Huntington Station, Shreveport, LA: Delivery Operations

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 26-027-1-R26 | March 11, 2026

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Transmittal Letter

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

March 11, 2026

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES R. CHAMBERS
MANAGER, LOUISIANA DISTRICT

FROM: Sean Balduff
Director, Field Operations, Central & Southern

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Huntington Station, Shreveport, LA: Delivery Operations (Report Number 26-027-1-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Huntington Station in Shreveport, LA.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Jennifer Schneider, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer & Executive Vice President
Vice President, Delivery Operations
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations
Vice President, Southern Area Retail & Delivery Operations
Director, Retail & Post Office Operations Maintenance
Corporate Audit and Response Management

Results

Background

The U.S. Postal Service's mission is to provide timely, reliable, secure, and affordable mail and package delivery to more than 160 million residential and business addresses across the country. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews delivery operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback in furtherance of this mission.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of delivery operations and property conditions at the Huntington Station in Shreveport, LA (Project Number 26-027-1). The Huntington Station is in the Louisiana District of the Southern Area and serves about 55,444 people in ZIP Codes 71101, 71103, 71109, 71119, and 71129 which are considered predominately urban communities[1] (see Figure 1). Specifically, 51,619 (93.1 percent) were considered living in urban communities and 3,825 (6.9 percent) were considered living in rural communities.

This delivery unit has 39 city routes and four rural routes. From November 1 through November 28, 2025, the delivery unit had three supervisors assigned.[2] In addition, the unit had a supervisor from another unit and one employee who was acting in a higher-level supervisor detail. The Huntington Station falls under the Shreveport Post Office for employee availability[3] measurement. As of November 14, 2025,[4] the year-to-date employee availability rate for the Shreveport Post Office was 90.4 percent, which is less than the Postal Service's retail and delivery operations employee availability goal of 93.7 percent for fiscal year 2025. The Huntington Station is one of three delivery units[5] the OIG reviewed during the week of January 5, 2026, that are serviced by the Shreveport Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC) and the Shreveport Package Support Annex (PSA).

Figure 1. ZIP Codes Serviced by the Huntington Station



Source: OIG analysis of ZIP Code data.

We assessed all units serviced by the Shreveport P&DC and the Shreveport PSA based on the number of Customer 360 (C360)[6] delivery-related inquiries,[7] stop-the-clock (STC)[8] scans performed away from the delivery point and at the unit, undelivered route information, and Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures[9] between September 1 and November 30, 2025.

We judgmentally selected the Huntington Station primarily based on the number of C360 inquiries related to delivery. We determined the unit average of 3.8 C360 inquiries per route exceeded the 3.6 district average.

1 We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.
2 Assignments based on the Postal Service's Time and Attendance Collection system (TACS). TACS is the system used by the Postal Service to automate the collection of employee time and attendance information.
3 The Postal Service calculates employee availability by dividing straight time hours worked by potential straight time hours. Potential straight time hours generally include actual straight time hours worked, sick leave taken, and leave without pay.
4 November 14, 2025, was the last day of Pay Period 24.
5 The other two units were the Plantation Station, Bossier City, Louisiana (Project Number 26-027-2) and the Southfield Station, Shreveport, Louisiana (Project Number 26-027-3).
6 Customer 360 is a cloud-based application that enables Postal Service employees to diagnose, resolve, and track customer inquiries.
7 Delivery-related inquiries include a compilation of package inquiry, package pickup, daily mail service, and hold mail inquiries.
8 An STC scan is a scan event that indicates the Postal Service has completed its commitment to deliver or attempt to deliver the mailpiece. Examples of STC scans include "Delivered," "Available for Pickup," and "No Access."
9 Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the P&DC on the day that it was intended. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at the P&DC on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate mail delivery operations and property conditions at the Huntington Station in Shreveport, LA.

To accomplish our objective, we focused on the following audit areas: delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys,[10] carrier separations and transfers, Voyager card[11] transactions, property safety and security conditions, and package separations. Specifically, we reviewed delivery metrics, including the number of routes and carriers, mail arrival time, amount of reported delayed mail, package scanning, and carrier complement. During our site visit January 6–8, 2026, we reviewed mail conditions, package scanning procedures, arrow key security procedures, carrier separation and transfer procedures, Voyager card transactions, property safety and security conditions, and package separation procedures. We also analyzed the scan status of packages at the carrier cases and interviewed unit management and employees. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on February 17, 2026, and included its comments, where appropriate.

