

# Postal Service's Workplace Violence Prevention Program

## AUDIT REPORT

Report Number 25-062-R25 | September 15, 2025



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# Highlights

## Background

Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the U.S. Postal Service is obligated to provide its employees with a safe and healthy place to work. The Postal Service proactively meets this obligation by implementing policies, procedures, special teams, and reporting tools related to workplace violence at facilities. The established zero-tolerance policy for workplace violence outlines that no employee should have to work in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation and the organization will address every threat or act of inappropriate behavior with an immediate and firm response. These threats or acts can result in corrective action up to removal from the Postal Service.

## What We Did

Our objective was to assess the effectiveness of the Postal Service's Workplace Violence Prevention Program from fiscal year 2022 through 2024. We conducted virtual interviews in three districts; site visits at 24 judgmentally selected facilities; and interviewed district Threat Assessment Teams, facility managers, and employees to understand the prevention program. In addition, we interviewed personnel from the Workplace Environment Improvement department to understand the policies and compliance requirements surrounding the program.

## What We Found

The Postal Service created the Workplace Violence Prevention Program to remain dedicated to violence prevention and provide a foundation for establishing a violence-free workplace. Overall, we determined the Workplace Violence Prevention Program to be sufficient in providing content and resources to the workforce. However, opportunities exist for the Postal Service to improve reporting and communication on workplace violence incidents. Specifically, we found instances of workplace violence not always reported or documented within the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system, and district Threat Assessment Teams did not always provide facility managers with supporting documentation and timely communication after incidents occurred.

## Recommendations and Management's Comments

We made four recommendations to address the Workplace Violence Prevention Program improvements identified in the report. Postal Service management agreed with two recommendations and disagreed with two. Management's comments and our evaluation are at the end of each finding and recommendation. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General considers management's comments responsive to recommendations two and three, and the corrective actions should resolve the issues identified in the report. We will pursue recommendations one and four through the formal audit resolution process. See [Appendix B](#) for management's comments in their entirety.

# Transmittal Letter



OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL  
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

September 15, 2025

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** MICHAEL ELSTON  
VICE PRESIDENT, LABOR RELATIONS

ELVIN MERCADO  
CHIEF RETAIL AND DELIVERY OFFICER AND  
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

ISAAC CRONKHITE  
CHIEF PROCESSING AND DISTRIBUTION OFFICER AND  
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

RONNIE JARRIEL  
CHIEF LOGISTICS AND INFRASTRUCTURE OFFICER AND  
EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT

A handwritten signature in black ink, reading "Kelly Thresher", is positioned above the "FROM:" field.

**FROM:** Kelly Thresher  
Deputy Assistant Inspector General  
for Finance, Pricing & Human Capital

**SUBJECT:** Audit Report – Postal Service's Workplace Violence  
Prevention Program (Report Number 25-062-R25)

This report presents the results of our audit of Postal Service's Workplace Violence Prevention Program.

All recommendations require U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) concurrence before closure. Consequently, the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. All recommendations should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesy provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Lazerick Poland, Director, Human Capital Management, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General  
Corporate Audit Response Management

# Results

## Introduction/Objective

This report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the Postal Service’s Workplace Violence Prevention Program (Project Number 25-062). Our objective was to assess the effectiveness of the Workplace Violence Prevention Program. See [Appendix A](#) for additional information about this audit.

## Background

Under the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, the Postal Service has an obligation to provide its employees with a safe and healthy place to work. The Postal Service established its Workplace Violence Prevention Program to meet this obligation and remain dedicated to violence prevention by providing the foundation for a violence-free workplace. Threats of violence are considered any verbal or physical threat or assault on a person with the intention of injuring, or resulting in an injury, and are not limited to fatalities, physical injuries, or suicidal ideations.


During fiscal year (FY) 2022 through FY 2024, there were a total of 2,646 reported workplace violence incidents nationwide. The Postal Service averaged about 13.8 workplace violence incidents per 10,000 employees. Threats accounted for 1,256 (47 percent) of the incidents, which are words or actions intended to intimidate another person or interfere with the performance of his or her official duties (such as standing in front of a corridor with a menacing posture and not permitting another person access to load a Postal Service vehicle). Physical assaults were the next highest reported incidents at 678 (26 percent).

