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SUBJECT: Audit Report -Violence Prevention Policies and Procedures, Milwaukee District Compliance (LM-AR-98-002)

This report presents the results of our review of the Milwaukee District's compliance with violence prevention policies and procedures; and our determination if any deviations from those policies and procedures contributed to the tragic events that occurred at the Milwaukee Processing and Distribution Center on December 19,1997.

Management agreed with our report recommendations and provided us their comments as to the actions taken or planned. We believe management's comments are generally responsive to all but two of the seven recommendations we made. Our evaluation of those comments are contained in the recommendations section the report.

The cooperation and courtesies provided by your staff during the audit were appreciated. If you have any questions please contact [REDACTED], Senior Evaluator, Labor Management Team at [REDACTED] or me at (703) 248-2300.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report responds to Congressman John M. McHugh, Chairman, Subcommittee on the Postal Service, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight, who requested information on the Milwaukee District's compliance with violence prevention policies and procedures. Our objectives were to determine (1) if the Milwaukee District Threat Assessment Team (TAT) was complying with United States Postal Service (USPS) policies and procedures regarding the prevention of violence in the workplace, and (2) if any deviations from those policies and procedures may have contributed to the tragic events of December 19, 1997, at the Milwaukee Processing and Distribution Center (P&DC).

Results in Brief

The Milwaukee District TAT did not follow many of the violence prevention policies and procedures outlined in the May 1997 TAT Guide issued by USPS Headquarters.¹ We identified three deviations which may have contributed to the Milwaukee incident:

- (1) a healthy work room environment had not been created and maintained;
- (2) case management or risk abatement plans for individuals identified as potential threats to the workplace had not been created and maintained; and
- (3) violence prevention training for supervisors, managers, and employees was not mandatory.

Although we are unable to determine whether following the policies and procedures would have prevented the December tragedy from happening, compliance with them might have provided management with an indication of the mental state of the offender, as well as the existing work climate of the office. This information could have been used to assess actions needed to prevent the outbreak of violence.

¹ As of June 1, 1998.

Background

During the early morning hours of December 19, 1997, a mail clerk assigned to the Milwaukee P&DC shot and seriously wounded his supervisor, killed one co-worker, and wounded another. Despite the attempts of a third co-worker to diffuse the situation, the clerk then took his own life.

Congressman McHugh, concerned about the tragic events of that day, requested that the Office of Inspector General (OIG) determine if the Milwaukee District deviated from USPS violence prevention policies and procedures. If so, Congressman McHugh asked us to determine if the deviations could have contributed to the tragic event.

Scope & Methodology

In performing the evaluation we reviewed applicable policies, procedures, regulations, and statutes.² In addition, we obtained documents and reports from the Inspection Service and USPS officials containing information about the workplace environment, as well as descriptions of the events that took place December 19, 1997. We also reviewed General Accounting Office reports for information regarding environmental indicators of poor workroom climate.

To identify the District's TAT activities, we interviewed USPS Headquarters, Milwaukee District, and Midwest Area Office officials knowledgeable of those activities and the events surrounding the December 1997 incident. We reviewed documents and correspondence provided by these officials as well as documents provided by the Inspection Service.

To determine the District's compliance with policies and procedures, we compared the District's TAT activities from August 1996³ until December 1997, to the criteria outlined in the TAT Guide as well as other USPS publications. We then developed a list of policies and procedures that the TAT did not follow. From that list we identified deviations that might have contributed to the tragic incident.

