Illinois 1 District: Delivery Unit Operations

OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

Roger P. McAuliffe Station

Northtown Station

Cragin Station

Daniel J. Doffyn Station

Transmittal Letter

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

December 28, 2023

MEMORANDUM FOR: JEWEL MORROW
MANAGER, ILLINOIS 1 DISTRICT

Joseph E. Wolski

FROM: Joseph E. Wolski
Director, Field Operations, Atlantic and WestPac

SUBJECT: Audit Report – Illinois 1 District: Delivery Unit Operations
(Report Number 23-139-R24)

This report presents the results of our audit of mail delivery, customer service, and property conditions review at the Illinois 1 District.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff. If you have any questions or need additional information, please contact Anthony Spriggs, Audit Manager, or me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
Chief Retail & Delivery Officer & Executive Vice President
Vice President, Delivery Operations
Vice President, Retail & Post Office Operations
Vice President, Processing and Maintenance Operations
Vice President, Central Area Retail & Delivery Operations
Director, Retail & Post Office Operations Maintenance
Corporate Audit and Response Management

Results

Background

The Postal Service's mission is to provide timely, reliable, secure, and affordable mail and package delivery to more than 160 million residential and business addresses across the country. To fulfill this role, the Postal Service is committed to ensuring that its delivery platform and services are always a trusted, visible, and valued part of America's social and economic infrastructure. This includes leveraging people, technology, and systems to provide world-class visibility of mail and packages as they move through the Postal Service's integrated system. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) reviews delivery operations at facilities across the country and provides management with timely feedback in furtherance of this mission.

This report presents a summary of the results of our self-initiated audits assessing mail delivery, customer service, and property conditions at four select delivery units in the Illinois 1 District in the Central Area (Project Number 23-139). These delivery units included the Cragin Station, Daniel J. Doffyn Station, Northtown Station, and Roger P. McAuliffe Station (see Figure 1).

We previously issued interim reports[1] to district management for each of these units regarding the conditions we identified. In addition, we issued a report on the efficiency of operations at the Chicago Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC),[2] which services these four delivery units.

Figure 1. Delivery Units Audited in the Illinois 1 District
Source: U.S. Postal Service OIG.

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
1   *Cragin Station in Chicago, IL: Delivery Operations* (Report Number 23-139-1-R24, dated October 11, 2023); *Daniel J. Doffyn Station in Chicago, IL: Delivery Operations* (Report Number 23-139-2-R24, dated October 11, 2023); *Northtown Station in Chicago, IL: Delivery Operations* (Report Number 23-139-3-R24, dated October 11, 2023); and *Roger P. McAuliffe Station in Chicago, IL: Delivery Operations* (Report Number 23-139-5-R24, dated October 11, 2023).
2   *Efficiency of Operations at the Chicago Processing and Distribution Center, Chicago, IL* (Report Number 23-138-R24, dated October 11, 2023).

Table 1. Route Information for Chicago Delivery Units and District

Delivery Units	Delivery Related C360s	Informed Delivery Contacts	STC Scans at the Unit
Cragin Station	7.1	31.6	57.3
Daniel J. Doffyn Station	7.8	30.1	5.4
Northtown Station	9.3	49.9	2.7
Roger P. McAuliffe Station	6.6	132.2	6.5
District Average	**7.7**	**61.0**	**18.0**

Source: U.S. Postal Service OIG analysis of Postal Service's C360, Informed Delivery, Facility Database, and Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) System data extracted 7-5-2023 through 7-7-2023. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

We judgmentally selected these four delivery units based on the number of Customer 360 (C360)[3] inquiries, Informed Delivery[4] contacts, stop-the-clock (STC)[5] scans performed at the unit (see Table 1), and undelivered routes.

The selected delivery units have a combined total of 209 city routes that serve about 343,933 people in several ZIP Codes (see Table 2), which are considered urban communities.[6]

As part of our examination of these units, we conducted text analysis on all C360 inquiries submitted to the unit between October 1, 2021, and June 30, 2023. In total, we reviewed and categorized 10,625 customer inquiries.[7] See Figure 2 for the results of our analysis.

Delivery issues for packages and mail made up the majority of the C360 comments. The second most often inquiry type was about scanning, including complaints that a package was scanned as delivered but was not received, the package lacked scanning details, or there was an inaccurate scan describing the reason for non-delivery. For example, one inquiry described that the USPS scan showed a package was not delivered due to "no access to the delivery location"; however, the delivery address was in a public building that is open 24 hours, seven days a week. All other categories had under 500 customer inquiries.

Table 2. Service Area and Population

Delivery Units	Service Area and Zip Code	Population	City Routes
Cragin Station	60639	88,450	42
Daniel J. Doffyn Station	60618	90,276	59
Northtown Station	60645 and 60659	88,779	55
Roger P. McAuliffe Station	60634	75,428	53
Total		**343,933**	**209**

Source: OIG analysis of Postal Service National Labeling List and Census Data.