In addition, the Postal Service reported a total of 139 suicides during FY 2022 through FY 2024. Labor Relations (LR) tracks all employee suicides, and suicides that are committed on Postal Service property are reported via the Safety Health Management Tool if the leading cause or factor of the suicide is related to work. Additionally, if there are any

“Threats of violence are considered any verbal or physical threat or assault on a person with the intention of injuring, or resulting in an injury, and are not limited to fatalities, physical injuries, or suicidal ideations.”

reported suicidal comments and threats of suicide that require convening from the Threat Assessment Team, then those should be entered and tracked within the Workplace Environment Tracking System.<sup>1</sup> See Figure 1 for a breakdown of workplace violence incident types in FY 2022 through FY 2024.

**Figure 1. FY 2022-2024 Workplace Violence Incident Types**



Source: OIG Analysis of Threat Assessment Case Tracking data.

<sup>1</sup> A database used to collect and record information that allows the Postal Service to achieve its goal of providing a workplace environment that is safe and free of workplace harassment, discrimination, threats, and assaults (implemented August 2, 2013).




The Postal Service’s zero-tolerance policy<sup>2</sup> provides the foundation to prevent workplace violence but is only part of other prevention efforts and strategies, such as promoting workplace violence prevention awareness, online training, stand-up talks (SUTs), and using designated teams to assess threats. The zero-tolerance policy for workplace violence outlines that no employee should have to work in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation, and the organization will address every threat or act of inappropriate behavior with an immediate and firm response. The zero-tolerance policy is required to be posted on bulletin boards within all facilities, and all employees receive

“The zero-tolerance policy for workplace violence outlines that no employee should have to work in an atmosphere of fear and intimidation.”

a mandatory SUT on workplace violence prevention, which also reiterates the zero-tolerance policy. The Postal Service focuses on six organizational strategies within the Workplace Violence Prevention Program to reduce workplace violence (see Figure 2).

**Figure 2. Six Organizational Strategies for Reducing Workplace Violence<sup>3</sup>**



Source: OIG evaluation of Publication 45, dated June 2025.

### Workplace Violence Monitoring Structure

The Workplace Environment Improvement (WEI) department oversees the Workplace Violence Prevention Program; educates the field regarding policies and programs; oversees, monitors,

and performs compliance audits of the Threat Assessment Teams across the Postal Service; and is responsible for annual maintenance of the zero-tolerance policy. The Postal Service WEI department oversees the Threat Assessment Teams, whose


<sup>2</sup> Dated February 27, 2025.

<sup>3</sup> The Postal Pulse survey is administered annually providing insights that help the Postal Service gauge progress and identify actions to improve the employee experience.

mission is to prevent workplace violence. The teams follow specific guidance<sup>4</sup> for responding to and assessing seriousness of violence and potentially violent situations. The teams have the responsibility

of identifying threat makers, assessing risk, and recommending a risk abatement plan.<sup>5</sup> See Figure 3 for an overview of the Threat Assessment Teams member composition and position titles.

**Figure 3. Threat Assessment Team Member Composition**



Source: OIG analysis of Publication 108, *Threat Assessment Team Guide*.

The core members<sup>6</sup> for each district Threat Assessment Team meet at least once every three months to review team responsibilities, address unsolved action items, and discuss updates on open incidents. Situational advisors and ad-hoc members are responsible for providing guidance and assistance to the team, but do not directly address incidents, issue corrective actions, or attend quarterly meetings.

### Workplace Violence Reporting

The Workplace Environment Tracking System database provides a nationwide, centralized repository for workplace environment processes. The system has several modules for documenting processes, including the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system,<sup>7</sup> to enter and track incident-specific information for threats. In addition, each district has a

specified number of overall system users responsible for entering, maintaining, and closing out incidents.

Facility managers<sup>8</sup> are responsible for timely reporting incidents directly to the district Threat Assessment Team. The LR manager is the team lead and will determine if the team should convene to assess the incident and determine next steps to mitigate potential violence. If the Threat Assessment

“The LR manager is the team lead and will determine if the team should convene to assess the incident and determine next steps to mitigate potential violence.”

<sup>4</sup> Publication 108, *Threat Assessment Team Guide*, dated May 2015.

<sup>5</sup> The primary focus of a risk abatement plan is to reduce risk and liability to employees, customers, and the organization.

<sup>6</sup> Threat Assessment Teams consist of six core members at each district who report to the applicable area team coordinators who report to WEI department specialists within headquarters.

<sup>7</sup> Threat Assessment Case Tracking system contains all relevant information for workplace violence threats and notes risk indicators, environmental conditions, societal factors, priority risk ratings, and potential contributing events that may have influenced the situation.

