Audit Report

U.S. Postal Inspection Service Charlotte Division

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Highlights

Objective

Our objective was to determine whether the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, Charlotte Division, implemented effective controls for accountable property, training, and case management. Based on a risk analysis of closed case count and workhours, number of hotline referrals, and National Compliance Review occurrence, we selected the Charlotte Division. The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) has a statutory requirement to provide oversight of Postal Inspection Service activities. As such, we plan to conduct similar reviews of other Postal Inspection Service divisions.

The Postal Inspection Service mission is to support and protect the U.S. Postal Service and its employees, infrastructure, and customers; enforce the laws that defend the nation's mail system from illegal or dangerous use; and ensure public trust in the mail. Postal inspectors are federal law enforcement agents responsible for enforcing over 200 federal statutes that deal with the Postal Service and the U.S. mail.

Postal inspectors use various tools and resources to carry out their mission. Postal inspectors use the Case Management System, an online database, to open and close cases, and to document and track case activities. In addition, postal inspectors are assigned accountable property (e.g., firearms and vehicles) to perform their work.

"The Postal Inspection Service has not consistently implemented effective controls for ammunition storage, training, and case management."

The Charlotte Division has 78 postal inspectors and 37 postal police officers. In fiscal year (FY) 2018, the Charlotte Division had 387 closed, jacketed cases. A jacketed case is opened when there is indication or occurrence of criminal activity warranting further review. We reviewed a random sample of 60 closed, jacketed cases in FY 2018.

What the OIG Found

We found that the Postal Inspection Service properly inventoried accountable property. However, the Postal Inspection Service has not consistently implemented effective controls for ammunition storage, training, and case management. Specifically, we found:

- Charlotte Division Headquarters ammunition was secured in a storage room, but accessible to all 18 postal inspectors located at the division headquarters. In addition, management did not maintain an inventory or track ammunition.

- Inspection Service personnel did not record training courses accurately in the tracking system for 96 of 115 (89 percent) law enforcement officers. Of the 96 officers, the error rates ranged from 40 percent to 100 percent for 34 required courses not completed.

- Postal inspectors did not prepare field notes for 53 cases (88 percent); update investigative details every six months for 26 cases (43 percent); and jacket cases within seven days of the event for 10 cases (17 percent).

Overall, these conditions occurred due to inconsistently following policy and inadequate oversight. Specifically:

- Management interpreted the ammunition storage as secured because only postal inspectors have access to the storage room and no other administrative staff has entry. Also, Postal Inspection Service policy provides the latitude of storing ammunition in safes or locked cabinets if possible and does not restrict access to limited personnel. In addition, there is no formal requirement to inventory or track ammunition.

- Personnel manually entered the data into the tracking system, resulting in data entry errors. Also, there is no formal review to ensure the accuracy of the information.

- Postal inspectors attached other electronic documents instead of field notes to support cases or deemed field notes unnecessary if there were no witness statements. Also, postal inspectors did not consistently jacket cases within the

prescribed timeframe due to other priorities. Additionally, management stated that postal inspectors did not believe they had to update investigative details every six months when cases were in pending, appeal, or prosecution status.

A prior audit reports identified issues related to ammunition inventory and case management requirements. These reports recommended management establish a formal process to periodically inventory and track ammunition; and provide refresher training to team leaders and postal inspectors regarding investigative documentation requirements, proper case closure procedures, and develop controls to ensure periodic reviews are conducted.

Management agreed and plans to establish a process for ammunition inventory and provide case management training by March 31, 2020, and September 30, 2020, respectively; therefore, we are not making recommendations.

What the OIG Recommended

We recommended management:

- Limit ammunition access to applicable personnel.

- Update policy requiring ammunition to be secured and limit access to applicable personnel.

- Develop a formal review process to ensure training records are entered accurately into the tracking system.

Transmittal Letter

OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

November 15, 2019

MEMORANDUM FOR: GARY R. BARKSDALE
                       CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR

                       DAVID M. MCGINNIS
                       INSPECTOR-IN-CHARGE, CHARLOTTE DIVISION

E-Signed by McDavid, Margaret
VERIFY authenticity with eSign Desktop

FROM: Margaret B. McDavid
                       Deputy Assistant Inspector General for Inspection
                         Service, Information Technology, and Operations

SUBJECT: Audit Report – U.S. Postal Inspection Service Charlotte
                       Division (Report Number 19TG013OV000-R20)

This report presents the results of our audit of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service
Charlotte Division.