²Criteria used to determine the District's compliance with USPS violence prevention policies and procedures, was found in USPS Publication 107, "Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace;" USPS Publication 108, "Threat Assessment Team Guide;" Healthy Workplace publication, "Dealing with Violence in the Workplace;" USPS publication, "A Safe Workplace My Right, My Responsibility;" Postal Bulletin 21900, "Policy Statement on Firearms in the Workplace;" Postal Bulletin 21811, "Joint Statement on Violence and Behavior in the Workplace;" USPS Employee Labor Relations Manual, "Safety and Health Medical Services, Section 864;" USPS Handbook EL-311, "Personnel Operations, Section 342;" the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990; USPS Milwaukee Performance Cluster, "Statement of Zero Tolerance for Acts or Threats of Violence in Our Workplace;" National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health Violence in the Workplace, "Risk Factors and Prevention Strategies;" and USPS Milwaukee District, "Contingency Plan for Violence and Credible Threats."

³ The period of time when the employee responsible for the violent acts was first brought to the attention of the TAT (August) until the employee committed the violent acts (December)

Our audit work was conducted between January and June 1998 in accordance with Generally Accepted Government Auditing Standards, at USPS Headquarters in Washington, DC; the Midwest Area Office in St. Louis, MO; and the Milwaukee District Office, P&DC, and the Inspection Service in Milwaukee, WI.

Noncompliance With Policies and Procedures

In February 1992, the USPS and various employee unions signed a “Joint Statement on Violence and Behavior in the Workplace”. The Joint Statement, the TAT Guide and Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of Violence in the Workplace (CMP) clearly outline the USPS position to provide and maintain a safe workroom floor through the prevention of work-related violence.

The TAT Guide outlines several initiatives designed to assist the TAT in responding to and assessing the seriousness of violent and potentially violent situations. These initiatives include violence prevention strategies, goals, tasks, processes, incident response, team performance measurements, and employee education and training.

The CMP provides guidance to the District for responding to a work disruption due to an incident of violence in the workplace, and in completing a post crisis evaluation. The District’s Contingency Plan also provides guidance for responding to violence in the workplace.

Both the TAT and CMP guides were issued in May 1997 and were effective upon receipt. According to the Milwaukee District Human Resources Manager, these guides were received in May or June 1997. The District’s Contingency Plan is dated January 30, 1997.

Our analysis of the TAT’s compliance with policies and procedures revealed that the Milwaukee District had not achieved the following:

- three of the six TAT violence prevention strategies were not implemented;
- five TAT goals were not attained;
- three primary TAT tasks were not conducted;
- two important processes were not followed;
- TAT performance was not measured;
- violence awareness training was not provided for craft employees; and
- violence awareness training was not mandatory for supervisors and managers.

According to the District’s Human Resources Manager, the TAT did not accomplish the TAT requirements because it did not have the time nor manpower to do so. The Manager stated that TAT member

responsibilities are in addition to their other day-to-day responsibilities. For example, the District’s Human Resources Manager is responsible for managing the human resources requirements for the Milwaukee Performance Cluster as well as coordinating and overseeing the TAT. He believes the requirements in the TAT Guide can only be met with dedicated TAT members who have no other conflicting duties.

TAT Violence Prevention Strategies Not Implemented

The District’s TAT is responsible for implementing six violence prevention strategies to reduce workplace violence:

- hiring the right people for the right job;
- ensuring appropriate safeguards for people and property;
- consistent communication and enforcement of postal policy regarding violent and inappropriate behavior;
- creating a safe and healthy work environment;
- providing employee support in dealing with problems at work and home; and
- safely separating employees from employment.

Our review disclosed that three of the six strategies had not been fully implemented by the Milwaukee District TAT. Specifically, the TAT did not:

- ensure appropriate safeguards for people;
- create or maintain a healthy workroom environment; nor
- consistently communicate and enforce postal policy regarding violent and inappropriate behavior.

Unsafe Workplace Environment

The TAT Guide provides several references regarding the case management of, and follow up on, situations or individuals identified as “threateners,”⁴ for the purpose of reducing risk to employees and the organization. Failure to manage and follow up on these cases could place other employees in an unsafe environment as evidenced by the incident that occurred on December 19, 1997. Our review disclosed that the employee responsible for the December 1997 incident had been identified by the District’s TAT in August 1996 as a potential threatener. The employee was placed on administrative leave pending a fitness-for-duty exam. Based on the exam results, the TAT authorized his return to duty that same month.

