management will reiterate the responsibility of the site manager to ensure driver receipts, and "high-risk" transactions are reconciled within Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS).

*Property Conditions:* Management has abated the safety issues found during the audit.

*Separation of Packages for Dispatch:* Management will provide service talks to reinforce package separation practices to ensure Priority Mail is not comingled with non-priority mail. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

E-SIGNED by JAMES R. CHAMBERS  
on 2026-02-18 09:35:33 EST

James R. Chambers  
a/District Manager, Louisiana District

Contact us via our [Hotline](#) and [FOIA](#) forms. Follow us on social networks. Stay informed.

1735 North Lynn Street, Arlington, VA 22209-2020  
(703) 248-2100

For media inquiries, please email [press@uspsaig.gov](mailto:press@uspsaig.gov) or call (703) 248-2100

---

This document contains sensitive information that has been redacted for public release. These redactions were coordinated with USPS and agreed to by the OIG.

---