<sup>8</sup> Includes management personnel who manage craft employees (i.e., postmasters, managers, and supervisors).

Team convenes, the specific incident should be entered into the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system. Postal inspectors in each district are considered core members and conduct formal investigations of incidents by preparing an Assault Threat Specialty Report, which outlines the facts surrounding any incident and is provided to the district team and facility manager(s) involved with alleged threats.<sup>9</sup> Once provided, district teams and facility managers should maintain the reports.

For each district, there are two to four employees who have access to and can enter incidents into the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system, due to the sensitive nature of the system. The district team lead<sup>10</sup> or their designees are responsible for entering incidents into the system. Districts use administrative assistants, district LR managers, or Human Resource (HR) managers to enter, maintain, and develop abatement information in the system.

Furthermore, the district team is responsible for communicating and providing facility managers with further actions on any alleged threats. These actions include case outcome memos. The outcome memos state the threat priority rating and abatement recommendations aimed at reducing the potential for violence related to the specific incidents. See Figure 4 for an overview of the district Threat Assessment Team threat procedures.

**Figure 4. District Threat Assessment Team Threat Procedures**



Source: Publication 108, *Threat Assessment Team Guide*.

<sup>9</sup> An Assault Threat Specialty Report should be generated whenever there is an alleged threat or assault reported directly to the Postal Inspection Service.

<sup>10</sup> The LR manager.



# Finding #1: Workplace Violence Prevention Program

The Postal Service remains dedicated to violence prevention through its Workplace Violence Prevention Program. The program provides the foundation for establishing a violence-free workplace through various content and resources, such as policies, publications, training, and mandatory postings. Overall, we determined the Workplace Violence Prevention Program was sufficient and did not find any issues with the content or available resources for the program.

Specifically, we observed the six organizational strategies ((1) selection, (2) security, (3) communication of policy, (4) environment and culture, (5) employee support, and (6) separation) functioning, as intended, at the sites we visited. District Threat Assessment Teams, facility managers, and employees generally agreed the strategies

were working and are effective. Additionally, based on FY 2024 Postal Pulse survey results, 76 percent of employees were comfortable reporting safety issues while at work, and 67 percent of employees felt safety was a priority and was addressed when reported. We observed examples of the strategies in place at the four districts visited and noted these examples in Figure 5.

“The Postal Service remains dedicated to violence prevention through its Workplace Violence Prevention Program.”

Figure 5. Organizational Strategies Observed During Fieldwork

Selection	Security	Communication of Policy	Environment and Culture	Employee Support	Separation
<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Facility managers engaged with new employees</li><li>• Employees stated they were confident facility managers could appropriately handle threats</li><li>• District Threat Assessment Team members completed required Threat Assessment Case Tracking training for reducing violence in the workplace</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• District and facility managers monitored employees' badges, access codes, and keys when threats occurred</li><li>• As a precaution, employees were placed on emergency placement when a threat occurred</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Policies and documents were annully emailed to facility managers</li><li>• All Threat Assessment Teams monitored case compliance, and the WEI departments provided bi-weekly reports</li><li>• Employees were aware of the zero-tolerance policy and EAP resources</li><li>• Mandatory SUTs and zero-policy were posted in facilities</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Facility managers regularly promoted EAP resources through publications and SUTs</li><li>• Facility managers were present and engaged with all employees, displaying fairness and being observant of any inappropriate behavior</li><li>• Employees were comfortable reporting threats to management personnel</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• District HR reminded field managers about EAP resources and identifying struggling employees</li><li>• Facilities had permanent postings of employee resources to EAP and Inspection Service hotlines</li><li>• Employees were aware of EAP and Inspection Service contact information via posters and publications</li></ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Removals when warranted, were handled appropriately as outlined in PUB 106, <i>Guide to Professional Parting</i></li><li>• Threat Assessment Teams provided Last Chance Agreements for minor infractions</li><li>• Threat Assessment Teams conducted employee assessments for future potential violent and inappropriate behavior</li><li>• All separations were authorized by district LR and HR managers</li></ul>

Source: OIG observations and interviews with district Threat Assessment Team s, facility managers, and employees.

Additionally, we gained an independent perspective about the Postal Service's content and available resources for its Workplace Violence Prevention Program by benchmarking against several other agencies and companies. We found the Postal Service's content and resources for its program were like other agencies and companies. Similarly, we found other agencies and companies have a Workplace Violence Prevention Program that promotes a safe working environment for all employees, which is free of violence, harassment, intimidation, and disruptive behavior. Also similarly, other agencies and companies state they will not tolerate violence or threats of violence in any form and will address them appropriately. Although other companies also implemented Threat Assessment Teams, these teams did not always rate individual threats based on severity or provide annual training like the Postal Service.