In the fitness-for-duty exam, the physician found that the employee did “not pose an acute danger to anyone at the Post Office.” However, the physician acknowledged that he could not “predict what

⁴ People who have shown a risk of violence toward others in the workplace or themselves and/or have committed acts of physical violence

the future will be,” and he recommended that the employee’s supervisors “continuously check in with him.” In spite of being aware of the physician’s recommendation, the TAT did not follow up on the recommendation. Had follow up occurred the TAT would have been aware that the employee was diagnosed with job-related stress 16 times from the time he was returned to duty in August 1996 until the December 1997 incident. In fact, on October 8, 1996, just two months after he was returned to duty, the employee was diagnosed with a stress-related condition, which resulted in his being placed on a limited duty assignment not to exceed 40 hours a week. He remained in this status until his suicide in December 1997.

Unhealthy Workplace Environment

Milwaukee’s workroom climate problems surfaced as far back as November 1994, when 39 employees of the Milwaukee P&DC complained to their U.S. Senator about unfair treatment and racial discrimination. Organizational climate studies conducted in 1995, 1997, and 1998; Employee Opinion Surveys in 1994 and 1995; as well as letters written to the OIG and Midwest Area Vice President established that employees continued to complain about their work environment. The number of Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) complaints and grievances filed are also indicators of labor relation problems in the Milwaukee facilities. USPS Headquarters, Area, and District officials agree that the workroom environment in the Milwaukee facilities is not as good as it should be.

Ineffective Communication and Enforcement of Zero Tolerance

The USPS and District Zero Tolerance policies clearly state that acts and statements of violence will result in consequences that could include removal. However, we found that the District did not effectively communicate the Zero Tolerance Policy. Based on information provided to us by the Inspection Service⁵, we believe that discipline may not have been consistently applied to individuals who violated the Zero Tolerance Policy. For example, in one case, a postmaster was reported to have “struck” a rural carrier on the back and shoulder with a piece of mail during a disagreement between them regarding rural route count procedures. The postmaster received no administrative sanction. In another case, however, an employee was issued a letter of removal for telling another employee he was going to “beat up” a co-worker.

To effectively communicate the Zero Tolerance Policy, the District must initiate corrective and progressive discipline against any employee who violates it. This is especially true in those cases where an employee verbally abuses or physically touches another employee or individual in an aggressive or angry manner, regardless of the circumstances.

⁵The Inspection Service is a situational advisor to the District’s TAT

TAT Goals Not Attained

The TAT is responsible for attaining five goals:

- identify threateners;
- assess the risk posed by the threats;
- engage in case management;
- contribute toward a safe workplace for employees; and
- contribute to the reduction of inappropriate behavior in the workplace.

The Milwaukee District TAT had not achieved any of the five goals.

As previously discussed, it did not contribute toward a safe workplace for employees, nor engage in the case management of threateners. According to District and Area Office officials the TAT did not maintain a list of threateners. The TAT did discuss each threat made by employees, but did not assess them or develop risk abatement plans using the criteria in the TAT guide. We verified that TAT meetings and discussions took place from August 1996 through February 1998. However, the discussions were specific to the employees involved in particular threats and did not include discussions regarding earlier threats—such as follow up or the status of prior cases. In addition, we found no evidence that each threatener had been assigned a risk priority⁶ or that background inquiry information had been presented.