We appreciate the cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff. If you have any
questions or need additional information, please contact Julie T. Wong, Acting Director, or
me at 703-248-2100.

Attachment

cc: Postmaster General
       Corporate Audit Response Management

Results

Introduction/Objective

This report presents the results of our self-initiated audit of the U.S. Postal Inspection Service Charlotte Division (Project Number 19TG013OV000). Our objective was to determine whether the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, Charlotte Division, implemented effective controls for accountable property, training, case management.

The U.S. Postal Service Office of Inspector General (OIG) has a statutory requirement to provide oversight of all activities of the Postal Inspection Service.[1] We plan to conduct similar reviews of other Postal Inspection Service divisions. See Appendix A for additional information regarding the audit.

Background

The Postal Inspection Service's mission is to support and protect the U.S. Postal Service and its employees, infrastructure, and customers; enforce the laws that defend the nation's mail system from illegal or dangerous use; and ensure public trust in the mail. Postal inspectors are federal law enforcement agents responsible for enforcing over 200 federal statutes that deal with the Postal Service and the U.S. mail.

Postal inspectors use various tools and resources to carry out their mission, including the Case Management System (CMS) which is used to open and close cases and document and track case activities. In addition, postal inspectors are assigned accountable property, such as firearms and vehicles, to perform their work.

The Charlotte Division has 78 postal inspectors and 37 postal police officers (PPO). During fiscal year (FY) 2018, the Charlotte Division had 387 closed, jacketed cases.[2] During this period, postal inspectors in the Charlotte Division spent 56,537 workhours[3] on 387 cases. Figure 1 shows the total of cases for the top five case types for that period: (1) Prohibited Mail Narcotics, (2) Mail Theft, (3) Workplace Violence, (4) Mail Fraud, and (5) Identify Theft.

Figure 1. Top 5 Jacketed Closed Case Types by Case Count for FY 2018

Source: OIG analysis and U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

Figure 2 shows the top five case types by workhours[4] during FY 2018, with mail theft having the highest workhour count.

Figure 2. Top 5 Jacketed Closed Case Types by Workhours for FY 2018

Source: OIG analysis and U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

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1 Title 39 CFR § 230.1.
2 Jacketed cases are used when an investigation results in evidence gathered to support potential administrative action or prosecution against a suspect.
3 The total workhours were for cases opened between FYs 1992 and 2018.
4 The total workhours were for cases opened between FYs 1992 and 2018.

We reviewed accountable property such as high value evidence, vehicles, firearms, keys, and confidential funds. We found the Postal Inspection Service properly inventoried accountable property. However, the Postal Inspection Service has not consistently implemented effective controls for ammunition storage, training, and case management.

Finding #1: Ammunition

We found that Charlotte Division Headquarters (DHQ) ammunition was secured in a storage room, but accessible to all 18 postal inspectors at the location. In addition, management did not maintain an inventory or track ammunition.

Per policy,[5] firearms and ammunition should be stored in safes or cabinets that are protected by a combination lock or padlock whenever possible. While the Postal Inspection Service does not have a formal process to inventory or track ammunition, we identified several agencies[6] that require periodic inventory of ammunition or an inventory management system that tracks ammunition usage. Additionally, while policy gives the latitude for locking ammunition whenever possible, we identified other law enforcement agencies[7] that store their ammunition in locked safes or dedicated rooms, preferably separate from firearms. Although not required by policy, limiting ammunition access to applicable personnel is considered a best practice.[8]

This occurred because Charlotte DHQ management believed the ammunition storage was secure because only postal inspectors have access to the storage room and no other administrative staff has entry. Also, Postal Inspection Service policy provides the latitude of storing ammunition in safes or locked cabinets if possible and does not restrict access to limited personnel. In addition, there is no formal requirement to inventory or track ammunition.