### Workplace Culture

During site visits, we gathered sentiments from facility managers regarding the Postal Service's culture. Most facility managers described Postal Service's current culture as a positive place to work. However, they noted each facility can have its own culture, whether positive or negative. According to FY 2024 Postal Pulse survey results, 54 percent of employees would recommend the Postal Service as both a great place to work and an environment where people feel like they belong.<sup>11</sup>

These individualistic cultures can be influenced by many factors including geographical locations. For example, a facility manager in a district stated there is an overall challenge of creating a positive workplace culture for employees. Employees understand there is repetitiveness in their tasks so they can become frustrated when there is a disruption in their daily routine, and they are not provided with an explanation of the changes from facility managers. This frustration could potentially lead to occurrences of workplace violence. To combat this inevitable frustration from lapses in communication, facility managers explain to employees how they fit into the bigger picture of any changes occurring with the intent of increasing morale, cultivating teamwork, and lessening the chances of workplace violence.

As we found the Workplace Violence Prevention Program sufficient and similarly designed in content and resources to other programs, we are not making any recommendations in relation to this finding.

#### Postal Service Response

Management agreed with this finding.

#### OIG Evaluation

Although this finding did not contain any recommendations, the OIG acknowledges management's agreement with the finding.

<sup>11</sup> The Postal Service changed vendor responsibility for the Postal Pulse survey in FY 2024. Postal Pulse survey questions were edited in FY 2024; thus, survey questions and results differ in FYs 2022 and 2023.

# Finding #2: Underreported Incidents

Even though the program was sufficiently designed, incidents still occurred, and we found opportunities exist for the Postal Service to improve reporting of workplace violence incidents. The Postal Service uses the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system to document, process, and analyze trends for workplace violence incidents; however, we found instances where district Threat Assessment Teams did not always assess or report potential threats in the system that they gleaned from Postal Inspection Service Assault Threat Specialty Reports. Furthermore, facility managers inconsistently reported threats to the district teams.

## Assault Threat Specialty Reports

The Postal Inspection Service uses Assault Threat Specialty Reports as a fact-finding document whenever it receives a report of an alleged threat or assault against Postal Service employees. We compared alleged threats or assaults from Assault Threat Specialty Reports to the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system in the districts visited and found 525 of 661 (79 percent) alleged threats or

assaults were not entered into the system. The remaining 136 (21 percent) alleged threats or assaults were entered into the system (see Table 1).

For example, during a district site visit, a facility manager provided a report describing a verbal threat made to a supervisor, resulting in the threat maker’s removal. However, the district Threat Assessment Team did not enter the incident into the system, and the team could not recall the incident during our interview.

We further compared Assault Threat Specialty Reports for jacketed cases and area cases to the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system and found 70 of 82 (85 percent) jacketed case threats or assaults were not documented within the system.<sup>12</sup>

“525 of 661 (79 percent) alleged threats or assaults were not entered into the system.”

Table 1. Interviewed District Incident Counts in FYs 2022-2024

District	Threat Assessment Case Tracking Incident Counts	Assault Threat Specialty Report Incident Counts	Assault Threat Specialty Reports Entered in Threat Assessment Case Tracking	Percentage of Assault Threat Specialty Reports Entered in Threat Assessment Case Tracking
District 1	232	185	104	56%
District 2	14	72	6	8%
District 3	46	36	14	39%
District 4	17	77	6	8%
District 5	5	172	1	1%
District 6	13	60	2	3%
District 7	17	59	3	5%
Total	344	661	136	21%

Source: OIG evaluation of Postal Service Threat Assessment Case Tracking and Assault Threat Specialty Report data.

12 The Postal Inspection Service categorizes the Assault Threat Specialty Reports as area or jacketed cases. Area cases are monitored for repeated incidents, while jacketed cases are deemed as credible threats needing additional resources. Jacketed cases should result in the team lead convening the Threat Assessment Team and entering the threat into the Threat Assessment Case Tracking System.

The Postal Inspection Service stores Assault Threat Specialty Reports in its Case Management System and provides these reports to district Threat Assessment Teams and facility managers where the threat or assault occurred, but there are no required follow-up actions by the Postal Inspection Service. The Threat Assessment Case Tracking system is the only system<sup>13</sup> used by the Threat Assessment Teams to track and report workplace violence. If an incident is not entered into the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system, it will not be properly tracked by the Threat Assessment Team.