Based on our comparison of the March 1998 Milwaukee Organizational Climate Survey and the surveys conducted in previous years, we do not believe the TAT contributed to reducing inappropriate behavior in the workplace. Employees continue to voice concerns that supervisor and craft employee relationships are strained and that there is racism, a lack of respect for employees, animosity, tension, and an antagonistic office environment. This is despite the District's efforts, which began in 1995, to educate supervisors and managers with diversity and human relationship skills training.⁷

TAT Primary Tasks Not Accomplished

The TAT guide lists three primary tasks that need to be accomplished when managing threats in the workplace: (1) identify the threateners, environmental and societal factors, and contributing events; (2) assess the risk; and (3) recommend a risk abatement plan. Some of the environmental factors to be evaluated include the condition of labor-management relations; ineffective communication; numbers of grievances, EEO complaints, and accidents; and employee

⁶ Priority 1 is an extreme risk, priority 2 is a high risk, priority 3 a low or moderate risk, and priority 4, no risk.

⁷ The District has not developed any goals or measurements to determine the contribution the training has had on the workroom floor. Using the March 1998 Organizational Climate Survey, it appears the training has had little impact.

perceptions. Contributing events to be considered include the threatener's perceived or pending job suspension or termination, loss of a loved one, and alcohol or other drug relapse.

The District TAT did not accomplish any of the primary tasks to manage threats in the workplace. The TAT did not identify the environmental and societal factors that may have contributed to any threat. As previously stated, risk assessments and abatement plans were not done.

TAT Process Not Followed

The TAT Guide requires that the TAT hold meetings at least quarterly to review cases and to educate TAT members. These meetings are to include case management discussions of such matters as what is to be done, by whom, when, the time frame for completion and for reporting updates, as well as discussions regarding the monitoring of environmental factors at identified work sites. The TAT Guide requires that minutes of these meetings be kept and include risk assessment findings on each case discussed, the risk priority rating assigned, and risk abatement actions.

The TAT did not maintain minutes to its meetings, document risk assessments, nor develop abatement plans. According to the District's Human Resources Manager, the TAT did not maintain minutes to its meetings and activities because of the rules regarding "discovery" should any of the individuals being discussed at the meetings file a lawsuit against the USPS.

The TAT also did not document the completion of background inquiries on persons identified as potential threateners. The information sources to be checked include personnel records, disciplinary records, safety and health records, injury compensation, job and financial difficulties, as well as marriage and family difficulties.

The District's Human Resources Manager confirmed this information is not formally documented, however, he believes personal notes taken at the TAT meetings and kept by each of the members may contain some of this information. We did not obtain nor review the personal notes taken by members at meetings since the TAT Guide requires formal documentation.

TAT Performance Not Measured

The TAT Guide states performance measurements are necessary in order to ensure a violence-free workplace. It lists several mechanisms the TAT should use including a TAT survey, a local or performance cluster incident tracking system, and a post incident analysis of each violent incident. Our review disclosed, however, that the District's TAT did not develop any of the performance measurements. As a

result, it did not know how effective it had been in addressing violence in the workplace issues.

The TAT survey is supposed to be sent to all supervisors, managers, and employees associated with a threat. Survey recipients are asked to respond to questions relating to how quickly the TAT responded to the threat, how well it identified steps or actions necessary to solve the problem, TAT recommendations, and the effectiveness of the TAT steps taken in reducing future threats in the workplace.

The incident tracking system includes information such as the date of threat, the location, what happened, the priority risk scale level, and disposition.

The post incident analysis should include what happened, why it happened, what could have been done to prevent it, what was done to prevent it, what should have been done, and what could have been done better. Other indicators the TAT could review for inclusion in the analysis are the numbers of employees who attended workplace violence awareness program training, and the number of EEO complaints and grievances.

**Violence
Awareness
Training Not
Mandatory**

TAT policy describes violence awareness education of supervisors, managers, and employees as vital to preventing violence in the workplace. The policy states that employees should be made aware of local systems and processes to support zero tolerance, and that every supervisor and manager must receive 8 hours of violence awareness training. Training should be followed up with 4 additional hours relating to such topics as defusing a difficult situation, providing effective supervision, and managing angry and troubled employees.