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3   A cloud-based application that enables Postal Service employees to diagnose, resolve, and track customer inquiries.
4   A free and optional notification service that gives residential customers the ability to digitally preview their letter-sized mail and submit inquiries for mailpieces that were expected for delivery but have not arrived.
5   A scan event that indicates the Postal Service has completed its commitment to deliver or attempt to deliver the mailpiece. Examples of STC scans include "Delivered," "Available for Pick-Up," and "No Access."
6   We obtained ZIP Code information related to population and urban/rural classification from 2020 Census Bureau information.
7   We removed 6,008 inquiries for which the text description of the ticket was less than 40 characters, and 184 inquiries that could not be sorted by our data analysis tool into a topic category.

Figure 2. C360 Inquiry Analysis

Source: OIG analysis of C360 inquiries.

Objective, Scope, and Methodology

Our objective was to evaluate mail delivery operations and property conditions at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and Roger P. McAuliffe stations in the Illinois 1 District.

To accomplish our objective, we focused on five audit areas: delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys,[8] carrier complement and timekeeping, and property conditions. Specifically, we reviewed delivery metrics, including the number of routes and carriers, mail arrival time, amount of reported delayed mail, package scanning, and distribution uptime.[9] During our site visits from July 25 – 27, 2023, we observed

mail conditions; package scanning procedures; arrow key security procedures; documentation maintained at the unit related to carrier work hours and time adjustments; and unit safety, security, and maintenance conditions. We also analyzed the scan status of mailpieces at the carrier cases and in the "Notice Left" area,[10] and interviewed unit management and employees. We discussed our observations and conclusions as summarized in Table 3 with management on December 12, 2023, and included their comments, where appropriate. See Appendix A for additional information about our scope and methodology.

Table 3. Summary of Issues Identified

Controls Reviewed	Issues Identified			
	Cragin Station	**Daniel J. Doffyn Station**	**Northtown Station**	**Roger P. McAuliffe Station**
Delayed Mail	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Package Scanning	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Arrow Keys	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Carrier Complement and Timekeeping	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Property Conditions	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes

Source: Interim OIG reports of selected units.

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8   A distinctively shaped key carriers use to open mail-receiving receptacles, such as street collection boxes and panels of apartment house mailboxes equipped with an arrow lock. Arrow keys are accountable property and are subject to strict controls.
9   Time of day that clerks have completed distributing mail to the carrier routes.
10   The area of a delivery unit where letters or packages that the carriers were unable to deliver are stored for customer pickup.

Results Summary

We identified issues affecting mail delivery, customer service, and property conditions at all four delivery units. Specifically, we found delayed mail and deficiencies with package scanning, arrow key controls, carrier complement and timekeeping, and property conditions (see Table 3).

Finding #1: Delayed Mail

What We Found

On the morning of July 25, 2023, we identified about 60,749 pieces[11] of delayed mail at the four delivery units. Management reported the mail as undelivered in the Delivery Condition Visualization (DCV)[12] system at the Roger P. McAuliffe Station, but not at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn and Northtown stations. See Table 4 for the number of pieces for each mail type and Figure 3 and Figure 4 for examples of delayed mail found at the carrier case and supervisor's desk, respectively.

In addition, we also identified mail that should have gone from the Roger P. McAuliffe Station to the Chicago P&DC. Specifically, we found 570 collection mailpieces on the workroom floor that should have been sent to the P&DC the previous night, and we identified an additional 567 missent letters that were not dispatched timely to the P&DC for further processing.

Figure 3. Delayed Mail at the Cragin Station

Source: OIG photo taken on July 25, 2023.

Figure 4. Delayed Mail at the Daniel J. Doffyn Station

Source: OIG photo taken on July 25, 2023.

Table 4. Type of Delayed Mail

Type of Mail	Cragin Station	Daniel J. Doffyn Station	Northtown Station	Roger P. McAuliffe Station	Total
Letters	2,817	12,729	26,328	2,716	44,590
Flats	597	6,155	8,000	1,022	15,744
Packages	66	7	62	250	385
Total	3,480	18,891	34,390	3,988	60,749

Source: OIG count of delayed mailpieces identified during our visit on July 25, 2023.

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11 Count of mail included individual piece counts and estimates based on conversion factors in Management Instruction PO-610-2007-1, *Piece Count Recording System*.
12 A tool for unit management to manually self-report delayed mail, which provides a snapshot of daily mail conditions at the point in time when carriers have departed for the street.

Why Did It Occur

Delayed mail primarily occurred because management did not effectively address issues impacting delivery operations, such as staffing and employee availability. Specifically:

- At the Cragin Station, staffing issues contributed to delayed mail. The unit had 14 employees on limited duty due to illness or job-related injuries, and management asked carriers to return to the unit by 8:30 p.m.

- At the Daniel J. Doffyn Station management stated that mail delivery was impeded by unscheduled absences, which management had not addressed because of other priorities such as daily teleconferences.

- At the Roger P. McAuliffe Station, management stated that delayed mail occurred for several reasons. Collection mail was not taken to the mail processing plant after the last truck was dispatched by the PM supervisor due to an oversight. Specifically, the PM supervisor stated she was preoccupied due to three part-time carrier resignations on that day. The missent mail was not processed for timely dispatch to the P&DC because the unit had two new AM Supervisors who were not fully aware of their responsibilities. Lastly, unit management stated that the delayed mail at the carrier cases was attributed in part to the new employees being unfamiliar with their routes and returning to the unit at the end of their shift with mail. In addition, the unit had a supervisor vacancy that made it difficult to effectively oversee all the carriers as they return.