### Inconsistent Reporting at Facilities

Facility managers were inconsistently reporting workplace violence incidents to their district Threat Assessment Team. Some facility managers stated they do not report alleged threats to the district team unless the incident includes physical altercations. For example:

- During district site visits, the audit team was provided with documentation involving a physical threat resulting in multiple pending removals. Although this information was reported to the district team lead, the team lead did not request to convene with all team members. Additionally, the district team lead did not enter the incident into the system because it was not reported via the dedicated district Threat Assessment Team hotline.<sup>14</sup> According to the district team lead, the incident would have been entered into the system had the hotline been used.
- A facility manager in another district provided several written employee statements ranging from harassment to workplace violence incidents on various dates within our audit scope. These signed and dated employee statements were not reported to the district Threat Assessment Team or the Postal Inspection Service and were kept only within the facility manager's locked file cabinet. The facility manager explained that employees were instructed to write formal statements in the

event behavior persists and required intervention from the facility managers or formal discipline. The facility manager does not escalate incidents to the district team or investigate threats unless the behavior has not improved, or the employee(s) would like to file a formal complaint.

- One district had a total of only five incidents reported in the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system during FY 2022 through FY 2024 while, according to Table 1, the district had 172 Assault Threat Specialty Reports conducted by the Postal Inspection Service. This low number of incidents compared to reports calls into question the accuracy and completeness of workplace violence incidents reported by the district.

District Threat Assessment Teams did not always assess and report potential threats by entering incident information into the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system because there is no requirement for them to enter incidents reported via Assault Threat Specialty Reports. All employees have the option to contact the Postal Inspection Service to report threats and assaults, which result in a report. If an incident is reported to the Postal Inspection Service instead of the district team, the Assault Threat Specialty Report is the only alternative report available for district teams to identify potential threats.

Facility managers did not consistently report threats and made subjective decisions on

reporting threats because guidance does not list which specific threats they should report. Additionally, some facility managers did not always want to escalate alleged threats to district Threat Assessment

“These signed and dated employee statements were not reported to the district Threat Assessment Team.”

<sup>13</sup> The Safety and Health Management Tool may be used to report workplace violence incidents that result in an injury, but the incident should also be reported in the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system.

<sup>14</sup> In 2004, this district implemented a Threat Assessment Team hotline that gives employees an opportunity to directly report specifics of an alleged threat after notifying a facility manager.



Teams because, when able, they wanted to resolve the threats locally. For example, some experienced facility managers believed they should not escalate or report threats to the team unless an employee requests it, the behavior persists, or a physical threat occurs, so teams are not overwhelmed. Alternatively, as a best practice, a district Threat Assessment Team created a “Threat Assessment Team Protocol” outlining specific contacts when there is a physical altercation, threat, or act of suicide/suicidal ideation. The district team also provided examples to facility managers on what each of the threats could include and what should be reported to the team.

The most effective way to respond to workplace violence incidents is to proactively engage in preventive measures and establish a violence-free workplace. When workplace violence incidents are not properly reported or documented, it hinders the Postal Service’s ability to establish a violence-free workplace and increases risks for employees and customers.

#### Recommendation #1

We recommend the **Vice President, Labor Relations**, require the Threat Assessment Team to assess threats identified in Assault Threat Specialty Reports as jacketed cases and document them in the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system.

#### Recommendation #2

We recommend the **Vice President, Labor Relations**, reiterate guidance to the Threat Assessment Team lead on responsibilities for reporting incidents in the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system.

#### Recommendation #3

We recommend the **Chief Retail and Delivery Officer; Chief Processing and Distribution Officer; and Chief Logistics and Infrastructure Officer**, in coordination with the **Vice President, Labor Relations**, clarify and reiterate guidance to facility managers on timely reporting incidents of workplace violence to their Threat Assessment Team.

#### Postal Service Response

Management agreed with this finding and recommendations 2 and 3 but disagreed with recommendation 1.

Regarding recommendation 1, management stated Assault Threat Specialty Reports and the work of Threat Assessment Teams are separate processes that do not operate in the same timeframes, and records are maintained in separate databases.

Regarding recommendation 2, management stated a memo to Threat Assessment Team leads will be issued reiterating responsibilities for reporting applicable incidents in the Threat Assessment Case Tracking module. This memo will be signed and issued by the Vice President, Labor Relations.

