

Station B, Cleveland, OH: Delivery Operations

AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 25-141-1-R26 | December 22, 2025



UNITED STATES POST OFFICE
STATION B
CLEVELAND, OHIO 44103

Table of Contents

Cover

Transmittal Letter	1
---------------------------------	---

Results	2
----------------------	---

Background	2
------------------	---

Objective, Scope, and Methodology	3
---	---

Results Summary	3
-----------------------	---

Finding #1: Delayed Mail.....	4
-------------------------------	---

Postal Service Response.....	5
------------------------------	---

Finding #2: Package Scanning	6
------------------------------------	---

Postal Service Response.....	7
------------------------------	---

Finding #3: Arrow Keys	8
------------------------------	---

Postal Service Response.....	8
------------------------------	---

Finding #4: Premium Fuel Voyager Card Transactions.....	9
---	---

Postal Service Response.....	9
------------------------------	---

Finding # 5: Property Conditions.....	10
---------------------------------------	----

Postal Service Response.....	10
------------------------------	----

Appendix A: Additional Information	11
---	----

Appendix B: Management's Comments	12
--	----

Contact Information	13
----------------------------------	----

Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

December 22, 2025

MEMORANDUM FOR: SUSAN A. TAYLOR
MANAGER, OHIO 1 DISTRICT

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Sean Balduff", is centered below the memorandum header.

FROM: Sean Balduff
Director, Field Operations, Central & Southern

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Station B, Cleveland, OH: Delivery Operations (Report
Number 25-141-1-R26)

This report presents the results of our audit of delivery operations and property conditions at Station B in Cleveland, OH.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Jennifer Schneider, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer & Executive Vice President
Vice President, Delivery Operations
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations
Vice President, Central Area Retail & Delivery Operations
Director, Retail & Post Office Operations Maintenance
Corporate Audit Response Management


Results

Background

The U.S. Postal Service's mission is to provide timely, reliable, secure, and affordable mail and package delivery to more than 160 million residential and business addresses across the country. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews delivery operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback in furtherance of this mission.

This interim report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of delivery operations and property conditions at Station B, in Cleveland, OH (Project Number 25-141-1). Station B is in the Ohio 1 District of the Central Area and serves about 61,344 people in ZIP Codes 44103, 44104, and 44106 which are considered a predominantly urban area¹ (see Figure 1).

Figure 1. ZIP Codes Served by Station B



Source: OIG analysis of ZIP Code data.

This delivery unit has 46 city routes. From August 23 through September 19, 2025, the delivery unit had three supervisors assigned.² In addition, the unit had an acting supervisor during our visit. Station B falls under the Cleveland Post Office for employee availability³ measurement. As of August 22, 2025,⁴ the year-to-date employee availability rate for the Cleveland Post Office was 92.4 percent, which is under the Postal Service's retail and delivery operations employee availability goal of 93.7 percent for fiscal year 2025. Station B is one of three delivery units⁵ the OIG reviewed during the week of September 22, 2025, that are serviced by the Cleveland Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC).

We assessed all units serviced by the Cleveland P&DC based on the number of Customer 360 (C360)⁶ delivery-related inquiries,⁷ stop-the-clock (STC)⁸ scans performed away from the delivery point and at the unit, undelivered route information, and Leg 1 and Leg 3 failures⁹ between May 1 and July 31, 2025.

We judgmentally selected Station B primarily based on the number of C360 inquiries related to delivery and STC scans performed at the delivery unit. We also chose this unit based on Leg 3 failures. See [Table 1](#) for a comparison of some of these metrics between the unit and the rest of the district.

¹ We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.

² Assignments based on the Postal Service's Time and Attendance Collection system (TACS). TACS is the system used by the Postal Service to automate the collection of employee time and attendance information.

³ The Postal Service calculates employee availability by dividing straight time hours worked by potential straight time hours. Potential straight time hours generally include actual straight time hours worked, sick leave taken, and leave without pay.

⁴ August 22, 2025 was the last day of Pay Period 18.