When all postal inspectors have access to the storage room and without a periodic inventory practice in place, there is a risk of loss or stolen ammunition and unauthorized use. This could affect the Postal Service's reputation and potentially result in legal matters. As a result, Postal Inspection Service ammunition, totaling ▆▆▆▆ is at risk.[9]

A prior audit report[10] identified issues about periodically inventorying and tracking ammunition. Management agreed to this recommendation in a prior audit and plans to establish a process for divisions to periodically inventory and track ammunition. The target implementation date is March 31, 2020; therefore, we are not making a recommendation related to ammunition.

> *"When all postal inspectors have access to the storage room and without a periodic inventory practice in place, there is a risk of loss or stolen ammunition and unauthorized use."*

Recommendation #1
The **Inspector-in-Charge, Charlotte Division,** limit ammunition access to applicable personnel.

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5   *Inspection Service Manual*, Section 3-8.1, Securing Firearms, September 2018.
6   *Audit of the United States Marshals service's controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives* (Report Number: 18-33, dated September 2018) and *Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Controls over Weapons and Munitions* (Report Number 19-35, dated August 2019).
7   *Federal Law Enforcement Purchases and Inventory Controls of Firearms, Ammunition, and Tactical Gear* (Report Number GAO-19-175, dated December 2018) reviewed 12 specific components including EPA Office of Inspector General (OIG), EPA Office of Enforcement and Compliance Assurance (OECA), Food and Drug Administration (FDA), National Institutes of Health (NIH), HHS OIG, IRS Criminal Investigation (CI), and IRS Police Officer Section (Police).
8   *Audit of the Drug Enforcement Administration's Controls over Weapons and Munitions* (Report Number 19-35, dated August 2019), *Audit of the United States Marshals Service's Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives* (Report Number 18-33, dated September 2018), *Audit of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives Controls over Weapons, Munitions, and Explosives* (Report Number 18-21, dated March 2018).
9   To determine the value of ammunition at risk, the team used an OIG risk assessment tool to input the total cost of ammunition at the Charlotte DHQ for FY 2018 ▆▆▆▆ and based on a low-medium risk, the risk factor was ▆▆▆ percent.
10 *Review of Postal Inspection Service Criminal and Administrative Processes – Fort Worth Division* (Report Number HR-AR-19-002, dated April 19, 2019)

Finding #2: Training Documentation

Training personnel in the Charlotte Division did not accurately document required law enforcement training in the Threat Management Tracking System (TMTS).[11] We identified that out of the 67 postal inspectors[12] and 29 PPOs,[13] none had all 34 training courses recorded in TMTS for FY 2018. The top five[14] courses not recorded correctly, and corresponding occurrence rates, as shown in Table 1.

Table 1. Training Courses Not Properly Documented in TMTS

Mandatory Training	Postal Inspectors and Postal Police Officers with Undocumented Training
Reactionary Gap Principle	100%
Use of Ballistic Shields	88%
Blood-Borne Pathogens Review	44%
Semiautomatic Pistol Malfunction Drill (twice yearly)	40%
Holster Handgun Retention Techniques (twice yearly)	40%

Source: OIG analysis and U.S. Postal Inspection Service.

Per policy,[15] Inspection Service (IS) Form 681 "U.S. Postal Inspection Service Firearm Score Sheet", is used to maintain firearms scores, and threat management training for each postal inspector and PPO. All original IS forms 681 must be kept on file until entered in TMTS. Each division shall designate a Division Threat Management Coordinator (DTMC) to implement threat management standards, including firearms, in the division. The DTMC coordinates division threat management training to ensure compliance with policy and standards and maintains required training records. In addition, management designated the Inspection Service Operation Technician (ISOT) to enter records in TMTS while the DTMC ensures training is completed.

This occurred due to data entry error by the ISOT responsible for inputting the information into TMTS. Also, there is no formal review to ensure the accuracy of the information entered in TMTS.

Without accurate data entry and review in TMTS, there is a risk that training data is not reflective of actual training activities. Management and external stakeholders need quality information to validate the accuracy of training reported to headquarters. In addition, maintaining complete documentation is widely known to be an important internal control and best business practice.[16]

"Management and external stakeholders need quality information to validate the accuracy of training reported to headquarters."

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11 TMTS is a system used by Postal Inspection Service to maintain firearms scores and threat management training for each postal inspector and PPO taken from the Inspection Service form 681.

12 We did not review training records for 11 postal inspectors because they retired, were detailed to another division, or left the division.