We are issuing this interim report to provide the Postal Service with timely information regarding conditions we identified at the Huntington Station. We will issue a separate capping report[12] that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for all three delivery units, as well as the district. The capping report will include actions taken by management to address the issues identified in this interim report. See Appendix A for additional information about our scope and methodology.

Results Summary

We identified issues affecting delivery operations and property conditions at the Huntington Station. Specifically, we found issues with six of the areas we reviewed (see Table 1).

Table 1. Summary of Results

Audit Area	Deficiencies Identified	
	Yes	No
Package Scanning	X	
Delayed Mail	X	
Arrow Keys	X	
Carrier Separations and Transfers		X
Voyager Card Transactions	X	
Property Conditions	X	
Package Separations	X	

Source: Results of our fieldwork during the week of January 5, 2026.

For carrier separations and transfers, we analyzed employee data from October 18 through November 28, 2025. All carriers assigned to the unit either reported to work or were accounted for by management during this time.

10 Arrow keys are distinctively shaped keys that carriers use to open mail-receiving receptacles, such as street collection boxes and panels of apartment house mailboxes equipped with an arrow lock. Arrow keys are accountable property and are subject to strict controls.
11 The U.S. Postal Service uses credit cards, called Voyager cards, to pay for commercially purchased fuel, oil, and routine maintenance for its vehicles.
12 The capping report project number is 26-027.

Finding #1: Delayed Mail

What We Found

On the morning of January 6, 2026, we identified about 1,666 delayed mailpieces[13] at 23 carrier cases and in the throwback case.[14] Specifically, we identified 1,192 letters, 242 flats, and two packages in 23 carrier cases and 230 letters in the throwback case. In addition, management did not accurately report this mail as undelivered in the Delivery Condition Visualization (DCV)[15] system. While management reported 94 delayed missent, missorted, and missequenced (3M) mailpieces, this only represented about 6 percent of the delayed mail we identified at the unit. See Table 2 for the number of pieces for each mail type and Figures 2 and 3 for examples of delayed mail. In addition, carriers did not complete a Postal Service (PS) Form 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report,*[16] to document undelivered mailpieces.

Table 2. Types of Delayed Mail Identified

Type of Mail	Carrier Cases	Throwback Case	Total Count of Delayed Mail
Letters	1,192	230	1,422
Flats	242	0	242
Packages	2	0	2
Totals	**1,436**	**230**	**1,666**

Source: OIG count of delayed mailpieces identified during our visit on January 6, 2026.

Figure 2. Delayed Mail in the Carrier Cases

Source: OIG photos taken before carriers arrived on the morning of January 6, 2026.

13 Count of mail included individual piece counts and OIG estimate based on Postal Service conversion factors in Management Instruction PO-610-2007-1, *Piece Count Recording System*, dated July 27, 2007.
14 The throwback case is a piece of equipment used by carriers to deposit undeliverable as addressed mail.
15 DCV is a tool for unit management to manually self-report delayed mail, which provides a snapshot of daily mail conditions at the point in time when carriers have departed for the street.
16 PS Form 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report,* lists all mail distributed to the carrier for delivery that was left in the office or returned undelivered.

Figure 3. Delayed Mail in the Throwback Case

Source: OIG photo taken before carriers arrived on the morning of January 6, 2026.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not fully enforce the redline process and did not complete a review of the workroom floor. Specifically, management did not review all mail that carriers returned to the office, require completion of a PS Form 1571 to document the reason why the mail could not be delivered, and record the undelivered mail in DCV. Further, a 3M case[17] was not provided for carriers to use when returning from street delivery; therefore, the carriers were putting the 3M mail in the throwback case upon returning from their routes. In addition, delayed mail was not properly recorded in DCV because the closing supervisor did not perform a review of the workroom floor to identify undelivered mail. The acting supervisor stated that she closed the unit for the first time alone the night prior to our visit and was not aware of the requirements to complete PS Form 1571 or record the delayed volume in DCV because it was not part of her on-the-job training. In addition, the supervisor stated that she did not perform a complete review of the workroom floor because she was busy checking in some of the returning carriers. Further, the unit manager stated that he did not believe a 3M case was necessary.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have provided sufficient training to the acting supervisor before allowing her to perform the unit closeout alone. Postal Service policy[18] states that all types of First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express are always committed for delivery on the day of receipt. In addition, managers are required[19] to report all mail in the delivery unit after the carriers have left for their street duties as either delayed or curtailed in DCV. Further, management must update DCV if volumes have changed prior to the end of the business day. Policy[20] also states that delivery units must follow the redline process, which includes completion of a PS Form 1571 for any undelivered mail brought back to the delivery unit. Further, managers must complete a review of the unit to verify delivery of all mail.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in DCV provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding. See Appendix B for management's comments in their entirety.