- At the Northtown Station, the station manager had an ongoing issue with carriers taking unscheduled leave on Saturdays. The station manager instructed the carriers to deliver any delayed mail from Saturday, which impacted their ability to deliver Monday's mail.

At all units except Roger P. McAuliffe, management did not comply with the requirement to record delayed mail volumes in the DCV system for a variety of reasons related to training, and management not following or being aware of Postal Service policy.

- At the Cragin Station, the AM supervisor stated she did not report the delayed mail due to other priorities, such as trying to resolve staffing issues and route coverage. The PM supervisor stated he had not been trained how to enter delayed mail into the DCV system.

- At the Daniel J. Doffyn Station, the PM supervisor stated she reported delayed mail in a shared TEAMS file the area manager could see instead of DCV.

- At the Northtown Station, the unit manager did not oversee the morning reporting into the DCV system, and the PM supervisor stated she did not know how to input delayed mail into the DCV system.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have addressed issues regarding the availability of resources to deliver all the mail each day. Postal Service policy[13] states that managers must review all communications that may affect the day's workload, be sure that replacements are available for unscheduled absences, and develop contingency plans for situations that may interfere with normal delivery service. Management should have ensured that all committed mail was processed and delivered daily by verifying that the unit was free of all outgoing collection mail,[14] and that missent mail was dispatched to the P&DC.[15] Postal Service policy[16] also states that all types of First-Class Mail, Priority Mail, and Priority Mail Express are always committed for delivery on the day of receipt.

In addition, management should have verified that all supervisors were trained to accurately enter delayed mail into the DCV system and enforce compliance. Postal Service policy[17] states that managers are required to report all mail in the delivery unit after the carriers have left for their street duties as either delayed or curtailed in the DCV system, and they

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13   Handbook M-39, *Management of Delivery Services*, TL-14, Section 111.2, June 2019.
14   *Delivery Management System Standard Work Instruction*, September 2018.
15   *3M (Missent, Missort, and Missequence) Standard Work Instruction: Supervisor*, May 2019.
16   *Committed Mail & Color Code Policy for Marketing Mail* stand-up talk, February 2019.
17   *Informed Visibility Delivery Condition Visualization User Guide*, March 2023.

must update the DCV system if volumes have changed prior to the end of the business day.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When mail is delayed, there is an increased risk of customer dissatisfaction, which may adversely affect the Postal Service brand. In addition, inaccurate reporting of delayed mail in the DCV system provides management at the local, district, area, and headquarters levels with an inaccurate status of mail delays and can result in improper actions taken to address issues.

> **Recommendation #1**
>
> We recommend the **District Manager, Illinois 1 District**, execute a plan to adequately staff the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and Roger P. McAuliffe stations so that all committed mail is delivered daily, and coordinate with Central Area Human Resources to fill the supervisor vacancy at the Roger P. McAuliffe Station.

> **Recommendation #2**
>
> We recommend the **District Manager, Illinois 1 District**, provide training to management at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and Roger P. McAuliffe stations to enter all delayed mail into the proper system, and subsequently confirm delayed mail is reported accurately.

Finding #2: Package Scanning

What We Found

Employees improperly scanned packages at all four delivery units. In total, employees scanned 3,151 packages at their delivery unit instead of at the recipients' delivery point between April and June 2023 (see Table 5). Further analysis of the STC scan data for these packages showed that 83.2 percent of them were scanned as "Delivered" and 9.1 percent of them were scanned as "Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location." This data does not include scans that could properly be made at a delivery unit, such as "Delivered - PO Box" and "Customer (Vacation) Hold," but rather, represent scans performed at the delivery unit that should routinely be made at the point of delivery.

Table 5. STC Scans at Delivery Unit

STC Scan Type	Delivery Units					
	Cragin Station	Daniel J. Doffyn Station	Northtown Station	Roger P. McAuliffe Station	Total	Percent
Delivered	2,166	227	73	156	2,622	83.2%
Delivery Attempted - No Access	165	62	21	38	286	9.1%
No Authorized Recipient	7	10	4	70	91	2.9%
Refused	41	2	0	10	53	1.7%
Receptacle Full / Item Oversized	8	6	37	0	51	1.6%
No Secure Location	15	1	13	0	29	0.9%
Delivery Exception - Animal Interference	5	10	3	1	19	0.6%
Total	**2,407**	**318**	**151**	**275**	**3,151**	**100.0%**

Source: OIG analysis of the Postal Service's Product Tracking and Reporting (PTR) system data. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.

Table 6. Scans Over 1000 Feet Away From the Delivery Point

STC Scan Type	Delivery Units				Total	Percent
	Cragin Station	Daniel J. Doffyn Station	Northtown Station	Roger P. McAuliffe Station		
Delivered	60	12	29	3	104	75.9%
Delivery Attempted - No Access	23	7	0	0	30	21.9%
Business Closed	0	1	0	0	1	0.7%
No Secure Location	0	0	1	0	1	0.7%
No Authorized Recipient	1	0	0	0	1	0.7%
Total	**84**	**20**	**30**	**3**	**137**	**100.0%***

Source: OIG analysis of the PTR system data. PTR is the system of record for all delivery status information for mail and packages with trackable services and barcodes.
*Total percentage does not equal 100 percent due to rounding.