13 We did not review training records for eight PPOs because they had either left the agency, on extended leave or not employed during all of FY 2018.

14 The remaining 30 training courses not properly documented were less than 20 percent.

15 *The Inspection Service Manual*, Section 3-3.2.3, Division Threat Management Coordinator; Section 3-4.7, Qualification Records; Section 3-3.3.5, Lesson Plans, September 2018.

16 The Committee of Sponsoring Organizations of the Treadway Commission *Internal Control – Integrated Framework*, dated May 2013, emphasizes that well-defined documented policies and procedures support an entity's achievement of its objectives. Additionally, Postal Service Handbook AS-805, *Information Security*, December 2018, states that formally documenting procedures is in line with business continuity objectives; increases organizational credibility with customers, business partners, and stakeholders; and ensures availability and accuracy of the information for stakeholders.

Finding #3: Case Documentation

Postal inspectors did not consistently follow case management reporting requirements. Specifically, postal inspectors did not:

- Prepare field notes[17] for 53 of 60 (88 percent) cases.

- Update investigative details every six months for 26 of 60 (43 percent) cases. Of those 26 cases, the average time elapsed was about nine months rather than the six months requirement.

- Jacket cases within seven days of the event for 10 of 60 (17 percent) cases.[18] One case took over four months to jacket.

Per policy,[19] postal inspectors must prepare field notes to document all matters that occur in an investigation. Field notes must be scanned and attached electronically in the case management system. A Team Leader or Assistant Inspector-in-Charge ensures all official files for cases requested for closure are in proper sequence under the closed case checklist.[20] Also, postal inspectors must update the investigative details every six months, even if major events do not occur. Additionally, a case must be prepared for case jacketing online, reviewed for accuracy, and approved in the case management system within seven days of the event.

These issues occurred due to postal inspectors inconsistently following policy and the lack of team leaders' oversight.

- Postal inspectors attached other electronic documents instead of field notes to support the case or deemed field notes unnecessary if there were no witness statements. Additionally, management stated that inspectors did not believe they needed to update investigative details every six months when cases were in pending, appeal, or prosecution status as cases can remain in this

status for longer than a six-month period, although the policy does not provide an exception. In addition, postal inspectors did not consistently jacket cases per the prescribed timeframe due to other priorities.

- Team leaders did not review the CMS timely to ensure cases were jacketed within the prescribed timeframe. Team leaders relied on case owners to complete the case closing checklists and did not review them to ensure case documentation was uploaded in the CMS before approving case closure.

Field notes can be discoverable and used during court proceedings. When postal inspectors are not adequately documenting investigative activities, they risk relying on their memory of events that occurred months or, sometimes, years ago, which could affect legal outcomes. Furthermore, personnel turnover or reassignment of inspectors could result in duplication of efforts or knowledge loss when cases are not adequately documented, or when investigative details are not updated timely. In addition, a lack of timely jacketing could cause case workhours to be misallocated.

> *"These issues occurred due to postal inspectors inconsistently following policy and the lack of team leaders' oversight."*

Prior audit reports[21] identified issues about case management requirements and recommended management provide refresher training to team leaders and postal inspectors regarding investigative documentation requirements, proper case closure procedures, and develop controls to ensure periodic reviews are conducted. Management agreed and plans to provide the training by September 30, 2020; therefore, we are not making recommendations for this finding.

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17 Field notes are detailed notes of an investigations. Postal inspectors must prepare field notes to document all matters that occur in an investigation.

18 Of the 10 cases: one case took more than four months to jacket; eight cases were jacketed between eight and 111 days, and the last case did not contain enough information in the event details to determine the days elapsed.

19 *FY 2018 Case Management Reporting Requirements,* Section 160, Field Notes; Section 220, General; Section 731, Reviewing Official Case Files; and Section 9, Narrative Report: Investigative Details.

20 The closed case checklist is used by a Team Leader or Assistant Inspector in Charge to review and ensure that all official files for cases requested for closing are in proper sequence. This includes items such as field notes, ISLs, arrest and search warrants.