⁵ The other two units were the Cleveland Heights Branch, Cleveland Heights, OH (Project Number 25-141-2) and the Shaker Heights Station, Cleveland, OH (Project Number 25-141-3).

⁶ Customer 360 is a cloud-based application that enables Postal Service employees to diagnose, resolve, and track customer inquiries.

⁷ Delivery-related inquiries include a compilation of package inquiry, package pickup, daily mail service, and hold mail inquiries.

⁸ An STC scan is a scan event that indicates the Postal Service has completed its commitment to deliver or attempt to deliver the mailpiece. Examples of STC scans include "Delivered," "Available for Pickup," and "No Access."

⁹ Leg 1 failures occur when a mailpiece is collected and does not receive a processing scan at the P&DC on the day that it was intended. Leg 3 failures occur after the mailpiece has been processed at the P&DC on a final processing operation and is not delivered to the customer on the day it was intended.

Table 1. Delivery Metric Comparison Between May 1 Through July 31, 2025

Delivery Metric	Unit Average per Route	District Average per Route
C360 Delivery Inquiries	6.2	3.1
STC Scans at the Unit	76.8	7.0

Source: OIG analysis of Postal Service’s C360 and Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data extracted August 27, 2025. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate mail delivery operations and property conditions at Station B in Cleveland, OH.

To accomplish our objective, we focused on the following audit areas: delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys,¹⁰ carrier separations and transfers, Voyager card¹¹ transactions, property safety and security conditions, and package separations. Specifically, we reviewed delivery metrics, including the number of routes and carriers, mail arrival time, amount of reported delayed mail, package scanning, and carrier complement. During our site visit September 23–25, 2025, we reviewed mail conditions, package scanning procedures, arrow key security procedures, carrier separation and transfer procedures, Voyager card transactions, unit safety and security conditions, and package separation procedures. We also analyzed the scan status of mailpieces at the carrier cases and interviewed unit management and employees. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on December 2, 2025, and included its comments, where appropriate (see Table 2).

We are issuing this interim report to provide the Postal Service with timely information regarding conditions we identified at Station B. We will issue a separate capping report¹² that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and

recommendations for all three delivery units, as well as the district. The capping report will include actions taken by management to address the issues identified in this interim report. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about our scope and methodology.

Results Summary

We identified issues affecting delivery operations and property conditions at Station B. Specifically, we found issues with five of the areas we reviewed (see Table 2).

Table 2. Summary of Results

Audit Area	Deficiencies Identified	
	Yes	No
Delayed Mail	X	
Package Scanning	X	
Arrow Keys	X	
Carrier Separations and Transfers		X
Voyager Card Transactions	X	
Property Conditions	X	
Package Separations		X

Source: Results of our fieldwork during the week of September 22, 2025.

For the audit areas where issues were not identified, we performed the following:

- Carrier Separations and Transfers – We analyzed employee data from July 12 through August 22, 2025. All carriers assigned to the unit either reported to work or were accounted for by management during this time, indicating no issues with employee separations and transfers.
- Package Separations – We observed package separation procedures on September 24, 2025 and determined the unit was properly separating packages based on management instructions received.

¹⁰ Arrow keys are a distinctively shaped key carriers use to open mail-receiving receptacles, such as street collection boxes and panels of apartment house mailboxes equipped with an arrow lock. Arrow keys are accountable property and are subject to strict controls.
¹¹ The U.S. Postal Service uses credit cards, called Voyager cards, to pay for commercially purchased fuel, oil, and routine maintenance for its vehicles.
¹² The capping report project number is 25-141.

Finding #1: Delayed Mail

What We Found

On the morning of September 23, 2025, we identified 4,376 delayed mailpieces¹³ at 40 carrier cases and in the collection mail area. Specifically, we identified 3,556 letters, 731 flats, and 89 packages. In addition, management did not report this mail as undelivered in the Delivery Condition Visualization (DCV)¹⁴ system. See Table 3 for the number of pieces for each mail type and Figures 2 and 3 for examples of the delayed mail. Further, the carriers did not properly complete Postal Service (PS) Forms 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*,¹⁵ to document undelivered mailpieces. Although some of the delayed mail had PS Forms 1571 attached, the forms were not completed in their entirety, and some were dated back to June 2025.