In addition, employees at all four delivery units improperly scanned 137 packages greater than 1,000 feet away from the delivery point, with 75.9 percent scanned as "Delivered" and 21.9 percent scanned as "Delivery Attempted – No Access" (see Table 6).

For example, the map below (see Figure 5) shows an instance where a carrier scanned a package as delivered 0.86 miles away from the delivery point.

In addition, on the morning of July 25, 2023, before carriers arrived for the day, we selected a total of 194 packages at the four delivery units to review and analyze for scanning and tracking history. We judgmentally selected 96 packages from the carrier cases and 98 packages from the "Notice Left" areas at these units.

- Of the 96 sampled packages at the carrier cases, 46 (47.9 percent) had missing or improper scans. For example, 20 of these packages were scanned "Delivered," which should only be performed when a package is successfully left at the customer's point of delivery; nine were scanned "Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location"; eight were scanned at the delivery unit; six were scanned "Addressee Unknown" and should have been returned to sender; two were missing a STC scan to let the customer know the reason for non-

delivery, and one was scanned away from the delivery point.

Of the 98 packages sampled from the "Notice Left" area, 32 (32.7 percent) had missing or improper scans. For example, 18 were missing an STC scan to let the customer know the status of their package; five were scanned "Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location"; four were scanned "Delivered", which should only be performed when a package is successfully left at the customer's point of delivery; two were scanned away from the delivery point; one was scanned "Receptacle Full/Item Oversized"; one was scanned "No Secure Location"; and one did not receive an "Arrival-at-Unit" scan.

- Of the sampled packages from the carrier cases, 15 (15.6 percent) had handling issues. Eight were scanned "Addressee Unknown" and should have been returned to sender; five were scanned "Delivery Attempted – No Access to Delivery Location"; and two were scanned "No Such Number - Address Unknown". The scan dates ranged from May 3 to July 23, 2023, and these packages should have been moved to the "Notice Left" area for further processing.

Figure 5. Scan Away From the Delivery Point in Chicago, Illinois

Source: Postal Service Single Package Look Up.

Further, 42 packages (42.9 percent) in the "Notice Left" area across all four delivery units should have been returned to sender. These packages ranged from one to 234 days past their return dates.

Why Did It Occur

These scanning issues occurred because unit management at all four delivery units did not adequately monitor and enforce proper package scanning and handling procedures. Specifically:

- Management at the Cragin Station stated they regularly enforce proper scanning procedures during stand-up talks, but do not monitor STC scans made away from the delivery point. They focused on package scanning failures. In addition, management did not verify that the clerk assigned to the "Notice Left" section was monitoring the area daily for packages that should be returned.

- Management at the Northtown Station stated that they were unaware of the scanning issues at the unit. They had not shown up on the area integrity reports, which they rely on for scanning issues. They were also not aware of available scanning exception reports they could have used to monitor and enforce proper package scanning and handling procedures. Further, management

stated that the packages in the "Notice Left" section were not returned timely because they prioritized other duties.

- Management at the Roger P. McAuliffe Station did not routinely monitor scan exception reports. Management prioritized other duties over addressing the handling issues of the packages we identified. In addition, there was no follow-up with the senior clerk to ensure that packages in the "Notice Left" area were returned to the sender within required timeframes.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have monitored scan performance daily and enforced compliance, including verifying all packages were scanned at the delivery point and not at the delivery unit. The Postal Service's goal is to ensure proper delivery attempts for mailpieces to the correct address with proper service,[18] which includes scanning packages at the time and location of delivery.[19] Packages in the "Notice Left" area should have been reviewed for second notices and returned to sender if they remained after the prescribed number of days.[20]

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Customers rely on accurate scan data to track their packages in real time. When employees do not

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18 *Delivery Done Right the First Time* stand-up talk, March 2020.
19 *Carriers Delivering the Customer Experience* stand-up talk, July 2017.
20 *Notice Left and Return Guidelines*, April 2016.

scan mailpieces correctly, customers are unable to determine the actual status of their packages. Our C360 analysis demonstrated that scanning topics were the second most common C360 inquiry submitted by customers of the delivery units we visited. By improving scanning operations, management can potentially improve mail visibility, increase customer satisfaction, and enhance the customer experience and the Postal Service brand.

> ### Recommendation #3
> We recommend the **District Manager, Illinois 1 District**, develop and execute a plan to ensure all employees are trained on standard operating procedures for package scanning and handling at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and the Roger P. McAuliffe stations.

> ### Recommendation #4
> We recommend the **District Manager, Illinois 1 District**, develop and execute a plan to verify unit management systematically reviews package scanning performance data daily and enforces compliance at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and the Roger P. McAuliffe stations.