District and Area officials told us, with the exception of union stewards, craft employees are not offered the violence awareness training because of the time and cost to administer it. The training is offered to all supervisors and managers but attendance is not mandatory. Our review of violence awareness training documents for calendar years 1995 through 1997, disclosed that less than 40 percent (105 of the 272) of the supervisors and managers assigned to the

Milwaukee P&DC and Main Post Office during that period received the training.

We believe the violence awareness training provided to supervisors and managers should also have been mandatory for craft employees given the circumstances surrounding the December 19, 1997 incident. Specifically, interviews with the offender's co-workers disclosed important information known by them regarding the offender's

possible motives for the shooting. In addition, at least two craft employees came into direct contact with the offender, immediately prior to, and just after the shooting. One employee received written notes from the offender indicating something was about to happen, but did not take him seriously. The second employee tried to reason with the offender before the offender turned the gun on himself. It is possible that had these individuals been trained in violence awareness they may have recognized the warning signs of violence, and could have defused the situation.

**CMP Post crisis
Evaluation
Incomplete**

The CMP Guide requires that when the workforce has returned to normal day-to-day operations, senior management and the Crisis Management Team must conduct a comprehensive review of the crisis management process. This includes a time-line narrative from the sequence of events (if known) that lead to the crisis and its conclusion.

On February 2, 1998, at the request of the USPS Headquarters Manager for Safety and Workplace Assistance, the District's Human Resources Manager submitted a post crisis evaluation regarding the December 19, 1997 incident. The District's statement regarding what caused and could have prevented the crisis contained less than eight lines of text. It did not contain information on potential contributing factors such as labor relations issues, EEO and grievance complaints, and employee perceptions of unfair discipline and treatment. These factors are listed in the CMP as indicators to be reviewed and considered.

Had the evaluation been comprehensive it might have disclosed such factors as the employee's poor relationship with his supervisor (whom he seriously wounded) and co-worker (whom he killed). It might also have disclosed that a significant number of employees viewed the supervisor's management style as autocratic. The evaluation also made no reference to an EEO complaint, and correspondence written by the employee indicating his poor relationships with these individuals. There was also no reference to the fact that he was trying to get transferred from the facility, nor that he had requested a change in tours of work just one week before the shooting.⁸

The post crisis evaluation devoted only two sentences to describe what could have been done to prevent the crisis: "Restricted accesses manned by Postal Police Officers who employ security measures and devices similar to that used at airports. Greater levels of trust between employees and supervisors." The evaluation should have included the

⁸ Three attempted out-of-state transfers to Springfield and Eugene, OR, and Florida; one transfer to tour 1 in February 1997 which was accomplished but then rescinded 2 weeks later due to a mistake on the part of the District's Personnel Office; and an attempt to make an appointment with the Facility Plant Manager in December 1997, one week before the shooting, to discuss a transfer from tour 1.

need for case management of threateners and specific improvements to labor-management relations.

CMP And District Provisions For Families Not Clear

The CMP is not clear as to provisions afforded family members of deceased employees and is in conflict with the Milwaukee District Contingency Plan. Specifically, the CMP provides for the payment of “flowers, donations, etc.” for family members of the deceased “individuals” but restricts visits by postal management to the families of deceased “victims”. The District’s Contingency Plan states that in the event of a fatality, notification of families (no stipulation as to victim or employee) should be made in person by a postal manager.

District Officials told us the USPS sent flowers and messages of condolences to both employees wounded in the December incident, and to the family of the murdered employee. In addition, the USPS paid the funeral expenses of that employee. The Postmaster made personal visits to both wounded employees and the family of the murdered employee. However, none of these services were provided to the family of the employee responsible for the shooting, despite the fact that like other family members, they too were victims of the violence.