Table 3. Types of Delayed Mail Identified

Type of Mail	Carrier Cases	Collection Mail Area	Total Count of Delayed Mail
Letters	3,080	476	3,556
Flats	537	194	731
Packages	3	86	89
Totals	3,620	756	4,376

Source: OIG count of delayed mailpieces identified during our visit on September 23, 2025.

Why Did It Occur

The delayed mail was due to lack of unit management oversight. Specifically, unit management did not always follow the redline process¹⁶ and verify that all mail was cleared from the unit because other duties took priority, such as checking in carriers returning from street duties, answering phone calls, and helping customers at the retail counter.

Figure 2. Example of Delayed Mail in a Carrier Case



Source: OIG photo taken before carriers arrived on the morning of September 23, 2025.

Figure 3. Examples of Delayed Mail in the Collection Mail Area



Source: OIG photos taken before carriers arrived on the morning of September 23, 2025.

¹³ Count of mail included individual piece counts and OIG estimate based on Postal Service conversion factors in Management Instruction PO-610-2007-1, *Piece Count Recording System*, dated July 27, 2007.

¹⁴ DCV is a tool for unit management to manually self-report delayed mail, which provides a snapshot of daily mail conditions at the point in time when carriers have departed for the street.

¹⁵ PS Form 1571, *Undelivered Mail Report*, lists all mail distributed to the carrier for delivery that was left in the office or returned undelivered.

¹⁶ The redline process is a standardized framework encompassing manager and carrier responsibilities after carriers return to the delivery unit upon completion of delivery assignments, ensuring that any mail returned from the street is identified with a signed completed PS Form 1571, and that no mail is taken back to the carrier case.

Further, management did not transport the collection mail that carriers brought back to the unit after the last truck had been dispatched to the P&DC. The unit manager stated that during the COVID-19 pandemic, he was verbally instructed not to transport collection mail that missed the last dispatch to the plant and he has not received updated instructions since then. The manager also stated that neither he nor the supervisors were instructed to record this mail as delayed in the DCV system.

Unit management stated that they instructed the carriers to use a PS Form 1571 for all undelivered mail, but neither unit management nor the carriers were aware that the volume of undelivered mailpieces had to be noted on the form or that the carriers could not re-use old forms.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have ensured that all mail was processed and delivered daily. Postal Service policy¹⁷ states that all types of First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express are always committed for delivery on the day of receipt. In addition, managers are required¹⁸ to report all mail in the delivery unit after the carriers have left for their street duties as either delayed or curtailed in the DCV system. Further, management must update

the DCV system if volumes have changed prior to the end of the business day. Also, policy¹⁹ states that delivery units must follow the redline process, which includes carriers completing a PS Form 1571 for any undelivered mail brought back to the delivery unit. An estimate of all undelivered mailpieces is required to be included on the PS Form 1571.²⁰ Management must also initiate procedures for ensuring that collection mail is transported to the processing plant in the event the mail does not make it on the final dispatch truck.²¹

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in the DCV system provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

¹⁷ *Committed Mail & Color Code Policy for Marketing Mail* stand-up talk, February 2019.

¹⁸ *DCV Learn and Grow*, August 1, 2024.

¹⁹ *Redline Policy Standard Operating Procedures* (SOP).

²⁰ Handbook M-41, *City Delivery Carriers Duties and Responsibilities*, Section 131.4, Reporting Requirements, June 2019.

²¹ *Dispatch Deviation Policy Standard Operating Procedure*, July 19, 2024.

Finding #2: Package Scanning

What We Found

Employees scanned packages improperly at the delivery unit, scanned packages away from the intended delivery point, and handled packages incorrectly at the unit.