Regarding recommendation 3, management will issue a memo to facility managers signed by the Chief Retail and Delivery Officer, Chief Processing and Distribution Officer, and Chief Logistics and Infrastructure Officer. This memo will be drafted by the Vice President, Labor Relations reiterating the importance of reporting threats and incidents of workplace violence to local Threat Assessment Teams timely. Additionally, Publication 45, *Achieving a Violence-Free Workplace Together*, will be distributed to facility managers to support their understanding of workplace violence prevention and response measures. The target implementation date for recommendations 2 and 3 is June 30, 2026.

#### OIG Evaluation

The OIG considers management’s comments responsive to recommendations 2 and 3 and corrective actions should resolve the issues identified in the report.

Regarding recommendation 1, although the Threat Assessment Teams do not have access to the Postal Inspection Service database and vice versa, each Threat Assessment Team is comprised of six core individuals, one of whom is a Postal Inspector. When a Threat Assessment

Team convenes to discuss threats, the Postal Inspector for each district has an opportunity to weigh in to determine threat priority risk and is directly responsible for creating Assault Threat Specialty Reports for identified potential threats. While the process for determining a jacketed case can operate in a different timeframe, it is imperative that all pertinent individuals have a complete history of all threats for full awareness and transparency within one system. We view the disagreement on this recommendation as unresolved and plan to pursue it formally through the audit resolution process.

# Finding #3: Post-Incident Communication

The Postal Service’s district Threat Assessment Teams did not always provide supporting documentation or timely communication to facility managers after workplace violence incidents occurred. Specifically, we reviewed 81 incidents with an outcome memo date recorded in the Threat

Assessment Case Tracking system. Even though a date was recorded in the system, district teams were able to provide only 41 of 81 (51 percent) outcome memos upon request. None of the interviewed facility managers could recall receiving an outcome memo, which outlines the risk abatement recommendations from district teams, which often left them unaware of the status for specific incidents after reporting them.

These missing outcome memos involved incidents associated with guns, inappropriate physical contact, mental health issues, and suicidal ideations. For example, a facility manager in a district did not receive documentation regarding an employee who was displaying threatening behavior and mentioned previously he would “shoot the place up.” Although the facility manager did not receive communication, the employee was escorted out at the time of the incident. See Table 2 for a summary of the Threat

“District teams were able to provide only 41 of 81 (51 percent) outcome memos upon request.”

Assessment Case Tracking system incident documentation by districts interviewed.

The district team should have timely communication with facility managers regarding the outcome memos to keep management informed on plans to alter the conditions or minimize

the future risk of violence. The outcome memos provide assurance to facility managers that the initial incident inquiry and risk rating was conducted by the Threat Assessment Team.

Incident outcomes were not always timely communicated due to district Threat Assessment Teams transitioning primary responsibility of the team from the Human Resources manager to the Labor Relations manager during FY 2022. This transition, along with standard<sup>15</sup> personnel changes, resulted in some processes changing. For example, a district team lead transitioned to a new district and was not aware of the documentation retention process maintained in the new district. Therefore, they did not have full access to previous workplace violence documentation maintained locally.

Table 2. Interviewed Districts Threat Assessment Case Tracking Incident Documentation

District	Threat Assessment Case Tracking Incidents Examined	Threat Assessment Case Tracking Outcome Memos With Dates	Threat Assessment Team Outcome Memos Provided to Audit Team
District 4 <sup>16</sup>	6	6	0
District 1	19	19	15
District 2	9	9	0
District 3	12	12	0
District 5	5	5	5
District 7	17	17	8
District 6	13	13	13
Total	81	81	41

Source: OIG analysis of Threat Assessment Case Tracking data and documents obtained.

<sup>15</sup> Such as retirements, promotions, relocations, etc.

<sup>16</sup> This district was unable to locate original outcome memos and post-incident analysis forms but provided the audit team with reissued documents dated April 4, 2025.

Timely communicating and providing supporting documentation for workplace violence incidents to facility managers demonstrates due process, establishes a record of patterns, creates a paper trail for any corrective action that may be issued, and allows for a fair investigation for all threats. Additionally, properly completing and providing incident documentation demonstrates adherence to the zero-tolerance policy and the immediate and firm response by the Postal Service Threat Assessment Teams. As a result, when district teams do not provide workplace violence supporting documentation or timely communication with facility managers, there is an increased risk for grievances and potential reoccurring violence at a facility.