According to the District’s Human Resources Manager there was a considerable amount of discussion between management officials at all levels regarding whether or not the District should extend the same provisions to the family members of the employee who committed the shootings as those provided to the other families. While most agreed the employee’s family members were victims of the incident, they did not want the perception that the USPS was providing support to the employee. In this regard it was decided no provisions would be extended.

Conclusions

The following three deviations from TAT policies and procedures may have contributed to the tragic incident: (1) a healthy work room environment had not been created or maintained; (2) a case management or risk abatement plan was not created for the individual identified as a potential threat to the workplace; and (3) supervisors, managers, and employees had not received violence prevention training.

The Milwaukee facilities have experienced unhealthy workroom conditions since at least November 1994. Although the District has provided some training, the March 1998 climate study indicates the problems still existed as of that date.

Case management and the development of a risk abatement plan for the offender may have provided the TAT with information necessary

to determine the mental state of the offender and the work climate of the workroom floor. Such information may have prevented the violence from occurring.

Mandatory violence awareness training would provide craft employees and supervisors/managers with tools necessary to recognize the warning signs of violence and to defuse a difficult situation.

Clear guidance did not exist regarding provisions for the families of deceased employees, including the families of employees' responsible for violent incidents.

**Recommendation
#1**

The Vice Presidents for Labor Relations, Human Resources, and Midwest Area Operations should:

- 1. Contract with experts in the field of human behavior for the purpose of determining how to improve the workroom climate in the Milwaukee facilities.**

Management's
Comments

Management's verbatim comments are at Attachment 1. Management agreed with our recommendation and told us that the District is finalizing a statement of work with an outside consulting firm which specializes in the areas of diversity and leadership behaviors which affect the work force environment. The goal of their consultation will be to design a comprehensive set of initiatives to improve the workplace climate.

In addition, Management told us that the District solicited a proposal from a Wisconsin university to provide human relations training for all managers. The university responded with a proposal which centers around developing and delivering a 60 hour curriculum over an 18 month period. Management told us the curriculum will be based on the USPS "Leadership Behavior Resource Guide" which focuses on the behavioral objectives of treating people with dignity and respect; communicating well; training and developing people; valuing diversity; having and demonstrating integrity; pursuing excellence; focusing on customers; and accepting community responsibility. The university has indicated that the first workshops can be offered the first full week of January 1999.

Evaluation of
Management
Comments

We believe that Management's initiatives, when fully implemented and followed, should improve the workroom environment in the Milwaukee District facilities. We noted however, that the 60 hour curriculum training regarding human relations training, is limited to supervisors and managers. We encourage management to make this training available to all employees.

**Recommendation
#2****2. Dedicate adequate resources to fully comply with TAT policies and procedures, including the permanent assignment of individuals to those responsibilities.**Management's
Comments

Management advised us that there were no performance clusters in the Area that had a full-time person assigned to focus solely on the TAT duties. They stated that the TAT, in its examination of the context of threats or acts of violence, makes recommendations to management about possible actions which may improve the immediate workplace environment. They believe a safe workplace is everybody's responsibility with the ultimate responsibility for creating and maintaining the healthy workroom environment resting with management specifically, but all involved parties in general.

Evaluation of
Management
Comments

Management stated, however, that given the history and current situation in Milwaukee, the Midwest Area would detail an individual or individuals to Milwaukee to assist the TAT in complying fully with TAT policies and procedures. They estimated the individual would arrive in October 1998 for a period not to exceed 120 days.

We do not fully concur with Management's response that the detail of an individual(s), for a period not to exceed 120 days, will enable the TAT to comply with TAT policies and procedures. We found that most, if not all of the TAT Guide requirements had not been followed because the TAT did not have the time or manpower to accomplish them. While one or two individuals, on a short term detail, would be instrumental in getting the TAT organized with policies and procedures in place, we believe many TAT activities require a fair amount of commitment in order for the TAT requirements to be met. We plan to reevaluate this issue in a future audit.