21 *Review of Postal Inspection Service Criminal and Administrative Processes – Fort Worth Division* (Report Number HR-AR-19-002, dated April 19, 2019), *U.S. Postal Inspection Service Area Case Management* (Report Number OV-AR-19-003, dated September 4, 2019) and *U.S. Postal Inspection Service New York Division* (Report Number OV-AR-19-004, dated September 18, 2019).

Management's Comments

Management disagreed with recommendations 1 and 2 and agreed with recommendation 3.

Regarding recommendation 1, management stated that access to ammunition is limited to postal inspectors. In addition, due to the nature of law enforcement responsibilities, inspectors must have immediate access to ammunition to respond to critical and emergent situations. Management also stated that the Charlotte Division's ammunition is currently secured in an access-controlled building and that Inspection Service offices also have an intrusion detection system.

Regarding recommendation 2, management stated that current policy requires proper security of ammunition at all times and they limit access to postal inspectors given their need to respond to critical and emergent situations immediately.

Regarding recommendation 3, management stated that they will develop a process to ensure training records are accurately reported in the Threat Management Tracking System. The target implementation date is October 31, 2020.

See Appendix B for management's comments in their entirety.

Evaluation of Management's Comments

The OIG considers management's comments unresponsive to recommendations 1 and 2. The OIG considers management's comments responsive to recommendation 3 and corrective actions should resolve the issues identified in the report.

Regarding management's disagreement with recommendation 1, as we stated in this report, giving all postal inspectors access to the ammunition storage room creates a risk of loss or stolen ammunition and unauthorized use. In addition, we do not believe other agencies use these storage rooms to support critical and emergent situations; rather, they use them as storage locations for ammunition used during training and to replenish ammunition used by investigators in the course of their duties. It is our understanding that inspectors are already issued ammunition that they are personally accountable for and which is available to them when they perform their job. This personally assigned ammunition is typically carried in the firearm itself and/or in additional magazines on their person and can be used in response to "critical and emergent situations". Therefore, we continue to believe it is important that the Postal Inspection Service limit access to the ammunition room.

Regarding management's disagreement with recommendation 2, they stated that their policy requires proper security of ammunition at all times. However, as noted in this report, the policy[22] states that firearms and ammunition shall be stored in safes or cabinets protected by a combination lock or padlock whenever possible. We believe management should update the policy requiring ammunition to be secured at all times. As noted above, allowing all postal inspectors' access to the ammunition room creates a risk of loss or stolen ammunition and unauthorized use.

We view the disagreements with recommendations 1 and 2 as unresolved and they will remain open as we pursue them through the formal audit resolution process. All recommendations require OIG concurrence before closure. Consequently, the OIG requests written confirmation when corrective actions are completed. The recommendations should not be closed in the Postal Service's follow-up tracking system until the OIG provides written confirmation that the recommendations can be closed.

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22 *Inspection Service Manual,* Section 3-8.1, Security of Firearms, dated September 2018.

Appendices

Click on the appendix title below to navigate to the section content.

Appendix A: Additional Information

Scope and Methodology

The scope of our audit included a review of Charlotte Division closed cases from October 2017 to September 2018. We selected the Charlotte Division for our review based the number of closed jacketed cases, case workhours, and number of hotline referrals identified, and National Compliance Review occurrence. We reviewed a non-statistical random sample of 60 closed cases to determine whether division employees followed case management requirements. We verified accountable property, including 34 pieces of high-value evidence, 17 vehicles,[23] and 73 firearms.[24] Another part of our review for accountable property included J,[25] O,[26] inspector,[27] and high value evidence keys, ammunition, and confidential funds. Additionally, we reviewed threat management training records for 67 postal inspectors and 29 PPOs.

To accomplish our objective, we:

- Reviewed a non-statistical random sample of 60 closed case files to determine completeness of case files, forfeiture, pre/post seizure, confidential funds disbursement, and arrests.

- Interviewed Charlotte Division managers and postal inspectors to gain an understanding of their roles and responsibilities.

- Evaluated the oversight and handling of confidential funds and high-value evidence for compliance with established policies.

- Reviewed a sample of high-value evidence, vehicles, firearms, ammunition, keys, and confidential funds for their completeness and compliance with internal controls.

- Reviewed firearms and safety training records to ensure compliance with Postal Inspection Service training requirements.

- Reviewed postal inspector workload, analyzing case count and workhours.