#### **Recommendation #4**

We recommend the **Vice President, Labor Relations**, develop and implement a process to verify outcome memos are timely provided to applicable facility managers and maintained accordingly.

#### **Postal Service Response**

Management agreed with this finding but disagreed with recommendation 4.

Regarding recommendation 4, management stated a process already exists for the purpose of verifying outcome memos are timely provided to applicable facility managers and is outlined in Publication 108, *Threat Assessment Team Guide*. Management also noted that in the Threat Assessment Case Tracking module there is a required entry field for the date the outcome memo is sent to the incident manager, and it must be completed for the case to be saved and closed.

#### **OIG Evaluation**

The OIG considers management's comments unresponsive to recommendation 4 and we plan to pursue it formally through the audit resolution process. Although a process already exists within the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system to indicate the date the outcome memo was issued, our audit identified 40 of 81 (49 percent) outcome memos that were not located or provided by the district Threat Assessment Teams despite there being a date recorded in the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system. This indicates dates are being added into the system to close cases without completing and providing the outcome memos to the incident managers.



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# Appendix A: Additional Information

## Scope and Methodology

The scope of our audit was Postal Service’s Workplace Violence Prevention Program during FYs 2022 through 2024. We reviewed the Postal Service’s data regarding threats during FYs 2022 through 2024. We did not look in depth at threats that occurred externally and focused on internal threats from employees at the Postal Service.

Table 3. Fieldwork Site Visits<sup>17</sup>

Area	District	Facility
Area 1	District 1	Facility 1
		Facility 2
		Facility 3
		Facility 4
		Facility 5
		Facility 6
Area 2	District 2	Facility 7
		Facility 8
		Facility 9
		Facility 10
		Facility 11
		Facility 12
Area 3	District 4	Facility 13
		Facility 14
		Facility 15
		Facility 16
		Facility 17
		Facility 18
Area 4	District 3	Facility 19
		Facility 20
		Facility 21
		Facility 22
		Facility 23
		Facility 24
Virtual District Interviews		
Area	District	
Area 2	District 5	
Area 3	District 7	
Area 4	District 6	

Source: Site visits based on OIG’s analysis of Postal Service data.

We conducted site work within four Areas, using the following methodology:

- For each area, we judgmentally selected sites based on the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system compliance data and performed interviews with LR and HR personnel at the district office.
- We also visited facilities in selected areas to interview facility managers regarding their involvement in the Workplace Violence Prevention Program and reporting threats. In total, we visited seven districts and 24 facilities. See Table 3 for facilities visited during the audit.

To accomplish our objective, we:

- Identified, reviewed, and documented the Postal Service’s Workplace Violence Prevention Program.
- Interviewed headquarters personnel regarding responsibilities, processes and procedures on reporting, documenting, and following up on alleged threats.
- Reviewed and benchmarked similar agency policies, procedures, and reporting structure with workplace violence prevention programs.
- Obtained and analyzed the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system data for trends and patterns such as:
  - Total number of threats by type and compliance.
  - System concurrence between Threat Assessment Case Tracking and Assault Threat Specialty Report incidents for selected districts.
  - Outcome memos for all threats in visited districts and required post incident analyses for any threats with a specified priority rating.

<sup>17</sup> While the Postal Service has a unique structure amongst their operations, district Threat Assessment Teams address all threats at Postal Service facilities regardless of processing, logistics, and retail/delivery operation’s organizational structure.

- Interviewed facility managers at judgmentally selected sites to identify how threats are reported at the Postal Service.

We conducted this performance audit from February 2025 through September 2025 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on August 18, 2025, and included its comments where appropriate.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the Workplace Violence Prevention Program internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following five components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control environment
- Risk Assessment
- Control activities
- Information and communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies related to all five components that were significant within the context of our objectives. Our recommendations, if implemented, should correct the weaknesses we identified.