17 The area of the delivery unit where carriers place their missent, missorted, and missequenced mail.
18 *Committed Mail & Color Code Policy for Marketing Mail* stand-up talk, February 2019.
19 *DCV User Guide*, October 2025.
20 *Redline Policy Standard Operating Procedures*.

Finding #2: Package Scanning

What We Found

Employees scanned packages improperly at the delivery unit, scanned packages away from the intended delivery point, and handled packages incorrectly at the unit. We also determined that some employees were inappropriately scanning packages at the unit in the evening using an in-office scanner. In addition, we found issues with employee barcode management.

We reviewed 473 scans occurring away from the delivery unit and more than 1,000 feet[21] from the intended delivery point between September 1 and November 30, 2025 (see Table 3). We removed scans that could have been performed within policy, such as "Animal Interference" and "Unsafe Conditions." Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 96 percent of them were scanned "Delivered."

Table 3. STC Scans More Than 1,000 Feet Away From the Delivery Point

STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivered	454	96.0
Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location	14	3.0
Held at Post Office at Customer Request	5	1.1
Total	**473**	**100%***

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service's Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

*Total percentage does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

We also found issues with scanning and handling of packages in the unit. On the morning of January 6, 2026, before carriers arrived for the day, we selected 30 packages from the carrier cases to review and analyze scanning and tracking history. Of the 30 sampled packages, 17 (57 percent) had improper scans or handling issues, including:

- Four packages that were scanned "Delivered, Caller Service[22] or General Delivery,"[23] "Delivered, PO Box," or "Delivered, In/At Mailbox" but were found in the carrier cases. A "Delivered" scan should only be performed when a package is successfully left at the customer's delivery address. Three of the four scans were made with an in-office scanner.
- Four packages were scanned "Held at Post Office at Customer Request." These packages either did not have a hold request on file or were held at the carrier case since October 2025.
- Three packages were scanned "Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location" and "Delivery Exception, Animal Interference" between 0.3 and 4.2 miles away from the delivery point (see Figure 4 for an example). Scans should be made as close to the delivery point as possible.
- Three packages were scanned with an in-office scanner as "Mis-Shipped," which indicates that the shipper misrouted the mailpiece. However, all three addresses were assigned to routes at the Huntington Station.
- Two packages were scanned "Vacant" but were held at the carrier case instead of being returned to the sender.
- One package was missing an "Arrival-at-Unit" scan, which is necessary to provide complete visibility.

21 Packages are expected to be scanned within a designated buffer distance from the delivery point. The OIG evaluates any package that was scanned more than 1,000 feet from the delivery point.
22 Caller service is a special service that provides an optional delivery service for a fee at a Post Office to customers with large volumes of mail, to customers needing multiple separations, or to customers who need a PO Box number address when no PO Boxes are available.
23 General delivery is made available for those without a permanent address, often used as a temporary mailing address. It is also available if carrier service or a PO Box is not an option.

Figure 4. Scan Away From the Delivery Point in Shreveport, Louisiana



Source: Postal Service Single Package Look Up.

Finally, employee barcodes were not properly managed at the facility. Specifically, unit supervisors left a hard copy of employee barcodes unsecured on top of the supervisor desk, which could allow employees to log into scanners as someone else.

Why Did It Occur

These scanning issues occurred because unit management failed to adequately monitor and enforce proper package scanning and handling procedures. In addition, one supervisor believed it was acceptable to scan packages in the office with an in-office scanner at the end of the day to avoid scanning failures. The unit manager also stated that the current issues are a result of the office not having a stable manager for an extended period, resulting in a lack of management oversight.

The unit manager also stated that he constantly reminded the supervisors to secure the list of employee barcodes, but it kept showing up on their desk. During our audit, the unit manager took corrective action by shredding the employee barcode list.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have monitored scan performance daily and enforced compliance. The Postal Service's goal is to ensure proper delivery attempts for mailpieces to the correct address,[24] which includes scanning packages at the time and location of delivery.[25] In addition, all personnel are responsible for protecting sensitive (hardcopy and electronic) information such as personally identifiable information, which could be linked to an individual, against theft and disclosure to unauthorized individuals. Sensitive information should be stored in a controlled area or a locked cabinet or desk.[26]

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Customers rely on accurate scan data to track their packages in real time. When employees do not scan mailpieces correctly, customers are unable to determine the actual status of their packages. By improving scanning operations, management can improve mail visibility, increase customer satisfaction, and enhance the customer experience and the Postal Service brand. Further, securing employee barcodes prevents the opportunity for theft or other non-authorized activities to occur.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

24 *Delivery Done Right the First Time* service talk, March 9, 2020.
25 *Scanning – Delivering with Accuracy and Integrity* service talk.
26 Handbook AS-805, *Information Security*, Chapter 3 – Information Designation and Control, September 2022.