Finding #3: Arrow Keys

What We Found

The Cragin Station properly managed and safeguarded their arrow keys, but we found deficiencies at the Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and Roger P. McAuliffe stations. Unit management did not manage arrow keys at the Daniel J. Doffyn and Roger P. McAuliffe stations. Specifically, at the Daniel J. Doffyn Station, seven keys were not listed on their inventory log or reported as missing to the U.S. Postal Service Inspection Service. Further, we found 12 additional keys that were not listed on the unit's inventory log. At the Roger P. McAuliffe Station, five keys could not be located, of which management reported only one as missing and stated that it loaned two to another unit (see Table 7).

Unit management did not safeguard arrow keys at the Daniel J. Doffyn and Northtown stations. Specifically, we observed that the arrow keys were not always stored in a secure location at the facilities. At both facilities we found that the keys were left unattended in ████████████████████████

Why Did It Occur

These issues occurred because management did not provide sufficient oversight to properly manage and safeguard arrow keys.

Management at the Daniel J. Doffyn Station acknowledged that they were using an outdated arrow key log, the assigned accountability clerk had been out on extended leave, and most employees had not been trained on arrow key policies.

Management at the Northtown Station stated that the normal process is to remove the ████████ ████████████ in the evening and lock it up inside the ████████████. However, they overlooked doing so, and the ████████████████████████ which was why it was left open (see Property Security in Finding #5: Property Conditions).

Table 7. Arrow Key Inventory

Delivery Units	Keys on Inventory Log	Missing Keys	Keys Found at the Unit	
			Listed on Log	Not Listed on Log
Cragin Station	40	0	40	0
Daniel J. Doffyn Station	59	7	50	12
Northtown Station	56	0	56	0
Roger P. McAuliffe Station	55	5	50	0
Total	**210**	**12**	**196**	**12**

Source: OIG analysis of arrow key inventory during our visit the week of July 24, 2023.

Management at the Roger P. McAuliffe Station stated that they had not updated the arrow key log or reported the unaccounted arrow keys to the Postal Inspection Service because other duties took priority.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have verified that arrow key security procedures were properly followed. According to Postal Service policy,[21] management must keep an accurate inventory of all keys and conduct a semiannual physical survey of all building keys. Missing keys must be immediately reported to the Postal Inspection Service. In addition, policy states that arrow keys must remain secured until they are individually assigned to personnel. A supervisor or clerk must supervise employees signing out keys on the inventory log. Upon return, arrow keys should be deposited in a secure location, and a supervisor or clerk must verify all keys have been returned and accounted for daily.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When there is insufficient oversight and supervision of accountable items, such as arrow keys, there is increased risk of mail theft. These thefts damage the Postal Service's reputation and diminish public trust in the nation's mail system. Additionally, because arrow keys open mail receptacles, lost or damaged keys can result in undelivered mail.

Recommendation #5

We recommend the **District Manager, Illinois 1 District**, develop and execute a training plan that instructs management and assigned staff on proper arrow key management at the Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown and Roger P. McAuliffe stations.

Recommendation #6

We recommend the **District Manager, Illinois 1 District**, to establish a schedule and periodically review arrow keys to verify they are properly logged and accounted for, and ensure missing keys are reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service at Daniel J. Doffyn Station and Roger P. McAuliffe Station.

Finding #4: Timekeeping Management

What We Found

We identified timekeeping management issues at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, and Roger P. McAuliffe stations between April 8 and June 30, 2023.

At the Cragin Station, management did not print and retain completed PS Forms 2240, *Pay, Leave, or Other Hours Adjustment Request*,[22] for three pay adjustments. This station also recorded four disallowed time occurrences and 379 instances of unauthorized overtime. There was no evidence that management completed and retained PS Forms 1017-A, *Time Disallowance Record*,[23] or PS Forms 1017-B, *Unauthorized Overtime Record*[24] for any of these occurrences.

At the Daniel J. Doffyn Station management did not retain completed PS Forms 2240 for two pay adjustments. One PS Form 2240 was requested but not received, and one lacked employee and supervisor signatures. Moreover, the station had 24 disallowed time occurrences for the same period, and there were no PS Forms 1017-A retained and completed by management for these occurrences.

At the Roger P. McAuliffe Station, 10 of 11 PS Forms 2240 were incomplete. Five of these were missing a supervisor signature and all 10 lacked an employee signature. Furthermore, management did not print and retain 16 PS Forms 1017-A, and 15 of these were incomplete, lacking dates of employee notifications, reason codes, or remarks. Similarly, management did not print and retain 228 PS Forms 1017-B, and 185 of these records were incomplete in the Time and Attendance Collection System (TACS),[25] missing details like notification dates and reasons for overtime.

Why Did It Occur

These conditions occurred because management was unaware of their timekeeping records responsibilities. Specifically:

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21 *USPS Arrow Key Standard Work Instructions*, Updated August 2023.
22 Form used to adjust either an employee's pay or to adjust timecard data that has been incorrectly reported to postal data center.
23 Form used only when a supervisor observes, or has reason to know, that an employee did not work, while "on the clock." The supervisor must document the basis for any such disallowance. The form serves as a cumulative record of the disallowed time.
24 Managers and supervisors are required to complete a PS Form 1017-B the first time a non-exempt employee incurs unauthorized overtime. The form serves as a cumulative record of unauthorized overtime.
25 The system used by the Postal Service to automate the collection of employee time and attendance information.