We assessed the reliability of FY 2022 through FY 2024 Threat Assessment Case Tracking system incident data provided by the Postal Service by testing the reasonableness, accuracy, and validity of the data. We compared the system incident number, incident disposition, initial risk rating, and final risk rating for the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system incidents to verify that records match for FY 2022 through FY 2024 and compared the source of Postal Service data and OIG-pulled data from Workplace Environment Tracking System. In addition, we interviewed knowledgeable Postal Service officials about the data. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

## Prior Audit Coverage

Report Title	Objective	Report Number	Final Report Date	Monetary Impact
<i>Workplace Environment Tracking System (WETS) User Access</i>	To provide Postal Service Officials immediate notification of issues and make recommendations for corrective action.	<a href="#">22-099-R22</a>	05/10/2022	N/A
<i>US Postal Service's Response to Sexual Harassment Complaints</i>	To evaluate the Postal Service's response to sexual harassment complaints involving Postal Service employees.	<a href="#">21-173-R23</a>	01/09/2023	N/A

# Appendix B: Management's Comments



September 3, 2025

LAURA LOZON  
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: Management Response: *Postal Service's Workplace Violence Program* (25-062-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings and recommendations contained in the draft audit report, *Postal Service's Workplace Violence Program*.

Management agrees with the three Findings by the OIG.

Following are our comments on each of the four recommendations.

Recommendation 1:

We recommend the Vice President, Labor Relations, require the Threat Assessment Team to assess threats identified in Assault Threat Specialty Reports as jacketed cases and document them in the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management disagrees with this recommendation.

Assault Threat Specialty Reports (ATSRs) and the work of Threat Assessment Teams (TATs) are completely separate processes and do not necessarily operate in the same timeframes. An ATSR may be "jacketed" long after a TAT completes its work on an incident. Moreover, the Inspection Service operates a separate database that is not accessible to postal systems and, likewise, does not have access to the Workplace Environment Tracking System (WETS) database.

Management would have agreed with the recommendation had it been to require the TAT leads to assess threats identified in ATSRs.

Target Implementation Date:

N/A

Responsible Official:

N/A

Recommendation 2:

We recommend the Vice President, Labor Relations, reiterate guidance to the Threat Assessment Team lead on responsibilities for reporting incidents in the Threat Assessment Case Tracking system.



Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

A memo to TAT leads reiterating responsibilities for reporting applicable incidents in the Threat Assessment Case Tracking (TACT) module of the WETS database will be signed and issued by the Vice President, Labor Relations.

Target Implementation Date:

06/30/2026

Responsible Official:

Vice President, Labor Relations

Recommendation 3:

We recommend the Chief Retail and Delivery Officer; Chief Processing and Distribution Officer; and Chief Logistics and Infrastructure Officer; in coordination with the Vice President, Labor Relations, clarify and reiterate guidance to facility managers on timely reporting incidents of workplace violence to their Threat Assessment Team.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management agrees with this recommendation.

A jointly signed memo from the Chief Retail and Delivery Officer, Chief Processing and Distribution Officer, and Chief Logistics and Infrastructure Officer will be drafted by the Vice President, Labor Relations and issued to facility managers, reiterating the importance of reporting threats and incidents of workplace violence to their local Threat Assessment Team in a timely manner.

Publication 45, *Achieving a Violence-Free Workplace Together*, Workplace Violence Prevention Program brochure will be distributed to facility managers to support their understanding of workplace violence prevention and response measures.

Target Implementation Date:

06/30/2026

Responsible Official:

Vice President, Labor Relations

Recommendation 4:

We recommend the Vice President, Labor Relations, develop and implement a process to verify outcome memos are timely provided to applicable facility managers and maintained accordingly.

Management Response/Action Plan:

Management disagrees with this recommendation.

A process already exists for this purpose. Specifically, Publication 108, *Threat Assessment Team Guide*, requires the risk abatement plan be communicated timely to the incident manager and the TAT Outcome Memo issued accordingly. Additionally, in the TACT module of the WETS database, there is an entry field under the Risk Abatement Action Plan section for the date the TAT Outcome Memo is sent to the incident manager. This is a required data field, highlighted by two red asterisks, which must be completed in order to save and close the case.

Target Implementation Date:

N/A

Responsible Official:  
N/A

 E-SIGNED by MICHAEL J ELSTON  
on 2025-09-03 15:39:26 EDT

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Michael J. Elston  
Vice President, Labor Relations

 E-SIGNED by ELVIN MERCADO  
on 2025-09-03 11:43:39 EDT

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Elvin Mercado  
Chief Retail and Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President

 E-SIGNED by ISAAC S CRONKHITE  
on 2025-09-03 12:37:03 EDT

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Isaac S. Cronkhite  
Chief Processing and Delivery Officer and Executive Vice President

 E-SIGNED by RONNIE J JARRIEL  
on 2025-09-03 12:24:08 EDT

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Ronnie J. Jarriel  
Chief Logistics and Infrastructure Officer and Executive Vice President

cc: Corporate Audit & Response Management

# OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE



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