We conducted this performance audit from May through November 2019, in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards and included such tests of internal controls as we considered necessary under the circumstances. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objective. We discussed our observations and conclusions with management on October 2, 2019 and included their comments where appropriate.

We assessed the reliability of CMS, TMTS, the Personal Accountable Property System, and the Vehicle Tracking System by reviewing source documents and interviewing responsible personnel knowledgeable about the data. We determined that the data were sufficiently reliable for the purposes of this report.

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23 Originally, we had a sample of 20. One vehicle was a trailer used for hauling material such as training, and two vehicles belonged to inspectors who were no longer detailed to the Charlotte Division.
24 This accounts for 48 assigned inspector firearms and 25 unassigned firearms maintained in a vault. Originally, we had 50 inspector firearms. Two inspectors were no longer detailed to the Charlotte Division.
25 J keys are used to gain entry to the front door of domiciles. They are issued to ████████████████████████████.
26 O keys are used to access Postal Service facilities with lookout galleries and investigative offices. They are assigned to ████████████████████████.
27 Inspector keys are issued to postal inspectors. The keys can access front door of domiciles, postal inspectors' offices, Postal Service facilities with lookout galleries and investigative offices.

Prior Audit Coverage

Report Title	Objective	Report Number	Final Report Date	Monetary Impact (in millions)
Review of Postal Inspection Service Criminal and Administrative Processes – Fort Worth Division	Assess the U.S. Postal Inspection Service's compliance with criminal and administrative processes, including the effectiveness of internal controls. Specifically, we reviewed the areas of case management, accountable property, and training in the Fort Worth Division, which was judgmentally selected based on number of investigative cases.	HR-AR-19-002	4/19/2019	None
U.S. Postal Inspection Service Area Case Management	Assess whether the U.S. Postal Inspection Service has developed and implemented adequate controls to ensure proper oversight of area cases.	OV-AR-19-003	9/3/2019	$14
Division Reviews: U.S. Postal Inspection Service New York Division	Determine whether the U.S. Postal Inspection Service, New York Division, implemented effective controls for case management, accountable property, and training.	OV-AR-19-004	9/19/2019	None

Appendix B: Management's Comments

GARY R. BARKSDALE
CHIEF POSTAL INSPECTOR

UNITED STATES POSTAL INSPECTION SERVICE

October 31, 2019

LAZERICK C. POLAND
DIRECTOR, AUDIT OPERATIONS

SUBJECT: U.S. Postal Inspection Service Charlotte Division
(Report Number OV-AR-20-DRAFT)

Thank you for the opportunity to review and comment on the findings
recommendations contained in the draft audit report, U.S. Postal Inspection New
York Division.

The Postal Service disagrees with recommendation 1 and 2, agrees with
recommendation 3. Management will address each recommendation separately
below.

Recommendation 1: The Inspector-in-Charge, Charlotte Division, limit ammunition
access to applicable personnel.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management disagrees with this
recommendation. Access to ammunition is limited to Postal Inspectors. Due to the
nature of law enforcement responsibilities, Inspectors must have immediate access
to ammunition to respond to critical and emergent situations. The Charlotte
Division's ammunition is currently secured in an access controlled building with the
Inspection Service offices having additional security to include an intrusion detection
system.

Recommendation 2: The Chief Postal Inspector update policy requiring ammunition
to be always secured and limit access to applicable personnel.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management disagrees with this
recommendation. Current policy requires proper security of ammunition at all times.
In addition, as stated in Management Response/Action Plan to Recommendation 1,
access to ammunition is limited to Postal Inspectors given the immediate need to
respond to critical and emergent situations.

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Washington, D.C. 20260-2100
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Recommendation 3: The Inspector-in-Charge, Charlotte Division, develop a formal review process to ensure training records are entered accurately in the Threat Management Tracking System.

Management Response/Action Plan: Management agrees with this recommendation. We will develop a process to ensure our training records are accurately reported in the Threat Management Tracking System.

Target Implementation Date: October 31, 2020

Responsible Official: Deputy Chief Inspector, Headquarter Operations

Thank you,

Gary R. Barksdale
Chief Postal Inspector

cc: *Manager, Corporate Audit Response Management*

OFFICE OF
INSPECTOR
GENERAL
UNITED STATES POSTAL SERVICE

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