- Management at the Cragin Station was unaware that they were required to keep and document these forms, since they were entering them in TACS.

- Management at the Daniel J. Doffyn Station did not know that signatures were required for both the supervisor and the employee on the adjust pay certification, nor that it was necessary to complete PS Form 1017-A for the disallowed time.

- Management at the Roger P. McAuliffe Station stated that they did not know that signatures were required for both the supervisor and the employee on the PS Form 2240. In addition, there were two new AM supervisors who did not have access to the TACS at the time of the team's visit and were unaware of the requirement to print and maintain these documents. Lastly, management stated that incomplete forms PS 1017-A and 1017-B were related to limited availability of the PM Supervisor, who was trying to resolve staffing issues.

What Should Have Happened

Postal Service policy[26] states that pay adjustments are to be kept on file and attached to supporting documentation for the current calendar year plus the three previous years. Policy also states unit personnel must complete PS Forms 1017-A and 1017-B and place them in a notebook binder that is secured from unauthorized access, documenting the reason for the disallowed time or unauthorized overtime.

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

When proper documentation of pay adjustments, time disallowance, and unauthorized overtime is not completed, management could incur excess administrative time. In addition, the Postal Service risks violation of the Fair Labor Standards Act[27] when unit management does not maintain documentation that shows the justifiable reason and employee notification for disallowed time.

> **Recommendation #7**
>
> We recommend the **District Manager, Illinois District**, train management at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, and the Roger P. McAuliffe stations on timekeeping records requirements and monitor compliance. Further, obtain appropriate Timekeeping Attendance and Collection System access for management at the Roger P. McAuliffe Station.

Finding # 5: Property Conditions

What We Found

We found property safety, security, and maintenance issues across the four delivery units.

Figure 6. Exposed Wires From Electrical Socket on Dock

Source: OIG photo taken on July 26, 2023.

Property Safety:

- At the Cragin Station, we found an electrical cover in the lobby was broken, and half the cover was missing. Also, one fire extinguisher in the workroom area was blocked.

- At the Daniel J. Doffyn Station, we found exposed wires from an electrical socket on the dock (see Figure 6), two blocked electrical panels, and one blocked inspection service door in the workroom area. Eleven fire extinguishers were missing monthly inspections: two fire extinguishers were missing from the wall, and there was not a manual

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26 Handbook F-21, *Time and Attendance*, Section 146 - Approving Entries, February 2016.
27 29 United States Code § 201-219.

or an audible fire alarm. Further, we observed an unsecured ladder in the registry cage, and both the handicap button and the handicap door at the front customer entrance were malfunctioning.

Figure 7. Exposed Wiring Near Equipment Room

Source OIG photo taken on July 26, 2023.

Figure 8. Exposed Wiring in the Registry Cage

Source: OIG photo taken on July 27, 2023

- At the Northtown Station, we found an exposed wire near the equipment room (see Figure 7), a blocked electrical panel in the boiler room, a tripping hazard at an exit due to power cords connected from one case to another, and the exit signs were not illuminated or reflective. Seven of nine fire extinguishers were missing updated monthly and yearly inspections, and three of the fire extinguishers were blocked. Further, the

ladders in the boiler room and in the PO Box area were not secured.

- At the Roger P. McAuliffe Station, we found eight fire extinguishers were missing monthly inspections, and two did not have an annual inspection. In addition, six exterior lights were not working, and the rear and side parking lots had large potholes. Further, one outlet in the registry cage (see Figure 8) and another outlet by the time clock had exposed wiring. Two ladders were unsecured in the vestibule near the loading dock. One breaker box in the registry cage was blocked. One exit light was not lit. One Postal Inspection Service door was blocked. During our audit, management cleared the items blocking the door.

Property Security:

- At the Daniel J. Doffyn Station, we found no signs posted around the facility stating that vehicles may be subject to search.

Figure 9. ▮▮▮▮▮▮▮ Gate Blocked by Overgrown Brush

Source: OIG photo taken on July 27, 2023.

Figure 10. ████████████████████████

Source: OIG photo taken on July 27, 2023.

- At the Northtown Station, we found the ████ ███████████████████████, no signage posted around the facility stating that vehicles may be subject to search in the parking lot, and a ██████████████████████████████████.
- At the Roger P. McAuliffe Station, we found ██ █████████████████████, one of the gates was blocked by overgrown brush (see Figure 9), and ████████████████████████ (see Figure 10). Further, the employee parking lot did not have signage stating that vehicles may be subject to search.

Property Maintenance:

- At the Cragin Station, we observed missing or damaged ceiling and floor tiles in the women's restroom, men's locker room, workroom area, and in the lobby. We found an inoperable urinal and a burned-out light bulb in the men's locker room and peeling paint in the retail lobby and

the women's restroom. Further, the parking lot by the dock had multiple potholes, a misaligned ground plate causing a potential trip hazard (see Figure 11), and standing dirty water, and there was a loose handrail leading to the exterior basement door (see Figure 12).