Finding #3: Arrow Keys

What We Found

Unit management did not properly update the arrow key inventory log and safeguard arrow keys. On the morning of January 8, 2026, we reviewed the unit's arrow key certification list in the Retail and Delivery Applications and Reports (RADAR)[27] system and conducted a physical inventory of keys at the unit. Unit management reported 14 keys in RADAR as "In-Use" and another one as "Damaged." Based on our physical review of arrow keys at the unit, the damaged key was the only one missing, and an additional five keys found at the unit were not recorded in RADAR. In addition, unit management recorded eight keys in RADAR as "Lost." However, we found five of these keys in carrier case drawers. Unit management also could not provide any documentation to support that the lost keys were reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service or that the damaged key was returned to National Materials Customer Service.

In addition, arrow keys were not always kept secure. Specifically, the [redacted] during the day, and carriers checked keys in and out without oversight. Carriers did not always sign the daily log to confirm acceptance of their assigned keys.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to properly manage arrow keys. Specifically, the unit manager stated that he had provided arrow key management instructions to his staff; and relied on them to handle the process without follow up. In addition, the unit manager stated that his time working on detail assignments at other units impacted his ability to effectively monitor staff at this unit.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have verified that arrow key procedures were properly followed. According to Postal Service policy,[28] management must keep an accurate inventory of all arrow keys. Any missing keys must be immediately reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service. In addition, after reporting a lost arrow key to the Postal Inspection Service, a computer aided dispatch number must be obtained. Further, when damaged arrow keys are returned to National Materials Customer Service, the key status in RADAR should be changed from "Damaged" to "Returned"[29] and the tracking number should be retained.[30]

In addition, policy states,[31] that arrow keys must remain secured until they are individually assigned to personnel. A supervisor or clerk must supervise employees signing out keys on the inventory log. Upon return, arrow keys should be deposited in a secure location, and a supervisor or clerk must verify all keys have been returned and accounted for daily.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there is insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is increased risk of mail theft. These thefts damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system. Additionally, because arrow keys open mail receptacles, lost or damaged keys can result in undelivered mail.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

27 The arrow key certification in RADAR provides a national platform for all facilities to verify current inventory and account for all arrow keys.
28 *Standard Work Instruction: U.S. Postal Service Arrow Key Guidebook*, dated March 2025.
29 *Standard Work Instructions, Arrow Key Guidebook*, dated March 2025.
30 Helping Hand #23, *Security Lock and Key Return Program*, dated July 30, 2025.
31 *Arrow/Modified Arrow Lock (MAL) Key Accountability Standard Work Instruction*, dated May 2024

Finding #4: Premium Fuel Voyager Card Transactions

What We Found

Unit management did not always properly reconcile unauthorized Voyager card premium fuel transactions. We reviewed the Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS) reconciliation exception report for premium fuel transactions from May through September 2025, and identified eight premium fuel transactions valued at $315.05. Although the transaction exceptions were marked as reconciled by unit management, five of the comments we reviewed lacked proper explanations for unauthorized premium fuel purchases valued at $224.43.

Specifically, the comments entered for the five premium fuel exceptions were "Correct Card Used – Oversized Vehicle Tank" or "High Mileage Route or Vehicle Used During Multiple Tours." These purchases were made by four employees. One of these employees made two purchases, and the other employees each made one purchase. While unit management was aware that premium fuel should not be used for Postal Service vehicles, there was no indication in the comments that the matter was addressed.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to prevent the purchase of premium fuel. Although unit management was aware that premium fuel should not be used for Postal Service vehicles, management did not properly annotate in the FAMS reconciliation comments that the matter was addressed. The unit manager acknowledged the need for supervisor training on reconciling Voyager transactions and attributed incorrect comments to mistakes by supervisors. He also stated that premium fuel purchases are infrequent and did not warrant an in-depth review.

What Should Have Happened

According to Postal Service policy,[32] all high-risk transactions must be fully reconciled with a comment that explains the reason for the transaction.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When premium fuel transactions are not properly reviewed and documented, there is an increased risk that the Postal Service may pay higher prices for questionable and unnecessary purchases.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

32 *FAMS User Guide*, Reconciliation by Exception Process, March 5, 2013.