We reviewed package scanning data for scans that occurred at the unit and removed any potentially accurate scans performed.²² In total, employees improperly scanned 3,470 packages at the delivery unit between June 1 and August 31, 2025 (see Table 4). Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 94.3 percent of them were scanned delivered. Specifically, we found that 3,092 out of 3,272 packages scanned as “Delivered” at the delivery unit were associated with one address. This address received a large volume of packages daily which were picked up by the customer at the unit. The carrier, rather than the clerk, scanned a firm sheet²³ to record the delivery of packages to the customer.

Table 4. STC Scans at Delivery Unit

STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivered	3,272	94.3
Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location	163	4.7
Receptacle Full / Item Oversized	25	0.7
No Authorized Recipient	5	0.1
No Secure Location Available	5	0.1
Total	3,470	100*

Source: OIG analysis of the PTR data.

*Total percentage does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

We also reviewed 62 scans occurring away from the delivery unit and over 1,000 feet²⁴ from the intended delivery point between June 1 and August 31, 2025 (see Table 5). We removed scans that could have

been performed within policy, such as “Animal Interference” and “Unsafe Conditions.” Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 80.6 percent of them were scanned “Delivered.”

Table 5. STC Scans Over 1,000 Feet Away From the Delivery Point


STC Scan Type	Count	Percent
Delivered	50	80.6
Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location	10	16.1
Delivered to Agent for Final Delivery	1	1.6
Receptacle Full / Item Oversized	1	1.6
Total	62	100*

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service’s PTR System data.

*Total percentage does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

For example, the map below (see Figure 4) shows an instance where a carrier scanned a package as delivered 2.8 miles away from the delivery point.

Figure 4. Scan Away From the Delivery Point in Cleveland, Ohio



Source: Postal Service Single Package Look Up.

22 This data does not include scans that could properly be made at a delivery unit, such as “Delivered – PO Box” and “Customer (Vacation) Hold.” Additionally, PO Box scans at the unit were only counted when the delivery point was an address away from the unit. This category does not include mail addressed for a PO Box.

23 When delivering 25 or more trackable items to a single address, Postal Service personnel create a firm sheet. Firm sheets expedite the delivery process by eliminating the need to scan each item at the time of delivery.

24 Packages are expected to be scanned within a designated buffer distance from the delivery point. The OIG evaluates any package that was scanned more than 1,000 feet from the delivery point.

We also found issues with scanning and handling of packages in the unit. On the morning of September 23, 2025, before carriers arrived for the day, we selected all 23 packages found at the carrier cases to review and analyze scanning and tracking history. Of the 23 sampled packages, 16 (70 percent) had improper scans or handling issues, including:

- Six packages were scanned “Held at Post Office at Customer Request,” but the customers did not have a hold request on file.
- Four packages were missing an STC scan to let the customer know the reason for non-delivery.
- Four packages were scanned “Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location,” of which three were scanned between 0.3 and 2.8 miles from the delivery point. Scans should be made as close to the delivery point as possible. The remaining package was held at the unit since September 2, 2025, but the customer did not have a hold request on file.
- One package was scanned “Receptacle Full/Item Oversized”; however, the package was found at the carrier case instead of the Notice Left area.
- One package was scanned “Forward Expired,” which should only be used when the forwarding order for the customer is no longer valid. This item should have been returned to the sender. The carrier stated that the scan was made in error.

Why Did It Occur

These scanning issues occurred because unit management did not adequately monitor and

enforce proper package scanning and handling procedures. Unit management stated that it monitors scans daily; however, the unit manager and supervisor were focused on scan failure reports and not the scan integrity reports that show improper scans and scans made away from the delivery point. Further, management stated that other duties took priority, such as resolving clock-ring discrepancies.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have monitored scan performance daily and enforced compliance. The Postal Service’s goal is to ensure proper delivery attempts for mailpieces to the correct address,²⁵ which includes scanning packages at the time and location of delivery.²⁶ When a firm sheet is created for a business where the items are picked up at the post office, the Firm Delivery Receipt barcode should be scanned by a clerk as “Delivered, Individual Picked Up At Post Office” or “Delivered to Agent, Picked up at USPS,”²⁷ as applicable.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Customers rely on accurate scan data to track their packages in real time. When employees do not scan mailpieces correctly, customers are unable to determine the actual status of their packages. By improving scanning operations, management can improve mail visibility, increase customer satisfaction, and enhance the customer experience and the Postal Service brand.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁵ *Delivery Done Right the First Time* stand-up talk, March 2020.