Figure 11. Misaligned Ground Plate in Parking Lot

Source: OIG photo taken July 26, 2023.

Figure 12. Standing Water and Damaged Handrail Outside Basement Door

Source: OIG photos taken July 26, 2023.

- At the Daniel J. Doffyn Station, we observed numerous stained ceiling tiles throughout the facility due to previous roof leaks and air vent discharge, peeling paint on walls in workroom

floor, overgrown landscaping and trash scattered around the grounds of the unit, a missing light fixture on the right side of the front entrance, and improper storage of floor sealant on the workroom floor. There was excess trash and equipment stored on the dock and vestibule of the workroom floor entrance, and the dock awning support poles were rusted and needed painting.

Figure 13. Crack on Wall in Men's Restroom

Source: OIG photo taken on July 27, 2023

- At the Northtown Station, we observed peeling and tearing wallpaper around the retail walls, one stained ceiling, and a leak around the supervisor's desk. We also witnessed dirty restroom floors and wall stains, a broken urinal, two broken paper towel holders, and a crack along the wall in the men's restroom (see Figure 13). Further, we observed holes in the boiler room ceiling and stained ceiling tiles (see Figure 14), three

missing lights in the breakroom, two non-working light fixtures in the PO Box area, six lights on the workroom floor not working, vestibule lighting not working, two dirty water fountains with rusty pipes, trash in the parking lot, weeds and trees growing along the fence line, and trees growing into the powerlines along the wall that borders a nearby business.

- At the Roger P. McAuliffe Station, we observed the loading dock had a leaking pipe with a steady stream of water and an inoperable lift. We also witnessed the front retail lobby and the workroom had stained, waterlogged ceiling tiles and inoperable air conditioning. The second-floor men's restroom had an inoperable and improperly fastened sink and stained, waterlogged ceiling tiles. Further, we observed overgrown brush growing on the sides of the building, graffiti on the building's front retail side, and a telecom box with no cover and exposed components on the rear exterior of the building.

Figure 14. Roof Leak in Boiler Room

Source: OIG photo taken on July 27, 2023

Why Did It Occur

Management at all four units did not provide proper oversight and take the necessary actions to verify that property condition issues were identified, reported, and corrected due to competing priorities that took precedence. Specifically,

- The manager at Cragin Station's first day was May 1, 2023, 86 days before our fieldwork, and she was unaware of most of these issues because other duties took priority.

- Management at Daniel J. Doffyn Station stated that other duties took priority over addressing facility condition issues.

- The unit manager at Northtown Station indicated that she was aware of a lot of the issues, and most of them had been submitted into the electronic Facilities Management System (eFMS).[28] However, they were either marked completed or denied, and she had not followed up to determine why they had been improperly closed due to other duties taking priority.

- The unit manager at Roger P. McAuliffe Station formally started on March 6, 2023. During the first few months at the unit, she prioritized trying to resolve staffing issues and route coverage over addressing property condition issues.

What Should Have Happened

Management should have provided sufficient oversight of personnel responsible for maintaining facilities, reported safety and maintenance issues as they arose, and followed up for completion. The Postal Service requires management to maintain a safe environment for employees and customers.[29]

Effect on the Postal Service and Its Customers

Management's attention to maintenance, safety, and security deficiencies can reduce the risk of injuries to employees and customers; reduce related costs, such as workers' compensation claims, lawsuits, and penalties; and enhance the customer experience and Postal Service brand.

Management Actions

During our audit, management at Cragin Station addressed the blocked fire extinguisher in the workroom area and the broken electrical cover in the lobby. However, other property condition issues identified at Cragin Station, Daniel J. Doffyn Station, Northtown Station, and Roger P. McAuliffe Station remain outstanding.

> **Recommendation #8**
> We recommend the **District Manager, Illinois 1 District**, address all remaining building safety, security, and maintenance issues identified at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and Roger P. McAuliffe stations.

Management's Comments

Management agreed with all findings and recommendations in the report and has begun to take action to address the findings. See Appendix B for management's comments in their entirety.

The target implementation date for recommendations 1 through 7 is February 15, 2024. Regarding recommendation 8, we confirmed with the Postal Service that the target implementation date is July 31, 2024.

Evaluation of Management's Comments

The U.S. Postal Service OIG considers management's comments responsive to the recommendations in the report.

All recommendations require OIG concurrence before closure. Consequently, the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. All recommendations should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed.

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28 A custom-built Postal Service system used to manage work orders, contracts, and payments for facility construction, repairs, and alteration contracts, along with real estate contracts.
29 Postal Service Handbook EL-801, *Supervisor's Safety Handbook*, July, 2020.

Appendix A: Additional Information

We conducted this audit from June through December 2023 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective.

In planning and conducting the audit, we obtained an understanding of the delivery operations internal control structure to help determine the nature, timing, and extent of our audit procedures. We reviewed the management controls for overseeing the program and mitigating associated risks. Additionally, we assessed the internal control components and underlying principles, and we determined that the following three components were significant to our audit objective:

- Control Activities
- Information and Communication
- Monitoring

We developed audit work to ensure that we assessed these controls. Based on the work performed, we identified internal control deficiencies in all three components that were significant within the context of our objective. Our recommendations, if implemented, should correct the weaknesses we identified.