Finding #5: Property Conditions

What We Found

We found safety issues related to property conditions at the Huntington Station, including:

- All seven of the fire extinguishers were missing monthly and annual inspections.
- There were exposed wires in the dock area (see Figure 5).
- There was a roof leak above the workroom floor. Management placed a plastic lined tub and drop cloths on the floor to catch the rainwater (see Figure 6).

Figure 5. Exposed Wiring in the Dock Area



Source: OIG photos taken January 6, 2026.

Figure 6. Workroom Floor Below a Roof Leak

Source: OIG photo taken on January 6, 2026.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight or take the necessary actions to verify that property condition issues were corrected. Specifically, the manager acknowledged that the missing fire extinguisher inspections were identified during an inspection in November 2025, but he did not follow up due to his temporary assignment to another unit. The manager also stated that the exposed wires were not functional and required no action. He also stated that the leaking roof was reported in August 2025 and was rejected because the Postal Service did not own the property.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have provided sufficient oversight of personnel responsible for maintaining facilities, reported safety and security issues as they arose, and followed up for completion. The Postal Service requires management to maintain a safe environment for employees and customers.[33]

33 Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook,* July 2020.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Management's attention to safety and security deficiencies can reduce the risk of injuries to employees and customers; reduce related costs, such as workers' compensation claims, lawsuits, and penalties; and enhance the customer experience and Postal Service brand.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

Finding #6: Separation of Packages for Dispatch

What We Found

Employees at the Huntington Station did not properly separate packages destined for the Shreveport P&DC and PSA. Specifically, on January 7, 2026, during the unit's evening operations, we observed Priority Mail[34] and non-Priority Mail packages commingled in the same containers going to the P&DC and PSA.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide oversight to ensure that employees properly separated packages for dispatch. Despite knowing the requirement, the unit manager stated that the unit receives minimal Priority Mail daily and that the Shreveport P&DC had not expressed any concerns about the comingled packages.

What Should Have Happened

The Postal Service requires all level 22 units and above to separate Priority Mail from non-Priority Mail packages and use a specific placard when dispatching to the processing facility.[35]

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Proper mail preparation is required for visibility throughout the Postal Service network. When mail is not properly separated for dispatch to the processing facility, in accordance with procedures, there is an increased likelihood that mail will require additional processing steps. Furthermore, this can result in delays and service failures and an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

34 Priority Mail is an expedited service that may contain any mailable matter weighing no more than 70 pounds.
35 *Learn and Grow RDC/RSC Updates*, May 2024.

Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from December through March 2026 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the delivery operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to all three components that were significant within the context of our objectives. We will issue a separate report that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for the Huntington Station, Plantation Station, and the Southfield Station, as well as the district.

We assessed the reliability of DCV, PTR, and FAMS data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Appendix B: Management's Comments

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

February 18, 2026

LAURA LOZON
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: Huntington Station, Shreveport, LA: Delivery Operations (Report Number 26-027-1-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings contained in the draft audit report, *Huntington Station, Shreveport, LA: Delivery Operations*

Management generally agrees with the six findings related to delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys, Voyager Card transactions, property conditions, and separation of packages.

Management has begun taking steps to address the six findings.

Delayed Mail: Management will conduct a service talk on proper handling and recording of delayed mail in DCV. Management will also reiterate the requirement to use PS Form 1571 *Undelivered Mail Report* and follow the *Redline process*. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Package Scanning: Management will provide a service talk on proper scanning procedures and conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

Arrow Keys: Management will update the inventory log to reflect all arrow keys on hand and report all missing keys to the US Postal Inspection Service. Management will also conduct training on proper management and security of arrow keys. Additionally, reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Voyager Card Transactions: Management will provide a service talk on guidelines for the purchase of unleaded fuel for Postal Service vehicles. In addition, management will reiterate the responsibility of the site manager to ensure driver receipts, and "high-risk" transactions are reconciled within Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS).

Property Conditions: Management has abated one safety issue and is working to abate the other safety issues found during the audit, which requires the submission of workorders for assistance from other resources.

Separation of Packages for Dispatch: Management will provide service talks to reinforce package separation practices to ensure Priority Mail is not comingled with non-priority mail. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance

E-SIGNED by JAMES R. CHAMBERS
on 2026-02-18 09:35:22 EST

James R. Chambers
a/District Manager, Louisiana District

cc: *Vice President, Area Retail & Delivery Operations (Southern)*
Corporate Audit Response Management

Contact us via our Hotline and FOIA forms. Follow us on social networks. Stay informed.

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