²⁶ *Scanning – Delivering with Accuracy and Integrity* stand-up talk.

²⁷ *PTR Domestic Scan Events and Descriptions*, USPS Domestic Tracking Scan Events, June 2025.

Finding #3: Arrow Keys

What We Found

Unit management did not properly update the arrow key inventory log. On the morning of September 25, 2025, we reviewed the unit's arrow key certification list in the Retail and Delivery Applications and Reports (RADAR)²⁸ system and conducted a physical inventory of keys at the unit. Unit management reported 94 keys in RADAR as "In-Use," "In-Vault," "Damaged," and "Code or Serial Incorrect." Based on our physical review of arrow keys at the unit, we found one key at the unit that was not recorded in RADAR. In addition, unit management recorded nine keys in RADAR as "Lost." The unit manager could only provide supporting documentation for one of these keys. However, we identified supporting information in RADAR for two other keys. Also, the unit manager stated that the six keys recorded in RADAR as "Damaged" were either mailed to the National Materials Customer Service or taken by the Postal Inspectors during their last arrow key audit, which are both acceptable actions. Management could not provide supporting documentation for any of the damaged keys. However, we identified supporting information in RADAR for three of these keys.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to properly manage arrow keys. Specifically, the unit manager stated that it was hard to read the serial number on the key that was not entered into RADAR. Therefore, he stored it in the vault and forgot about it until we brought it to his attention.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have verified that arrow key procedures were properly followed. According to Postal Service policy,²⁹ management must keep an accurate inventory of all arrow keys. In addition, after reporting a lost arrow key to the Postal Inspection Service, a computer aided dispatch number must be obtained. Further, when damaged arrow keys are returned to the National Materials Customer Service, the key status in RADAR should be changed from "Damaged" to "Returned"³⁰ and the tracking number should be retained.³¹

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there is insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is increased risk of mail theft. These thefts damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system. Additionally, because arrow keys open mail receptacles, lost or damaged keys can result in undelivered mail.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

²⁸ The arrow key certification in RADAR provides a national platform for all facilities to verify current inventory and account for all arrow keys.

²⁹ *Standard Work Instructions, Arrow Key Guidebook*, dated March 2025.

³⁰ *Standard Work Instructions, Arrow Key Guidebook*, dated March 2025.

³¹ *Helping Hand #23, Security Lock and Key Return Program*, dated July 30, 2025.

Finding #4: Premium Fuel Voyager Card Transactions

What We Found

Unit management did not always properly reconcile unauthorized Voyager card premium fuel transactions. We reviewed the Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS) reconciliation exception report for premium fuel transactions from March 8 through August 31, 2025, and identified 17 unauthorized premium fuel transactions valued at \$827.05. Although these transactions were marked as reconciled by unit management, none of the comments addressed the unauthorized premium fuel transactions.

Specifically, the comments entered for the 17 premium fuel exceptions were “High Mileage Route,” “Vehicle Used During Multiple Tours,” or “Oversized Vehicle Tank.” These purchases were made by 12 employees. One of these employees made five purchases, and another employee made two purchases. While unit management was aware that premium fuel should not be used for Postal Service vehicles, there was no indication in the comments that the issues were addressed.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight to prevent the purchase of premium fuel. Specifically, the supervisor performing the fuel card reconciliations did not complete the required Voyager card training. She stated that when she performed the reconciliations, she selected one of

the comment options at the top of the screen and did not realize there were other options below. The unit manager was not aware that the supervisor had not completed the required Voyager training because she was already performing the reconciliations when he arrived in 2022 and he had not reviewed her training records.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy³² requires any individual responsible for reconciling Fleet (Voyager) card activities to complete the eFleet Card for Site Manager training annually. The Voyager Program – Fleet Commander Online (FCO) training is also required to be completed prior to the approval of access to FAMS and/or FCO. In addition, all high-risk transactions must have a comment entered for the transaction to be fully reconciled. If none of the pre-approved comment options are sufficient to explain the reason for the high-risk transaction, the “Other” option should be selected and an applicable comment should be entered.³³

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When premium fuel transactions are not properly reconciled, there is an increased risk that the Postal Service will not identify unauthorized purchases.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

³² *Voyager Fleet Card SOP*, Section 1.4, Training and Accountability, October 2023.