We assessed the reliability of data from the PTR system, the DCV system, the SVWeb database, and the eFMS by reviewing existing information, comparing data from other sources, observing operations, and interviewing Postal Service officials knowledgeable about the data. We determined the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

Appendix B: Management's Comments

UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

December 14, 2023

JOHN CIHOTA
DIRECTOR, AUDIT SERVICES

SUBJECT: *Management Response:* Illinois 1 District: Delivery Unit Operations (Report Number 23-139-DRAFT)

Thank you for providing the Postal Service with an opportunity to review and comment on the findings and recommendations contained in the draft audit report, *Illinois 1 District: Delivery Unit Operations.*

Management agrees with the findings in the report on delayed mail, package scanning, arrow keys, timekeeping, and property conditions.

Following are our comments on each of the eight recommendations.

Recommendation 1:
We recommend the District Manager, Illinois 1 District, execute a plan to adequately staff the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and Roger P. McAuliffe stations so that all committed mail is delivered daily, and coordinate with Central Area Human Resources to fill the supervisor vacancy at the Roger P. McAuliffe Station.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.

Management will conduct regular attendance reviews to address unscheduled absences. Additionally, the supervisor vacancy at Daniel J. Doffyn has been filled.

Target Implementation Date: 02/15/2024

Responsible Official: Manager, Operations Integration

Recommendation 2:
We recommend the District Manager, Illinois 1 District, provide training to management at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and Roger P. McAuliffe stations to enter all delayed mail into the proper system, and subsequently confirm delayed mail is reported accurately.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.

Management will give a service talk to the appropriate personnel at each station on proper recording of delayed mail into the system of record. Additionally, management will conduct reviews to monitor compliance.

Target Implementation Date: 02/15/2024

Responsible Official: Manager, Operations Integration

Recommendation 3:
We recommend the District Manager, Illinois 1 District, develop and execute a plan to ensure all employees are trained on standard operating procedures for package scanning and handling at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and the Roger P. McAuliffe stations.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.

Management will reinforce proper scanning and package handling procedures through a documented service talk at each of the stations.

Target Implementation Date: 02/15/2024

Responsible Official: Manager, Operations Integration

Recommendation 4:
We recommend the District Manager, Illinois 1 District, develop and execute a plan to verify unit management systematically reviews package scanning performance data daily and enforces compliance at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and the Roger P. McAuliffe stations.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.

District management will instruct local management to monitor scanning performance daily for accuracy and will conduct site visits to monitor for compliance and ensure all packages are scanned accurately.

Target Implementation Date: 02/15/2024

Responsible Official: Manager, Operations Integration

Recommendation 5:
We recommend the District Manager, Illinois 1 District, develop and execute a training plan that instructs management and assigned staff on proper arrow key management at the Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown and Roger P. McAuliffe stations.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.

Management at the Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and Roger P. McAuliffe stations will be retrained on proper procedures for arrow key management including updating key

logs, reporting missing arrow keys to the USPS Inspection Service, and ensuring arrow keys are verified and secured daily.

Target Implementation Date: 02/15/2024

Responsible Official: Manager, Operations Integration

Recommendation 6:
We recommend the District Manager, Illinois 1 District, to establish a schedule and periodically review arrow keys to verify they are properly logged and accounted for, and ensure missing keys are reported to the U.S. Postal Inspection Service at Daniel J. Doffyn Station and Roger P. McAuliffe Station.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.

Management at the Daniel J. Doffyn Station and Roger P. McAuliffe Station will report missing keys to the USPS Inspection Service. Additionally, reviews will be conducted to verify compliance with arrow key policy.

Target Implementation Date: 02/15/2024

Responsible Official: Manager, Operations Integration

Recommendation 7:
We recommend the District Manager, Illinois District, train management at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, and the Roger P. McAuliffe stations on timekeeping records requirements and monitor compliance. Further, obtain appropriate Timekeeping Attendance and Collection System access for management at the Roger P. McAuliffe Station.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.

Management at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, and Roger P. McAuliffe stations will be retrained on proper record keeping when processing pay adjustments, disallowing time and recording unauthorized overtime. All appropriate personnel will have access to the TACS. Additionally, management will conduct reviews to monitor for compliance and validate documentation is complete.

Target Implementation Date: 02/15/2024

Responsible Official: Manager, Operations Integration

Recommendation 8:
We recommend the District Manager, Illinois 1 District, address all remaining building safety, security, and maintenance issues identified at the Cragin, Daniel J. Doffyn, Northtown, and Roger P. McAuliffe stations.

Management Response/Action Plan:
Management agrees with this recommendation.

Local management is working to abate those property conditions within their control. All other issues have been referred to the appropriate office for repair when resources become available.

Target Implementation Date: 07/31/2023

Responsible Official: Manager, Operations Integration

E-SIGNED by JEWEL MORROW
on 2023-12-19 12:21:36 EST
_____
Jewel Morrow
Acting Manager, Illinois 1 District

cc: *Corporate Audit & Response Management*

Contact us via our Hotline and FOIA forms. Follow us on social networks. Stay informed.

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