**Recommendation
#3****3. Ensure that the TAT fully implement the policies and procedures outlined in the TAT Guide particularly in the areas of determining the environmental, societal and other contributing events to incidents of violence; creating and maintaining a healthy work room environment; case management of threateners; and the development of risk assessment and abatement plans.**Management's
Comments

Management agreed with this recommendation and said that the Area Office and Headquarters would send individuals to Milwaukee at the outset of the October 1998 detail of individual(s) mentioned in recommendation #2. They stated that this would ensure shared understanding of the purpose and goal of the detail, the tasks at hand, and the processes by which to resolve questions and problems. The area and headquarters staff will return 90 days later to ensure the policies and procedures of the TAT Guide are being implemented.

Evaluation of Management Comments

We concur with Management’s response that Area Office and Headquarters personnel will assist the TAT in implementing the policies and procedures.

Recommendation #4

4. Enforce compliance with the CMP requirement for comprehensive postcrisis evaluations.

Management’s Comments

Management agreed with this recommendation and stated that it will re-emphasize the need for comprehensive postcrisis evaluations in a memorandum to be issued no later than October 2, 1998. It will also establish a system to monitor compliance with this requirement. Publication 107, Crisis Management Plan for Incidents of violence in the workplace, is in the process of being revised and will include further instruction on the purpose and process of completing the post crisis evaluation. Management expects the revision to be completed and disseminated in FY 1999.

Evaluation of Management’s Comments

We concur with Management’s response.

Recommendation #5

5. Strictly adhere to the USPS Zero Tolerance Policy as it relates to issuing disciplinary action for inappropriate behavior regardless of the circumstances.

Management’s Comments

Management agreed with the criteria of dealing with violence in the workplace as provided in the USPS Zero Tolerance Policy. They said that violence or threats of violence by employees at any level is inappropriate and will have consequences, up to and including removal. They further provided that the consequences will be administered in accord with national labor agreements and the Employee and Labor Relations Manual.

Evaluation of Management’s Comments

We believe that management’s response to this recommendation is unclear as to how it will correct the District’s ineffective communication and enforcement of the Zero Tolerance Policy. As stated in the report, we believe discipline must be assessed against employees that exhibit inappropriate behaviors in the workplace. We plan to reevaluate this issue in a future audit.

Recommendation #6

6. Mandate attendance at violence awareness training for all craft employees, supervisors, and managers.

Management’s Comments

Management agreed with this recommendation and stated that attendance would be mandated at future violence awareness training.

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| <p>Evaluation of Management Comments</p> | <p>They stated that the training curriculum for craft employees is under development with the first draft scheduled for completion by mid-October 1998. They stated that the necessary coordination, development and deployment would follow.</p> |
| <p>Evaluation of Management Comments</p> | <p>We concur with Management’s response to this recommendation and suggest that District and Area Management monitor compliance with the training requirements. In addition, we encourage the prompt completion of the violence awareness training curriculum for craft employees.</p> |
| <p>Recommendation #7</p> | <p>7. Clarify USPS guidance regarding provisions for the families of deceased employees, including the families of employees responsible for violent incidents.</p> |
| <p>Management’s Comments</p> | <p>Management agreed with this recommendation and told us that the language in the CMP guide was being revised to clarify this guidance. They said that this is clearly a topic with significant and complicated public perception (internal and external), legal, and perhaps financial ramifications. They further provided that a recommendation regarding the provision of services to the “perpetrator’s” family is expected to be presented to the Management Committee by November 18, 1998 for their decision. This decision will be disseminated to any site with a similar occurrence, should one happen prior to issuance of the revised CMP guide. Management stated that a service which will be provided to the perpetrator’s family members is that of the Employee Assistance Program counseling, so that the family members can better deal with their own losses.</p> |
| <p>Evaluation of Management Comments</p> | <p>We concur with Management’s response to this recommendation and encourage the prompt revision and issuance of the CMP guide.</p> |