³³ *FAMS User Guide*, Reconciliation by Exception Process, March 5, 2013.

Finding # 5: Property Conditions

What We Found

We found property safety and security issues at Station B. Specifically,

Property Safety

- Four of the five electrical panels were blocked.
- A Postal Inspection Service door was blocked.

Property Security

- The employee parking lot did not have a sign posted stating that vehicles may be subject to search.

Why Did It Occur

Management did not provide sufficient oversight and take the necessary actions to identify and address property safety and security conditions at the unit. The unit manager stated that he was not aware that the issues were occurring at the unit regarding the blocked areas and parking lot signage. In addition, he stated that the parking lot signage was posted in the employee parking area when he looked a few months ago and he was not aware that it was no longer posted.

During our audit, the unit manager removed items blocking the four electrical panels and the Postal Inspection Service door after we brought it to his attention.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have provided sufficient oversight of staff responsible for maintaining facilities, reported safety and security issues as they arose, and followed up for completion. The Postal Service requires management to maintain a safe environment for employees and customers.³⁴ Additionally, the Postal Service is required to provide signage that vehicles may be subject to search.³⁵

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Management's attention to safety and security deficiencies can reduce the risk of injuries to employees and customers; reduce related costs such as workers' compensation claims, lawsuits, and penalties; and enhance the employee and customer experience and Postal Service brand. In addition, proper signage in the employee parking lot could reduce the risk of employee theft and associated costs.

Postal Service Response

The Postal Service agreed with this finding.

³⁴ Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, July 2020.

³⁵ Handbook RE-5, *Building and Site Security Requirements*, Section 2-2.4, Site Signage, September 2009.

Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from September through December 2025 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the delivery operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to all three components that were significant within the context of our objectives. We will issue a separate report that provides the Postal Service with the overall findings and recommendations for Station B, Cleveland Heights Branch, and the Shaker Heights Station, as well as the district.

We assessed the reliability of DCV, PTR, and FAMS data by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Appendix B: Management's Comments



December 3, 2025

LAURA LOZON
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: Station B, Cleveland, OH: Delivery Operations (Report Number 25-141-1-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings contained in the draft audit report, *Station B, Cleveland, OH: Delivery Operations*.

Management generally agrees with the five findings related to delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys, Voyager card transactions, and property conditions.

Management has begun taking steps to address the five findings.

Delayed Mail: Management will conduct a service talk on proper handling and recording of delayed mail in DCV. Management will also reiterate the requirement to use PS Form 1571 *Undelivered Mail Report* and follow the *Redline process*. Reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Package Scanning: Management will provide a service talk on proper scanning procedures and conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

Arrow Keys: Management will update the inventory log to reflect all arrow keys on hand and report all missing keys to the US Postal Inspection Service. Management will also conduct training on proper management and security of arrow keys. Additionally, reviews will be conducted to monitor for compliance.

Voyager Card Transactions: Management will provide a service talk on guidelines for the purchase of unleaded fuel for Postal Service vehicles. In addition, management will reiterate the responsibility of the site manager to ensure driver receipts, and "high-risk" transactions are reconciled within Fuel Asset Management System (FAMS).

Property Conditions: Management has abated the security issue found during the audit.

E-SIGNED by SUSAN A TAYLOR
on 2025-12-03 12:37:08 EST

Susan Taylor
District Manager, Ohio 1 District

cc: Vice President, Area Retail & Delivery Operations (Central)
Corporate Audit Response Management

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE



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